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s u M M A R I
An important change took place in Greek Philosophy 
with Socrates, and any understanding of the philosophies of religion 
of Plato and Aristotle is impossible without referring to his ideas*
It was these ideas that influenced Plato, hut had little influence on 
Aristotle, although he in his own way attempted to answer the ouertions 
which Socrates had raised*
Socrates'a emphasis on the*care of the soul* led Plato 
to develop hie ideas about morality in close connexion with Socrates’s 
ideas} and Socrates’s disavowal of the ability to teach virtue led Plato 
to emphasise the great difficulties there are in learning what virtue is*
But not only Socrates's views about morality influenced Plato. Socrates 
thought of his mission to the people of Athens as a ’service of the god', 
and this religious character of Socrates's thought is nowhere clearer in 
its influence on Plato than in what he has to say shout creation in the 
Timaeus and about religion in the Laws. In the Laws especially there 
Is a very close connexion between morality end religion* Plato thihks 
of morality as the service of the gods, Just rs Socrates had thought of 
his mission*
Plato recognise: the limitations that there are in human 
thinking about morality and religion. There is no perfect understanding 
possible here. What is important is the kind of life that reople live.
It must he a life that is in record with divine happiness and not with 
godless misery. But the nature of these is such that human beings cannot 
understand them. They only begin to understand, in so far as it is possible 
far th< m to do so, when they reek to live according to the standard of 
divine happiness. The limitations that there are here mean for Plato 
that there is no independent philosophical understanding of morality and 
religion, and this, in turn, means that for him it is not possible to 
distinguish hero between philosophy on tho one hand, and morality and religiom 
on the other.
In Aristotle, however, we find an approach where philosophy 
iB distinguished from moral and religious ideas. His view is much more that 
philosophy (wh"t he calls first philosophy) is a method of enquiry that 
enables human beings to attain some kind of independent knowledge about, 
for instance, the nature of God. His ethical views too are of suoh a Mwj 
that he thinks it is possible to gain some kind of understanding about morality 
independently of the kind of life a person leads.
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Docrates is usually remembered for his ethical views 
and these are often discussed independently of any views he might 
have had about religion» The docratio paradoxes» for instance, 
all seem to state issues v/hich have to do only with ethics»
Apart from this em vhasie, ho,ever, there is the recurrent question 
of v.hat v.e can kno.. with any certainty shout docratee's views»
From a purely historical point of view this question is important, 
but from a philosophical point of viev, it can hardly claim 
precedence. Here the problem is one of understanding rather 
than of historical knovledge - and even if a view we attempt to 
understand is not that of the "historical11 Socrates (or the 
"unknown x" as Diels called him) then this is not as important 
as a correct understanding of the viev-. itself.
In the Apology we find both ethical and religious 
issues discussed. The accusation which Socrates answers has 
to do with corrupting the youth and teaching false religious 
beliefs. His defence not only refers to those three views that 
are stated in the paradoxes (that virtue is one thing, that evil 
doing is involuntary, and that virtue is knowledge) but it contains 
frequent references to Socrates's religious beliefs» It begins 
with an appeal to the Delphic oracle and ends with the wordsl 
*1 go to die and you to live; but which of ue goee to the 
better lot, is kno.n to none but God". This statement has 
sometimes been interpreted ae a statement of agnosticism, but SB 
it stands it cannot be regarded as that. From the nature of 
the accusation it seems probable that Socr-tes was not only known 
for his teaching about morality, but also for things that he said 
about religion»
'•Ve can gain some idea of vlat these views were from the 
Apology itself, and an understanding of them is important not 
only in attempting to understand Plato's views about these matters 
but also those of Aristotle* For if Plato's work is to be regarded 
as an interpretation and perhaps even a development of these views 
of Socrates, then Aristotle's may be seen as stating a different 
kind of viev. Socrates is undoubtedly a figure in the history 
of philosophy who it not just remembered for tne views he stated, 
but also as remember Heracloitus and d)inoz.a, Tor the 
character of hi- life. His vievs on ethics and religion are to 
be looked at, in this way, ae an expression of hie own character
'j T i . XC »'tL. kit-} V*.
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and the life he lived. Aristotle's ethics compared with what 
we know about Socrates's views has an air of detachment, which 
points to important differences in their views that we shall 
attempt to show. Socrates died for the rightness of the views 
be held; Aristotle preferred to save the Athenians from 
committing ® second sin against philosophy.
The "Aiiology" may be regarded as not only a personal 
defence» but also as a statement of Socrates's views on ethics and 
religion. His views on ethics may best be discussed in connection 
with the three docratic paradoxes. It is not surprising that 
the views of Socr&tee, whose irony was an integral part of his 
character* should have come down to u:. in this form. (dven the 
statement of the Delphic Oracle is not only ambiguous* as it was 
usually taken to be* but also ironic. "No-one is wiser tnan 
Socrates" - but everyone may be just as vice and in fact no-one 
may pocve wisdom. That Socrates interprets the oracle as he 
does to mean that his wisdom it hi., knovledge of his ignorance 
shows that he recognised its ambiguous and ironic character).
The three Doeratic paradoxes are closely connected and 
all point in the Bame direction. ?Jhat is it that makes them 
paradoxes? One main feetux-« ic that they all seem to state 
what is, as a matter of face* false. They become paradoxes that 
is by being interpreted in this way - as if they were statements 
of matters of fact, based upon some kind of empirical notion in 
e&ch case.
Virtue is Knowledge. • If this is interpreted empirically 
then it would presumably mean thrt there is a form of knowledge 
which can be learned* the application of which brin ;© about virtue. 
But no such knowledge is known, hence the paradox. As the 
matter is put in the "Meno", MIf virtue is knowledge then it 
can be taught".
2* Sp one does evil voluntarily or intentionally*. *
If this is interpreted empirically then one can give examples of 
wrong actions which are intentional.
3. All virtu»a wr* one. - If this is Interpreted empirically
then there is no difference between a courageous and a just act, but 
empirically there is. So from this point of view the paradoxes 
remain and shed no light on what Socrates may have meant.
eiach may be re arded as a comment on the other. Then
they can be thought of as instances of the kind of knowledge that
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virtue is» They are general statements about virtue and depend on 
some kind of general understanding of what virtue is* k 
clarification of any of them is also a clarification of the other 
two.
Virtue is Knowledge. This is often regarded as a statement of 
Socrates’s opposition to views about virtue put forward by the 
Sophists. The views stated in the Gorgias and t:;e Protagoras 
make this clear. The Sophists claimed that virtue is not knowledge 
if what is meant is that our knowing what virtue is entails agreement 
on what it is; because there is no agreement. Here the kind of 
agreement meant is agreement that virtue is one and only one thing.
The Sophists thought that there could be agreement of a 
conventional kind about virtue, but such agreement might make possible 
completely different views about it. Socrates’s view, however, 
is that knowledge of wbat virtue is does not depend on agreement 
of this kind. It is not a matter of convention. There are two 
issues here!
(a) If virtue is one thing by agreement then it can be knowledge.
The Sophiste denied this. So did Socrates. He wished 
to argu-' that it was not a matter of agreement anyway.
(b) If virtue is more than one thin,; and it is each thing by 
separate agreements, then knowledge about it which 
presupposes a common agreement, is impossible. This is 
the Sophists’ position.
Socrates denied both positions, and for him there was little to choose 
between the two. The kind of knowledge that he considers virtue to 
be is not dependent on any kind of human agreement. It is not 
because jvg. agree that certain things are good and evil that they are 
so, Socrates wants to say that the difference oetween good and 
evil is independant of our agreement about the difference* The 
difficulty, then, is to say what the difference is, and the difficulty 
is made acute by the absence of a convention that decides Ike 
difference, for if the difference is ju; t a natter of convention 
then the appeal can be made to the convention and that ends any 
dispute as to what the difference is, Socrates’s problem is*
How can you point to the difference if there 1b no convention which 
decides what the difference is? So if virtue is knowledge as the 
Socratic paradox states, then the knowledge that it gives of the 
difference that there is between good and evil does not rost on 
convention » that is on human agreement.
The question of convention is also Important with regard to 
the question of the unity of virtue. The fact that the terms w# 
use for different virtues arc conventional ones may lead us astray 
and prevent us from seeing that port of the knowledge that virtue is.
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is knowledge of its unity* When v,e give empirical examples of 
virtues* then the examples we give are determined by convention in 
this sense* that e have uecided to call certain kinds of virtuous 
actions fay certain names. TLi, leads us to think of them as 
different and to forget what it is that they have in common* The 
problem, however, is just in attempting to say what they have in 
common* If me attempt this we run into di.. faculties simply because 
we are attempting to say something that is not amenable to the 
conventions of that kind of language which ^e use to state what is 
the case. The statement 11 All virtues are one" is not a description 
of virtue as the statement “Courage is a virtue" can be* ..e could 
imagine someone making a mistake with regard to "Courage is a 
virtue"« He might* for instance* call a just act courageous if he 
did not know how we use the word just, and that would be a mistake 
in conventions but be would still regard the act as virtuous. Bo the 
question is* "What is recognising something as a virtue at all?" The 
recognition is independent of any convention. It is this recognition 
that is knowledge for Socrates, and for him this recognition 
depends on an ¿.fasolute distinction between what ie virtue and 
what is not. But this is no longer to make an empirical judgment, ■ 
but a moral one.
7 r> \ c \ 9 /Nor is ou(>ti£ CK<ov meant as an empirical
judgment. So interpreted it is false. That is if it means for 
instance that no murder is ever committed intentionally. This 
statement is presum bly meant to mean something else like:
"Only if there is a definite distinction between good and evil and a 
recognition of this difference, will it make sense to say, that a 
person does wrong".
Neither can the point that Socrates is making here be 
explained in terms of conventions about language. If certain 
actions are called wrong and someone does one of these actions then 
what J& »ay i© "He does wrongI" Imagine the case of someone who knows 
that a certain action is, as we have said, called 'wrong1, does this, 
and in doing it ©ays: "I am doing something that is called ‘wrong1 ; " 
he not only saye this, but also: "I know I*m doing it • I*m doing 
it intentionally,»* it will always be possible to ask ouch a 
person: "Do you know that that is wrong, or juct that it is called 
"wrong"? " If his answer ie that he only knows that it is called 
"wrong", then it is difficult to see how Socrates's statement
applies to this case.
If we take the case of a person who says "I not only 
call the action "wrong", but I knor it to he wrong and although I 
know that it is, I do it quite intentionally", then if the Soeratic 
paradox is to have any meaning, it cannot jufc-t apply to this ease as
it stands) for the person here admits that he does the action 
intentionally. But if intention here means "being aware of what one 
ie doing") then we also huve to admit the possibility of the actions 
being done unintentionally. If it were this kind of intention that 
Socrates is referring to, then we could conceive of someone not 
being horrified if he murdered someone while sleep walking. If 
we interpret Socrites empirically then ve cannot wake any sense of 
this case.
There is a great lifference here betv.een "Do I know what I
am doing?” in the sense of ”Am I aware of what I am doing?" and
"Do I knov that what I aw doing is wrong?" Socrates’s use of the 
< /word S»<uW cannot refer to the first sense of intention which is 
indicated when the first uestion is answered "les". Is the sense 
that he gives to the intention indicated then by an affirmative answer 
to the second question?
The answer to this question it in the negative, because 
Socrater did not wish to claim that a per .on can never know when he 
is doing wrong, fcr that . ouib make any distinction between right and 
frcnv very difficult. His statement, if it i;. tc have any sense, 
does not refer to cases which can be described as follov;st 
(•) I can do wrong and not know I am doing wrong.
(b) I can do wrong and know I am doing wrong.
Socrates is not here referring to what is possible or impossible as a 
matter of fact, but he is referring to what is logically impossible.
He means "I cannot do wrong and not know that I am doing wrong", 
that ia "If it makes any sense for me to say ’I am doing wrong*. 
then I must know that what I am doing is wrong". Both oases (a) and 
(b) refer to possible cases. "I cannot do wrong and not know that I 
•m doing wrong "is quite different from "I can do wrong and not know 
I am doing wrong". "I cannot do wrong and not know that I am 
doing wrong” does not refer to some possible case, but to any case.
It might seem then to contradict (a). But this is not so, for "I 
cannot do wrong without knowing that I am doing wrong" determines 
how it makes sense to say "I am doing wrong", but (a) only makes 
sense at any particular time if one is un ble at that time to say 
"I am doing wrong”.
Socrates’s view on this matter, however, is more complicated 
than this, and what has been said so far does not state his view 
completely. It is easy to be misled by the Socratic identification of 
virtue and knowledge, if one just attempts to understand what this 
identification can mean. There ie another aspeot which is 
fundamental. That is the view which Socrates states by saying that 
nil men desire the good. This statement seems as much of a paradox 
as the statement that no one does evil voluntarily, because as a 
matter of fact it seems clear tbmt people desire what is evil.
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f A \ C V *7 /Socrateo*s statement Ouhii£ fcKuW may ba interpreted from
this point of view to mean "No one does evil desiring the evil”.
The fact that the statement seem.' to mean this too shows that the 
interpretation which has already been given ir terras of knowledge is 
not sufficient. That there is this additional sense to the
c /
phrase is clear from a passage in the Oorgias (509 £)• ̂  y-W
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”Ke have agreed that no one wishes to do wrong, but that everyone 
who does wrong does so against his will"» That is everyone who 
does wrong does so against his desire for the good* A passage in 
the Meno (77 B ff) also deals with this matter*
Those who desire evil may desire it in one of two ways«
(1) Either they desire it and know it to be evil, or
(2) They desire it not knowing it to be evil, but think it is good» 
In the second case such desire cannot be properly regarded as desire
of evil, but desire of good. They only desire what is evil out of 
ignorance and they are ignorant if they desire the evil thinking 
that it will benefit them. In the first case those who desire evil 
which they know to be evil also know that they will be harmed by it 
and so be miserable. But no one desires misery and if misery is 
the result of gaining evil if it is desired, then no one can desire 
such evil*
How is this viev. related to It seems
to state the same view, and it is a view that is fundamental for 
Socrates. It is a statement of the view that knowledge of 
good and evil cannot be regarded as independent of what we may oall 
personal desires. It is in this way that Socrates attempts to 
combat the view of the Sophists that morality is a matter of 
convention. The view that it is a matter of convention does not 
take into account what Socrates calls the general desire for what is 
good.
It might be argued, however, that the Sophistic view does 
take this into account* For presumably nothing is agreed to be good 
unless it is desired. And if in this way the emphasis is placed on 
desire, then the way is left open to say that there are as many 
different kinds of good which are agreed to be such, as there are 
different kinds of desires that may exist. The fact that 
Socrates denies this view shows that in what he means by desiring the 
good, the emphasis is not on the desire, for that may allow desire 
of different forms of the good, but on the good. His view is not 
that the good is good because it is desired, but that it is desired 
because it is ood. At least that way of stating the matter seems 
to suggest a distinction that boerctes wishes to make» But this 
does not mean that there is a clear cut distinction between the 
desire and the good. According to the Sophists there would 
presumably be as many forms of desire as there are forms of good,
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but for Socrates the unity of goodness entails that there is only 
one form of desire. In that sense it is one thing ~ the desire for 
good« It ie because there is this desire for the good that any evil 
doing is contrary to it. (cf. Kierke ;aard. "To will the good ie to 
will one thing*')•
One of the questions that arises here, as in the previous 
discussion, is that between matters of fact and non-factual 
considerations. The statement "All men desire the good" seems 
to be interpreted by Oocrates as a statement of fact, which can be 
rebutted by showing that as a matter of fact men sometimes desire 
what is evil. However Socrates does not deny that and this means 
that what he means by saying "All men desire the good" is not a 
denial of the fact that men sometimes desire evil. This statement 
then i© not to be interpreted as some kind of inductive generalisation, 
but it is meant to state what is necessarily true aoout all men* It 
means of course too that the desire is of a certain kind, but the 
emphasis is not so much on the form of desire as on what is desired*
It is a desire independently of particular desires. It may be the 
case that desires for different particular gdod things may be of 
different kinds, but this is desire for the good as such*
Socrates suggests in the Meno that all men are the same with 
regard to desire ( 18«OdynA ), what they differ in is their ability
), This would seem to make his view closer to that stated 
by Saint Paul, than is sometimes allowed* For that statement might 
be interpreted as meaning that men desire the good and not the evil, 
but although they desire the good they are unable to do it, and do 
what is evil* However there does see# to be a difference between 
the two views, if the interpretation of Socrates’s view that we are 
*a8gesting now 1 3  correct. For what Saint Paul seems to be referring 
to are particular good actions, for instance, which he is Incapable 
performing, whereas what Socrates seems to refer to is not a desire 
perform particular good actions, but a form of desire which 
characterizes any action. That is the desire for the good is not 
desire for something in particular, but it is a fora of desire which 
applies to anything which can be distinguished as being either good 
or evil. It could be identified with the possibility of seeing what 
difference there is between good and evil*
But what is meant by saying that the desire for the good la 
not a desire for anything in particular? Part of the difference can 
be put by sayin ■ that if it ie asked what is the good which according 
to Socrates all men do desire, then this question cannot be 
answered, for instance, by mentioning any one particular thing •
®*g* a virtue like justice. (This is connected with what Sooratea 
meant by talking of the unity of virtue, and shows there is a
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relationship between this view and the vie* that all men desire the 
good). It can be made clear r by referring to the vie* stated In 
the Re public th t it ic. the -*o o-j which renders all other things useful 
and beneficial. It is not a desire for any one thins* But even with 
desires for li ferent kinds of articular thinjs we can indicate 
differences in th' form of ic; ire. In eoivt oases, although the 
objects of dee-ire nay be -¡iff . rent, the fora of desire way be of the 
same kind. If, for examnl o, one bar to choose between drinking 
coffee or tea on a particular occasion, although one might give 
reason, for one’s choice in deciding what one wants, there is no 
laai.. difference oetv.eui, the desires whatever ic chosen* If the 
choice is what we call a moral choice, that is, between something 
that is considered to be good and something that is considered 
to be evil, then the d sire is not indifferent, but there is a 
different form of desire for whut is evil and for what is good. Here 
the form of desire changes itfc a change in the object of desire.
But bov is this connected \ l.tb Socrates’s view? What he means by 
desire for the ;oot, - hen h* says ail men desire the ood, is not 
that form of desire which i possible in particular cases when the 
object of desire is good, raw ' hie', i,- o-jpor.ee to the form of desire 
which is possible in particular caw.- s ”hen the object of desire is 
evil, with li ?: rexit . oo.s oui evil objects of deeiro, the particular 
form of desire in each ca;e can be different, but in any case it 
la a particular desire at a particular tin;. , which v.e can conceive 
of as taking place at other times. ith regard to these forms of 
iesire it maker ccnso to ask what the object of desire ie, and when 
the desire takes lace, and to eac! of these ueBtions a definite 
answer can be iveru There is also a difference between particular 
desires v̂ iefc are evil and those th^t are good, and this difference 
also marks t;:eu, off as particul r desires at particular times* It
*ne, we might say, these forms of desires to which Saint Paul 
referred. Socrates, however, i6 referring to something which in 
prior to this distinction. He ic referring to what makes it 
possible to make any distinction at all between particular desirea 
which are good and evil. It ie this that he refers to when he says 
MA11 men desire the good”* It ie closely connected with his view 
thtit virtue is knowledge, as ®e shall chow. Part of Socrates’s point 
may be put by saying that the distinction between particular desires 
which are good and evil is not just purely descriptive of these 
desirec, as we might describe different desires as strong or weak* 
bhether a desire ic etrong or weak can be decided by examining the 
desire itself; but whether a desire is goo.* or evil doea not just 
depend on the desire itself. If all we could say ab-ut desires 
depended ju.-t upon the desires, then there would be no sense in speaking 
of them ac good or evil. bet her they are good or evil depends on 
something else ti.an their nature as dssires*
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It is this that is decided by what Socrates c&llr the desire for the 
good. The oOuhisti; position as put forward by Protagoras for 
instance, may be stated by saying that what Socrates regarded as what 
we may call the general dbsire for the good is impossible. All that 
is possible are particular desires of which some are called better 
and others worse, but none can be reg rded at good or evil, from  
what we have ¿aid it is clear that on Protagoras’s view we cannot speak 
of the desire for the ¡ood ae hoertes intended this. ^n Socrates’s 
view it will still be possible to distinguish between desires which 
are better and worse, but his position is such that he does not make 
this distinction something independent, it will depend on what he 
calls the desire for the good, ,','hat is ultimate on Protagoras’s 
view are certain forme of desire, but for Socrates this is the good»
This becomes clear in the Protagoras itself where the method 
of mensuration which, it is claimed, applies to pleasure is an ironic 
comment on Protagoras’s view* If the good is to be identified with 
pleasure and if different pleasures can be quantitatively assessed, then 
there is a method for deciding between different degrees of 
goodness. It is sometimes suggested that Sooratet: was seeking some 
6ucb general method of assessment of what is good and what Plato 
says in the Philebus about pleasure and good may be regarded as an 
argument for this* Hut the view in the dhilebus about the art of 
measurement is quite different from that stated in the Protagoras, 
and the main difference is that it takes into account not only the 
difference between pleasure and the good, a difference which that 
srt of measurement in the Protagoras does not consider, but also 
it takes into account the Socratic view that all men desire the good»
VJhat has been said ao far shows that there was a fundamental 
difference for Socrates between particular desires and the general 
desire for the good. This applies, for instance, to those desires that 
w® can call desires for pleasure» Although it is true, and it is a 
fact of which Socrates was aware, that not all particular desires for 
pleasure are of the same kind, the desire for the good, as such, is 
different from any of these in not being a particular desire»
However the view stated in the Protagoras about the art of mensuration 
is a direct result of the Protagorean view. It is only possible if 
all desires for pleasure are of the same kind * that is, if they 
can be quantitatively compared. But that such an art is possible 
also presupposes that nothing else is of importance here except 
individual particular desires. That is, all that happens is that the 
desires are measured against one another. There is nothing else 
which determines the method of assessment apart from the desires 
themselves. And for Socrates this ia only an assessment of desire 
and not of what is good.
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But what about the general desire for the good, if this is 
not a particular desire in the sense we hove explained? It is rather 
a principle in accordance with which all desire:: are to be judged# 
Protagoras*e position is different from this* Plato thought that 
hie viev. wast ’Everyone should profess to be just, whether he is or 
not, and whoever does not make some pretension to justice is taadj 
since all witr.cut exception mu t share in justice in some way or 
other, cr else not be of human kind* (Protagoras 323 B - C).
Justice is then not something to be desired in itself and 
independently of human judgment. It is only a matter of human 
judgment. Then there is nothing external to moral judgments 
which is the standard in accordance vith which they may be judged. 
Socrates thinks that there is one, and this is part of what he 
means when he says that all men desire the gcod.
The difference between different forms of particular desires 
is fundamental for Socrates. This becomes clear in the second half 
of the Gorgias, in the diseussicn between Socrates and Callicles.
The question in dispute is whether morality is a matter of convention 
cr not, out rocratea deals with the matter in such a way that it 
becomes clear that this que tion is closely connected with the 
question o? the difference that there is between different forme of 
particular desires. For on Callicles’s view, any "or® of desire la 
good as long as it does not prevent the person who so desires from 
preserving the power he possesses. ho there is here a standard of 
a kind, but it is a standard which claims that any desire can be 
good under certain circumstances. The desire in itself is 
secondary, and this view does not allow for any distinction between 
desires in themselves. This is the view of Callicles that pleasure 
is the good. What is meant by pleasure, however, is what serves the 
end of preserving power. Bo desires are not good or evil la 
themselves, and this is what Callicles means by saying that 
•orality is a matter of convention* Socrates’s view, however, 
that all men desire the good, is meant to claim that there are 
differences in desires themselves, and that the difference is that 
some are good and some are evil, not in respect to something else, 
such as the preservation of power, but in themselves.
It might be misleading, however, to describe Socrates’» 
pooition in just this way* It may suggest that what be describes 
as the general desire for good is not desire of any kind* ?ie have 
distinguished it from particular desires in order to show that for 
him, it is what determines whether any particular desire is good or 
®vil. But it is not just a standard which may be regarded as being 
separate from desire of any kind. Socrates would argue that if 
according to Callicles's view any desire is good which preserves 
power, this is because there ie a general desire to preserve power*
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The preservation of power, which ie the standard, is also something 
desired. That would be, however, to identify desire for the good 
with a particular form of desire, and then there is no means of 
deciding about the different desires which, it is claimed, preserve 
this. For Socrates it is the desires themselves which have to be 
judged as either good or evil, and whether they can be judged as such 
depends upon whether there is a general desire for what is good.
There has to be both the desire and the good and the desire has to be 
for tie good* It is not sufficient to say that the standard ie the 
good, unless this standard which ie the good ie also desired.
So the important distinction that it is necessary to make 
in order to understand Socrates*s view ie the distinction between 
particular individual desires, which according to him may be good or 
evil, and the general desire for the good which is not a particular 
desire (i*e*, its object is not particular), but a desire which is 
a standard of judgment for all particular desires.
- - I f  \ t s
( ^ow the relationship between ot'£ a«a
TVdVTtJ f*W becomes clearer. Both these
refer to the central point we have been discussing. ilelther 
statement is to be interpreted as referring just to particular 
cases of wrong-doing and to particular individual desires, but they 
refer to the possibility of distinguishing between actions that are 
right or wrong and desires that are good or evil, Socrates is 
insisting that any action is either right or wrong la itself. To say 
this is to say that there is a general desire for the good, and 
that any wrong action is one which is contrary to this general desire. 
It is something that applies to all actions and desires«
If, however, Socrates*s position against the Sophists is 
interpreted as stating an objective view of morality as against a 
»objective one, then this distinction is misleading. It is misleading 
because it fails to take into account Socrates’s emphasis upon desire 
for the good* It is the unity of desire wbieh is equally of 
importance for Socrates, and by the unity of desire is meant that it 
is desire for the good* Socrates's view is certainly that the good 
cannot be regarded a® independent of the desire for it. But what fora 
doe® this desire take? v.e have been suggesting that it can be looked 
at in two ways. Independently of the possession of it, it can be 
regarded as that which mokes possible the distinction between good and 
evil desires; but its possession Is not only this but also the desire 
for the good itself.
It is because of this double aspect of what Socrates means 
by desire for the good that the most well known of his paradoxes seems 
so paradoxical. That is, that virtue is knowledge* The possibility 
0x virtue depends on a form of knowledge, and that is in the first 
place ¿knowledge of the difference between particular desires which
n
are good or evil, Bpt this only describes an aspect of the 
possibility of virti-. It is not virtue itself. It is true 
that virtue depends upon this knowledge , but this knowledge is not 
sufficient, end it cannot be just with this form of knowledge that 
Cocwates wished to identify virtue. The knowledge that virtue is 
necessary must also be closely connected with desiring the good.
V>'e may say V; l the only way in which the knowledge that virtue is 
necessary can be put to any account is by desiring the good* It is 
not enough that someone recognises the necessity of living virtuously, 
there must also be a genuine desire to live virtuously. The 
distinction can be put by distinguishing between "being good” and 
"doing good”. Doing good may be regarded as the result of 
recognising the necessity of being viituous; that is, one does good 
because one recognises the necessity of the distinction between good 
and evil, but this doing of what is good might not be accompanied by 
a desire for what is good. And this desire is what Socrates wished 
to point to when he spoke of the general desire for the good* It 
is what he refers to in the Apology when he says» ”1 say the same to 
everyone whom I meet ...... For I knov that this is the command of God}
and I believe that to this day no greater pood has ever happened in 
the state than, my service to my Gou. For I do nothing but go around 
persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for 
your persons (f »»> or ycur properties, but first and chiefly
to care about the greatest improvement of the soul ”
Irwi. > ° °  A ~ B) This desir*
for the good is what we distinguish as "being good”* The same 
distinction is what is hein,: discussed in the second book of tbs 
Republic and elsewhere} it is also tbs origin of the views that Plato 
develops in the Lysis, the Symposium and tbs Phaedrue about love*
It ie also, however, connected with what Socrates says in tbs 
Apology about ignorance. Thin is not just irony* Socrates»s 
intention is to point out that knowledge about the good is a form of 
ignorance* He says this in order to show that it cannot be 
knowledge as that is generally understood. It becomes ironic because 
Socrates knows that those to whom it addressed will suppose that 
the knowledge he disclaims is of ouch a kind that one could give 
an account of it in similar terms to those in which other forms of 
knowledge could be described. So they will not understand his 
ignorance, and will imagine that it is feigned. This is the point 
of his comparison of,knowledge of virtue with those forme of knowledge 
that we find in various • For these, knowledge is
something independent of the possessor of It. That means that it 
can be learned and taught. It is knowledge apart from its 
possecsion. Rather we may say it is knowledge to which the 
distinction made by Aristotle between potential and actual knowledge
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applies* The knowledge becomes actual in its application - it is 
in this sense practical kno.ledge. But this distinction does not 
a;‘iAy to knowledge of virtue, or the knowledge which virtue ia* 
Knowing what virtue is in this sense is identical with being good • 
that is, virtue is the knowledge» It is being virtuous. And that 
is why Socrates claimed to be ignoraxit; for in tbs sense in 
which knowl̂ , ,;j.. was thought of, ae being knowledge of something in 
particular, knowing what virtue is could not be anything of the sort*
But to point this out is to point out a source of 
misunderstanding; it is not tc state what is important about 
Socrates's view* Certainly the knowledge that virtue is, is 
ignorance if it is supposed that it is knowledge of the form of a—  f
| * X ^  * This is not all that Socrates means* If it is not
knowledge of this kind then it eannot be ignorance of this kind 
either, for if it were ignorance of this kind, then this would 
presuppose that the form of knowledge that it is would be the 
opposite of this form of ignorance* To show that virtue is not af
is to s ;ow what form of ignorance it is not, and not 
what form of ignorance it is. bo we have to show what kind of 
ignorance Socrates genuinely claimed.
«hat this is can be illustrated b* comparing Socrates’s 
views about morality and religion with those of the Sophists. Ths 
Sophistic position about religion as represented by Protagoras 6 one 
of ignorance. Protagoras is ignorant about the gods, and W  
ignorance is the lack of knowledge of a certain kind (i»e* a X  j
. with his vies aboutto deal with the matter. The same is the came « n «
_ , .h»fh«r virtue is one thing*morality* V.e have no means of knowing * e
It is the same form of scepticism v.itto regard to both ao.*lity an 
religion. The questions are shelved because «e have no know e 
Protagoras seems to have dismissed the religion^ questi ft 6 
Be did not, however, dismiss the question «bout morality. •»
, .. . i,iimAn beta a to which to appeal»here there was the moral behaviour of huma
_  ̂ « f.0M what he considers to be theProtagoras’s view, however, results r m
i H*h*viour. ?or tbo *®8tcorrect description of this moral bena
, *.n. 4* that there is no agreement in important characteristic of this is n
agreement, then bs would nomoral opinions. If there were general ag ««hero
doubt bava boon preparati to aay that thara 1. k.o»l«d*a « »
of morality, and th.u ala» a diatinctlo. b.tua.n tra. -
Judgmanta. But tha aaln diffarenca bat»«.n tha »t*. ®f ° *®
-  Socratae ia just thi. point about th. hind of hnovla,*. that 
poaaibl. .ith ragard to morality. Th. hind of Rnoalad*. ahioh 
Protagoras would accept as knowledge here is quit« different from
,, , 1 1.41 4 which Socrates is intereststhe kind of knowledge the possibility or
. , . h*tween their views because theIn* There ie a specious resemblance o
kind of knowledge which Protagoras denies is possible but would aocep 
if it were possible, is a kind of knowledge which Socrates not only
&
denies to be possible» but which he considers it would be a mistake 
to accept as knowledge about morality at all. To think, as 
Protagoras seems to have done, that such a form of knowledge with
regard to morality would be acceptable, is the fundamental mistake.
So the moral scepticism of Protagoras arises from the fact tnat he 
thinks a certain form of knowledge about morality is not possible.
Hie view is that we cannot speak of moral judgments as being true or 
false, but only of one judgment being be-ter or worse than another. It 
is important, however, to recognise that he arrives at this view only 
because he has in mind a para¿is« of knowledge which he tries to apply 
to morality* That is, if there is to be knowledge, it must be of this 
kind and no other. Because it is not of this kind, it is not knowledge, 
¿^grates, too, denies that knowledge of morality is of thi; kind, but 
he is not led to the scepticism of Protagoras because he does not accept 
his view that there ie this paradigm of knowledge. He denies that 
knov.1' dge of morality is only conceivable if it is related to such a 
view of knowledge. gocrates*s problem still exlstc even if, as he 
thinks there is truth and falsity v-ith regard to «oral judgments. He 
would claim that this would still leave the aroblem regarding the kind 
of 'o-v ledge knot-lea re cf morality ic. In other ror^e* the problem 
would then be the problem of understanding what this knowledge is* and 
Socrates*s viev. voula be th-.it &a under.'-,tandin:; could not be identified 
with that kind of knowledge in the sphere of morality that Protagoras 
denies is possible,
when docrates identifies virtue with Knowledge, part of hie 
purpose ie to emphasise that such knowledge escapes us* It ®®y 
by saying that we cannot give a reason for the necessity of being 
virtuous which ie somethin,; different from knowing that virtue is 
necessary. If .e could give such a reason, then it would be possible 
to distinguish between virtue and knowledge about it* It is because we 
cannot do this that aocrate. identifies the two. Our knowledge about 
virtue is only knowledge of the necessity of being virtuous itself, and 
not knowledge of a kind whioh gives a reason for its necessity, So 
ignorance here ia not the result of a form of knowledge with which we are 
acquainted not applying, but it ie ignorance of .uite a different kind.
It is not knowing what fora of knowledge it i£ that coula apply. This 
is the point of Socrates's remark that he knows that he does not know.
The Sophists thought they knew, but they are ignorant in one sense, because 
they do not know that they do not know. They apply a form of knowledg 
that does not apply. Because they do not know that they do not know, 
they lack the form of ignorance which Socrates claim«»
e can well understand why Socrates was accused of corrupting 
the youth, if he claimed ignorance of the kind wbich he mentions n 
Apology, This would be interpreted as a denial that one can know wha
virtu© is, in the sense that one can know any difference between good and 
evil* This is to misunderstand Socrates’s ignorance about virtue; for 
his Ignorance is not not knowing vrhat knowing such a difference is«
But bis knowledge of the difference is quite definite, as we have tried 
to show« His ignorance is, however, closely connected vith his view 
that the difference is ouite definite -nt absolute. He knows the 
difference, but not why there ic this difference. This may lead to the 
view that the difference is an ultimate one, i.e., that no reason for it 
can be given, This incy be thought to be bocrater’e view, but it is not 
clear that it in. For bis view way be that there is possibly a reason 
for this ultimate distinction, but he does not know the reason. She 
emphatic way in which be speaks of hie ignorance suggests that his view
is the latter one.
The Apology makes clear that Socrate- thought that what he 
said about virtue was only said because he believed that in saying it he 
was fulfilling a divine mission. This may suggest that he believed 
that the distinction was not an ultimate one for which no reason could 
be given« bocrates’s ignorance i; clo connected with this« His 
ignorance is that he lacks underotunding. He does not moan that 
under;.tending is iic'oseible, but only thrt it ic not possible for 
him. This ic ;hy he speak ; of hi; own v isdom as that wiedoni which, is 
proper for human beings ( of <To(̂ |«A ) and cor carer it with a
form of -ledum which is groa'e; than human wisdom, which he does not 
claim ( WoL »j Kit' oiyO^wloV ) (Apology 20 D - 13)* By such a
form of wisdom he means a form of wisdom which claims an understanding 
of virtue. This: was the understanding he thought the Sophists falsely 
claimed, but t is understanding they claim made virtue something that it 
is not. Socrates’s own justification for his insistence on the 
difference betv an good and evil and on the necessity of living a virtuous 
life is a personal one. It ic his belief in his divine mission.
From this point of view we sea that for Socrates morality 
is connected with some form of religious belief. It seems that 
because it is connected ;ith religious belief for him that his attitude 
towards virtue in regard to understanding it» »ay be characterised as a 
form of humility which is opposed to the pride of those who clai* to 
understand when they do not. This characteristic comes out clearly in 
connexion with what Socrates thought about his divine mission. He did 
not think of himself as a teacher of virtue, as, for instance, aorgias 
did. ( 4-yto $ i  l>ibarf Ki*Ao£ jdiV doSt-'/ô  TlwTloV Apology 33A)*
Socrates knows what virtue is, ut does not claim to understand it. If 
he understood, then he would to be a teacher. Ik.* knowledge that hs 
possesses about virtue, as ue nave interpreted that, is of a personal kind« 
lbe kno.,led;t. not independent of the possession of cue desire for the 
3doi. This desire is not the result of teaching, in the aenae of teaching
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to say that it can be understood, for the knowledge io then, aa we put it, 
a matter of human invention. e can conceive cf such knowledge as 
changing, but the kind of knouletlje that Socrates refers to with regard to 
virtue does not change. F■.•roan beings cannot alter this. Apart fro» 
thin, however, it is knovledge of a personal kind, in the sens« that it 
has to be learnt for oneself. dven this ho-,ever, may not show, the diffWMD*
that there is etween t is kind of knowledge and a I^X^l * for ev#n 
of a ii might be said that it has to be learnt for
oneself, if it ic lesrnt at all. However, with regard to a 
v;bat is learnt by one person is the same as what is learnt by anyone elea» 
The "T^^Wj is practical in this cense. It 1e based on rules that
are learnt. ".hot make? it posriole to teach it is that there are these
rules. If there weren’t rules, then it could not be taught. Of 
course the rules have to be understood by tha perron taught, and this 
understanding is different from the rules as such. The teaching 
depends upon both the possibility of understanding the rules and the 
existence of the rules themselves. with regard to virtue, there ere no 
practical rules of this kina whi ;.b can. oe sad© the means of teaching*
It mi ,nt be thought that the position with regard to virtue would be 
analogous with the position with rv:gard to a ^  could
not be taught, but everyone h «1 to discover the rules for himself* To 
suggest this, however, makes no sense. The very idea of a rule contain* 
the possibility of its being able to be taught and l arnt. A!itb regard 
to the knowledge of wiich ¡Socrates speaks in connexion with virtue, there 
are no rules. If there were rule®, then an understanding of what being 
good it,, would be the same as understanding how to be good, if bbie 
b&iog good were the result of applying the rules. Because there are 
no rules, the understanding cannot be of this kind. $tth regard to any 
of the , there is no fundamental difference between being a
craftsman of a certain kind and snowing the rules and applying the» “ 
i*e. being a craftsman, and un^er tending what the
Socrates denies that he is a teacner, because there is nothing to teaoh* 
But even if there it nothing to teach in this sense of the word, that 
does not mean that there is nothing to know.
If we Characteri ,6 the difference here ae that between ’doing 
good * and ’being good», it is because it is possible to learn to do good, 
but not possible in this way to learn to be good. One can learn to do 
good if one learns whnt actions ©re good and does them. There is here 
in good actions something to be observed and imitated* 3ut this 
would be, in Plato's terms only imitation of the ooct without knowing 
what the good is, end it is this distinction which Plato has in »iad 
in the deputlie in the simile of the cave. This distinction between
- lb -
•doing good’ and’bein; god* may easily be misunderstood with regard to 
Socrates. For ’doing good’ is not the same «hen it is accompanied by 
goods*"-,? and «ben it is not, this la the same distinction as «• made 
earlier between recognising the necessity of living a goo? life» which
may exi-.-t without a genuine do ire to live virtuously. It is only 
this do.vire ,fs:■ virtue which according to goer -to • can make the difference 
between, a good and a bad life in contract to rood ana bad actions. When 
goer-tier: cgseaks of human viiue ( vj olV&guiTfiV'vj ) he is not
ei>eaking of somethin.; that primarily characterises human action?, but 
human life. This form of virtue ie an end in itself for him when
compared with virtuous actions of different kinds. for virtuous action» 
are not certain marks of a virtuous life. They may be performed a»
Plato shov s in the second book of the Republic only to preserve one*» 
reputation, where the real desire is for something else which would not 
be considered aa virtuous. But even in the case of a person who ie 
genuinely coneoraed with doing what is good, he may find that bis actlone 
vary at different times and under different circumstances, so that it is 
not always what be knows to be good that he does. In that case what 
he lack® i.; what ¿»©crate':- calls human virtue. The human virtue which 
Socrtaes in pointing to is a desire or love of the good, itself$ it is to 
love the gooa always* But to understand this form of good which does not
change Is what is difficult. For this, is not like some particular action 
which can be observed and judged to be good, if it is recognised a® good. 
For what must be understood now is what makes it possible for human boingn 
to call not some particular thing, but anything good. And that ie what 
socrates says he cannot understand* But whatever it is a person 
does call good, his calling it so, is to be identified with what for hi» 
is human virtue* If this however makes it look as if there will h» •« 
many forms of human virtue as there as are human beings, that is not 
Socrates’e view. One can state what the virtue of a particular man io, 
just ae cnc can stats what the virtue of a particular action is* but 
there is something over and above both theee, which ¿¡©crate# thought it 
was possible for all men to share *» and that ie human virtue proper*
But it is just this that we do not understand» If a man possess©© tbi® 
virtue, it cannot be identified with any particular kind or kinds of 
action that he regularly performs, even if it ie intimately connected with 
themj but it is the life he lives itself. If be lives this life, then 
goodness will be its pattern. He knows that, but doe® not understand 
ho» it can be the pattern,but only that it must be.
. « M , : »  i s . . . « »  t.,ev, t .  i s . « « «  • »  — * T lr tM  l 0 * **
t»re m t t  that h, does not unierctsn'i the dificr het*.«n S® ‘
, . 0 r* ’ thinks thatHe recognises the difference betvecn the t*-Q* uU"ev * ’ «nitaomiaet, *.u *■ + v,» difference is independenttv kno»? that there is this difference, and tfl~t *
„ . .i.al . it ir because there is a®of human opinion, is what is fundam^cd-i.»
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understanding that virtue cannot be taught, and the knowledge that there
is of the difference between good and evil muot be gained, without tea**«, 
by every person for himself. If a person does see the difference 
and makes this recognition a guiding principle of his lire, then he is« 
in ̂ ccrrtes'r .oris, caring for his soul. There is *<* naceesarily
any suggestion of the soul's being a eeaarMe entity which is eternal 
in nature. To assume that, or to try to prove it, would xead in the 
direction of claiming the kind of understanding that io not oossibie 
This is what Mato attempted to do, but as we shall see, Socrates»» 
ignorance about this matter still influences .x.ito’b vie. in certa 
respects. Hoover, what a matter of ignorance for .cerates becomes 
the beginning of a "metaphysical" view with Plato.
...hen socrMor. says "an unexamined life is not worth living1* 
this becomes Mth Plato the quo■tioa »Lbat is the nature of the soul?» 
and we find the same question raised by Aristotle when at the 
beginning of Li. "be Anima" be assumes, to begin with, that the soul 1» 
the principle < ) of life. This form of enquiry may well seem
to have been inevitable, seeing tb?. t both Plato and Aristotle, unlike 
iiocr. tea, were not juot inters.*, ; a in put. cions aocut morality. It 
is 4.1 i .onurast M M  both their views that v.e can see i>ocre tea's position 
more clearly. Mato never definitely distinguished, as Aristotle did, 
between theoretical and practical knowledge, but it would be a mistake 
think that Arictotle's distinction makes hie. view more Locratic. On 
the one hand, Plato tries to answer questions like "A'h-1 is the 
nature of the good"? and "V.h t is the nature of the soul”? and 
he tries to give a theoretical answer to these questions* Aristotl 
rejects a theoretical sai.ov.er to the first, but his attempt to answer 
the ¿econu is still theoretical* In bin "kthics", however, Aristotle 
seeks a form of practical knowledge. Hie position in that <1° 
wish to know what the ,Tood i: , but how to become good'»* But this is a 
Socrates's position either. CocrateE denies both forms of 
knowledge at tbit point. Both misinterpret Socrates in their own way 
end the views they out forward can be seen in thi- light, 
is true of the different kinds or view they held about morality and 
religion. Socrates's ignorance applies equally to what be thought about 
morality and religion, he can give no reason for his insistence on the 
difference between good and evil, nor can he give a reason for his belief 
in hie divine mission. Plato's view as v.e shall see, still attempts to 
hole these two together, whereas that of Aristotle separates them 
almost completely. The "Mena" is a y°°d example of these differ» 
between So rates and Plato. It begins in a ¿ocratic way. There is 
first of all the question of whether virtue is acquired (by teaching) or 
whether it is innate. The preliminary discussion up to the intro uc 
of the view of the eternal nature of the soul contains many boerntic 
allusions to such questions as to whether we can know the na 
virtue, to the involuntarineee of evil-doing and to the general
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for the good* Socrates* ignorance seems to be what ir> at stake, 
and the question is whether this can become knowledge*
■¿'he- lour,.tic ignorance, Louever, is not scepticism, as we 
have at c» > ocd vo SiiO»(, xn the *n * e nx tj*v do**<*nl o . hno yoo¿xcxlxty 
of a cQitain form of ¿»jiowls...¿w, cecauos dooi'^tes’n point is that that 
fora oi knowledge dotiti not ap̂ /iy* du - it would remain swĉ iticxias) of a 
different usd sox*« serious kin* if ^ocrntee’s , ositioa was that 
because «.© do not understand, there is nothing to say. That is, 
his position is not pessimism either. vx'hat it is not peanimistic may 
explain uuat often teems to be in flats an over- oytimi; tie view of 
thing»)* It is not scepticism because he insistu on the difference 
between good and evil - this is what ho does know, and this knowledge also 
keeps him from pessimism oi a form which states that because there is 
no understanding of the differut.ee between good and evil, it is 
impossible to cl air. that the good aiu: t be desired* Lccrntee’s 
ignorance is a form of humility which ioet- nos allow him to be 
pessimistic, but which leads him to state certain things no a matter of 
faith. This becomes clear at the er. 1 of the Apology, where he sayst 
»‘But it ir. nececcary for you, : ; ' y judges, to face death with good hope 
and 5.a he certain of this one thing at least • that no evil can befall 
as upright man cither in life or in death, and that bin life is in the 
hands of Uod. For nov: cne hour bar come for me to die* Ion will go 
on iiviu .’hich is toe better fate ic knopn to no one except <JodM*
Uhls can hardly be interpreted m; ncepticioc., certainly not as pessimism* 
It is a atatenent of hope bas:.ci upon iccratec’s conviction that a good 
life in one which can suffer no harm* Death is not the wornt of evils, 
but viickednoes ic, 0 9 k. "It is not hard to excape death? it is much 
more difficult to escape wickedness $ for that'runs faster than death* 
nOi), **j do not believe ti,.t it is God’s will for'a better man to he 
injured by a worse“/• It in a statement of religious faith* «hat is 
important to notice, newever, is that «ocrates’s knowledge of the 
difference between good and evil, and hie insistence on the need to live 
a good life, are equally a matter of fafch for him*
It might be argued that the Eutbypfcro states, a view which 
does not allow this close relationship between Socrites’e moral and 
reli^iou. views. Thin dialogue however, although it may indicate 
certain questions which concerned Socrates, does not state any view 
of his in a definite way* The ancient clat-sification of it as 
"ti-i£okfT<K0£ is right in this respect• There is nothing in it which 
could suggest that Cocrates would not identify, ns he Deems to In the
Apology, v,hat is holy with what in God’s v.ilx* Che dialogue is ^
meant to show how confused «uttyphre, who cle.xw.i- posseonion PI . TiXV^ 
about what i» holy, is about these matters* gocr&tes here is certainly 
criticising the religious art that -uttyphre claims to poueees, and 
his criticix® of this practical kno ledge C ) is
comparable with his criticism of the possibility of practical knowledge
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about morality. If, as we have suggested, morality and religion were 
very closely connected for Socrates, then this criticism v.ould be »ore or 
less the sa¿r¡e in each case. Then Euthyphro would, according to Socrates, 
he claiming a for» of knowledge that is not possible here. It is 
certainly Socrates who poses one of the main questions, which Euthyphro does 
not understand, about the relation between what is right and shat is holy, 
and be also raicea difficulties about identifying To ^Micuov/ and 
To oflov . But there is no positive answer given to this question, 
hocrates (12,ß) agrees with Sutbyphro’s statement that that part of 
f0 SilfouoV which has to do with the gods in To <¡>$"1 tV , and that the 
remaining part of t o £iV»tio\/ is that which has to do with men. That,
■ o- ever, is not the main point at issue, which ie the question which 
iioc rates states as follows* "Is that which is holy loved by the gods 
because it is holy, or is it holy because it ie loved by the gods'?” The 
first part of this question suggests that what ie holy is independent of 
the goda, but the eecond part suggests that it ie not.
he find that the way in which Socrates, at the beginning of 
the Buthyphro, states the question about holiness is similar to the method 
he adopts In the Beno. He puts the master in the way in which it has 
often been claimed leads to lato’s theory of forms. It is stated^ as^ a^ 
question (5i>) Td-utW ItfTiV 0*dTw>,
To otfeftoV Tow Mo\t IVAVToj IvooA IoV ; oiuto 8«. * * * *  * |*'ol0V 
ifou Y I * V 7 o t L ^vo<yiov iiVtAi
It was this kind of question which Plato answered in the affirmative and 
which led to his theory of forms, and which caused Plato himself, and 
writers about him, difficulties when they have attempted to discuss his 
religious views. Plato himself, a long time after the Suthyphro, in the 
Timaeus, thinks of the forms as patterns of creation which are independent 
of the • If what we have said about Socrates is correct,
that he claimed no understanding of the nature of virtue, then his view 
about holiness might well have been the same. Certainly he says here that 
he is ignorant « and this may he interpreted not Just a® irony in the face 
of luthy;hro** confident claim to knowledge, but as a genuine statement of 
what Socrates thought. If holiness ie one thing, just as virtue is, 
that does not mean that we can say what its unity is* From whet we have 
already said, we can suggest that for Socrate* it v*ae not independent oC Cod’s 
will. In the Suthyphro, if Li states ..ocratas’s vie* at all, we find a 
criticism of current religious views which are similar to those in 
Republic Book 2. If holiness is what it is important to understand in 
connexion with religion, and this is Socrates’s concern, as we sea it in 
this dialogue, then the traditional religious vievs which make avan 
differences of opinion about good and bad possible for the gods, cannot 
be of any help in an attempt to understand what holiness is* For Socrates 
assumes, ¿utt as be assumes with regard to virtue, that it is one thing, 
but the traditional religion makes it different for different gods. In 
the Republic God is described as one and unchangeable, and this must have
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been Socrates's view too, if he thought, as he seems to have done, 
that holiness is one and unchangeable. The criticism that Socrates 
makes of Euthyphro*s proposed definition of holiness, that what is 
dear to the gods is holy, seems to be that the proposed definition is 
not one, because it suggests that holiness is definable when it is 
not, •She point of Socratesb question; "Is that which is holy 
loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is 
loved by the gods?" is to point out that "being loved by the gods" 
is a Hd Doj and so cannot define the Oo<ft<A of holiness (llA).
The position with regard to holiness seems to be the same as that of 
good and evil? one cannot understand its nature.
What is said in the Buthypbro about holiness being connected 
with ©££eUt£i«l can be understood in relation to what Socrates 
says in the Apology about his divine mission as a service to God.
Be thinks of that as showing his fellow citizens the necessity of 
living a life of virtue. It is this call to virtue that is his 
divine mission, and in calling people to this, Socrates also thought 
that he was calling them to a holy life. The question about what place 
holiness has amongst the other virtues is not a question of Its relative 
merit. This aay be suggested by this question of the relation between 
■to B ftoV and To ^tve^tev . Socrates's view of morality is
a religious one. By this is meant that he does not account far
morality independently of religion, but he thinks of morality, that is, 
the knowledge of the difference between good and evil, as something for 
which no reason ton be given. That is, it cannot be understood, and 
as has been pointed out, this knowledge is part of hie belief in hie 
divine mission. Be does not understand, but hie lack of understanding 
is not all there is for him. He cannot just leave the matter there, 
because this knowledge he does possess he thinks is of first importance; 
and his faith in this knowledge about virtue is a faith that is Ood^given. 
W » n  in the Euthyphro he asks what this achieves, the answer
*• not given in a definite fora, but fro® Secret*»*® conception of his 
divine oteeion, we can easy that M s  answer would be, that its aim ie a 
holy life.
At 14b Socrates says; "For now, when you were almost giving 
me the answer, you turned aside? and if you had answered it, X should 
already have obtained from you all the instruction I need about 
holiness". This answer suggests that there 1® no instruction 
of the kind that Euthyphr© claims, and Socrates is denying that he is 
right in thinking that there is detailed and accurate knowledge ^ 
which is to be gained here, ( *Àt(ov*£ *£.y0w t f W  
tUvr* TolCrte uoofcV) Socrates interprets Suthyphro*s ^
etateaent that t o  " &<T<oV is TO ^  **** ^
suggesting that this 1» a T^X^'V) ♦ 3X1(3 tht® is to
interpret it in the way in which Eutbypbro thinks of it. But when
. . rSecretes incuiree late the nature of this *T<%)(v'V| by Giving 
examples cere this concept a .plies« Guthy taro does not agree»
Vi hat Socrates dots not understand 1. what Buthyphro means by this 
attention ( "Tyi d<£kW«CV 0̂ tT«> 1$A)*
does it imply the same form of which is to be found in a
* Socrates characterises here as something which
always aims to achieve an end, and hi point is that the end 
achieved ir different from the Ti^Vf| itself» ( OvitOoV 
"YCTUr*, TuoTdV SlAn̂ TrcttUg)» Its ait.. is to brim.; about some benefit 
to that to whitfh it pays attention, hut this cannot be what is 
meant by Ttov 9t£y for the gods are not benefited by the
© 4£otlCtC*. • The sedond e»u/pent ion that Suthyphro makes is a 
view which we find Socrates himself statin-;; with regard to his own 
divine mission in the Apology (y A) whê re he says* T*0t<* -yî p 
0 &(4K id "ett, ofonoic 00 W  -0U> Sf6?\/ feti£>V *Y*0 ov
/ _ *■> » /. a v* » \ ' o r\ a C /'ftvti&u, tv TIOXu TuJ « t w  It is Socrates,
who in the Eutbyphro suggests that the ^<.£<A«tvV is »v<^
Once he has made this suggestion, however, h- goes on to interpret the
BigjiHUJ. as understood in thi- way again in analogy to a t £^vvj
Buthyphro does not see, however, that Socrates is ait-representing bis
suggestion in interpreting it ir* ti.is way* ihe misrepresentation is
deliberate bo, ewer, and nuthyphro doee not see it because that is 5° 
how he thinks of this - as a * H<5 ^  BJ
1C«l |uVtw. <Tol Aty*», ^  ^  Y “ , ̂ T t L ,  W i o t v i W .
\ y < c r l , , *  e a ts , *  a  w n w  a f r *  * « ■  ̂  w ’
The 6i£ptiiiA which ie holiness, is a menns to the end of pleasin*., 
gods. Socrates, however* does not think ox the matter in this ay 
The god® need nothing and everything good which human beings 
co».e fro. the ,oa, « 5 1  r f S i * * , y * W
So even the , rightly interpreted, if it *« Sood*
Socrates would say it is, is not something human beings .l ive © 
gods, but a gift of the gods to human beings» ¿©crates s
which 1 » the best thing that ban happened 1 » 01t*’ lt alS° *
divine gift. ( o k  S A  tee 0t»l Tg , & * -  S * V e 9 * Y  , 10"
J1A) Socratea'e view eee.a clear enough. Ihe  ̂ IgpivtCA
life ita.ll and not U«rr<n  *s T* ^  V
and it 1. . hoi, lile w h i H  V. V  °f ‘
Socrates agrees that there ie » difference b.t«.n ^  
end W o *  . the, enn he dietlneulehed ee " "
t S v • Bat lt lB “ot i""**1”* * ^  0l, „
obvious what Is m e a t  b, S i y w *  « *  attl* 8 *hl* l* ,
g i !««♦ The cue stion of b>t£p«rn* t S>v the force of the dirtinction is lost. ^  ,
„ , «»id makes clear whativ6p>>T!t<W 1» « *  dlecnaeed, hut .hat ». h.v. M l *
^  A* ru»i 0 itb +  There are, however, someSocrates understood by U* ^vov
hintr her. about derates-, view on thin general qu.otlon of .
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relation between morality and religion. For To %g \os/ is not
separate from To , bat is that part of it which is
concerned with 7W  & W ,  v hat v.e may speak of as man’s
relationship with God. It is a holy life which recognises all good
as-coming from God. The 6)i£otT!ilol Tw\/ «tVdga> IWV' is not discussed 
here but from the Apology wo see that Socrates thought of this too as 
something which was commanded by God. ( T«ivxrot tf-fcAtutu o )
So morality and religion are not separate for him« (Those ideas
influence Plato in the view he puts forward in the tenth book of the 
laws).
The close relationship that existed for Socrates between 
morality and religion is clear from what we read in the Crito*
Socrates states hie view that *we ought reitber to requite wrong with 
wrong nor to do evil to anyone, no matter what he may have done to us*. 
(^9C) He holds this view not only because he considers it right, but 
it is also a result of hit view that what iB ju t and right is 
decided by a higher authority than he himself. The right of 
punishment belongs to the la?s and the city and not to any individual 
men, and the la,?c. tell Socrates that they are above bim.̂
^Vov 07itbv i^olb to &1W 10V' Kell -wltV, K*t tflToi 0
^  <Ti |4.$V n o t i fy  Kbi. (TOC Tolu Tot «  VTuTtOiS.lV 0 , t c
iivd.c ; (5 Jh) The individual is not a law unto himself; and no 
man can regard himself as possessing greater wisdom than the laws.
(51 A - B) Socrates thought that justice is to be recognised in the 
laws, and not in the opinions of men. And the laws are for hi* a 
divine institution. This is shown by vhat he says at thê  end̂  of the 
dialogue t VEot T01VUV, ¿>K$IT«W, "U^TTlOfiV Td6v*J, 1 ^ 1^  TAOT-v] O
• (^51^ To obey the laws is to follow the command of God. 
Justice ie not the opinion of inaividuals; from that only anarchy can 
result. Human wisdom is only found in obedience to God through 
obedience to the laws.
What can be gathered from Socrates's relijiou^ faith? It is
somethin,; that is part of the life that Socrates lived. 'We are told 
of his action after the battle of Arginusae when he insisted that the 
generals should be tried individually because this was according to the 
lav. e knov too that when ordered with four others to go and arrest 
a man he went home. In doing this bm was doing what he thought right,
but this depended for him on his belief in God. His belief in the
good and the right was for him a belief in the authority of God
over human life. It was not just that he thought this. This is no
doubt why he pieced so much emphasis upon his SeM^ovioV * He
believed that he was divinely guided not to do what was wrong. In
deciding that something was wrong he thought that he vas not just 
following his own opinion. The command was not his own but came from
God. That was the care that the gods took of human life* 
bocrutec thought if somethin;,; is wrong, it is not just that one 
tlanks so. Hov does one think so? Doing wrong is not like making 
a mistake where one dots against what one thinks is correct. for 
what is wrong is not decided by oneself* -hat is wrong is 
independent of me. I can't make it right or wrong. But if it is 
independent of me, what is iniependent? It was for Socrates the
command of God. Shat is why the care of the soul is so important, 
for the soul lives by either doing what is right r wrong. If that 
is inde endent of the soul, then one must be as careful as possible 
to learn what the difference between the two is.
Socrates claimed no knowledge about morality in the sense
of understandin . the moral view which he claimed, but this moral view
was centra- to what he considered his divine mission. He did not? /think that there was with regard to morality, if that
means practical knowledge of the form of a t t^Vvj *
liis claim to ignorance about morality is a genuine one and comparable 
with hie ignorance about other matters, such as r.hetber death may 
not be a great blessing and not the great evil that many suppose it 
to be* Neither is there any purely theoretical kno.ledge about 
morality of such a bind chat it is possible to say what the nature of 
good and evil art• Knorlodge of good and evil is only such that
human beings can know that tin-;re is a difference between the two.
They cannot understand their nature. It was these views of Socrates 
that influenced Platde views a great deal. Aristotle's view on 
the other hand is different from Socrates's in important ways: in 
ways which show that both Socrates's and Plato's views are 
religious, whereas Aristotle's is not.
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The nature of the soul ( v(>0^  > occupies a central position in
Plato’s philosophy. It Is not, however, a subject on which his views coco 
stated remained the same. There is a development in what he writes 
about it from the Fhaedo to the Laws. It is also connected with other 
views of his on politics and ethics, on the theory of knowledge, and on 
matters of religion.
The origin of this emphasis is to be found in the influence which 
Socrates had on Plato’s thinking. This is the most important influence. 
But he was also influenced by ideas about the nature of the soul found 
in Orphism end in Pythagoreaaieo* Socrates may well have been influenced 
by such ideas too, but the way in which Plato works out his ideas about 
the soul suggests a difference between his view and that of Socrates.
The exact historical truth about these matters eecaps ua, but at least wo 
nay see that what for Soorates was a moral and religious concern for what 
he called the ’soul', became with Plato more of a philosphical quest to 
determine the nature of the soul in order that he might be able to provide 
some form of philosophical proof for his moral and religious views.
This he begins in the Fhaedo where he discusses the relationship between 
the soul and the forms* Then in the Phaedrus we have his statement of 
the nature of the soul as self-motion. But although his view of the 
soul changes, he is always trying to say ’what it is*.
He states his view in the Laws! ’That nature whose definition 
is self-motion is identical with that which is oalled soul*. And this 
marks an important difference between his view and that of Socrates, 
whose view is that the soul is involved in a struggle between what is 
good and evil, and that that soul which is good Is protssted by Ood. 
Socrates’s interest as we have pointed out is moral end religious* 
whereas Plato’s is also theoretical. Just as Sosrates disclaims knowledge 
about the nature of good and evil, so he disclaims knowledge about the 
mature of the soul) (Crito V?E.) but although he claims no understanding 
he is insistent on the importance for hvmmn life of knowing that there is 
an absolute difference between good and evil, and that the life of the 
soul, which is the most important part of human life, is concerned with 
this difference.
Plato begins in the Fhaedo by emphasising this aspect of the 
matter. When in the first jmrt of the dialogue, he talks about the life 
of the philosopher as the practice of death, this is related to the 
picture we have of Socrates in the Apology stating his belief that diatfc 
may be the greatest of blessings. Tho emphamim hare is on the lifb ef 
the individual philosopher and this is why there is so muoh iateremt 
taken in trying to discover a proof for the immertality of the eeul. ^  
W»t is meant by immortality here is individual immortality, end the p*p»f 
that is being sought 1. a proof of the Immortality of individual souls.
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It becomes clear, however, towards the end of the dialogue 
that the question of the nature of the soul cannot be adequately treated 
In tills way and these are suggestions that lead on to the view as It is 
stated later in the IhaedruB, the Titaaeus, and the Laws that soul is the
of all motion» This development in Plato's view is one in which 
an idea of the soul which arises from Socrates's interest in individual 
moral and religious matters becomes more of a principle of explanation 
not only for individual human life but also for everything that is * 
the whole *otfy05 »Shis ¿bee not mean, however, that the emphasis on 
individual moral and religious matters disappears.
The view of the soul that Plato puts forward in the Fhaedo is 
first stated in the Memo ( 8la ff.) It is introduced there as what is 
taught about the soul by certain people who are versed in religious 
matters, tt is also connected with the name of P i n d a r T h e  soul, 
according to this view, is eternal (¿Qavaioj), and death and life are 
only phases of Its existence in some bodily state. These phases do 
nothing to alter its nature and it is indcstruhtibls* Part of what is 
meant here by saying that it is eternal is that it is has knowledge of 
all things ( ) •  The life of the soul in a human body is 
such that it can by recollection retrieve this knowledge, which is kncwlegs 
’about virtue and other things' * Here we find also a statement which 
is suggestive of the way in which Plato intends to develops his view, ^
It iej 3Tfc "P*j$
Kooivia Cv fovov 8 Si,
«U&£iOTl<n,, Tvivva WOTOV £*40^4^ ^ *1,0'U V-'"V)
Bie kinship of the whole of nature which can be known by the soul, and 
which makes recollection possible leads on to Mato's view of the world*« 
soul which in hi® later dialogues (e.g, the Philebus and the Tiaaeus) 
he connects with his view of the human soul* That is la not
just regarded as. something that belongs to human life, but the husnn 
soul la to be thought of as part of the world soul itself*
What is to be noticed is that Mato takes over tills religious 
view and urns it for his own purposes* He takes it as stating the 
nature of the soul, and what he has to say about the soul in subsequent 
dialogues is an attempt to give an account of the eternal nature of the 
soul, Plato, then, accepts a religious view of the soul current in his 
day, and uses this in his attempt to state something about the nature ef 
the soul in a way which Socrates had not attempted* For« Socrates as 
we have pointed out, the nature of the soul was something of which he 
m e ignorant, and Plato's attempt to state that we any o %U a philosophical 
view of the soul which is influenced by certain religious ideas, raises 
problems about the relation between philosophy and religion*
1, Pindar, KsX. f w W  f*W livTiov 1 Q 6  Qi.'/tij #
JOftv V I tl X aivub «fiuvos tT8M>\jov* to 'i+ i 4 m * f e w  
I k  O i a WFragment 13 6 'Pindari carmina cum fragment» edidit A.Turyn*.
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His argument about the nature of the soul as self-motion 
was criticized by Aristotle! who also ¿aits forward an argument connected 
wit; the nature of motion to prove the existence of a first unmoved mover« 
There are, as we shall see, important differences in their views, but both 
attempt to state arguments for their views*
There was,also sonet' i:;g in the view that Socrates stated about 
morality which probably led Plato to this view of the eternal nature of 
the soul« Socrates thought of the difference between good and evil 
as absolute. That is the difference did not change, and was not 
dependent on changing human opinions about the matter. There was 
something unalterable about it, and trie may naturally lead to the view 
that human life which is involved in this unalterable difference is 
itself in some way unalterable. To live in such a way as to take 
this difference into account was what Socrates called caring for one's 
soul. So Plato was led to at erupt to dhow that the life of the soul 
itself Is unalterable* But whereas Socrates had emphasised mainly this 
unalterable difference between good and evil, when Plato sou^it to 
connect this with the nature of the soul itself as unalterable, hs was 
led to difficulties - especially the difficulty of stating what this 
eternal nature of the soul is, and how it can be connected in any way 
with a fora of life, that is human life, which is not unchangeable, 
it is this dtfficutly which arises in the Phaedo and which makes it 
necces ry to discuss the nature of generation and decay. Once this 
issue cooes to the fore the question about the eternal nature sf the 
soul ceases to be just a question of individual immortality, and w# ate 
here the beginning of Plato»a later view that toe soul la the oauae of 
all becoming. When we come to toe Fhaedrua we find t at although in 
the myth about the soul there ie a great deal that la connected with 
the kinds of life that individual souls lead as human beings, ths gensral 
statement or definition of the nature of toe soul which precedes the myth 
•®d which seems to be regarded as a moro definite statement about the 
nature of the eoul than what ie said about it in the myth Itself, is not 
a definition of the nature of the human soul but of all soul. All soul 
is eternal ( Ttyr* *0kv*to$ )•
Ibis development in Plato's vi w raises as we have said 
certain difficulties about the relation between philonghy attft rell#na 
which arise also in connection with the views of Aristotle, but which are 
not so serious for him since his view is less religious than Plato's.
The main difficulty can be stated by comparing Plate's view with that 
of Soezmtes. It can be pet by saying that the interest of religion 
is not in determining ths nature of the soul as such fe&’Au'r-vjv **
Plato puts it). It is the consequence of the view that the
soul Is eternal as it is stated In the Mono that is important for 
religion. Xt is said that because the soul is sternal it is necessary 
to live as holy a life as is possible. And this is what Soerate* 
etgfeaslsed« Whether the soul t u  eternal or not he did net know, hut
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this ignorance did not make the necessity for Using a holy life any 
the less* Plato’s question is different« but it Is boro of the same 
interest - an interest which his answer cannot satisfy.
It is primarily a moral and religious interest for Socrates, 
and the necessity of living a holy life is not shown by showing that the 
soul is eternal. This is what Wittgenstein refers tot ' The temporal 
immortality of the human aoul, that is to say, its eternal survival after 
death, is not only in no way guaranteed« but this assumption in the first 
place will not do for us that we always tried to make it do. Is a 
riddle solved by the fact that I survive forever? Is this eternal ife not 
an enigmatic ae our present one?* (Traotatus 6.bJ12) The poesdbBLity 
of the soul’s survival of death is one of the main questions in the first 
part of the Phaedo« but with the introduction of the question ef 
generation and ceeay t ie question is not so much in evidence and as 
Plats developed M s  later view about soul« the question of humen 
immortality took on a different aspect. In the Theaetetus (176) and 
in the Timaeus (90) the purpose of human life is seen as achieving 
inaortality in so far as that Is possible for beings« and that
suggests that it ia aomet ing different ft*«» a feme of inmertallty *hi«h 
Is eternal.
We may also contrast Plato’s attempt to prove individual 
immortality in the Phaedo with the Christian belief in order to see that 
the main Interest of the latter too is not to establish the eternal 
fiaSSHOL of the soul. in the Christian belief eternal life Is a gift 
ef Qod. ’The wages of sin is death, (Romans 6.23) but the gift ef Cod 
is eternal life*. But on the view that Plato is trying to establish 
the soul ia eternal anyway. At least that would be the outcome if 
the soul were shown t be eternal and in the Phaedo the efforts to «how 
this seem to be quite serious. That the arguments put forward are 
regarded as inconclusive suggest too« however« that Plato may have 
fnlt some of the difficulties that have been mentioned. There does at 
least in the later dialogues seem to be some confliot in Hate’s mind 
between this view about the eternal nature of the soul and another 
view that we find stated in the Tlsaeus. There he says in his myth of 
creation that the order of the cosmos« to idiieh he refers when he speaks 
of the world aoul, is not completely indissoluble in its own nature, 
but its depends on the wrm of the createstt"(6l 8).
Sven in the Phaedo, however, there is such to suggest that 
for Plato what is of interest is not Just proving that the soul is 
eternal, for there is a great deal in the dialogue that show that he 
is interested in the character of the eternal life of the soul. Be 
thinks that this eternal life has a character of its own, and it is the 
character of the life of the soul that allows it to achieve 
immortality whether it is strictly eternal or not. In this respect 
we see that Plato is much closer to the view of Socrates than he would 
be if his "*»•>* interest were just in proving the soul eternal.
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Here it is sufficiently clear that the kind of life tbs soul (that is 
the huaan soul) leads does not belong to it of necessity* Oils contrast 
is seen in Fhaedrus too. There is the definition of the soul as eternal « 
but then a description in the myth of the kind of life that is possible 
for the huaan soul*
If we ask why the kind of life that belongs to the huaan soul 
does not belong to it of necessity then the answer seems to be that it is 
because the life of the human soul Is tied to the life of the body*
Here again we have a clash of different aspects in Flato* s treatment«
For the view he states suggests that the natural life of the soul is 
a puro one) it is its presence in the body that wakes its life Impure*
This account of the matter presupposes that soul and body are distinct* 
and with regard to the soul it presupposes that it is something of an 
eternal mature which has been compelled to lit» in a physical body*
But even if it presupposes this, it at least make® possible some account 
of the form of life that is considered to be natural to the soul Which 
it is prevented from living by its presence in the body# Here Plato 
«as no doubt influenced by the Pythagoreans* The body is the prison 
house of the soul, and tí» life of the philosopher is meant to be os» in 
which he strives to over««» those influences of 13»  body which prevent 
the soul from living that life that is proper to it.
It is easy to misunderstand gome aspects of the account in 
the Fhaedo, however, if all the emphasis is placed on the distinction 
that there is between the body and the soul* for although the body 
is a prison, it is a prison of our own making* It doss not have is be 
a prison* If it is a prison then human beings have mads it a prison 
for themselves* This is why Flato says in his discussion of the lusts 
and pleasures that can accompany bodily life that »the prisoner is ths 
Chist assistant in his own imprisonment». (ToC £‘£̂ {*©3 ^
V  S ' V d T 0<, W-nv, ¿ i **< « U j ‘o
^vj veO &«u (8 2 B).
Hato thinks that the philosopher heeds t© purify his life of 
« mi latineases that result feo» lito in the body* Bo describee this 
OST& IrtVfJLetV« TOy So ths
end to bo aohiovod is a life separated from the body, and this view aay 
woll seem to bo ia etxetngs contrast to «hat we find in the Phaedrue 
(2bfiB)i v*<r* í¡ Tulrros *»0 . The aaln
differonee between thee two views evens to be that the former thinks of 
the soul as siapl» and unchanging in nature, whereas the latter 
attributes to the soul a fora of motion which dose not allow it to bo 
simple and unchanging. The view in the Ehaedo aloe snkea the Ufo of 
the soul alien to that of the body whereas the later view does not make the 
difference between them so radical* Ihere is a contrast also between 
t&at Flato says about Clod in the Fhaedo and «hat ho says in ths Ifeasdrae* 
In the Fhaedo <bd seems to be thought of in the same way as a form • 
that is free from everything bodily. In ths Ffcaedrus, however, Hate says
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'Although we have newer seen or rightly conceived a god, we imagine an 
eternal living being which possesses both a soul and a body, which are 
united for all tine*» (2h&>) Bat in the fhaedo the proper life of 
the soul is not one which ie life in a body*
She min difficulty in understanding the Fhaedo is that it 
does not just state oneview about the nature of the soul) it shows us 
the difficulties which Plato saw in a certain view of the soul an 
eternal and unchanging« In the first part of the dialogue we have a 
view of the soul that is other-worldly« Because the soul is thought 
of in tills way, asceticism is regarded as the ideal of human life*
And this is a view of the soul which pays attention only to an individual 
human life. It is the immortality of the individual human soul that is 
important, and It is thought necessary to dtim this irrespective of any 
relationship there night be between the life of an individual soul and 
other souls. Its immortality also is something which is achieved in 
separation from the human bodyj for the body is alien to it« This view 
m a  probably suggested to HLafco by the life of Socrates,and the importance 
ha attached to the soul in the sense of the life of an individual huar<“ 
being« Per Socrates this was not connected with any attempt to prove 
anything about the nature of the soul, but once Plato attempted to apeak 
about this, than the question« of the relationship of a m  soul to another, 
and of whether the body la completely alien to the soul, were bound te 
arise« So the view of the soul that we find in the first part of the 
Ftiaodo before the objections of Csbes sad »f— la a oonssqusnee of 
Socrates's teaching, but it is also an account of the nature of the eoul 
which gives rise for Plato to difficulties which Socrates was net 
concemsd with. According to this view each human soul Is considered 
as independent, and its immortality is something that belongs te Itself 
aleme« the first arguments are only concerned with how such an 
individual soul can possess an eternal nature* So cos has to show that 
eoul will survive the death of the body and that it existed before 
ita life in the body*
those arguments are concerned with attempting to show that the 
life of the philesopher la not a forlorn hope. for the philosopher 
lives in mch a way that he has no fear of death. It does not harm his 
•**&! ft tarings release from the evil influences of bodily life. He 
faces death eonfidsotly beaaus* he believes that he will go to live 
among mcm that are better than any who live on earth. Ihe ph'Peooiihnr 
desires to esoape from the life of the body, which Is evil < K*K<£ )«
for as long aa the soul is shackled to the body it will never gain «hat 
It desires - the truth. So Plato describee the life
of the philosopher ae a|*iVvrijwhich takes the form of a 
tha evil of bodily life* This is preparatory to that pun life of 
the soul which will be achieved in a future life. It will only .however,
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be achieved by those who have earnestly sought to purify themselves»
♦for it is not allowable for the impure to attain to the pure* (668)« and 
♦the life after death will be far bet er for the good than the evil* (63C).
The end that is achieved by the purified soul is described as the 
acquisition of wisdom and 'nowledpc, and this is only properly possible 
in a life that is lived 1*  7o0 <ftoyi*TN>j . The philosopher seeks to 
live in such a way that he is untroubled by the pleasures and desires of 
the body. These have no value for him. But in thinking of them in 
this way he is misunderstood by the majority of men who thin!'- J --t life 
is only worth living in so far as one takes delight in bodily pleasures#
The philosopher# however, takes delight only in one thing (68a ^̂ wvSl ) *
wisdom, and because he sees that the possession of wisdom is only impeded 
by the body, his desire is to esoape from it as hateful to hi*.(67c, 684)*
Be knows that even in this life, where his search is impeded by the body* 
truth is only attained iv tu> AovjiJuS’eKv (69C), that is by the soul in so 
Skr as It separates itself from the life of the body# The purifidation 
«hi«* eeeka to bring about in this life the oontinued separation of the 
eoul from the body involves a great struggle (*) $73),
but its fruits in this life are the foundation of a hope that death will 
be the means of achieving a complete purification (63c, 670) of (die 
soul from those evils which result fro« a life lived in the body# The 
man who grieves at the approach of death la not a ^^¿co^e>£ but a 
jajM o  ̂ (68b ); he is more concerned with cultivating the 
life of the body than that of the soul# To cultivate the life of the 
body is to be a lov°r of the body, to regard as of first importance the 
pleasures of food, drink and seacyal love; but the objects of desire for 
the life of the soul when it is properly cared for are not these but the 
fwrms of justice, beauty and goodness in themselves# The soul will 
beccae like that which is the object of Its love. It it loves wisdom 
then it will become like those things which alone make wisdom and pure 
knowledge possible; and these things are the forms. The fora is the 
«ay true object of knowledge. The forma Plate refers to here «ire moral, 
aesthetic sad mathematical which are conceived as ideal standards to lfcose 
perfection particular strive to attain. The ferae cannot be
known by the senses; it belongs to the activity and life of the soul 
to know them# and aims in them to strive to attain to that
purity which belongs completely to the forms. It achieves this by that 
activity that la characteristic of its own life - by thinking (& ̂ if^os 794). 
It can only do this if it is not influenced by the body; it is only 
the man who ^  Wv#U x e ^ h ^ J  u  ahl* *• »**••**
to make a search for €»*•«£•«* W w - r i v  '¿vrw<664) . The kind
of life which is here suggested as the one proper for the soul is one of 
contemplation. If anyone is said to know anything in its purity* it is 
neceoaary for him to be separated from the body and contemplate things with 
the soul alcms. It is because the soul cannot achieve true knowledge 
while living in the body that true knowledge will never be attained exeept 
after death. In this life one will approach nearest to knowledge only
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when on» strivec to avoid communion with the body and seeks to purity 
oneself from it« until God sets one free*
It is necessary, however« to distinguish between two aspects 
of this account« one which remained central to Plato’s view as it 
developed, and another which changed* The aspect that changed is the 
idea that this life of purity is only the concern of the individual 
philosopher* -hen in the Republic Plato demands that the philosopher should 
return to the cave« that demand seems foreign to what is said in the 
Phaedo* What remained unchanged is the view that there are certain 
elements in human life which need to be driven out, if anything like a 
life of purity is to be possible for human beings*
Plato Insists that the rule of the soul over the body is a 
natural ruls; human life becomes unnatural when it is bodily pleasures 
that ruls* What Plato moans here when he speaks of the pleasures and 
lusts of the body, is not just purely physical pleasures and lusts, but 
anything that would pr vent the soul from achieving its proper purity 
of life* There is a definite struggle betve n soul and body, and the 
life of each is affected by that of the other* That means that there 
is impurity of soul* It is not just the body that is the cause of 
impurity* Bath«* it is the soul itself* For it is the soul that rules, 
and if it rules By directing its life in accordance with 1ear desires, 
it becomes impure* It has to overcome the turbulences of life In the 
body so that its own life may be pure*
But how is this poasiblef Only if the end of the soul’s rule 
is Its own purity* Otherwise the life of the soul is destroyed! its 
life becomes one which is determined by its bodily existence* It becomes 
chained to the body, and is forced to follow desires vbioh are unnatural 
to it. ’Because the soul has the sane beliefs and pleasures as the body 
it is compelled to adopt also the same habits and mods of life, and can 
never deport in purity to the other world, but must always go away 
contaminated with the body*. (83©) If the soul does not make its own 
purity the end it seeks, then all that is possible is for it 'to exchange 
pleasure for pleasure, pain for rein and fear tat fear’* (69A). That is 
what Plato means here by the life of the body from which the soul mast 
escape* It is a life whose end lx not purity of soul) its self- 
restraint is a form of eelf-indulgense. It is the life of those people
irtio refuse scat pleasures only in order that they nmy enjoy others which 
they cannot do without* Because they cannot do without those it is 
impossible for them to aohieve purity of soul. It is that which is 
virtue and wisdom, and only this Is able to judge the true nature af 
pleasure, pain and fear*
It is this idea that remains central to Plato’s view throughout* 
Human life must not be just an exchange of pleasures, pains and fears* It 
must be a search for wisdom and virtus. When it is the former, then it 
becomes impossible to care for the life of the soul. It is these things
that prevent the soul from gaining its own purity*
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But they are not external to the life of the soul and just a part of 
bodily life. Otherwise the prisoner woi^d not be the chief assistant 
in hio own imprisonment• As it is he is* and he will remain a
prisoner to his low desires, unless he realises that there is something 
else to care fo. Such pleasures and pains are not external to the 
life of the soul, but can influence its own life* and their influence 
is so immediate, that many people think that these are what make life 
worthwhile. They are so acceptable to most people, that Plato calls 
those who indulge in them with what he calls self-restraint,
(68 E) . They are the people in the cave who see only images. They 
think they follow virtue, but it is only a painted imitation of it.(69®).
Plato’s view here is one that is stressed in many religions.
It is found in Christianity in the saying of Jesus{ ’Lay not up for 
yourselves treasures upon earth where noth and rust do corrupt, and 
where thieves break through and steal; but lay up for yourselves 
treasure in heaven where neither moth nor rust do corrupt and where 
thieves do not break through and steal*. (St.Math.C. VI. w.  19-20).
•Love not the world nor the things of the world* (l.John 2. 19) Pinto 
imself connects the view in the Phaedo with the mystery religions of 
his own time. He says; *1 fancy that those men who established the 
mysteries were not unenlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning 
when they said long ago that whoever goes uninitiated and unsanctified 
to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there 
initiated and and purified will dwell with the gods. Tar as they say 
in the mysteries, **the thyrsus bearers are many, but the mystics are few**J69C > 
•Straight is the gate and narrow is the way that leads to life, and few 
there be who find it*. (Luka 13.2̂ .) Socrates for Plato was a
person who had learned to care for his eoul{ who had learned the kind 
of Virtue and wisdos that is possible for human beings. That wisdom 
®»d virtue does not lie in choosing what pleasures one wants and 
avoiding others so that these can be achieved. It is not a question of 
choosing those pleasures that are the least troublesome, eo that one can 
hi comparative peace . ithout too many pangs of conscience, and avoid 
the pain* that may follow from over-indulgence. For that nails the 
soul to the body in the oem* way that a life of pure indulgence doee.
There is no escape in that direction, from one point of view the 
distinction between soul and body is not absolute, In so far as the life 
of each is affected b- tie other. But from another point of view they 
are, for to care for the soul ia to live a life that is quite different from 
any of the multitude of liven that are an exchange of pleasure for 
pleasure, tfnlese one prevents oneself from living such a life, then 
it will be impossible to care for one’a coul. Care of the eoul only 
comes in so far as that’.-dnd of life is overoome. Vfcten Boormtes remained 
in prison, he was not concerned with what for most ;«ople would be a natter 
of choosing between pleasure and ¡»in, but of doing what he thought ri^bt.
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He wau able to do that, without compulsion, because he had lived a 
life which was not a continual choice between one pleasure and another* 
or one pain and another, but a life that only sought virtue and 
truth; virtue and truth that are that kind ox life.
This life knows no fear o,; death, uocrates could have 
escaped* but he thought that that would be contrary to the laws. But 
even if he faced death for that reason, he might still have feared it* 
though fox ¿»cerates; the tr.u were closely connected» he had overcome 
that fear» be may well ast, what he had overcome• He bad overcome 
that kind of desire wbicu nieces its hopes in this life; that cannot 
bear the thought of being ivepurt.teu from the pleasures that life in 
the body brings with it. tie had learned to live in such a way that 
there was nothing upon which he depended to live except virtue. He 
w&e prepared to lcse everything ercept that; and that no one could 
take from hi®. It would lead him, be thought, to a life with the 
gods. It is no doubt possible to have no fear of death, but not to 
possess the hope that Socrates shows in the face of death.
Epicurus thought of death in this way? * her we are, death is not; 
when death is, we are not». One's view of death, fcevever, is closely 
connected with one’s viev of life. Cue could say that it is part of 
one’s view of life, although then the difficulty arioso of how 
one distinguishes between the two. Certainly Epicurus*s view about 
death is a result of the way in which be thought about life; that view 
of human life included tbs idea that death is the end, and because it 
is the end there is no need to ferr it. If death is the end, then that 
also determines the way in which one thinks of life* One important 
difference between the viev; of Epicurus and £ocrstec*s is that 
Epicurus has decided what death is* When a person dies h?. knows and 
feels nothing. He does not even dream as he might when asleep. 
Although there i© a dead body, the life that belonged to it has 
completely ceased to exist* Epicurus’s view of life in this sense 
depends on hie being right about what death is. ¿.aerate- does not know 
what death iB. This makes his view very different. It is his view of 
life that gives him hope that after death he will go tc live with the 
3°di:* who hav« provided for him during his lifetine.The difference might 
be put by saying that for Epicurus what life determined by what 
deatn is, whereas for Socrates what death ie^leteraiaed oy what lire 
is. Those who have lived a good life will fare better after death 
than those who have not. Philosophy is the practice of death in the 
sense that the philosopher seeks to live in ouch a way that hie life 
is a preparation for a future life in which none of the distractions 
and turbulence, cnat accompany life in the body will be present. If 
that is what deato makes possible death is not something to be feared, 
but something to hope for.
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What assurance is there that this hope will he fulfilled?
Plato thinks that it must depend on the soul being eternal in nat re.
This is the point of the first two arguments that are put forward* The 
views that everything must be generated fro© its opposite and that the 
soul’s learning is recollection are meant to show that the soul exists 
after death and that it also existed before birth* This too is the 
purpose of the argument that the soul is uaconrpounded and simple in 
nature. But none of these arguments answer the main objection put 
forward by Cebes,that there is no means of showing that the soul is 
eternal in nature, because even if it does exist before the life of the 
body and survive it, death in the end may be the destruction of the soul 
itself, Cebes's question raises the problem of the nature of coming-to-bs 
and passing-away. The question of the eternal nature of the soul cannot 
be discussed Independently. For the life of the human soul is life in a 
human body* and its life cannot be thought of as completely different 
fro» that of the body, unless it is sfoovn to be different. Siaraias puts 
forward the view that the soul is a harmony of the life of the body, but 
Plato thinks that this idea does not explain what is most characteristic 
about human life* If the soul is a harmony of the body, then how can it 
admit opposite states-such as virtue and wickedness.
The answer that is given t this question in the Fhaedo is only 
the beginning of an answer for Plato, and the question continues to 
exercise him throughout the later dialogues. The answer here begin® by 
attempting to show that an answer to the question of and
cannot be one just in physical terms. For that will leave 
something physical unexplained. The point here seems to be also that 
human life cannot be explained only in physical terms, for such n  
explanation does not account for what is most characteristic about it, 
that it is a life which has to dto with virtue and wickedness. So Plato 
proceeds to discuss the nature of the soul in connexion with what are 
regarded as the true causes of physical existence - the forms.
But the view that is put forward in the Fhaedo raises difficulties not 
only about the nature of the forms themselves, but also about the nature 
of the soul if it la compared to a form. The main difficulty with regard 
to forms is just how they are to be causes of physical things which come 
to be and pass away, and this problem becomes central to the discussion in 
the Parmenides. for physical things participate in forms, what is the 
nature of this participation? It is difficult to understand how if the for» 
is to be an efficient cause it can remain unchanged, and how it is the 
same form which is the eause of many particular things* For that would 
suggest that the form is not indivisible. This problem is not dealt 
with in the Phaedo, but it arises in connexion with the question of the 
nature of the soul, because the e ul does participate in physical 
existence. So is the soul divisible or indivisible in nature?. That 
is the main difficulty here. if the eternal nature of the soul is in 
aome way like the sternal nature of the forms, then It must be shown how
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a form is related to physical existence in order to Make clear how the 
soul is.
The account that we have here of the dissatisfaction felt by 
Socrates with physical speculations shows in some ways the kind of 
distinctions that it is necessary to make between the soul and the body. 
For the soul is concerned with understanding the goodness of things and
this is something which cannot be understood in terms of physical causes» 
When Socratoe claims that the reason why he remains in prison can only be 
explained in terms of what is the best, this may be regarded as explaining 
hie action in doing so. But Plato wishes to make this kind of cause 
more general* It is not only meant to explain human actions but also the 
order of the universe.* It is To K e w o V  TT&Ti'/ . (98b).
Ifoose who are only concerned with ■hyeical speculations arc not concerned 
with this kind of cause. They are unable to distinguish between what is
s cause 'Tty ¿sfj c , and that which is not such a cause but tbs
necessary condition for the existence of such a cause . (to y<*£
SttAci&ac olov t ’iWdi, S n  t C & < m  fk oi\tiov/ t «o
¿v/Tc,wXXo^i 4«t»vo dvtu ou ro di-now ow< ttotV{^ <*?rfioV (99b).
For recognising this distinction is to recognise that there is some divine 
power which causes things ao they are to be in the best possible state* 
(99c) That is also the kind of cause that the soul can be in its life in
the body* It can rule the body in such a way that human life bdcomes 
as holy as possible (I07d)*
The connexion between this view that mind is the cause of * 1 1  
things and orders them for the best (9 3 a*b), and that the true causes of 
things are the forms is not clear* It was not clear to Plato either 
and it remained a problem for him even in the Timaeua, where he thinks of 
the o who is the mind who orders things for the best as
separate from the forms which are the patten* in accordance with which ho 
doom order the world for the beat. And the difficulty is present here in 
the Phaedo in attempting to show the nature of the soul. For first of all 
the cause is thought of as some divine power, which we might identify with 
tht , but also the cause is the forms. This may be 
why Plato here seems almost to>think of the soul itself as a form. And if 
it were just a question of the forms-themselves which are unchanging and 
eternal being causes,then it would seem that there would be no alternative 
to regarding the soul as a form. But Plato does not give an account only 
in terms of the forms. That this is the view in the Fhaedo ndght be 
suggested by the first statement about the form as a causet *If anything 
is beautiful except the form of beauty, it 1 « is beautiful for no other 
reason than that it shares in the form of beauty* *(100C). This suggests 
that there is just the form of beauty which is unchanging, «ad particular 
beautiful things which are not unchanging but which owe any beauty they 
possess to the unchanging form. On this view it would be difficult to 
say anything about the nature of the soul, for then there would he a form 
of soul from which any particular soul would derive the being it possesses 
as a soul* &it how exactly it derives its being would be left unexplained.
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nato aU,’%,tu to ,jive ali a.yswer t. this question by saying that ìt l® 
noe* w-xrj to take late account not just thè forte but acnethlng «1»«.
Each furo la s*;. aurate and unaffected by any other fosti Ho Coro vUl 
admit ito o. ooitc. This io true of forme themselves« but Plato goes on 
to any that it io also trie of thin..;.- that participate in forno (uotò tÒ 
fcvWflW tAv̂TiO WwttOV ftV* $V toTt ̂ ÌVOITO, oCtoTo tW ob'tt, To ty Tj| <̂ <T(0 2X)5b)«
The position now is that the true eaueof:» of thing:"., are the forno in thing» 
themselves, and if tilings ¿-osa«©» opposite forts«) thei. it io i»j*>».-ible
for one to become the other and «till ¡.oooeoa its form* But there are 
other things whose nature; 1 © ouch that although not ©i-posic® to- eose 
particular fora cannot admit the iareeence of that fora without ite nature 
changing. Thus the number three although net oppoelte tc the for: of 
evenness cannot adstt the jresence of that for© without changing ite 
own nature* Shia view ia how a;. lie! to the nature of the aoul. Title 
would mean that the eoul although not the opposite of death C‘«*uaot admit 
ite presence without a change In it» own nature. The argument an Plato 
•totes it ie however invalid. Instead of ,.®ing ae a promise in his 
arguaeat what he claim to have par*«red* that is, that the aoul cannot 
adodt death without a cl ton;:© in it nature, he sakes a premise of tie 
statement fcsat the eoul does net admit of death, and no ae«u«es that be 
•••He to i:.rote. Be eee»vs to jv-alime this when he goes to ask whether what 
ie iiaiorti l Is also imperishable, and the.-e ia the eugs^stio» that further
argument aay be needed to show this (lOfo).
do the argument 1« inecKuuuaive« There are, however, suggestion* 
here that «lato seek« to work out. He »peaks of God and the fore of life 
which are immortal sad imperishable if any thing is. This ie suggestivi of 
the view stated in the fimaeua of the vo^fòv which serves as a
pattern accordine to Which the «reatea the world. In the
**••*»» the eoul is created and this marks it ®ff fee® the iatellifjible 
weeld.ef forme which are uncreated. In addition, the view (80b) that the 
•oul ie akin to the divine and the eternal leads on to Plate*a view of 
the eoul ae intermediate between the indi visible and the divisible« It le 
thie view that eeecwi to be most lorertan* t» the ihaedo« This ie that the 
life ef the soul ie something distinct and sennet be identified with 
bodily lift* for the eoul bee a life ef such e kind that it ie not 
Independent of the difference that ttore is between good and evil.
The achievement ef a good life le d at se««® to be oeant by the eoul’e 
immortality« bit there ie no certain proof that this form of life that 
can belong to the aoul of the philosopher la iaj*>riehablo. At 10? A 
¿soemtee aayet *Q» soul then, Cebec, aore than anything else ie immortal 
and imperishable* and tide certainly i© the ctmcluelon that Plate want« te 
reach. The argonauts are not ooneluaivc, but they clearly show that Plate 
ie attempting to bring forward arguments for the faith with which Socrate» 
faoed death« There say ala© be a eutectica in ti» Fhaedo that Plate 
thought at this time that the immortal nature of the scad would be an 
argmant for the necessity of living a good life.ClQTC). Because the eonl
le Insertai there is a need to become as good and wine ae possible in order
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te caca» ovil in a futura Ufe* flato in thio waj? «eofco to d m l o p  allá 
e-stabllab fcbo «lew» th.it •'«orate« aevrx te law held, ¿wá wtwm fe» «poto 
th© i Hoto ttm «¿tañí nu;-- of doiac tul» aoci»d to lila to preve ttet ti» 
aoul i® laMVtol» 3at to ;jwm ttdo te oot *&ot i* eost ta?:ort»»fc te 
Sócrates’s thought. /or hirt it la r»e©..Tj .rv to U l» a Ü5®od til*© itfttir 
tfe» aoul ia ianortal «r aot« Show!»,; that tí» aoul lo loRWPtol m á  
«tonal wtll not «how wtwt Hnd of Ufa modo to fe» U w d »  la ti» ffcaade 
both tt»a« aepactís» noeal? tí» <g**a*rtloo of th« eoul*e «tonal notar« tmá 
ti» nwd to Ufo « bou Ufo *r pnornt asé ti» n U t i x »  batnee tíua* i» 
aot «loor* Xa ti» ¡tepublie (&Ud) lato altante to o w w c »  tí» 
difficulty b'j jsatting forward the orguaent that ti» ooul 1« not deatrojied 
tof «vil» ©ti« »NNM that bote £ood and «vil «aula or« temarte!* It le 
elaor, bowewor, la tí» Hanla that by ti» laeiertaUty of tí» eoul le «l*» 
mmab that tí» «nal eeeke to U n  «e gooá a Ufo m  poeoitte« Hoto eaoee 
to han rcallaid t He difíteulty. ti» dlfflcalty 1® %o áletlapilali 
«leerly he tona ti» eoul'e Iwteg «tonal 1» natura and tí» H a d  of lite 
It l*ads«
fia Buboauwmt díalos?»« at»a he aieneoee tí» reature of tí»' «oul 
it 1» tí» telad of Ufo that 1« noalhle for ti» «nal that 1« t p p w w t  
la H e  Had, and he m o m  te tefe» tí» «tonal «ature «f tí» «nal thr 
sraated. H e  «law of tí» *.%& tot choageR* arú im m  loager eeake to 
«oUblícáj lt’3 « t e m í  nuture hy t 'la-lar of it aa atediar tr an eternal 
f o m 9 bat he álecueoeo tí» aature of th« humo eoul ia tena# of 
and fe» eoaceeta tí 1« vite a Hff«mnt «leu of tí» eeulte «te «al notar«« 
tea «oal 1» eternal beeauee it 1« oalfHSotloa« U »  «oul 1» rvat títousH of 
«1 aeeeaearlly ;§oo4, «td froa thle i»otet of «lew if n  tufe» luto accouot 
tí» eanoeetloa that tíwre 1« la tí» i t a t t í  betune t í»  notloai ot 
ioeertauty «nd goodBoa® of Uf», han« ineitdltf le liaited.
< K*.-»V ) Xeeortelity teaeme ldantical wlth th« gaodeeaa of
tí»  U fe o f tí»  «oul. M ora IMte «leu feeoem« olear» houenr, H ete  
™ » f 'tt  aateneury t© di m a m  th« natan of t í»  aoul la  ©oomxítlen wttíi 
it e  notar« a® , and th ie l«4 Me tothink o f hume U fe  frea
» ln *  taHmdual poiat of «lew* For that le  wl»t 1« «treaeod Ir ti»  
lho«do tí» «  a m o f  la  i»^ b t for ti»  loaavtaUtqr of ladl«iAaal eoale.
Om q  douht 1« oa®t aj»ii u«le i t  bo«oe»e m**am*r$ to  w i »  a fhr mor* 
detallad  ««qulry la to  the «atare o f t í»  U fe  o f  the ooul l t t e U ,
rjato dieeueeee tí» «atan of Ion lo tí» tyele« tís« Pyoptmixm 
m á  tí» íhoedna» i» the Thaodraa e* «Lnt fiad hio deflaUic» of eoul 
** ealf-í>otioe. th» «i«v of etatod te th® íheete le
«caree t«d ulth thi»* heeoue« «»1 « attarlhutee to the «oul aa «Hllty ef 
ite oua • a H e d  ef tíoat»ao» ablllti of tí» aoul te reoHlaet tí» 
f«VMN to p u t fine tí» eepeeto of H a «lew of ti» ecw& as
aalf^ootluot «hltíi n  «hall éonl wlth later, tí» >»»*— « aoul 
p o m w o m  n i f n e t l n  whlab Plato thteke of ae aad ♦
It wao the of tí» eoul la Ito neallnt’.oa of the for«
tlmt «a» «ê -'haoleed In tho "Hoéo sfeerí: the eoul lo a&id to he «kte to 
th® fono w ich it roeoli««t-.:it U »  tature of the ooul aa ^£,»s
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however, is more closely connected for Plato with the life of the soul 
as good and evil, and In his discussion of this it is the Socratic view 
that all men declare the good that he has in Bind.
2he discussion of this question brings about a different approach 
to the question of the nature of the soul. The Socratic view about the 
care of the soul had suggested to Plato that the soul is something that 
exists independently, and then the moot important part of human life is 
the care of this independently existing soul* But this independently 
existing soul la hardly human at all. It can inhabit other forms of 
bodies apart from human ones. Its life in a human body is accidental*
So Plato does not find it difficult in the Fhaedo to accept the 
possibility of the transmigration of souls* If the soul is of this 
nature then its living in a human body ia only a form of imprisonment 
and it must seek an escape from this. Such a view of the soul will not 
allow of a serious consideration of human life itself as the life of a 
human soul ia a human body. The view of that Plato now states is 
an attempt to discuss the nature of the buff*» soul, and whereas in the 
Phaedo his view of the soul which belongs to a philosopher is hardly 
distinguishable from that which belongs to a god, the view that he now 
develepeeis one #Mch makes a clear distinction between human and divide 
life. On the view stated in the Fhaedo there would be little need for 
any kind of religious devotion. Salvation depends only on the moral 
struggle of the soul itself to free itself from body. That is the soul 
saves itself, it is able to do this bemuse its life in a human body is an 
imprisonment only, and its true nature is of such a kind that, if it succeeds 
in its escape, then Its immortality Is assured, Socrates would have had 
little sympathy with this. Hie insistence mi the care of the soul was ter 
the husan soul, and it was because he did not know the nature of this
that we find in the Apology that he cannot state with certainty what his 
fete after death will be, Plato in the Fhaedo attempted to achieve just 
*hls certainty, but only at the price of making the nature of the soul 
something that could not be regarded as the human soul. From this point 
of view the way in which Plate later seeks to understand the nature of the 
humen soul is »ere Socratie.
In the lysis we find the beginning of the view that is stated 
in more detail in the Symposium that the nature of 1 ® neither good
nor evil in itself, and this leads to the view that, if this A»
part of the life of the human soul, then it is neither good nor evil in 
itself. This is quite different from the Fhaedo where the View stated
seemed to be that the soul is immortal in nature and also good* its evil 
is a result of its life in a human body. It becomes clear in these three 
dialogues that Plato* s main interest is to show what human love for the 
good is, and how it is possible. There are two points made in the lysis 
*bich help to make clear the direction that Plato’s thou^it will take.
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One is a statement about the nature of love, and the other is a 
statement of the nat re of the good. In the Fhaedo the de-ire of the 
philosopher to achieve immortality was a desire to achieve that state of 
soul which is his true state of soul. His desire for this is a result of 
his life in the tody which is alien to him* And that state of soul is good 
in itself. But now there is a se: a ration of the desire from the good, The 
life of the human soul in the human body is a natural state for it, and 
the desire is not now something which belongs, to the soul because it lives 
in a human body, but it is a natural part of the soul itself. This means 
too that the human soul if it desires the good cannot be regarded as good 
in itself, but only hindered from achieving this goodnesu by its life in 
the, body. Because it desires the good and this is part of its life, 
the human soul is not perfectly good in itself.
The discussion of love in the Lysis shows that this is a subject 
on which it is possible to hold confused notions, and no notion at all 
of the fact that love defines the nature of the human soul, that is of 
human life. The first question ist Who is the true lover- the person who 
lovea or the person loved2 Asking this question, however presupposes
that one nows what love is, and so the discussion leads into 
difficulties. The first part leads to no conclusion because it rests 
entirely on ambiguities of the word love- ambiguities which lead to 
views of the following kind« It is possible to love and not be loved * 
and so friendship is impossible! It is not the lover who is a friend, 
but the one who is loved; It is the hated who is an enemy, and not the 
one who hates § People must often be loved by their enemies and hated 
by their friends and be friends to their enemies and enemies to their 
friends. There are other ambiguities too. If, however, it is thought 
that only pereone of like character can be friends, this too leads to 
difficulties. For then a good person is supposed to be a friend of someone 
8°od but it is Claimed that a good person will be self-sufficient and »dll 
meed nothing and so will neither cherish nor love anything. This is ths 
argument that is put forward again in ths Symposium ho show that a god 
does not love because he nothing. If because of this it is thought
that'love is between opposite characters then this will lead to such 
absurd result« as the just loving the unjust.
3heee impossible positions now lead to what is put forward ns 
a view that really meets the difficulty, that what is neither good nor 
bad loves the good and the beautiful on account of the presence of evil 
( TO ^ T i  HavCoV e l i>jot©ov
t©3 ¿>j<*Qou 8 k  W£ou<y{o<v. Ill B. )
(The use of the word here is interesting. It is a word whieh
Plato often uses when he states a view which he tqkee to be important and 
fundamental, but which takes the form of a view to be argued for, and is 
not just the result of an argument, it might be called an intuition or 
insight, That Diotiaa states the aarae view in the Symposium bears this 
out). What Plato is now tgUg to make clear is that if love is to bo
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understood at all one must make a distinction between love and its object*
And what is being a turned here is that the proper object( OiKs/i oV 221E)
of love can only be something that is superior to that love itself«
That is the insight contained in saying that what ia neither good nor bad 
lovea the good and beautiful on account of the presence of evil« This 
dialogue is given the title ̂ *(Io t iK.oc) , and much of what is said has that 
character. There are only hints given ao to the position that ia to be 
adopted} but although the dialogue ends on an inconclusive note because 
it seems to have returned to a view that M s  bean rejected that ’like love* 
like*, the whole point of the use of the word bllCiV^ here seems to he 
that love must be of its own proper object which is the good« It ia 
suggested that what is neither bad nor good loves the good because of the 
presence of evil« in order to avoid saying that what is evil loves the 
good« This in any case would not be a correct statement of the ease« 
because human life is not regarded as being evil of itself« If it were then 
it would not love the good« The example is from medicine a* so 
often« A human body which is neither bad nor good needs medicine on 
account of the presence of the evil of disease. (Compare the saying 
of Jesusl »1 am not come to call the rightesous, but sinners to 
repentance. They that are whole have no need of a physician* but they 
that are sick*(Luke 5*32). ¿vil can be present i,> two ways, however, and 
it cakes a ¿rent deal of difference which way it is present« The soul** 
nat re as neither good nor bad is changed if evil is completely present«
Then it loses its deaire and love for the good. But if evil has not 
completely taken possession, of a 30ul then the desire for the good is 
still possible, ( KeU To |vV|Ti. *<**0V
K**oO 0 % ^  fctfTiV» &rti TCi o o t o w
Y ^ W i V ,  TT«*VO yt . OuKouV &IblV VfoUCOV “Vj vto<|iou
^ ¿ ^ © . 0  «iVo «..tt
HOloS«* itwVTitC «’»TO Tt 3 ,^  1% 4 ‘X'*S
Too * 'f<Qo'\i, ou V tiv ©W v«<av ©urt ¿yocSov̂ iAfc* 2172).
This view is one in torna of wh ich one can state the Socratio 
view about ignorance* Socrates’s ignorance was that he knew that he did 
not know, and so his state is intermediate between complete ignorance «»d 
and knowledge« The one ia evil, the other good. The Socratio position 
is intermediate between the two* and it is on account of his ignorance Whish 
is evil, and because he knows that he is ignorant that he can love 
knowledge and wisdom, and b© a philospher* Bui what is said about good 
and evil here does not solve the problem that Socrates could not answer 
about the nature of evil and good. That it is difficult to state the 
nature of the soul as neither good nor evil is a result of not being able 
to understand this. For the nature of the soul as neither good nor evil 
is defined in terras of good and evil. But although it does not give 
an explanation of this, its purpose is to say something about the nature 
of the soul with regard to good and evil, and the fact that these are not 
understood makes it difficult. That is why the soul is spoken of in
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toros cf love* This question of ¿ood and evil continúen tote disc.issed 
by Iluto, and in the end of the tenth book of the laws there is a 
sugigentio- that he can ,riv.- no answer to the question when he says that 
there moot be at least tv:o hinds of soul responsible for the nature of 
things, ono ¿os-' and one ovil. (Laws 89612) But if the soul Is thought 
of as love, then it is possible to thin; of the humen soul not as either 
yood or evil in it.elf«
In the Lysis, the break with the position adopted in the Phaedo 
does not seem to be as complete as it scons to be in Symposium where there 
is clear cut distinction between the divine and the human. This 
distinction is not discussed in the lysis* hut there is an indication 
-b. t the view of the soul as eternal in nature which was put forwar in
the ibaedo still engages Plato’s attention« 53ie examples that are given 
to illustrate the two different ways in which evil can be present in the 
soul are reminiscent of the view stated in the line do of the relation of 
the forms to thing®« For it is suggested that evil can be present in 
such a way that the presence of good is impossible, and in the Pfaaedo the
view m s  that life belongs to the soul in such a way that death is 
impossible for it* Sow what is discussed in the Lysis is not the 
question sf whether the life of the soul is eternal cor not. That 
question it d elved here to be raised again in the Phaedrus* The 
question here is how one can speak of the life of the soul in relation 
to good and evil irrespective of whether it is eternal or not* All 
the emphasis is on this characteristic of human life* At 221£ Plato 
says: to <̂ ii©v v̂cfcivoo ©u ckv S©vtgc
V v ' i* J* u , Ttuic too oiwtioe|toc. >|«yVfo*.s. «« t l  °* t*‘CV**' ' J
^OlKfcV, % Tfc <6tV îXvdL Kbo, SniQupkk Toŷ wWiv 0&<Ta .
This aee. .3 to refer to the view of the soul in the Phaedo» For there 
the soul on account of its life in the body ha« had something taken away 
fro© it « the possibility of its living that life which properly belongs 
to it, She true object of love for the soul is something ©' wti tv «
This leads to the last suggestion of all (222®) that the goo# 
is friend of the good alone. ( o £ ^ *© 0 5 vu» 3y<*©co )«
The difference that is stated here between “A  S^oiov and vo o’wtlev 
also s-eras to re fer back to the Phaedo, for there it was the relation 
of what is like to like that was important in describing the life of 
the soul* The life of the soul is most like ( o|Loi^Tatov ) 
that which is eternal and unchanging, but new the emphasis seems to be 
0« that good wh ch is o^vttToV to the soul itself, and its likeness to>r *
something-sternal is left out of account. Those seem, to bt 
contradictory suggestions, but may not seem to be so when wo realise 
that the suggestion that the soul »becomes deficient in that which it is 
deprived of’ (221S) also contradicts the suggested nature of the soul as 
neither good nor bad b it as loving the good. The contradiction that
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arlaos te tl¡at i£ Viso fío-Xt 4.. ■.,. .. .. . .*:> - ...ve-
flCBOfcf.lng ©’»H.tAOV ,  til«»  t i i io  v3C*ivOa» i t  .'i». - - .—I _., ..„;;V
batee©» *1» ooul os tero ami tía  ©bjaot ©o it«  lw«,'. vju-o vvj&Lmi i*.¿- 
«lffiauXty, and te  tho %«$k»1u» ha «©asteo -> I I  naovw ry lo «eíjuiro 
&vt~w into tfa# uature of tea tere wblch tha aoul pona®»»** m d  íx^u 
that 1 te ten» la  aot tere oi tea boaotifuX Cor te© goal) bot loro of 
goaoratleo and ©uaeoítl-e te  tea teauiifui* Í30& ní th te aakoa i t  
pooülblo lo  «tettegateh beteoea tha m$  x-o of tea ®otil a® tero as bategf 
aelthar t>ood m »  ovil te  ItmXÍ m á  tea obáoot of ib® lora* I t  te  ahora 
that tea loro te «Ifforoni freo lis cfcjoet* 5hl© te  jk>1 otear te  tea 
lyate*
Tt4«r*A
tete te ateo acmaaatad alte saetear oaltar ahíte 
tecroaategly tenerte**! fbr iluto. te hte «aoueolca of test te 
te tea teste te «aforo te ttet eopd te teite « U  tetef gse4*
V^tXw "Ti¿ #V"tV. Kl*S Wtí/CX ivCiStfO <x3t» Ŝ VtfX , íA$ © TH 
aV-wk <<t ^iAuo TtAíA> • oukomV "¿o ^
í>\m 4 *̂ ov/ V ^ v T,V6S tn«6* 4 ,x#>v ^ LC> ^
I f  tea fo d  te  oNk¿ i©v tena lisa «gsod te  t&lsh « il sooái
«te** te goofeoa® of aoalf *nd o© wo «rote tero a póstete» «'.!•
« *  te  « tem aste teffovotH froo tte t  te  tea Hwafe*
fteftl sote te oofc dloauaaod tero m 11 te te teo «apobllo for
th» «itefaot «f te te
%*r* i% *• «teofly ooaatetes «tifiare»! fWm tea coo*aa«o «ftdob aa 
te á lr lte il Mía oa» ««Moro» a l t i io ^  11 te  te s t te  rrte tfea  lo «hite 
1«*m  Ufo ooa hoooa» soo«* te te  rateo» » qaoetii» thol te  ootetol te 
d ató te  ríos «f aseoUly« te  11»  íjocd only tem a or áooo o m  tero  te  
«ote 11« «Tiste «teorterat teo teoooetealro «alare «f Uaa lyote »Malta 
te©« tte  fael te s t i% «aiy «oteas u  te a »  U te . ten a r»  tea t te  «al« 
•te te  teo final gao« too* aot testigo lo te la r «texagnag i»  «o la r «o *
«•artel« «teUaoU«a te  a««« tete«*« «U «otetlo»
( t *> UtóL 4 ^ ov W u s ío , ¿s, £> inteyÍTAifávt* áAAoc^vcat
íl<é« 4«Lw  # L l iivsa i«"./*, «■'"’S •22* >*
»1 6 H »«irt t o * .  M t a n  o« «*••*<* « »  f«*»*" 1<r*** “ ** i* ^ "
not £=r w t t te e  « . t M » « a U  (¿¡« lev  ) *«* * »  •«««>»>« « •
ooul ^  n >T1|í<_ ^  ^  jj^agtingit Of t e a o t e o f  te«  ten* ten» t e
t te l  tea «ote by t e r l ^  tea «so« «■■■ «tetera te«l te «ataate f »  11*
(lo UiM 4 ^ ^  <?\ K^ÍqV 4 '̂ t,V _
n  teoonte test 11 te» tela te tea rito ttel te «tete* te tea ***•«* **ot 
» 1 te teo ̂ agootea aai teo íteatea» l isto attoâ te te «!«•« tea H »  te
11« «Iffloolltea teo t oro «aloe* te  tea Lyoio otra aoU 
U te«tealo4 by the fte a t teo «po««te» te  teo  iteoSvoo» teofc te  by teo 
te«ate of Igateo te  proteo of teo aoaateoMr» aa l tea wŷ -frcifi «r Sooaotea 
ao tea «asa oubjaol* teooo te« fptiiboi» teosa
■baowioii th«y laovo im> te  ¿kmbi m  t«  $4» ! tea «otate ©f teas lar» te .
V/hat Plato wishes to argue is that trus lows can only be defined by its 
object, biu what thooe two speeches do is to examine the non-lover and 
the lover unless proper attention be given to the object in each caw.
The kind of life that is proper and good for the soul can be understood
only in so far as true love is understood* When Socrates criticises 
Lysias' 3 speech his criticism of it is that it lacks a definition of love, 
-,nd without tnis any discussion of love is impossible* Socrates1« first 
speech is however ah ironic imitation of Lysias* a. Although he ostensibly 
begin® in the way in which he thinks Lysias ought to have, by giving a 
definition of love this definition only serves the purpose of his irony, and
in his withdrawal of his speech Socrates claims that it cannot have been 
a speech about love, because it describes low as evil, but *if love is
a god or something divine, he can be in no way evil*. Socrates*s
'Ehi® discussion of lève in both cases does not deal with what 
nato think; is essential before an account of love is possible, and that 
is on account of the nature of the human soul. (2h5C) An esaminati on of 
LydLce's speech, and the first speech of Socrates shows that *i»at is being 
described is the non-lover and the lover from What we might call a 
' phenomenal* point of view* It is just a description of a certain kind 
of love, or on th„ othor-hand,absence of that love, which is made 
entirely from the point of view of the lover and non-lover without 
considering the objects of their love, There is no attempt to 
explain the rosoiblity of such kinds of love, and to understand whether 
there is not some standard in accordance with which they can both be 
judged. What the two speeches give are accurato enough descriptions 
of What .la possible and what in fact does occur, but these descriptions 
do hot allow for any judgments to be made on the different kinds of 
emotions they describe*
®ie two speeches contai- two different ways of praising the 
non-lovesr. Socrates*s speech is ironic, because although it does praise 
the non-lover, it is meant to suggest that such praise is only possible 
if love is interpreted in the way in which he defines it. But that 
i,J not what love ie, lyaias's speech properly assumes this definition 
of love, and that is.why it praises the nonelover and not the lover*
If that is what love la, then it is difficult to praise it* Socrates*s 
speech, however, does contain statements which are central to Plato** 
view, as he states that in the myth, when he gives a picture of the 
nature of the human soul, and tries to show that love can only he 
understood in connexion with that* The two ruling principles which 
Socrates says belong to every man ara later referred to ih the myth as 
the two horses of the soul. They are \ o W  111 frogia
and -r0u } the former leads to t; ,the latter
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to <Tiaj ,(237!)) love ie defined as the former of
ti.ece, and tine point of Socrafced’s speech is to chow that the speech 
of Lysias understands love in the same way.
If love is thr . r.t f in t. is way t’icn some of things that 
Lyaias say© abv-ut the non-lev.-r seoia acceptable ono^&i, The kindnesses 
ox the non-lover are not tho result of passion) unci so he does not 
repent of ehe kindnesses he snows us the lover aces when his passion 
ceases, . because his actions are not passionate , there is no compulsion 
ire what he does. He acts of his own free will» and is able to take his 
own interests into account. A passionate person, on the other hand, 
that is the person whom Lysias describes as the lover, will have many 
regrets. He will event of the injury done to his own affairs because 
he has followed his passion# He will think of the trouble his love has 
caused him and believe that the persons whom he loves are in his debt. 
Passion gives rise to jealousy, and to new objects of passion, k 
passionate person, i f  his passion becomes directed to another person« 
will hate the person to whom his passion was formerly directed. If 
love is pas -ion of this kind, then it Lacks compietely the self-control 
of the non-lover. It is momentary and not lasting} depending on the 
urge of the nonentj and unable on this account to form any sure 
judgement aoout human character. The non-lover, however, b cause 
’ e practises self-control, and is not led astray by momentary passion» 
is able to judge character. He attempts to understand people» forgives 
them their involuntary wrongs and tries to prevent their intentional 
ones, The pasaxauawe person is to be blamed far hie evil way of life} 
but lack of such paejxon is not to be blamed# It is not on this account 
t'uat a peraon con be blamed for mismanagement of his affairs,
dome of the ideas here strike one as Plato * s own, though cast 
in another mould* The ability to forgive involuntary wrongs and prevent 
intentional ones is something which Interested Plato a great deal, and 
the idea no doubt had its origin with Socratee* Bat Lysias has only 
succeeded in praising certain moral traits at the expense of love.
His speech suggests that if you want to practise self-control, then this 
only possible in the absence of love. Bat the love which is then absent, 
is not true love. It is not sufficient Plato thinks to kill 
something must take its place* Other.rise a man may find himself in the 
condition that Jesus described when he talked of casting out one devil 
only to let seven other devils take its place. If there is a form 
of passion which is evil, lit must be replaced with another fora that 
is pood. Lysias's speech shows uc what the nature of sudd evil passion 
is, and its critioism of it appears just. But it io not sufficient just 
to drive out love of what is evil| it must be replaced by love of what 
la good. Lysias's non-lover has only apparently got rid of that love 
of evil, but what has taken ito place is not love of the good. It seems 
to be a condition of disinterestedness which is not capable of any love 
at all, Socrates suggests that such a state is impossible.
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is an ir.cvit bl: art of human life, and if ore form 
of it is driven out,it »rust talcs another form. Socrates suggests this 
at the vein beg.'.nnirg of hie, speech* ®uTui |A<*kA.ov
■ b l . i • frivlTul xl tp^crToio -notvo 'noMoo.
>fr-
ÎfcHUVjF W05 ̂ |*«*Xa t<c*Aĉ * toorie s£ 'i\<n*V IpeHTTct-L, Tl vt» ,'° « 
^  St T(J «tuTiOV «1^ .6 k©£ ^V, %  ojii-voj ^TTOV iqjZ'/ ifli-lfttvCLt
tO$ Wi< i ^ Y  (::3?B) The disinterestedness is only a covering of 
r ml intentions. The caul of each a non-lover still lives in a state of 
Rolf-iioceptiea. He ¡say lack the ov-. ¿whelming .w^.ion of t'uo lover whoa
Loaratos despisee in his first speech; lot he does rat. possess true love* 
he las given. over ids life to n calculating sensuality, and i” doing so he 
thinks he Id still master of hitiseif. Ouch a state is not that of true 
love( &LQ&S 2^30), out one of servility, although it
is praised by the multitude as virtue ( ¿(Vi.X.tv ©€£)*.'v utto uX'Vj^ou^ 
tTlaiVou |«.iv«V|V igi.t'vjv ¿5Si£) •
Lysias1» praise of the non-lover does not take into account 
the conflict between good and evil that takee place in human life« That 
conflict arises, according to Plato, because a person loves both what is 
good and what is evil, Lysias wnntc. to drive the love out; for him It 
Is only something evil. Plato, however, recognises that it is not just 
ti.vt, and he l: inkn that it needs to be purified* It needs this, because 
it was once par:*. Dut in or er to unesrst::id this need it is necessary 
fj rot of all to understand the nature of the soul} to understand that what 
it needo is purification; it neodo that because it has become impure.
The love which characterises the life of the human soul is not evil in, 
nature; it is only evix as a result of its fall from itc original purity*
It is impossible,however, to understand the nature of this fall 
unless c m  tries to understand the nature of the l i f e  wtrlch belongs to the 
soul. The speech of fhaedrus does not mention the soul at all. It does 
not attempt to understand how eooeone can be the kind of non-lover it 
describes. It is just a description of that condition# It is only 
possible to praise the non-lover in this way if one assumes that love 
is what Socrates defines it to be# 9ufc if love is not $ust that, but 
can be understood in another way, then other arguments would have to be 
rweeated In praise of the noo^lover# Bat even so there would then be 
only different opinions as to the nature of love and no means of deciding 
whether one opinion is the correct one or not# It is necessary to e-xp-lain 
how love Is possibles at all. Plato realises the difficulty of attempting 
to do this. He says that ho can only state what the life of the soul 
is, and 00 how love.is possible, in a myth. Human knowledge is unable 
to state ite nature; that would demand an account of a divine nature.(2MiA). 
But although he speaks of love only in a myth, the myth gains its serious 
purpose from being a myth about the nature of the soul, and without sons 
understanding of this, it is impossible to have any understanding of 
what love is.
In the Lysis we have a discussion of love which is Independent 
of any discussion of the nature of the soul# This is the reason why tbs
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discussion '«wrv load« oc no dor.ju.Ui conclusion about the nature of love. 
It raises certain problems about it only. ¿tod those problems still remain 
after the speech ox Lysias and die first speech of docrateo in the 
Fhaedruo. The Lysis, of course, does surest that love is something that 
is oi^inov to the life of the soul, out it does not show how
that is possible. Love is only discussed there as a part of human life, 
and its divine origin is not mentioned.
If we compare this with the speech of Agathan in the Symposium, 
then there is en immediate contrast. Agathan' s speech in praise of love 
praises it as a god. Then the difficulty is to see how it can be part 
of human life, neither the speech of Lysias which considers love to 
ue only human, nor the speech of Agathcn which regards it as only a god, 
can answer the question as to the nature of human love. Plato vnntuto 
show that love i3 a form of »madness vhich cooes from God, and 1« 
superior to sanity, which is of human origin' (Fhaedrus 24U)) 'It is a 
madness that is given by the gods for our greatest happiness', (2450)*
If love is of this nature, then it is understandable that 
Plato speaks of it in a myth. but an examination of the myth shows that 
it is not unrelated to human life. He does try to show how the 
ideas he expresses in his myth are related to the different ways in 
’which men live. One might think that Plato's view about love and the 
divine origin of the soul is just an illusion. How wouldFlato answer 
such a charge? His answer, I think, would be that a myth of 
the divine origin of the soul, and so the divine origin of love enables 
one to understand something about the soul and love which could not 
be mderstood in any other way. In seeing how Plato relates 
the myth to human life, we see its purpose and value as a myth.
If it did not enable us to understand anything about human life, then it 
would be illusory. But this does not mean that the myth gives us same 
understanding that can be stated apart from the myth. Bather the 
understanding is latent in the myth itself. But it gives understanding 
in so far as it is related to human life. It is a picture of elements 
in human life of which one cannot give an accurate account. If m  
think of the innumerable different kinds of tilings with vhich human love 
in its different forms is connected, then ve realise that its nature 
is a mystery to us. How could one accurately distinguish between the 
kind of love shown by the lover of Lysias' s speech, and the lover of 
a Zeus-like nature in the myth? If cne says that cne is attracted by 
a certain kind of physical beauty (233), while the other is moved by 
beauty of soul (253) then making this distinction in no way explains 
how love is pocsiuLe in each case, v*e cannot find out anything about 
its nature apart from -the way in which it reveals itself, but to 
understand it even a3 it reveals itself Plato considers to be full of 
difficulty. The question of how one loams to recordse love is 
very difficult to answer. Plato thou ht that it cannot ts answered at 
all unless we think of its origin as divine and not human. And Plato
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thought too t at such an understanding of what leva is enables one to 
.nde. tnnd certain things ab it it which cannot be underctood in any other 
way* In fact he thin's that this is the only way in w ich love can be 
understood. But this kind of juxd;?rstaading only comes when people live 
a life in which thoir relationships to one another are also relationship» 
with the gods.
If we examine the speech of Agathou in the Symposium, then we 
see that what he says ab ut love, does not help us to understand what 
human love ia. Although in Agathon’s speech tl ere are statement.--, about 
the nature of love with which we may feel Plato would not disagree, the 
speech does not say anything about human love, and how that becomes 
possible for human beings. Plato wants to see how it is possible to 
understand human love. For there are ideas in Agathon’a speech which remind 
one of what Plato says in -the Timaeus about creation But what he says in the 
Hraaeus about creation is concerned with divine activity in creating the 
world, and not with human life except in sc far as it is part of that 
creation. Agnt on ask* ’Who will deny that the creative rower of all life 
is the work of Love’s wisdom, by which all living creatures come to be and 
are borne?” (19?A). Agathon opposes the works of reason to those of 
necessity, and creation is the victory that persuasion gains over force.
Love must be distinguished from necessity. It is love that in <f o ̂ 05 *
( °S «■©^w. 197A). It is what brings order where there was
disorder before. It not only rules in the realm of natural becoming, but 
it is also the regulating principle of divine life. Before the birth of 
love there were TioXX* »fcu. among the gods, due to the rule
of I but the birth of love brought n*vt‘ , both
to gods and men through the nature of its love, a love of beautiful things.
Socrates objects to Agathon*e praise of love. He has said that 
love is love of the beautiful (to S£*v Twv but Socrates criticises
this statement. Love itself is not a longing for the boutiful as ax oh, 
hut it is a longing and desire for conception and generation in the 
beautiful (206E) j it is not a longing and desire to love the beautiful 
or even to know that there are beautiful things, but the of
each living creature is a desire te perpetuate its own existence in 
accordance with the beautiful, i.e. to become beautiful oneself.
In the Symposium Plato is seeking to show that all becoming 
strives to achieve a state of being which is always the same, a state 
which he calls • He thinkr 0f the process of becoming
as a continual transition from one state to another, where nothing 
remains the same. This is also the account in the Fhaedo (74d), The 
idea expressed there was that one particular thing strives ( $0vAt‘C<v. ) 
to become like something else which it is not, but falls short of this.
The question of generation and decay is discussed in the Fhaedo, in 
relation to the sY£-^ • Each thing It is said, derives its being
from the presence of the form in it» nothing is heauHfdl apart from the
presence of the form of bealy. According to the view of the matter
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as :'t is put forward in the Ihaedo* it is for the best that becoming 
dr uid be determined by the fares (9?c f£*a<rrov ti©***«. taut-v, i v ) »
That everything she JLd be as it is» by the presence in It of its 
appropriate fora in for the bast. Aristophanes, in his speech« regards 
the fruition of love as ¿(m c t o v  (193C). His view of love is from 
Socrates’s point of view, completely one-sided and it is criticised 
(205E). It had only to do with sexual love which found its consummation 
in the finding of one's other half. Socrates shows that love Is not 
only something which has to do with love between a man and a woman« but 
also that it has a far wider meaning* He illustrates what he means by 
explaining the use of the word 1To/r^«’«i * This word (and its
oognate ) is usually only used to refer to one class of
people* those who write poetry* But this is am unnecessary narrowing 
deem of the real meaning of the word* for all creative activity should
be regarded as VotV’S • f i t Tdc * *  T*G ff;S tV>
S tto #l»v tfVd v2O'* IcTC / lĈ t u1t0I •*««<&**£ -TW’i (
r i p ^  ll<yt W*''- 6 L fOwfiOv/ d'»||«,ieo£yei-
In the same way the leaning of the word?£u>s has been 
down* Just as all TTm ^ î  is a cause of bringing anything into being,
60 is In every case a love of that which is good* for there
carnot be any love unlese it ia a love of the good, and this love of the 
good whch men possess is not only a desire to possess the good, but 
to possess it for ever ( © Too t o  oty*.&'oV dfoxZ €̂ V«>cl a<tC ).
Love then, just as creative activity is universal in its
«cope and activity; and just as all is determined by love
, / . i / r >> i go all love itself isonly, insofar as it isqvt'wyij kaVtotowst i t w ♦
a attA the trood is the same as the only love when it is love of the good, nd gooa
_ .. - , _ . ., . oren*ration and conception being the objectbeautiful. Thie t o m »  tnat generation *•
. , 4 _ rsaod̂  and in this way theof love is good, for every object of love s & *
* i , .run with that given in the Ihaedo * account given in the Symposium agree» n
that everything that is, is *0T best.
What is emphasised in the Symposium is that this love of 
generation and conception is Tto ><kXcJ • Here we see in Plato's 
account the way in rhf**» he is seeing to answer the question of the 
relation between the temporal and eternal which is so fundamental 
to any view of immortality* The reason why Socrates says that love 
io not the love of the beautiful itself is because the beautiful itaelf 
( To K U\<w , the fora that is > is unchanging and eternal.
So amy love of the beautiful itself would, in a sense, Itself be 
unchanging. The four previous speakers had all agreed in their 
eulogy of love in praising love es a god. How Socrates denies the 
divinity of love, far the nature of love is that it desires that which 
it lacks, but no god can in any way be said to lack anything. She 
beautiful Itself is unchanging* it is that which is  the end and aim of 
all training in 1 * yuTi*«*. , which is achieved when a ran looko
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partakes of its nature in such a wav that however much particular 
beautiful things may come to be and perish * beauty itself re::iains for 
ever the sarae. It is clear that in the Symposium th© emphasis is 
placed on the unchanging nature of the form, the form of beauty as it 
is here. As for things that become, they are for ever changing. 
(207D.E.) Human life is never the same* and this change applies both 
to man's body and to his soul, and it is only because the soul possesses 
this love for generation ( TU> vcotX̂ J ) that it can achieve 
i. ¡mortality in any way whatsoever. For love is described as a great 
daemon; a mediator between what is divine and human; between the 
immortal and mortal; between the unchanging and eternal, and the changing 
and temporal. The myth about the birth of love throws light on this* 
For levs itself Is borne of earth and of heaven; he is the offspring 
of lesouree and Poverty. Kite > As such love la that which is
always changing itself. «In the spacw u£ a day he will be no;, ;hen all 
goes well with him, alive and blooming, and now dying, to be box« again 
by virtue of his father's nature, while what he gains will always ebb 
away as fast' (203E). All generation is a manifestation of love, which 
is forever seeking to gain immortality for itself* ‘The whole creation 
is inspired by this love, this passion for immortality"• (208b ) This 
desire for immortality is a desire to be always the same and unchanging, 
a state which is achieved for human life insofar as it can be achieved 
In a kind of "beatific vision".
* matter, in the Fhaedrua,discussion in the Republic, and, f®* *
, , , , . . thg discussion in th© Symposium* Herewhich is closely connected with the ax«©»
A _  «nerml drift of Plato's discussion, we ssy note «»at seems to be the generau
_  u0 to and including the Republic,His main interest in the dialogues, p
to see hew a man can possess such a knowledge of what is good, just 
and beautiful, that be say become such himself. This «»ole discussion 
is one which is carried on in relation to the doctrine of the forms 
which are the true objects of knowledge* We see, however, that Plato's 
interest in what we may call personal life, that is, in «hies, led him 
into difficulties when he attempted to explain how human goodness depends 
on divine goodness (the form), Hie form was a principle of explanation;
everything «»at derives Its from participating in a form* This
view of things meant that to explain anything was to explain it by its 
form, and in regard to virtue, it led to the view that virtue in itself
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is one thing* Men, when t:ey are good, are not good in different ways 
or thro $ 1 different causes, but they are good in the same way} for not 
only is it the case that «lut«» to ol̂ ol&O'/ (the form) la always one 
and the sane, but also any one n®n who is f ood can only be good because 
he chares in the goodness of the form itself» (c »f» Mono 73 C* A H  
persons therefore who arc good a o good in the same way} for they are 
good by being x>ossessed of the sane qualities*) This principle of 
explanation as atlied to human life presents difficulties! the 
difficulty, for instance, of how anything can be good-in-itoelf, which 
Aristotle raised* But the view raises far more serious difficulties 
when, from being a way of accounting for the nature of human lif® 
conduct, it is elevated into a principle to explain all things, or 
everything that la« For litis is the view put forward in its most 
elaborate form in the Republic, where we find that the form of the Good 
is regarded as the • the most important
thing to be learned* As such it is that which gives being to everything 
that is (the ideas themselves) and also it forms the pinnacle of the 
hierarchical system of knowledge as it is de scribed in the Republic | no 
object of knowledge can be properly known for what it is, unless one 
has knowledge of the form of the Good* It is that which gives the 
intelligible world of the forms its order and being and is also the 
principle in accordance with which all things in the world of becoming, 
become as they do* It was because Plato chose to make the form, which 
was first of all only used in considerations about virtue, into a 
principle of teleology that his most serious difficulties arose* For 
now there were not only ethical Ideals * justice, beauty, goodness} 
but also there is the question as to whether there are physical ideals — 
a form of fire or a form of dirt (Rurmenidea 133)* But hot only that} 
there is also the question of how such forms (of physical objects) need 
to depend for their being and nature on the for® of the Good*
We mention this later development ef Plate in brief in order 
to point out that the **** of discussion of immortality and the whole 
question of the purpose of human life wh eh we find in the Symposium is 
one which it is difficult to connect with his later discussion of the 
natter. For here the most important role in this achievement of 
immortality is played by %£<*>$ • ĵ01r* *•* the determining factor
in the desire for immortality} without love it would bo difficult to 
see, on the view put forward in the Symposium, how immortality, and 
what goes with it, wore possible* For love Is that ceaseless striving 
in all that is, to besoms like the diviao* It is not divine in nature 
itself} but without its operation there can be no relationship with 
what is divine and eternal. It is described as a$otip.mv and as
auoh it makes Intercourse between what is divine And hums possible. 
This role of a mediator between what is h m m  and diviao Is a necessary 
oas, for Otos $1 ol (203A). Ths divine is
entirely different from the human, being changeless and eternal, 
itereas human life is always changing* la both the Symposium and the
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Phaedrua this power of love is directly connected with the arts of 
divination and pro hecy which depend on an inspired ¡sadness (as it is 
put in the Phaedrus) for their working* In the Fhaodrus, when Socrates 
wishes to enquire into this great power of love and the divine Badness 
vfhich it inspires in human life, he firot of all ;:ives an account of the 
immortality and nature ( ) of the soul. This shows us
quite clearly that is a possession of the soul, both human
and divine» In the myth of the Phaedrus, the figure wh:;.ch is uaed to 
depict love is that of wingsj it is the wings of the soul which enable 
the soul to wing its flight to that <?\»goiv'CtkTt&J where it may feast 
upon and contemplate the world of the eternal and unchanging ideas, 
love enables the lover to become one with the beloved* Through love 
the soul becomes Capable of what Plato, in the Ffcaedo, had described as 
the kinship of the soul with the forms.
The m i n  difficulty which he had faced in the Fhaedo, and failed 
to solve, was how the soul can be regarded as immortal unless it is 
unchanging in character, since the icwortal and divine are unchanging.
At least the forms are m»ehttMg4«g and eternal, and alvays the same, 
but human life and the life of the human soul cannot be regarded so. The 
soul can change, and the nature of its life can change, and this fact is 
brought out, in part at least, in Plato's account of metempsychosis which 
appears in other accounts of the life which the human soul lives (in the 
myths of the Gorgiae, Republic, Phaedrua, *nd in the account of the 
creation of the human soul in the Tinmens.) The doctrine of 
metempsychosis however, is s part of Mate's attempt to see the life of 
the human soul as something **yt-gh meets Judgment ¿or its life in the 
body, and the kind of life which a human soul will live in smother 
incarnation is determined by the kind of moral striving it is able to 
attain in any **»w»f* U f a  it might live. One of the important points, 
stressed in the Phaedo, is that the life of the true philosopher is one 
vhich enablea him so to take oare of his soul, that he may have a sure 
hope that after death he may go to live with the gods and escape from 
the "wheel of rebirth•" It is the philosopher who is regarded as able, 
if anyone is, to live the kind of life which makes this escape possible, 
for his life is characterised by a moral striking which will enable him 
to. avoid the Judgment that naturally comes the way of the human soul. 
However it is clear that the hhman soul does strive | its achietnent 
of immortality depends upon this, and this, in its turn, means that the 
life of the human soul must change.
7. fWith regard to this* the doctrine of is important.
For the soul does not remember what it bac learnt in a previous life 
ab ut the forms as a matter of course! it can either recollect more 
dearly or more dimly« and whether its remembrance is dear and pure 
depends on the purity of the life which it has itself achieved. Plato's 
argument about the kinship of the soul with the divine and eternal mist 
be connected with his whole view of ¿VH 13 • It is not merely
that is meant to prove the pre-existence of the human soul
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before birth| it also, in a way, shows that the soul is of such a 
nature that it can recollect what it once knew. This means not 
only that the activity of the soul in remembering is characterised by 
Xt»furpVs , but also that this is dependent on the
soul's being akin to the divine and the immortal. We raî xt say - the 
soul is not immortal because it thinks and reasons, but rather that this 
activity itself, which is regarded as that which makes ^ ys-\$ possible* 
is only conceivable because the soul itself is immortal in nature, or, 
as the matter la put in the Phaedo, akin to the divine and the unchanging» 
So the soul conceived as pre-existing before its life in the body must 
have had a life of a specific nature| if it did not have this kind of 
life it could not have known the forme. The argument which Is connected 
with this atat ment about the soul being akin to the divine is that of 
the soul being uncompounded and simple. That which does not change 
(the divine and immortalt the fora) is uncoapounded and indissoluble, 
and the soul is akin to this, and so it is argued that it ie »altogether 
indissoluble or nearly so». The view ie that the soul is of thl nature* 
because in human life itself, the soul, as long as it continues constantly 
the same and unchanging tCc*©’ «turv̂ v ) is able to contemplate and
know the forme. This condition of the soul (t w Q ^ ccT^ ) is
wisdom ( >̂£0 '/'yrî  ), y^at the soul must achieve is "reduplication»
( 3 v<* j u ^ ^ c r ) 0f n s  condition when, before its life in the body, 
it knew the forme as they are in themselves. It ia the soul in this 
condition that can be thought of as uncompounded and simple, and the 
life of the philosopher is the striving to achieve this kind of 
condition for his soul. It is striving after wisdom. But this can 
only be achieved by the soul . This is the main
point of the o t v d o c t r i n e .  She life of the soul in 
the body, however, that is human life, mast be an attempt more and more 
to achieve this state) that is, a state unchanged and simple, and as 
like the divine as Is possible, far in such a state, and only in such 
a etate, the soul will be able to oontemplate that which la eternal and 
altmye the sane.
From this it becomes dear that the fundamental difficulty is 
how the soul of the philosopher can be immortal at all* for this can only 
be the case if it 1 so«vt>) »w£VG-cy, but it ia equally evident that it is 
never this but also changing. It is this difficulty that the doctrine 
of ie meant to meet. It is interesting to note that in the
Ehaedrus Plato dlvldee his account of the soul into two parts. There is 
first of all a general kind of proof for the immortality of the soul 
(a^5C - 2WA), or rather for the soul qua soul, that is for the state 
of the soul described in the Pfcaedo as < * w **0 • Ths soul as
such, it is argued, is immortal because it moves itself and its self - 
motion is ungenerated. For Plato the presence of soul always implies 
the existence of a living being ( ^u >6 \f )\ and his position in 
respect ie important.
-  5 3 -
It mi$\t be argued that it is not at all clear whether in fact 
this is the case, for in the Phaedo, his description of the soul lied cone 
very near to saying that it is a form, and it vjouLd be very difficult to 
understand how a form (according to the Phaedo view) as unchanging and 
oíuTn could in any sense be said to be alive ( ov'
1 * a -and Plato nowhere 3ays there that the l\ 6a^ is a 5 6>/ » t
his difficulty is seen In the fact that he speaks of the fora of life 
(«AA to í\ $05 ) and for our purpose, it is important to note
that that fora is there coupled vAth the words O Qtbç } and it is said 
that if anything is immortal and indestructible, it is these two.
But neither of these is the soul« When vn come to the Phaedrus, 
we have the statement (difficult enou$i to interpret in detail) TT*<r«*
j not only is the soul imaortal, it is indestructible 
and ungenerated - this is vhat its immortality implies« Presumably,
however, this indestructibility and immortality of the soul is different 
from that vhich is attributed to A  r*js £w*>|S find e &to£
for a fora, at least is unchanging, and it is difficult to see how 
Plato ever thought of it as otherwise. So it does not partake of 
motion* it does not move as a fora. This mention of a fora of life 
is perplexing, for how can it be a fora of life vriless it is living 
itself« If that is the case it must in seme way be regarded as its 
owa fora, if we are to evade the difficulties of the third man argument. 
This brings up the whole problem of the relation between the changing and 
unchanging, vhioh is the fundamental problem of Plato’s philosophy#
As for the account given of the soul in the Fbaedrus, it is ¿Lear that it 
forms part of Plato’s later attempt to answer this problem. For his 
answer begins with the (In the Sophist for instance) that
T6  TR\/T£\£>£ OV itself contains motion, life, soul and
intelligent activity, and here we find that is made the means
of distinguishing between what is mortal and what is immortal, between 
vhat is temporal and what is eternal. Soul in its perfect condition 
and fully winged cares for everything which is without sm£L, and govern# 
the whole cosmos, the soul of a human being is different from this 
because it has lost its wings and so its perfection and goodness. It has,
by this loss of its wings, suffered a kind of fall which is apparent in 
the fact that it inhabits an earthly body. The mortal is distinguished 
from the lsmortal in this way. A H»ing creature ( g w  ) vhich ie 
mortal is one vhich is compounded of soul and body* its mortality 
consists in its having lost its wings and inhabiting a body. In this 
state it has lost the power to maintain its proper relationship with what 
is immortal and divine*
la the Phsedrus, the nature of the human soul is discussed from 
two points of view, both of which attempt to show in what way the soul 
can be regarded as having any relationship with the divine# First of a n  
there is the discussion of in. the syth as the power whereby the
soul gains access to the divine and secondly there is the discussion of
rhetoric in vhich Plato attempts to show bo» the life of a soul is its A 
(discourse) end how souls of different kinds are determined in their
differences by different which make up their life, and how
the beet kina of soia has a ko\jt£ about things that are divine
and eternal*
Plato’s whole philosophy up to the Republic is orientated toward« 
the For:: of tho Good uh ch he regarded as the ^ 0 / ^  °* all knowledge«
The dialectician is described as <Tu7eiiTivco^ - he who is able to see 
all things in their proper relation to everything else, -and is thus able 
to give an account which is true and correct. There is, however, in the 
Republic, a strict cleavage between the realms of opinion ( 6 ̂  }
and knowledge ( k 'v ), The description of the dialectician
as <rovon-nv*Oi is similar to his account of the flight of the 
soul to theoifcUoj TÓitcv in the Phaedrus, and also the description of tho 
Fora of Beauty in the Symposium. Althou^i in the Symposium 1« is the 
Fora of Beauty that is the main object of discussion, (c.f. Pteedro» 250D)* 
and the other forms are not so much as mentioned* we find that in the 
Hiaedrus the same status is given to the other forms (2^70) justice, 
temperance and knowledge* It Is important that the fora of knowledge 
itself is mentioned here, for it shows what Plato*# thought in this 
respect was. In this port of the myth I» ia describing the nature of 
0>io 0 §<X/o ic< , It is nourished '/**? ftvoiv.
which has no relation to generation and change ( *yî ttf*i )» but is
TÌ,v w  4  % fen* 3* * ® ‘i8  1 8  ^
of divine life which is unchanging and eternal. There is only this one 
kind of divine life. Which is unchanging! but human life takes different 
forma and the clarity of this ia made to ftpead on the clarity of vision 
of the eternal world which the soul possessed prior to its full. What 
is important is the description of that kind of human life whijfc the 
philosopher lives. The fall of the aoul fren thim ©u£*vi«s TotToS le 
described as a loss of Its wings which symbolic the power of love which 
enables it to follow the procession of the <bds to the heavenly plain, 
and feast upon the forms. Sow of all the human forms of life, only one 
does not seem to be regarded ae a complete fall and a complete loss of ̂ 
«lags. Oil. 1 « the life of the philo^her (2»tf G*"> ^
\  ±iU*Lk”  $«<*"> PhUosciher seeks to
remember those eternal fore» the contemplation of vhich make divine life 
Whftt it is. W ,  i. l o u  t> > pwticulM «JT by thinking ( )|
hy Mains «ha unity of tba f om in ® I  iwrtieulm», that unity of the 
form which the philosopher eaw When he travelled in the procession of the 
Gods.
What of account can Plato give of the soul then? Be tHwk« 
that the immortality of the soul follows from Its being self-motion^ 
but as for the nature of the soul as it really is, this could only be 
known by a long and superhuman account. FTco a human point of view it 
is only possible to give something resembling an account of its real 
nature. This is attempted in the myth. Here we meet one of the most
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dhamcterlstlc featuros of RSatö*» **«* tvStM*  to 010
tUfitinetion b t o *  Wtert io tarn» ra* »  not «nly appoara
hen; in tho toecSrua. In t o  Bej^He, t o  torneo, » *  too ©f 
tbo 300a can on-y b? ^  oribe* by « » *  o f ß « issila , mA W m A m  i»  
the mir«*«, tho accouut wiiich 1s of cr*atl«n caanot be r*$*r«*d
ae W *  *v» m i o n  » d  t o m S*»* ^  « *  ef ^  w U
duwree in the natura of timt «orld itaelf* t o  m *xr« of t o  »coa*** 
tbat can b« ~iv * of anythin,- i» detemtod by t o  »tu*« of tot tblo® 
itnelf* Hie er>>atcd « o r li, coBr«i«»-ì « Uh thè moxHi vhich  la eternai*
io an of timt eternai «orlai o© th« «©con* «bioh can »  & * *
of it 1« «cay «n :.mc* con;a~v vAth an aoeouat of that «hi» i«
and ’irohnn^iBg»
Hm*ro are na^cntloas ln  th« ilme<lni» mgtíx of thi# M A x ic tim  
bet-e n «bat 1 » hmmm and ü»t 1 « dt*to. Ä  t o  Urna of hi« *9*,
Plato distingui»«« betwcon & aortal » *  imßxrt* living creature, 
iwtw*» a I » m  bet*; and a ¿od# * »  i ^ o o e  arguwwA »  t o  
isoortality of th« *>ul ted bocal coocerned wlfch aoul apart feo» muy u t 
ito particular aanlfeotationo in t o  «orla of beotfeAo®* it b»* Xm» 
concerned to «tiov that aeul 1« uo&enerated and tho <34*u®° ©»»«ttoft*
How i» t o  a*th Plato oe«Ki» to talk about thè Afferò** m y  i»  
thè «oul «hi» io ua@eao!«t®»d j«rtio4i*tea in thè Ufo of th* 
ue a «hola* oul &A1òt‘ tv %xx#is * «nd ito t«o ton»
«Uh «hi» he io her« me» t o  dito* a*** *«*»» to*» u t umA*
v'oul conoide : d genoscully apart ir©« **• vetta*** «anifpatetico* ha* th*
«ore of all that «hi» i* m*ùX*a* tm vorm e t o  t o U  h*s**a**
but in doto too it apioare in Aff**©afc tmem of oreetw*,
of vi deh the-vo ai« two Kin U> »ich h® bere «• tho mortai a*KÌ
t o  imertal, t o  A » t  inette® » i »  i* Auam botv*» t o  huma «*
«wtal «ad t o  divi» and ia»rt*l W * W  « tato* i* mm * & +
d t o * »  »  t o t o r  ««il io perfeot or not.i > t o  Ä t t o t i o n  U
not « W  «hi» la to*ö upo* a dtffereooe between « creato »ad*» 
uoereated living «reato1«« bat upo* a differì»« in t o  hiad of üf*  
tot «eoi U » o  in « a »  «a», fbr eoul tot io pwrtot gevemo th* »«3« 
«ocrld- and thie oirfeot *t*t* of soni io «Nswribed lioi.'e a* a fhll
of « a »  «  «• « •  - a .  -  — I
foto and find ite nourtouea» toro, t o  «orto U«i«6 «reaturo*«
Ufe io « u »  aa it i* beoau» ite ooul tee tot ite oinge, and hao b o M
àotoa to * body* io t o  t o  l*»rtal Utriac «rentar«, no roano»* 
aeeeuwt 0 »  be gito of ito » t u » ,  but it io iaa^imd a« »an ianortnl 
bei» WhiA ha» a ooul a*a a body »ich are uait-.’d for all ti»M* t o  
alvi» aoul io portotly good, »orea* th« huma ooul i» nnrfely otU.
t o  Ufe of t o  godo io 0 » «hi» la porfOot aad onUterablo« 
to rc i*  no üffieulty t o  them to ano»* to t o  00^'«^ 1 »  
contemplate thè «temei tovw* t o  loso of «Ing* owwse about » »
bouXb » o are <Ü«im« but tollem  in  t o  proceden of t o  god», are mmVl*
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to follow an account of the recalcitrance of the here# which represents 
evil in die so u l. Such a soul "loses its wings and flails to the earth"* 
la the myth the kind of life lived by a human being on earth corresponds 
to what he saw when he followed in the divine procession* There Is a 
gradation of different kinds of lives beginning with that of tbs 
philosopher and ending with that of the tyrant* The philosopher gained 
the clearest vision of the eternal world) the tyrant saw the least of 
all* Of all those it is only the philosopher who in any way still 
possesses wings, and this because he Is able, by the exercise of 
Ko^\<r to recollect what onoehe beheld* Such a ana
does not concern himself with human interests, but tarns his attention 
to «hat is divine. In doing this he is misunderstood by the majority 
who consider him to be mad, whereas he is really inspired*
There Is one recollection in human life which above all else 
•aablss a man to regain the use of hie wings and so live the life of 
• philosopher. This is the recollection of beauty, and it is by the 
love of beauty as seen in human life that a mas is able not only to 
rsgainUs own wings hit also to be the aeons of bringing the person who 
is the object of his love to regain his* This regrowth only happens, 
however, insofar as that unruly horse of the soul is tamed and brou^nt 
unto? control j at least as far as he is ooneemsd with achieving the 
"tab» of the philosopher* For the souls of men seek for their loved 
who is of like nature to their own, end who reoekM.es the god wham 
they follow* this relationship becomes the basis of education; for 
«• the lover recollects, by means of his beloved, the nature of him 
8®d, and seeks to imitate the life of his god so also ho loads tho 
beloved to live a life in accordance with tho life of tho god*
This kind of life is only possible insofar as the love eschews evil.
especially tho case with the followers of Zoos, who seek out 
°®* ef a philosophic nature for their beloved* Their action towards 
their beloved is free from envy end slavieh ill-will. Love >
is that pwoer in the life of the soul which brings a man to his 
destined state) it means a recovery of his pristine nature and life 
before ho lost his win s. Bore, as in the Symposium, the achievement 
of this is not an individual effort, as it is In the Phaedo , on 
the part of a man by himself, but it is mads to depend on a 
relationship of love with one ktio is like minded with oneself) and 
love can only be good, for evil cannot bo the friend of evil* Only 
tho good can be the friend of the good.*
The second part of the Efeaedrue throws some light on the 
oath itself. The myth describee different kixde of souls, and had 
depicted the different kinds of life as to some extent determined by 
the following of different gods. The followers of Ares, when they are 
ooiaed by love and consider themselves to be wronged in  any way, become 
wrdsrous in intent and wish to sacrifice both themselves and their 
loved ones. Tho myth also accounts for tho different kinds of Uvea
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lived by different people (l.e., the philosopher* the physician* the 
sophist and the demagogue etc.) by relating them to the clarity of the 
vision of the eternal world which the soul gained before its life on 
earth* The differences that exist in human souls is Platons say of 
referring to different kinds of life that people live* Plato sss 
undoubtedly very interested in distinguishing between these different 
kinds of lives and in seeking to show that it was the life of the 
philosopher, ruled by the cultivation of , that was the best*
It ie no accident that two of his most important later dialogues are 
called "The Sophist" and ’*15»  Statesman". A great deal of *toat Plato 
wrote was concerned in showing the importance of being able to 
.«■Mwgirtrit between different kinds of life and which life was good and 
which was evil*
The importance to be attached to the art of persuasion or 
rhetoric in this connection is paramount. Plato had inherited from 
Socrates the idea that philosophy was concerned with discussion and with 
persuasion by of discussion* Rhetoric, as practised by the
sophist, is described by Plato as T « ^  ^  K *1'*s/ (26U)*
and Plato himself was concerned to show what he considered tile true 
nature of tvi4̂  art of persuasion to be* He thought that everything 
worthwhile in the end depended upon the right kind of persuasion, and 
to bring this about he considered to be the true end of education* The 
influence that this idea had with him ie seen tfien we icmnstmr that his 
whole view of creation In the Tiaasus is considered as a victory of 
persuasion over fores* But the persuasive art *i*t ess truth as its 
guide* and not be led astray by deception* it sn»t he a persuasion of 
the good over the evil and not vise vewn. »»ere wsa, howkvsr, so 
far as rhetoric itself was concerned, s spurious kind of art which was 
the art ef the Sophist* It was merely concerned with words and not 
with truth - it was a \oy«W and not a XoyoS lvr«iV  .
Hat© mentions here hi# theory of dialettie, which is more fully treated 
in ths Sophist and Bliticus. The rhetcridsa, at least, must, if 
he is to be successful, knew the nature of the soul and be able to 
distinguish between the different kinds of soul, because there are just 
as many different wees* of msn to bo persuaded as there «re different 
iH*yCn of sm£ c m e  firmt necessity in s speaker is that he should know 
tiie truth about those things with which his speech is concerned* Be 
nust be to give a clear definition of all the particular things 
with which he U  and he oust be abl* to divide them into their 
appropriate «lasses until further division is impossible* If he is not 
able to do this* his diseoarss will rest upon opinion and error and net 
on knowledge and truth. The true discourse as a moans ef persuasion 
oust be a persuasion of souls w ich will lead them to know ths truth* 
flush discourse will only be possible if one uses dialectic* the art 
which shows on* the true nature of any particular thing#
piato wiahos io omphooi». that tea potete A o  uaoo tho tru. 
art of por.ua.ion oooke to croate .oul. lik. mindod to B W
dlaoour.o it.olf «rot ho aonotruotod lik. a living otturo, and a. ««A 
it croato, ita own likonooo in tho .oul of tho ono who hooroi «ad telo 
proooa. oan ho oontinuod from ono por.on to anotk«p for «ror, and tho 
po.oo.aion of thi. di.oour.o i. tho hi#.«ft foro of tate» happinooo.
It i. not th. writton word, «or th. word opokon a. a »«ma to «o». ond, 
oiioh a. doeoption or portonal gain, as is th. oa*o with .0  wxoh of 
rhotorio, that aro tra. ^  -***• *f
•oul to goodnoo. and juatio. (277*. 278à)| hot rathor "thoaa oord. 
ahont ¿natio. and goodnoo. opokon h/ toaohor. for tho oak§ of 
in.tru.tion and roall/ writton in tho oonl, Aioh «lana poa.ooo 
olarltr, porfootion and truo vaino. te* thooo te. to ho oo»»ld«rod 
th. hpoakor«» oro logitlroto offpring. »*•* tho word within Atetef, 
if it ho found tea»., and aoootely it. dooooterot. or hrothroo, A I A  
«te hwro apmnt up in a worte/ »naror in tho «oul. nf attero.*
*ho m a  who pnrotm *ho tate of oroating AoV0<' <*
kind 1. th. philooophor, tho lavar of wioflwai ho io not «ino, te
wiadoa holoaga to Ood olonof hot hi. loro of «iodo» lo no d»At fi»
Plato a kind of loro of Ood and tha divino. 3oo*atoo*o prte** 
tho ond of tea dialogo, lo ono whioh «tona Flato*a intontite. Ite 
what Sooratoo prora fo» ia wtet Pioto h*n hoon onggooting io tho al» 
tho philooophor. So p*a/a to Pan and tha goda of tho plaoo «»V* tw>t * 
ylvloBvJ ond hi. p*V#r ««ho«* ***** ia **iA •**” •**** 
3/npoalua, that lava ia not a longing far tho hoantifnl, hot a longing 
for gonorotion and oonooption in tea hoantifnl*
Ihla aooonnt of what Piata ite» ** ^  a» ^ w t w »
ond tea Phaodrua, hringo to li*t oortten tetterò teat aro otetral to 
hi. dioonosite, and whioh, ao wa hava anggtetad, Ate a Aanga in vite 
tea» wtet wa find i» tea Phaado. tearo tho difforont virtuoa aro 
opokte of ao foenu, whiA aro .tornai «intona#., Aa». roalitgr i* 
nonniod — hnt whiA gote to ho te» *«arrte tea» tho wo»ld of 
oonoo, Zf in tho Phaado a Ufo of goodnooo fo» hroan hoingo dota 
dapond o» knowlodga of tho forte, Aro it oo—  te dopate te .teothing 
ooapìotol/ ronoto from tho worU in whiA tei. gaodrooa la to Malfate
itaolf. 8o tho prohlte hoooaoo teioi hor io it pooolhl. to think of
hroan Ufo itaolf ao ono in A I A  nnAanglng otaadnxda of goodnooa onn 
appi/? fhat io, how oon tea tero of ¿natio. appoar \\f T** *e<* 7
ite teA ia tea «roteloa aho»t tho poaoibtlit/ of tea attainaont of 
TirVao in hroaa lift itaolf. IO» in tho fftvat part of th» Phaado th» 
aarai farro oro groapod tp »ogateing tero ao oh$oota of knovltego. 
fh«p ara knoon tp X o ^ kT ^ os • hot that kind of knowlodga of
tero doo. net show how tho/ oon ho r alai od to tea praotloal dlffioultios 
of hrom Ufo it.olf* Plato aoroo to ho giving on ou/ anawar to tea 
«Matite A I A  hai «onearoad Sooratoo ahont ho» it io poaolhlo to ktm 
Ani virtno io ond what tela knowlodga ia. What tea idontifioation of
virino and knowlodga waa for Sooratoo wo A r o  trite to oxplain.
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Plato in his first attempt to answer this question seems to be 
separating the two. The form of justice becomes an object of knowledge« but 
in becoming just that« it seems to lone its character as justice, ill 
the emphasis seems to be placed on the kind of object of knowledge it is« 
and its specific character as justice seems to bs lost. It is difficult 
to see for instance« how justice as a form differs from equality as a 
for». For what it is that mokes both of then forms is something that 
they each possess« the character of being an unchanging object of 
knowledge.
Perhaps it is possible to suggest how this happened* Socrates*s 
interest was certainly in knowing what virtue is« but he did not think 
it possible to gain a oomplete understanding of what he called the unity 
of virtue. He insisted, however* on its unchanging nature. What 
happened« it seems« in Plato's first attempt to deal with the question 
la that he denied the unity of virtue by make a virtue like justice a 
«nity ae a form in itself < <*uto k*0  VSr* ) and by claiming for 
•ach of these forme that they arc unchanging. But then each of them
*•**■ to become a separate object of knowledge, and a question that is 
*°«t important for their understanding is left out of account. What is 
it that they have in common? But it ie not only the status of those forms 
** objects of knowledge that is in question. By making them forms ef 
this kind it is also claimed that they are known in a certain way, Hud* 
nature as forms determines the way in which they are known« and then there 
arises the question as to whether thin is the kind of knowledge that la 
possible where virtu# ie concerned.
In fact this view of knowledge with regard to the forms led la 
ti* Sophist to a complete revision of Plato's view about knowledge. X# 
the Fhaede the life of the senses« that la the life of the body Is a 
source largely ef error* view of knowledge is there closely
•««»•ted with his Idas ttet virtue im attainable for the soul only in 
m  far as It ia able to eocape from the body and order Its life acecrdiag 
to the forme which arc the only true objects of knot&tdge* But in the 
^heaetetus and the Sophist the question about knowledge has beoone one 
which not only refars to eternal firms« tot alms applies %e the world 
of becoming, Btr now the question thick Plate tries to answer ie that 
knowledge there ean be ef the world ef becoming itself* It ie a* laager 
regarded jus* aa a source of error* and what he saye at the cod of the 
Phaedo that things that beeane participate in forme* and possess 
whatever reality they de possess fro a these Is the beginning of an 
attempt te amsuer this question. It ia new net — to my that the 
true objects ef knowledge are eternal ferns and that thaws are 
real* It Is ales necessary to try te understand hew things that 
become have a reality that Is dependant on the feme*
life of the soul is seen ia later dialogues to share in 
the world ef becoming, and the moral lift of the soul is also oomn*Mit 
tkat W « .  B »  VIMttOB nou 1, to show just ho* tt i, for
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the soul to become good. This le what la made clear la the Symposium 
(2isa)j »He brings to birth not shadows of virtue» bat true eramplea of 
it* For he he is not in contact with shadows» but with t&at ia true.
Th* man who brings to birth in hia soul true virtue, and nurtures that 
there becomes dear to God, and he, if any does, become# irasoi t1it • 
love, «w* the false love of which Socrates speaks ia his first
speech in the ifcasdrus, is a love of immortality, and that is the 
cultivation of a virtuous life*
Tor this means too that the kind of knowledge that is possible 
about Virtue is not something that can be learned apart from a long 
process of education. And here the distinction tAich we have see» 
between the, kind of knowledge that is possible with regard to 
and the knowledge that comes ia virtuous living which was so important 
for Socrates is developed by Plato « H# does this in the Phaedrus by 
spreaking of rhetoric, and one of the main points that ho makes there 1m 
to show that properly speaking this is concerned with dL»tinguiaiiing 
between a good »nd evil life* (26OC) Bit if one asks how this 
distinction is to be made clearly, then the answer is that no atatement 
of the difference is adequate, and the distinction is only possible 
the life of a person Who knows the difference and lives in accordance 
with it. 'Shat is what Plato means here by saying that a Aoyoj£ 
must be . <27&) )•
For Socrates, as we pointed out, there was no agreement* about 
the meaning of auoh moral term* as Justice, and thie loads to 
difficulties if one wants to insist as he did that virtu» ia cn# thing, 
because the lack of agreement about meaning, makes it impossible to «tote 
what the unity of virtue is. this too ie the view that Plato states in
the Phaedrus (263 B). He says» **» l***» lnten** ****bllA 
the art of rhetoric mast first make an orderly division of those things,
and understand the nature of each separate class of things whether it is 
oas about which people most be in doubt or not*, the first examples 
ho gives of what people aro *»* certain of are Justice and goodness*
Love, too, fell» into the class of things about which there are different 
opinions, none of which are definite. It ia this that Plato illustrates 
in the dialogue* Soemtee makes two speeches about love and tho 
characters of these speeches are related to the difference that Plate 
sees between good oad evil. *r tho first deals with that kind of love 
which has evil for its objeet, the second with that love which is love 
of the good* Love is described as a form of madness. «Chare are two 
forms of madness, ons which arises from human weaknesses, and the other 
which is a divine release fire» generally accepted custom*1 (¿6 5 0 * It in 
the latter form of love which is the cause of tho greatest blessings to 
men. (266b ).
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The point of calling l o w  madness < ) in both oases la
that it does fall into the clacn of things which cannot be defined 
accurately. It la To &^£OVT^$ ¿lAvoiots and To t*j$ •
(266A) But even if love cannot be accounted far in the desired way« 
it la Important to distinguish between these forms of love* Otherwise 
anything that is said about it is bound to be inaccurate* Although 
it la possible by a correct division to show the difference that there 
is between the two foras of love, this does not mean that either of 
them is understood except in comparison with the other* Love still 
remains something that la not understood* That is why Plato says of 
the right kind of love that it la madness which cornea from God and is 
superior to sanity which is of human origin 42M*D) Love falls into 
that «Lass of things that is described os t o ^  ¿vwy vo*«* t i.
•«». LugCvV (236d).
If that is the case with regard to love, what can be said 
about it? Any about it must be . Plato is here
criticising rhetoric as it was thou$it of at his time,as, an art of 
spceMng and writing* Rhetoric was thought of as an art to be 
practised in connexion with law and pditles. Plato points out, however, 
that its scope la much wider than this* It applies equally to primate 
life as well as public. If it la thought of as only an art of imfrsnasihn 
that applies to public life, then what he speaks of as th* divine release 
from generally acoepted customs la impossible* It i* these that than 
determine the actions of the person who practises this art, and the result 
ia that what he says is determined by tee general opinion as to what is 
virtuous or not. teat one considers virtue to be eeaees teem to be an 
^M> UX65 ^  y*S * If virtue or love is thought of in this way, them
there is no difficulty in stating what it is, for teen all that meeds to 
he said in describing it is what the general opinion of it is* But 
Piste*e view is that it is not like test* It amst be nurtured in 
e*oh individual soul and it is only to be found there* If virtue is 
a matter of teat ia commonly accepted then a k¿\{o$ of it will 
he subject to change just aa commonly acoepted notion® of virtue are*
A true \ayo$ ie one «white la written with knowledge in the soul 
of the learner, white Is able to defend itself, and knows to teom it 
should apeak, and before whom it should sliest« • But it ie just 
because it ie a possession, of the soul that it cannot be adequately 
stated. Bow then can there be any
knowledge about itf It is only in iaatruetlon that a person can 
to know what virtue ie, or teat tee true form of love is* Anything 
teat ie written about it can only be an image of t h e f y ^ , ^  (276a ).
It la because this is so that Plato now claims teat education $s so 
important. It is important because knowledge about the true forme 
of love that leads to virtus cannot be gains* &tv> (2733),
and that means a long process of education. It is only in so fer as one 
la abl. to «.atingal* aittawnt tor» of \4,0l and aae ho« thoaa aro 
th. ofta^tng ot differant tor» oi ^  , that on. a m  bo
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to bring to birth ii one's own soul an '|'WX®3 of virtue.
The understanding then becomes part c£ the life of the soul which it ban 
gained through it3 relationship with kindred and like-minded soul«.
But it w ild not be possible for a person in whose soul such a A o y 0$ 
has cos» to birth to explain to another perbon what it is unless that 
person himself goes through a eamilar kind of education. The Ffcaed© 
bad suggested that knowledge about virtue is something that an 
individual person gains for himself when his bouI (tvrvj KotG^uv-v^/ 
contemplates by Aoy u r the eternal forms, and that way of 
¿peaking about the matter does make it look as if knowledge about 
virtue were some kind of theoretical knowledge which a person can gain 
for himself. It glre© the impression that it is soaet ing external to 
th© person himself, and from that point of view might be compared to the 
conclusion of an argument the soundness of which depends on the forms 
of reasoning which are independent of any one particular person.
It is as if the knowledge that is gained in this way is aueh that it 
forma some kina of conclusion to an argument, so that as long as season» 
is able to follow the argument, then it will be possible for hi* to 
understand the conclusion. But the moat Important thing is that the 
conclusion can be stated, and its statement stands alone. Plato now 
sees that the laiowiedge that is possible for the human soul about 
goodness cannot be like that. It cannot be the kind of knowledge that 
is capable of a precise statement, That he thinks this is dlear from 
what he says in the Symposium about the kind of education it is that la 
possible with regard to Tot l^jOTivCoi • This is a long process 
and there is no easy substitute for it* %at is o^Kiiov to tie 
soul can only be attained by such an education in the 'long and 
difficult syllables of life* (Politicus 2?6d ),
-  63 -
PLATO’S V33W GF CR--ATICK.
The Idea of creation is one which in different forme is to be 
found in many religions and the part that it : lays in Plato* s Tiaaeus 
®oy from certain points of view bfe regarded as religious* This ha® been 
denied, however, by Cornford, who says that the is not a
Religious figure* (hie question that has often been discussed is whether 
■^to*s idea of creation is comparable with that which we find in 
Christianity* (Was Unto a monotheist car a polytheist?) One of the main 
distinctions that is pointed to in this respect is that the Christian 
doctrine of creation is ’creaiio ex nihilo* whereas the view of Plato is 
different from this because he thinks of his creator as bringing order into 
80®e form of chaos* Another point that is thought important here is the 
question of whether creation is no ant to be temporal or not* Comford 
®eee a difference between the two views* He says: ’Myriads of Jews and 
Christians from Moses to the present day, have believed that in the 
beginning God created the heavens and the earth, and have understood 
'beginning* in a temporal sense** (Plato’s Cosmology p*27). He thinks 
bhat Plato’s view is in no way temporal. But even if it is not, this would 
hot be an aigwent against saying that it is religious. Plato himself, 
however, seems to suggest that this question cannot be answered* At the 
v**y beginning of the account Timaeus aayst *We who are now to discourse 
»bout the universe • how it came into being, or perhaps had no beginning 
of existence » must if our senses are not altogether gome astray, invoice 
GOds and goddesses with a prayer that our discourse throughout may be above 
*3-1 pleasing to them and in consequence satisfactory to us’* That at 
ioast connects Plato’s views of creation with religi ous belief« The 
difficulty here seems to be the sense in which the two possibilities are 
bo be taken * tpw It came into being, or perhaps had no beginning of 
existence. There is another passage in which Hate expresses doubt 
About whether the universe is eternal or not. At 388 he says* ’Time 
c&a© into being together with the universe, in order that, as they were 
brought into being together, so they may be dissolved together, if ever 
bbeir dissolution should come to pass; and it is made after the pattern 
°f the ever-enduring nature, in order that it may be as like that pattern 
48 Possible; for the pattern is a thing that has been for all eternity, 
Ahereas the universe has been and is and shall be perpetually throughout 
time*. Both these pas age© seem to suggest that with regard to the 
V*eetion of whether or not it makes any sense to speak of a temporal 
b®ginning of the universe Plato is unable to decide. Whatever he means 
^  creation it is not an answer to this question, loth these passages 
*u®B«et to us that Plato did not think that that question had any
Sometimes« however, it has been suggested that there is to be 
found in the Timaeus a particular forra of theology which can be contrasted 
Hth that of Christianity* (M* Foster) 1 It is claimed that in the 
Haaeus there are two contrary views about the relation between the creator 
®hd the world* There is first of all the artificer-artefact image which 
euggeste that there is a disctinctioa in nature between the creator and his 
®*®ation. There is also, however, the father-son image and this is 
®ontrary to the former because, it is claimed, a father must be of the same 
Sature as his eon. Christian theology, it is thought, does not make this 
•intake, beeauoe it uses the ter® father with regard to the doctrine of the 
^Haity, where God and Son are of the same nature - both divine* The term 
however, is ueed in Christian theology only in the doctrine of 
®*eation and it refers to something that is made that is distinct in nature 
**0® God - that the created world is not divine*
Faster adopts this view because he thinks that any scientific 
Hew of the world most presuppose a theology, and this vitiates the account 
** gives* He says, for instance, that the assumption of the uniformity 
»ature which has sometimes been put forward as a basis for the truth of 
science is a theological assumption* But if theological statements are 
sfcout God, does this mean that the statement that nature is uniform is 
skcht God? If there is some such thing as the unifrooity of nature, it 
•°«t be shown if this is regarded as a theological statement just how It is
* statement about God* Unless this is shown it cannot be thought of in 
thi« way*
Foster*© account in any case presupposes that it is possible to 
CooPsre Plato*s theology with that of Christianity, and this seems to 
depend on a particular view of what theology is. Theology is thought of 
** a science whose object of investigation is God* It says certain things 
chout the nature of God* It is certainly true, historically, that 
Christian theology, as stated in the Athanaalan creed for instance, makes 
•fcatements about the nature of God, and Foster is right in thinking that 
these were mainly concerned with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity,
•»d the Christian doctrine of creation • especially with the former*
* **e»t deal of this theology was stated as an aplogia against heresy)
®hd the creeds were thought of as giving precise statements of the 
Christian faith. Precis« statements, that is, which could be distinguished
heretical ones* The beginning of the Athansalan creed is typical) 
^ ■ K u o u tv  V̂oC OirOM, TW-tLf* TWVtO vCĝ -fô oi. > TfcWTlOv Ô 0i.T<3̂  TL- ^
* 1  n o i v y .  Koll 4 ^ 0 1  V I ^ o O ^  W toV, tov ̂
eioG v i v f G & i W  U to? m e * ,
^  ©lot) 0{X'y|&lVoUi ^iVVvjOtVtol> 0\)
pV TÍO 8 l’ oS nkvXcL
(8aha-Bibliothek der Symbols und Glaubens^egeln der Alten Kirche 137-8).
Christian theology and modern science of nature. Mind w *  X U V  & XL?*
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If this theology is interpreted as it semmtiraes is as a means of arriving 
truths about the nature of God, then it certainly does not make clear 
ihst how one arrives at them* For the creeds; are not that, but statements 
°f fhithj but the view that they are the result of theological enquiry will 
I®ad one to suppose that theology is a means which human beings possess of 
stating truths about the nature of God*
The distinction that is sometimes made between natural and 
*®vealed theology does not in any way help here so far as the nature of 
theology is concerned* For in so far as both of them are supposed to make 
statements about the nature of God, which are meant to be understood, they 
«*» both alike.
It seems to be the case that theology has been thought of in this 
*sy within the Christian church, but it is a mistake to think that Plato 
thought of xt like this* For btm there was no Kayos al)out Sod# 
^derstanding by *bat he speaks of in the Tifflaeue as Voij<Fis {*€■« loyt\J
^ith regard to the distinction between natural and revealed theology, it 
I® sometimes supposed that what Plato writes is natural or rational 
theology, and what he has to say in the tenth book of the Laws, when he 
®®*ks to prov» the existence of gods against atheists, seems to be this» 
what he ha® to say there can hardly be regarded as a proof or argument, 
when it is taken together with what he says in the Timaeus it locks 
3*** like natural theology* If we examine what natural theology was for 
®®ooone like Thomas Aquinas we may begin to see the difference« Aquinas 
bhinke of it as part of what he calls divina scientist and he thinks of 
bhls form of knowledge as one in which we arrive at definite conclusions 
certain premisses* There is a great difference between the Timaeus 
^ d  the Summa Theologies even if they both stqte natural theology, 
because for Aquinas the notion of natural theology depends on the 
distinction he sees between this and revealed theology, and no such 
distinction exists for Plato* But the main point is whether Plato 
thought that there was theology at all in the sense in which Aquinas 
®*®epted natural theology*
There is one characteristic that all the proofs that Aquinas 
pat®forward chare* That Is that he thinks all of them prove the 
•kietence of a first eause of the universe - and then he adds, and seems 
«ee no difficulty in this addition, that »this he «all God»* From 
*bi® poiat of view what Plato says in the Timseus is not an argument to 
P*©v% the existence of God, His whole account of creation presupposes 
***** Because it presupposes it, it cannot be regarded as a natural 
theology in the accepted sense which regards the existence of God ss 
®°®®thiag to he proved* Thatis why Plato*s account can be regarded as 
*** account of creation, whereas natural theology is not* And it is ths 
dd£ferenc0 that there is between speaking about creation and ths kind of 
^t^eraent that is made in natural theology that is important*
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Natural theology as often interpreted, depends upon the 
cosmological argument which is thought of as going back to Aristotle.
®iio argument seems to arise from asking the question: *r<hy is there a 
world at all?* and proceeds to treat the question as if it were of the 
kind as *Wky is there a solar system?* Not that it completely 
treats the question in this way, but the way in which an answer is given 
cannot help giving this Impression. For the answer takes tho form of 
saying that there cannot be an infinite regress of movements in the 
Universe, although it has no means of showing this. The problem is - 
*H°w could one show that an infinite regress of movements is impossible?
^0r this is regarded as in some way self-evident. Aquinas himself 
Realised the difficulty* because he thinks that it is only possible to 
SQy that the world is net eternal because it has been revealed by Sod 
to us that it is not*
This objection has led to the arguments of natural theology 
stated in a different way which does not* it is thought, raise the 
question about an infinite regress of causer* It ic claimed that the 
Mature of the world is contingent, and this demands the existence of a 
Cause of this contingent nature. And this argument is not meant to be in 
*B9' way scientific, as the one about an infinite regress of causes might 
k® «opposed to be. It is called a metaphysical argument. The form of 
contingency referred to is metaphysical contingency. If it is asked 
■hat exactly this is meant to be then the answer is not clear. It seems 
ho suggest that this is a characteristic that is shared by everything that 
exists, and because this is the case, it becomes impossible to point to 
thing in contrast with it. That is to something which does not 
Possess this characteristic* It seems however to be important to 
'ecognise this if one is to answer the question *Shy is there anything 
ot all?» it seems that that question can be asked only if one tec 
recognised this contingency. Recognising this contingency is then 
Regarded as a necessary step in arguing that there is a Sod.
If one wonders M y  there is anything at all* then it is not 
clear Mat the fora of wonder this is. But it is* no dofibt, a common 
feeling. If one could be clear about what kind of wonder it is* then one 
®*-Sht be nearer to an answer* is so far as one could decide whether it is 
kind of wonder to which an answer can be given. It seems to be a Vied 
°* wonder for which we cannot imagine what fora an answer would have.
^or the only kinds of wonder to which it seems possible to give an answer 
wonder about particular things and our wonder is answered by reference 
*° other particular things. But we are speaking of wonder about 
everything. It is what Wittgenstein referred to when he said »She feeling 
°f the world as a limited whole is the nyetical feeling*. (Tractatus 6.^5), 
^&t is meant to suggest that it is a feeling that cannot be understood.
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*»t if this feeling is made the basis for an argument to the existence 
of God, it can only be so if the feeling is not mystical, but is 
something that is understood. The arguments of natural theology do 
oeeo to be attempts to understand this, but impossible ones# For if 
there were some necessity which leads ftrom this wonder to the existence 
of God, why is that some people who possess this wonder do not see the 
necessity if the necessity is, as it is claimed, part of the wonder 
itself? It might be argued that those who do not see the necessity*
30 not really have the wonder, but this only pushes the point one step 
farther back. Then it becomes necessary to ask how ease distinguishes 
between genuine forms of this wonder and spurious ones. And then the 
only answer seems to bet the genuine ones are those which see the 
ocoessity. And that is no answer. The trouble seems to be not that 
this form of wonder about everything is impossible, but what is to be 
gathered from it. Is the metaphysical contingency of the world 
something that everyone is supposed to blink at, and then really open 
bis eyes in order to be able to say that God exists? It then becomes 
almost as if aslong as one is able to possess this feeling, the question 
About God is solved. It is claimed that because we see that the world 
is contingent, then there must be something upon which this contingency 
spends, which is necessary and not contingent. But even if there werd, 
Although there is no way of showing this, then if this were called God, 
as Aquinas pi ̂4«w> it i®, there is nothing to identify this with the God 
•bom Aquinas wishes to identify it. For the God Aquinas refers to is 
bhe God Who he« revealed himself in Jesus Ghrist.
This objection may not be fatal if people may claim that there 
is & God without accepting Christian revelation. And Plato did. But 
If such a statement of God*s existence were accepted, then it would 
probably, as in the case of Plato, involve an idea of God as creator*
And of course tbs argument to which we have referred about the contingency 
of the world seems to be an argument to the effect that God is the 
creator of it* But then problems arise about bow the idea of creation 
Is to be understood. It may be argued for instance that there is no 
Conception, of creation in Aristotle*s God. This would raise the 
question of the possibility of there being a God who is not a creator.
And then it looks as if there is a question of the following kind to 
decides How can we decide whether God is the creator or not? From 
Abe point of view of the argument that we are discussing this question 
1« easily answered. God is the creator because he is a necessary being 
cn which the contingent existence of the world depends. So any 
inception of God which would deny that he is the creator is mistaken
because it does not take this argument into account* It would have to 
deny the whole point of the argument that the contingent existence of the 
*°*ld does depend on God*e necessary being*
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It .kouid be clear that on argument of thie kina ie possible 
only if theology of this kind ¡takes sense. If it does not, thou 
the difference between the cou.ce fcions of creation in Christianity 
and la Plato is not as fundamental as it ¡tight seem. For Plato*s 
idea of creation need not be interpreted in the same way ¿ns the one 
that is common in natural theology, which we have tried to outline, 
for the important point about both of them is that the idea of création
is not reached by argument. In fact what natural theology does is to
®ake something material for an argument that cannot be this. It coaid 
only become material for an argument if it were understood, but it 
cannot be understood. ¿hat has been described as a feeling about the 
contingency of the wfarld, could not be identified as the feeling it is 
if we could understand it. If we did understand it, then we would be 
able to supply a reason for it, but we are unable to do this, Se can 
also say that we would not possess this feeling as we do now, if we 
understand what we do not now understand. For the feeling as we 
possess it now is something that we do not understand.
If we take as an example of natural theology its attempt to 
show that God ie the creator of the world, then it might be possible to
sho.v something further about the kind of confusion that can exist here,
for the argument claims that it can show that Bod is the creator.
Tk® argument shows that he is. If these arguments are meant to be 
philteophical, then they are comparable to other philosophical 
arguments - like the one for the existence of an external world. So if 
the argument is sound then it would be contradictory to say that God ie 
hot the creator* But this is to put all the weight upon the soundness 
of an argument, without considering the question which is prior to the 
soundness of arguments. That is the question about whether the terms 
of the argumenta make sense. For unless they do make sense, then even 
If the form of the argument is valid, we do not know what the argument 
is about. It is because we cannot give a sense to this feeling about 
the contingency of the world that it cannot be a tens of an argument 
^ad so we do not know what arguments about it are concerned with.
To put forward arguments of this kind is to suppose that this feeling 
kas quite a definite sense which leads on to an idea of creation that 
kas equal sense. It is because the feeling of contingency has a sense 
fchat the idea of creation has one too. But if we cannot say what the 
sense of this is, then it becomes clear that it is not on the basis of 
this that the idea of creation can have sense. But that is what is 
claims*. We understand what is meant by creation because we 
Understand what is meant by the contingency of the world#
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If, however, the idea of creation cannot derive sense fro® 
this, then this is not an argument to show that it only makes 
sense to speak of God as the creator, and that it does not make sense 
to speak of hi® not being this* That it makes sense to say of God 
that he is the creator is not the result of an argument* Whatever 
it means, its sense is independent of any argument that we can put 
forward. Its sense is not the result of argument* Bat if the 
idea of creation has no sense which allows it to be a terra in an 
argument, does this man that it has no sense? Its sense is not 
fche remit of an argument or proof, as for instance the sense of a 
theorem in raatheraaties depends upon its proof* What sense then does 
it have?
Its sense is prior to any argument about it* It is not a 
question of showing that it has sense, but rather of seeing its sense* 
apart from argument* To speak of God as the creator is the way in 
which it makes sense to speak of God* There is no question of showing 
whether he is the creator or not* That is already decided* That 
is what is determined about what it makes sends to say about God* If 
one goes on to say certain things about this idea of creation, as Plato 
does for instance, then this is not to be regarded as an argument for 
the truth of this idea, but as a consequence of the idea itself* To 
nay that God is the creator is not to say something about God which is 
either the result of some form of empirical investigation or some form 
of argument, but to make a statement about what It makes sense to say 
about God*
But if this is accepted, can we say what the sense is?
And here there arises the difficulty of which Plato seems to be quite 
aware, when he suggests that no account of this matter that Is 
accurate and precise can be given* He means that it is not possible to 
understand perfectly the ease of saying that God is the creator*
And it is in this respect that his view of the matter may be compared 
with the view of creation that we find in Christianity for instance*
The idea of creation is central in the Christian faith* Both 
St. John and St* Paul speak of Jesus not only as the Redeemer but also 
as him through whom all things are created* (John I, Colossiane I)* 
Apart from this, however, the creation is a matter of faith, and there 
is no distinction here between what is believed and what is understood* 
Hot that there is no difference between the two views. But they do 
have this much in common that the idea of creation is not thought of 
as something which is understood* The kind of understanding that 
Baraann had of the creation is quite different from that of Plato when 
he sayst *How often does Moses, and the Spirit of God through him* 
find it necessary to repeat this assurance that God has created man in 
his own Image, In the image of God* after the divine likeness*
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Bare reason sinks down« and it is on this basis that the decision 
°f God rests to save fallen man, to restore this image. How much 
it has cost that I am saved! Unfathomable God* thou hast nevertheless 
Considered this race worthy of the costly ransom* And that we are so 
worthy in our salvation is due to the worth which thou hast ascribed 
®hd communicated to us in creation. To restore this likeness God 
had to assume the likeness of men. Both are equally great mysteries of 
faith.* (J. G. Hainan® Biblical Reflections Genesis I trans. R.G.Smith 
P«l24). There is also an idea of human salvation in Plato, which he 
thinks of in terms of a human imitation of divine life, but this is 
different fro® the Christian view. The Christian vie® does not think 
of the possibility of salvation as an imitation of divine life, so much 
o* a gift of divine grace* This affects the different views of creation 
t°o. In Christianity the idea of creation is closely connected with 
that of redemption* Creation is totally the work of God, and this 
includes human life. For Plato there are limits set to the creative 
activity of God* He cannot make Ids God in any way responsible for 
human wickedness, and that is why the creation of men is pictured by 
Flato as the work of subsidiary gods ,!eo that he might be guiltless of 
hhe future wickedness of any of them1'. (^20) So Plato1 s God differs 
fro® the Christian idea of God in this important respect, that there 
ia nothing like the Christian idea of redemption in Plato's view.
To return to the idea of creation. It may be thought that 
^lato puts forward an argument which is very similar to that of natural 
theology about the contingency of the world. At the beginning of the 
®i*aeuo (2?C ■<* 29D) he gives a statement of three rinclplec which 
determine his account of the creation. One of these is* 'All that 
becomes must needs become by the agency of some cause{ for without a 
cause nothing can cone to be. ’ ( <0 ”t* i>ir>
<*ÎTÎoC T iv^£ But immediately after this cooes
the well-known statement* 'The maker of this universe is a hard task; 
to find, and having found him it would be impossible to declare him to 
all mankind.' The proximity of these two statements suggests that for
$lato, there was no easy inference fro® the contingency of the world to 
the existence of a necessary cause. In another passage where he is 
discussing the relation between form, copy and space he sayst 'This 
(i«e. space) indeed, is that which fe look upon as in a dream* and «y 
that anything that is met needs be in some place sad occupy some room, 
end that what is not somewhere in earth or heaven is nothing* Because 
cf this dreaming state, we prove unable to rouae our wives aid; to draw 
* U  them distinctions an others akin to them, even in the case of the 
•eking and truly existing nature, and so «0 state the truth! namely, 
ibat whereas for an image, , since not even the very principle on which
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It has come into being belongs to the image itself, but it is the ever 
**ing semblance of something else, it is roper that it should cose to 
in something else, clinging in some sort to existence on pain of 
nothing at all, on the other hand that which has real being has 
^  support of the exactly true account, which declares that, so long 
*® the two things are different, neither can ever com to be in the other 
^ch a way that the two should become at once one and the same thing 
®**d two** what becomes • clings in sane sort to existence on pain of 
nothing at all** This may be compared to what has been called
*°nttngent existence, but for Plato this form of existence is not of
a kind that we can infer from it the existence of a necessary cause 
it* And the reason for this according to him is that there cannot 
a true and exact account of its nature* Only if this were possible 
its dependence on a necessary cause be clear* If Plato's view 
Wae similar te the kind that we find in natural theology that the
®°ntingency of the world implies the existence of a necessary cause of
its existence* then there would be no point in his saying, as he does,
that the maker of this universe is a hand task to find* The idea of
Mention is presupposed in all that he says about the world* The Timaeus 
not an attempt to prove the existence of the creator, but an attempt to 
■how what meaning such idea can have* But the meaning also cannot be 
clear, because any account shares the nature of that Of which it is 
*** account* And so what Plato says about creation is set in the form 
°f a myth, or rather as we shall see later, in a series of myths* The 
*>dea that there is only one nyfch might mislead us into thinking that the 
treatment is systematic, even if mythical, as if the different parts of 
the myth had some internal connexion which makes it an integrated whole* 
that is not so* There are gape which prevent this* Rather the 
^«aeus is to be seen as diffemnt myths, each of which attempts to 
represent something about different aspects of what is meant by the view 
creation put forward* And this too shows a difference between Plato's 
treatment and that of natural theology* For the latter does attempt some 
kihd of systematic treatment in which the parts are connected in a whole, 
Plato's account is not like this* That it is not like this shows 
^**t he thinks the subject matter with which he is dealing is. quite 
Afferent from anything of which it is possible to give a systematic 
*®eount.
In the Republic Plato speaks of the sun as the offspring of the 
*0r* of the good, and this is an idea which he develops in the Timaeus
he gives an account of how the woild is the creatiog of the B ̂ 1  odgyô » 
***• Reason why there is this connexion between what Plato say« in thfeae 
dialogues is heonuse whereas in the Republic it is the form of the 
*88d that is the cause of the things that become, in the Timaeus the
*hp is the cause is described as good* Not that the two 
to be identified, however, for they have different roles* We eannot 
attempt to interpret what Plato says in a completely systematic way*
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Both in the Republic and in the Timaeus Plato soys that about the 
Questions under discussion there can be no corn lete account; he makes 
same point in the I'oliticus where he says* "It is difficult to 
with any of the more important subjects of discussion adequately 
®xeept by means of illustrations} for it looks as if each of us knows 
everytaing as if he were in a dream* but is completely ignorant of 
everything when he comes to his senses*♦. Plato is pointing to the 
difficulty that there, ic if one set out to account for everything that 
there is - for the whole universe} and his view is that no account of 
ihia hind could make complete sense* But although that is so* he 
nevertheless thinks that something must be said about it*.
The main distinction that we find Plato making in the Tiaaeu® 
is on© between what we can call cosmology and theology* This distinction 
is comparable to the one that he makes in the Republic between the form 
°f the good* which he calls the first principle of everything ( Tc><J 
SUB) and those principles which are only hypotheses, 
an example of the kind of thing that Mato meant by an hypothesis we 
maUy c .nailer the cosmological account that he gives in the Tiaaeus* 
it is to this kind of account that he refers also In the Republic (510Cff)t 
who study geometry and calculation and similar subjects* take as 
hypotheses the odd and the even, and figures, and throe kinds of angles* 
other similar things in each different enquiry* They make them 
i®to hypotheses as though they knew them, and will Ive no further 
account of them either to themselves or to others on the ground that they 
3Tq plain to every one*. It is characteristic of cosmology that it 
begins from first principles which are hypothetical* and because this is 
the case it is a f :m of inquiry that can. ot arrive at a first principle 
of everything, for that could not be a hypothesis. Part of what Plato 
3®emc to mean here is that once certain hypotheses have been accepted 
first principles* like the axioms of geometry, then what can be 
^Bttced fro« these is not a first principle of everything, but only the 
Consequences of hypotheses which are limited in nature* So the 
Consequences too will be limited. But the first principle of everything 
^  in no way a deduction from anything else, for then there would be 
®°»ething prior to it} and as the first principle of everything it is 
n°t limited in its scope* If what Plano means in this passage (J511B)
^  the first principle of everything is the form of the good, then what 
** says about it is by no means clear* This lack of clarity foes with 
the difficulty that Plato saw in speaking about a first principle of 
•v«*ything (cf* Sophist 253Bff.) For the form of the good is the final 
°Bject of that form of inquiry that he calls dialectic which he 
Ascribes here* (511B) This »treats its hypotheses not as first 
Principles* but as literally hypotheses, that is* as stepping-stones 
starting points, until it comes as far as that which is not a 
^■ypothesis, to the first principle of everything* This it grasp*.
-  7? -
and t'ion reversing its procedure takes hold of that which takes 
hold of tills first principle, until it so completes its descent*.
This for® cf in~n^>y is different from that of the so called arts 
(pit t\^you. KaAoo f4VoU 5 U C ), by which he means such studies as 
astronomy and geometry. This form of the good oh ch is the final 
object of knowledge for dialectic is we are told only reached with 
difficulty. (51?C) But what flato says about it suggests what he says 
in his seventh letter* It is not the result of what we would now call 
scientific investigations, for it is not only connected -•vith what can 
he said about the physical universe, but it is also connected with the 
hind of understanding that is possible about human life. This seems 
ho be the point of what ilato cays in the loliticus (273 C-D): *Can 
*® wonder, then, that our soul, whose nature involves it in the same 
uncertainty about the letters or elements of all things, is sometimes 
in seme cases firmly grounded in the truth about every detail, and 
aSain in other cases is all at sea about everything, and somehow or other 
has correct opinions about some combinations, and then again Is ignorant 
°f the came things when they arc transferred to the long and difficult 
syllables of life*.
The passage in the Sophist to which m  have referred (253Sff) 
»ekes the same point as the passage from the Politicos* »When people 
have lived longer and grown older, they will of necessity come closer 
to realities and will be forced by sad experiences openly to lay hold 
of realities! they will have to change the opinions which they had at 
first accepted, so that what was great will appear small and what was 
®asy, difficult, and all the apparent truths in arguments will be 
turned topsy-turvy by the facts that have cone upon them in real life*. 
(2j&D) This must be part of what Plato means too in the R̂epublic (511B) 
when he speaks of stepping-stones to the form of the good* The 
question then is not about what can be known as a result of scientific 
enquiry only, but it has to do also with the kind of understanding that 
is possible for human beings* And this is not a matter of a scientific 
theory, which as the Timaeus states might be superseded as cm 
explanation. Human life can only be understood in terms of goodness, 
sud to understand how this is possible demands a long process of education* 
The first stages of such © process are ones in which false and perhaps 
contradictory principles of interpretation are used. These have to be 
Siven up until this final, for® of interpretation is reached, in the 
light of which what was previously misinterpreted can now be understood*
But this is not to be compared with abortive attempts to establish some 
scientific theory which finally result in an adequate one. If it were 
similar to that there would be no point, as we have said, in speaking 
°T a conversion of the soul. With regard to a scientific theory, its 
statement must be as precise as it is possible to moke it. But this 
kind of precision is not possible with regard to the fora of the good*
It 1b not that kind of explanation« A scientific theory must state 
clearly its own ¡caning; but there is no such statement about the
fora of goou. i*tu.t Xu Xv. can ovi-.j oG xxi As<#r ■ ueo#
Prom this point of view there is much in common between what 
Plato seys in the Republic and in the Timaeus* The general point 
»hich he ha3 in mind in both dialogues is that between the kind of 
knowledge that is gained in science, and the kind of general 
understanding which human beings often demand about their own lives, 
and the world in which they live« Such an understanding, as we have 
seen, both for Plato and Socrates depended an the first place on a 
recognition of the difference that there is between good and evil end 
their view is that there is no theory about this. Socrates, however, 
thought that his mission of bringing the difference to the attention 
Of his fallow citizens, was a divine mission. Plato adopts the same 
point of view when in the Timaeus be apeales of the world as .created by 
a god who is supremely good. He speaks of this god ranch as he does of 
the foro of the good. Just as it is impossible to give an adequate 
account of the fora of the good, so it is impossible to speak of the 
*aker and fatlier of this universe, in such a way that people could 
understand. hart of the difficulty here has to do with giving sn 
account of everything, of the whole universe of becoming* Such an 
account, on Plato’s view, is impossible in merely scientific terms, 
for that account must start somewhere, and the point at which it starts 
®Ust refer to a part of the universe of becoming itself, and so the 
point from which it starts is left unexplained. It is only a hypothesis. 
The kind of account w! ich Plato is speaking of is not one which starts 
from some part of the universe of becoming and then, proceeds to give an 
account of the rest of it beginning at this starting point, but one 
which deals with the whole of it. But to give an account of this kind 
Plato sees is to give an account of an entirely different order*
In so far as an account in the terms of cosmology is an account, this 
other is not an account at all« For a cosmological account is only 
Possible if there are certain ideas in terms of which the account is 
given - geometrical ideas for instance ; and Plato himself attempts to 
give an account of the material elements of things in terms of 
geometrical solids. But what he says about the is not
like this. There is nothing comparable in terms of which he accounts 
for the creative activity of the £.yo¿ * It might be thought
that the account is in terms of goodness, but that is something which 
belongs to the <̂*|̂ «Ov>£y<>£ himself, and so cannot be thought of as 
something in tenas of which on explanation can be given«
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What Plato is trying to account for, it seems* is the beauty 
°f the world* The- acrid is saprenj® in gr-atness and excellence, in 
beauty and perfection" ( y-UjurTos K<*c Ŝ i<rtô  K<*AA«Oqj t£ vc**l 
Tt\tu> ToLTÔ  yi^OVfcV )• But such a description of the world is quite 
different from saying that an account of its 'material elements can be 
given in geometrical terms# Even if the geometrical account were final,
®-Qd Plato does not think that this is this, it would be a geometrical 
account which could be understood by someone who ¡¡light not describe the 
w°Rld in ter'¡s of beauty and perfection as Plato does. So it is hot the 
understanding of an account in terms of geometry, for instance, that will 
enable one to say that the world is supreme in beauty and perfection.
®ut to say that the universe is supreme in beauty and perfection is to 
say something about the universe as a whole which is not said in a 
®athematical account of the material elements in it. But this is 
®°®et ing which he says depends on the goodness of the .
The world is the most beautiful of tilings that have come to be and the 
is the best of causes* C £ vO^AA»<TT2>Jj
Tiov 'fiywoTW'j o S'ê idTOj Tk>v MA). But this is not a statement
k* cosmology* tihan Fir to says (29fi) that the goodnes of the creator is 
'the supremely valid principle of becoming and of the order of the world*
( ^ *<#tt K<ys" t o  tolT'Vj ) he is speaking of
soicetLing that is iot part of the world itself, aa the geometrical 
Configuration of the material elements is. The aiatheraatical account 
°an be understood only with respect to the world, but this principle of 
theology accounts for the world Itself* But if we say this it oust be 
Remembered that the sense of ’account* is not the same in each case.
The difference that there is between the two can partly at 
least be referred to by saying that the principle of theology appeals 
to the life of the human soul in a way that the cosmological account 
cannot. At the end of the Timaeus (90A-D) Plato speaks about the life 
°f the human soul,, and he is concerned with that life which is best for 
It* Be tliinkc that it is by a study *of the revolutions and harmonies 
the world* that the intelligent part of the human soul achieves that 
life that ie best for it, by becoming like these. This may mem to 
ohggest that it is cosmology that is important. But a study ’of the 
Revolutions and harmonies of the world* includes for Plato what he speaks 
a^out as the goodness of the P «>£̂ 0$ in creating the world. That
belongs to the life of the human soul too, and it is in recognising this that 
It is converted, as he puts it in the Republic, fro® darkness to light.
•or this is a life of the soul that eschews a life that is 'engrossed is 
appetites and ambitions and spends all its pains on these*• This is 
to cling to mortality, and to be unconcerned about the guide which God 
k&e given to every man. It is, however ,«fthi a form of life for the 
«°ul that Plato thinks it impossible to speak about in precise terms.
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®h»t he has to say about the in the Timaeus and the form
0* the good in the le-.-ublie, especially in the simile of the cave, 
is an attempt to Give expression to t' is* For seeing the goodness 
of the world is more of the nature of revelation v.-h5ch conics to the 
soul when it doet; realise that there is order and beauty in the world, 
®hei’£ previously it could not nee these* But this .revelation for 
Plato is net just something tc be seen, as something might be seen in 
«¡¡oometry for Instance* Seeing this ir to see one’s life as different, 
®-hd to see what t!w best kind of life possible for one’s soul is*
Eht thir does not me on that one con say what the best life is, and 
Give an account of it that is easily understood* But it it tc see 
that there is a life that is best, just as one sees that the world 
ie the best of things that have come to be* If one wishes to attempt 
to ¡speak of this best life then one can describe it as Plato does in 
the Theaetetas as a life which is patterned according to divine 
righteousness* But this pattern is not just all there is* If there 
is a demand to say something about it, then there is something to which 
it can be compared, and that is a life of godless misery* To me the 
difference between these two is to see what kind of life can be best, 
for the human soul* Just as this difference between a life of divine 
righteousness and godless misery is the final distinction that can be 
®ode about human life, so the distinction between saying that the -world 
ie the creation of a good god and saying that it is not is the final 
distinction thqt can be made about the world* Both distinctions affect 
the life of one’s soul. They are in fact part of the life of one’s 
soul itself, and to make the distinction in the right way is part of 
that life which is the best possible for one's soul* This distinction 
between cosmology and theology is present in a great deal of what 
Plato says in the Timaeus*
The account that Plato gives of creation in the Tiaaeus 
begins with a distinction that is probably the most frequent in hie 
writing, but the sense of which, as he speaks about it, in the Tima©us 
is by no means clear* It is the distinction between 'that which is 
slvays real and has no becoming and that which is always becoming and 
in never real’. (27B) What distinguishes these is that the former ia 
that which is apprehended by ’thought together with an «count*
|*-vu Ao'foO)« while the latter is that which is ’the object of 
belief together with sensation’ (So§<l fĉ T,ai]<r9*jc,4u^) • He thinks
too, that the latter, that is, all that becomes, must become through 
the agency of a cause, and that there is a relationship between this 
cause ami that which is always real and unchanging. This is the
nodel in accordance with which that which becooes, becomes as it 
does through the agency of the cause* But this is not all*
??
It is because the pattern or model of becoming is eternal and 
unchanging, that what becomes through the agency of the cause of 
becoming is good. If the pattern were not eternal, then the K’od'fcOS 
would have come to be according to a pattern that was imelf changing, 
and then Plato thinks it could not possess that goodness that belongs 
to it because it is fashioned according to what is eternal and 
unchanging. It is because the looks to that which is
eternal that he is the best of causes, and so fusions things in the 
beet of possible ’.»aye. The whole witfyo* is the best of things 
that have become. To deny that it is like this is blasphemy.
There la also another ueneral joint that is made. This is 
act part of the statement of Plato’s account of creation, but 
something that makes that «necotât the kind it is. ‘Any account is 
of the sane order as the things it sots forth* (2$B), The account
that is given of the world shares the characteristics of the world 
itself. The world is not unchangeable, and it is only of this that 
°no can give an account that can be regarded as perfectly true. The 
world itself is only a likeness of what is unchanging, and thé account 
that can be given of it is only an image of what an exactly true 
account is* This distinction is made in the same terms as those that 
are used in the simile of the line in the Republic* *As reality is 
to becoming, so is truth to belief. Here one can only have an
i?
Thirdly, Plato speaks here of the , whom he
Colls ‘the maker and father of this universe*, *It is a hard task 
to find him, and having found him it would be impossible to declare 
him to all mankind* (23c).
As Plato proceeds with his account there are other details 
of importance which amplify this first statement of his (27$ - 292)• 
But it is important first of all to bear in mind what he states in 
this opening passage, because most of what is said afterwards is by 
way of commentary on it. This passage does, however, raise certain 
questions for the understanding of flatu’s view. For instance, when 
he says ’that which becomes must necessarily become by the agency of 
some cause* (2SC) the immediate reference to the S'tj|aeog.yc/̂  , 
seams to suggest that the cause he is thinking of is the 
himself. It might be thought that he is referring to causation 
within the itself, but the reference to the * whole heaven
or world* shows that it is not this that he has in mind, So it is 
not to any kind of physical causation that he Is appealing* And so 
that raises the questions *hat kind of causation can he mean? It 
is this question that led Flato to give the kind of account of 
creation that he does give. He thought that one cannot give an 
account of *the whole heaven* in terms of physical causes.
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At least there Is no way of accounting for the goodness of the 
*°rld in this way* And the whole point of introducing the figure 
of the $4||UioO£Y<4  his account of the world ie to attempt to
oay something about the goodness of the world* It ie beoauae the 
is able to look to a pattern that is eternal that 
*>i© work of creation is good* But the is also
described as good (29E). His goodness is completely devoid of any 
fora of jealously* and so in creating the world he sought to make it 
os like himself as possible. It ie this goodness of the creator 
that is ‘the supremely valid principle of becoming and order in the 
•orld* ( * . 1  K o V f o u i ^  vcueiwTAToj 29E). The beat is 
that which possesses intelligence* and the brings this
about by creating soul* for intelligence cannot be present in anything 
apart from soul* The creation of the universe is thus conceived as 
the creation of a living creature in which the fashions
reason within soul and soul within body. In this way* as the result 
of the providential activity of the creator the universe becomes as 
it is a living creature* The £yo$ in creating the universe
88 a living creature uses as his pattern that living creature which 
’embraces and contains within itself all the intelligible living 
Creatures* (300)* The visible universe is made as like the 
intelligible world as possible and this means that the visible universe 
Is made to be one just as the Vo i t o v  £ u> o'/ is one (3 1B).
The question is why Plato gives this kind of account*
There are* of course* difficulties of interpretation* especially with 
regard to what Plato meant by speaking of the voyt»\/ £Qo\s, But 
opart from these difficulties of what exactly Plato meant and how 
*hat he says in the Tiaaeus ie related to what he seys elsewhere* and 
•hat Aristotle and others said about his view* what Plato does say is 
instructive in this sense that * points to certain difficulties that 
be saw in attempting to speak about creation* We have already 
pointed out that Plato thought that the kind of account that can be 
given about the world is an livcu>£ X.oyo$ • The reason for this 
la that it Is an account of something that becomes and changes*
This is Plato’s view anyway apart from the kind of account that be 
gives* That this kind of account is the only possible one is not 
Part of his »myth* of creation* What he does give of course is a likely 
account, but even with regard to such likely accounts it is possible 
for him that one may be more acceptable than another* But that 
only a likely account Is possible is what is certain for him* And 
that likely account is the kind of account that is possible for 
human beings* Plato mates this clear at the very outset at 3$C 
•here he says* *If we can furnish accounts no leas likely than any
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other, we ¡sust be content, remembering that I who speak and you try 
«Mges are only human, and consequently it i© fitting that we should, 
thee© matters, accept the likely story and look for nothing further'• 
ie clear too, as has been pointed out, that what Plato means here 
ty t»Ku>i not an account that can be described as probably
true a® if some account could be mors probable than others. Cornford 
right in emphasising as against oylor that the account that ic 
8&*en can only be an image of a true account# And the point of this 
•®ems to be that human understanding of the world is bound to be limited 
***3 it is with regard to the limited nature of human understanding that 
figure of the is important.
This view of the difficulty of speaking about creation is not 
«My stated in the Timeaus# In the Politicos Plato faces a similar 
<&*ficulty in attempting to describe kingship and in this connexion he 
•sjrsi'It is difficult to set forth any of the moat important subjects, 
«*®®pt by use of examples' ( ^  iue<*Wy(wua X£wj^cv/ov
l**-*Q± vGff&tc Tt TwV |*4t^W«ov 2 7 7D). She word
®*ed here has the same force as the phrase Aoyqs used in the Timaeus. 
form of the good which the Republic describes as jctyicTov |ict&oĵ uat 
also seething of which it is not possible to speak with complete 
alarlty, (hie can only suggest what it is by means of similies# All 
these three sire examples of important matters of which human beings have 
«My a limited understanding# It is a similar point that Plato makes 
about education in the second book of the lave# 'Shall we regard such 
* «an as better trained in choristry and music when he is able both with 
®»sture and voice to represent adequately that which he conceives to be 
G°°i* though he feels neither delight in the good, nor hatred of the 
feed, - or when, though not wholly able to represent his conception 
lightly by voice and gesture, he yet keeps right in his feelings of pain 
fchd pleasure, welcoming everything good and abhorring everything not good?* 
(6^5d ), y9 See hero the distinction which,we have already noted, was 
^atral to the view of Socrates# It is the distinction between that 
kind of knowledge that is a T^vvj and that which is not# The 
knowledge of the difference between good and evil was for Socrates not 
be thought of as knowledge which takes the form of a .
®k© difficulty then, of couree, is to attempt to say what this 
knowledge is, and w© suggested that for Socrates this fora of knowledge 
®*nld not be understood# But that did not in any way minimise the 
*®portane© of the distinction# If its form as knowledge as applying 
*0 human life could not be stated, this did not prevent Socrates from 
8l*ing innumerable examples of the ay in which this distinction did 
tpply to human life. We also noted the difference that there was for 
Socrates between reoognising the difference that there is between good 
evil and seeing the necessity of living a virtuous life, and 
Possessing a genuine desire to live in accordance with this distinction.
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It seems to be a similar point that Plato is making in the Laws*
Even if there cannot be an adequate statement of what Is conceived 
to be good* any kind of knowledge of what is good* however inadequate, 
is pointless unless a person delights in the conception he has of what is 
good and hates whatever he understands to be evil* So there seems here 
to be an appeal to the relationship that can exist between what is 
conceived to be good and the person who conceives it. It is not 
•hough that something should be thought of as good* It is also 
Oecessary that a person should delight in what he thinks to be good*
I® the Laws* passage the emphasis seems to be on the inadequate nature 
of human conceptions of what is good* &it although this is the case 
It ie the delight in it that Is really stressed. And this is in line 
•ith what we have seen Plato says about love. In the Laws* a» we 
shall see, he thinks that this incapacity of human beings to completely 
understand what ie good should determine their lives in a oertain 
direction. Even if you cannot understand the good, you should delight 
la it. And for Plato delight in the good took the form of giving 
proper attention to the gods, and ir. paying respect to their care and 
Providence for human life*
It is from a similar spirit that his view of creation arises*
yor here too, he thinks, there is something that is thought of as good, 
but there is no perfect understanding of its goodness* II there were 
this, then there would be no difficulty in giving an adequate account 
°* the goodness of the creation. But then it would be possible to 
speak of the creation in quite a different way. The maker and lather 
®I tills universe would no longer be hard and difficult to find* But 
It is just because human understanding of the goodness that is revealed 
in creation is so limited that what Plato says about the creator is 
limited too* From this point of view it is a misunderstanding of 
•hat Plato says to attempt to interpret it as giving the kind of account 
that he thinks is impossible. Ibis misunderstanding can take the fora 
cl regarding what Plato says as some kind of systematic account of 
creation, and it was this kind of misunderstanding that arose later in 
Ceo-ilatonism with its doctrine of e^anvnees* It is impossible to
interpret Plato in this way* But to attempt to do so is to fail to 
recognise that fear him to speak about creation ie to attempt to give 
•erne account of the goodnees of the world, and also to recognise that 
this goodness can only be understood in a limited way# But even if 
the understanding is limited, this goodness for him was something to 
take delight in, and even knowledge/it was good without the delight vs 
°* little worth* This seems to bo the point of Plato*ssaying <37C)|
- Q s K*v/*|$£V *v>to *Wt $ & V  T & V
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She creation is good and its goodness is something to delight in. 
She creator himself recognises its goodness and the understanding 
*&ich human beings can have of the creation is the recognition of 
Its goodness*that is possible for them.
It is only if this central point of what Plato says in the 
Tlraaeus is missed that a auc er of questions arise which in the 
context of the dialogue itself seem to demand on explanation. It is 
then assumed that some sort of ansv.er to them exist within the dialogue 
itself. For the idea of creation it is thought raises the
question which Aristotle asked about Plato*a account in the Timaeus. 
Boes the world have a beginning in time or not? Aristotle (De Casio 
280 a 30) says that Plato holds *that the heaven, though it was 
generated, will none the less exist to eternity*• As against this 
there la the interpretation that was held in the Academy that Plato 
did not intend to teach that the world had a temporal beginning, and 
his account of the creation is not to be taken literally in this
respect. The Academic tradition has led to the view that Plato meant 
his account of the to be nothing more than a fiction, which
was used by Plato * 311 intarPr®tation which
Aristotle criticises (De Caelo 280a). And so re have the kind of 
riew that is suggested by Cornford that the is to be
identified with the world soul. Comford, who puts this forward as
an inte pretation of what Plato says, himself says that ‘this solution 
of the problem is no more warranted by Plato himself than others that 
Can be supported by a suitable selection of texts*. (P.C. p.39)* 
la this ease, as Cornford puts itt *The demiurge will no longer 
stand for anything distinct from the world he is represented as making*, 
(ibid), Taylor, on the other hand, identifies the with the
haws. 'The Demiurge of the Tiaaeus is 
exactly the *best • which is said in the laws to be the source
Of the great orderly cosmic movements* that Is he is Cod, and if we 
are to use the word Cod in the sense it has in Plato’s natural theology, 
the only Cod there is*. (Commentary p.8 2). Both interpretations are
of the same kind* They attempt to answer the question* *What does 
the §'^|<uoo^ye^ stand for? What is there in Plato with which it 
oan be identified? Cornford seems to think that there is really this 
problem*. But Plato nowhere states the problem to which this is 
supposed to he a solution. What he says about the S->^iouQ,ycS ® 
statement of his belief in creation, and not a solution of a problem. 
The whole of the Tiaaeus is an attempt to understand how the goodness
of the oreator is present in the world, and that is why, as we shall 
see, the world is described as It is$ it is the best possible world.
If Plato points to what he regards as evidence of this goodness in the 
world, this is not to be identified with what he means by speaking of
the creator of this goodness. The Sij |»>‘0C^y4  ** 1104 3«®* a figure
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la a myth which has nc serious purpose. It is possible to claim that 
there is order and oodnoa. in the world without referring to it as the 
work of the creator. That ; la to does refer it to the 
oust be taken seriously. It must, however, ic reriemhere' that he 
distinguished clearly Detween the creator and his creation. For with 
Regard to the latter, he thought that he could point to definite signs 
of goodness in the creation itself, hut as to the creator he does not 
eeem to have thought that anythin,'; could properly be said about him
except in terms of what he has created. The maker and father of this 
universe is a hard cask to find’. The $*)J*-10U£Y0$ is not 
then just a figure in a myth. From this point of view it is better 
to compare Plato’s view with that of the Psalmist when he says? 'The
he .•vens declare the glory of uod .and the firmament ehoweth his 
handiwork' (Psalm Iv. 1), than to think that the ^ • * | O(ryo$ 
is a figure in a myth which stands for something else which Plato
mentions.
This difficulty about the S <*| JU.ioo£̂ i>£ may be compared 
bo what Plate says in the Phaedrus about the soul. He first of all 
puts forward a general argument that all soul is inmortal« and he 
bhinlcs that th argument for the soul's immortality is sufficient.
( OvV & fvfeiVtô  21*6A) When, however,
he comes to speak about the nature of the soul (!*£*• it
apart from its immortality, which., if it is true that the soul is 
self-motion, he considers to have been satisfactorily proved, he can 
only use a myth, because, as he puts it, it would be impossible, 
bo describe the soul as it really is. We may compare with this 
treatment of the soul in the Phaedrus, his treatment of the 'the cause 
of becoming* in the Timers. Just as he thinks that the 
immortality of the soul is assured, so he thinks that the existence 
of a 'cause of becoming’ is assured, but just as it is a more difficult 
Matter to speak ox the nature of the soul which is imortal, so it is 
difficult to speak of the nature of the 'cause of becoming'. We 
find that Plato uses mythical images such as 'mixing' and 'blending* 
to attempt to speak about the creative activity of the ^  «
Likewise, he uses th image of the chariot and horses to described 
the soul in the Phaedrus. What Plato says about 'the gods and the 
generation of the universe* in the Timaeue is similar. It is 
impossible *to give an account about them that is entirely consistent 
with itself and exact* (29^). In the Laws, however, it is regarded 
as sufficient to prove the existence of the gods by using the 
argument which had een used in the Phaedrus to show the immortality 
of the soul,but when in the Timaeus what has to spoken about is the 
nature of the gods, the only way in which this can be done is by a 
myth. Likewise in the Phuedo after the attempted proof of the 
immortality of the soul, the personal destiny of the soul is described 
la a myth. The same thing applies at the end of the Republic when
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after Plato uses an argiiment for the Immortality of the soul as not 
feeing destroyed by its own vice, he proceed® to speak of the destiny 
Of the soul after death In a myth. The view that theSi^i u0£YdS *« 
the world-soml mast then be rejected if we take into account what 
Plato says in the Timaeus. For there the soul is described as * the
host of generated things*. This may seem to contradict the account
fa the Phaedrus where soul is regarded as the source and beginning of 
motion, and is as such ungenerated. But the soul is ungenerated as 
the origin of the motion of the Ko<T|m >5 . It still possesses its 
own motion, but the is nowhere described as ossessiag
Ktv<vyn$ . »hat is clear from the Tlmaeus is that Plato
thought that the movements of the world soul, which bring about the 
orderly movements of the heavens, are part of the creation of the
It is necessary to bear in mind here the distinettons m have
®ade between theology and cosmology. Plato’s view of the soul as the
source of motion belongs to his cosmology. If we want to compare what
he says about the in the Tiraaeue with anything else in
his writings it is best to compare it with the description he gives
°f Cod in the second book of the Republic. *Go<l is a being of perfect
®implicity and truth, both in deed and word, and neither changes in
himself nor impose« upon others, either by apparitions, or by words
by sending signs, whether in dreams or in waking moments* (382s)
Can we say that the attributes which Plato ascribes to God here can also/he ascribed to the ? When in the Tiraaeue Plato speaks
°f attempting to talk about the *gods and the generation of the 
uaiverse* he is probably referring to *the visible and generated gods*
Of which he speaks later on (bOD). These are the heavenly bodies* 
immediately after making reference to them he refers to »other gods* 
about whom he says it is not possible for him to speak. These, the 
gods of Greek religion, must be accepted as they are reported in 
Popular religion. All these gods, both those that are visible in the 
oaiverse and those that are not are then described as being created by 
the $^|m .o o £Y<>£ . Even the gods of Greek religion owe their being
to him. That Plato should say this suggests to us that he thought of 
the $ vj|m o  vg,yo$ as being supreme and different from all other gods. 
**or he speaks of the creation of these, but ha raowhere speaks of the 
as being created or being dependent on any other 
Oause for his existence. The «rented gods are *not immortal nor 
Indissoluble altogether* (blB) and this leads us to Infer that Plato 
means to say that he considers that the is completely
Immortal and indissoluble. So from this point of view of the 
haehangeablesness of God the account of the Republic agrees with 
that of the Timaeus.
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? In the Republic also icd is deocribed as truly good
( o ©io^ Ttj> 3 vtc 279A). ‘This is the way la which the
8Y ' °  °QJi^S is described in the Timaeus (29E). As we have
Pointed out it is the goodness of God that is there emphasised in 
Connexion with his creating the world* This reference to goodness is 
•beent from the proof of the immortality of the soul in the Phaedrus. 
is another indication that the descriptions of God in the Republic 
°i the in the Tiraaeus are the same. *e no ice that
** both myths, that of the Phaedrus and that of the Tixuaeue it is when 
N  goodness of somethin)?' has to be talked about that Plato reverts to 
a ®yth. The main point of the Phaedrus myth is the struggle between 
N  two horses which can lead either to an evil or a good life of the 
®°hl. So in the Time us. If you want to talk about the goodness of
world you can only do this in terms which are not precise and 
Mediately understood, for what an account is being attempted of is not 
¿fast the physical structure of the VCo<rp.<?j , but its goodness, and it 
f̂cods to bo shown how the physical structure itself exists as it does 
Beaune it is the work of a good creator.
The same kind of difficulty which arises with regard to the 
^®tinction between the and the world-soul in the Tiaaeus
***•308 in connexion with the cause of the mixture and To 
^  the Philebus. Plato suggests first of all that Voog is the 
Cauae of the mixture, and so of the life of the world, the world soul.
*hst as V0 O5 is the cause of those beautiful tilings that come to be 
the human soul, (2.6b) so it is the cause of all the beauty and order 
that exist in the world as possessed of soul. The order and beauty of 
the world as a whole is thought of here as being dependent on the 
Activity of Vooj . He says that wisdom and reason cannot come to be 
from the presence of soul. He gives the same account in the 
^fcasus. But oven the presence of reason and wisdom is attributed to 
agency of the cause. 'In the nature of Zeus you would say that a 
N g l y  soul and kingly mind were implanted through the poser of the cause’• 
(30D), We are reminded here of a reference to Zeus in the Phaedrus myth: 
^0vv the groat leader in heaven, Zeus, driving a winged chariot, goes 
*trst, arranging all things and caring for all things1. In the Tiaaeus 
r®ad of the discourse of the world soul. The rational understanding 
knowledge of this discourse is only possible because of the presence 
soul. In the Philebus Zeus is described as having reason and soul 
*k*ough the power of the cause; and in the Timaous we are told that theV f
°^|MOo^yc£ * fashioned reason within soul and soul within body 
^29B of Sophist 2&9A). In both the Philebus and the Tiaaeus Plato 
®*®ks to give a cause for the intelligent life of the Vci<5"|*oS •
N  account in the Timaeus of fashioning reason in soul, and soul in body, 
** called a likely account, of the way in which the world became a living 
feature with soul and reason through the providence of the creator. In 
th® Philebus the cause of the mixture is described as VoO^ and the fact 
that Zeus fa»« been described as possessing soul and reason, has led to the 
Notification of these two, Just as the has been identified with
N  »orld ©oul. a.
This Ir what Hackforth does • Ha says: * Although we may 
afeii that Plato has not expressed his nooning with perfect lucidity,
y®t the difficulty largely disappears if we realise that the 
distinction*is one of aspect rather than being. Transcendent
immanent Vp3$ are not two different Reasons* the latter is 
Ifcs self-projection of the forcer’. (Hackforth, Plato’s Examination
of Pleasure, p.57 note). This type of interpretation seems to miss
tho reason why Plato should speak of an tfrru or the cause of the
mixture. In the Philcbus the life of the Ko<rfu>i itself is the
mixture of the TTt£et£ and the « ¿ H i , So Plato says at
»Thence arise the seasons find all the beauties of our world,
fc? the mixture of the unlimited and the limit’. If there is beauty
sod order in the universe it must bo due to the agency of a cause.
Ohe must attempt to understand why it is that there can be seen in the
universe this order which is described as rational and living. This
°**der in the universe Plato seeks to describe in terms of mathematics
1® the Tiaaeus, in connexion with the movements of the planets, and
the >vay In which the .rimary elements combine with one another to form
the body of the world. All this order, however, is something that
®lato emphasises in different places. He says this in the Philebus
(28d»B) and in the Sophist (265C-D). Be mentions the belief of the
Oaay that the world i* '’ne to some * -elf-acting cause*. 1 T*Î?
«v t * V î w Îv  Tive$ xîtuij w*u
<(>uo6<r\sy> ̂  A^yoo Tt £«urr^^s «V* ee6U
V p  0 |i^0|S)
It is tho same point that Plato makes when he argues against 
»theism in tho laws. It is because he th'nlcs this that he says In the 
^imaeus* ’Now the body of the heaven has been created visible; but 
®he is invisible, and as having part in reason and harmony, is the best 
Of things brought into being by the most excellent of things intelligible 
sad eternal*. (3&3) The ’supremely valid principle of becoming and of 
the order of the world’ is that the creator is good and he seeks to make 
the world as like himself in goodness as is possible. Plato’s point is 
that it is one thing to know that there is order and beauty in the 
world, but it Is another to recognise this order and beauty as the work 
Of the creator, For otherwise one has to say that the order and 
beauty is just there* And that is no different from saying that its 
existence is due to chance* Plato thought that a senseless thing to 
bay which in some way contradicts the order and beauty that can be seen, 
®b© point that he wishes to make, however, is that sock thing has to be 
said about this beauty and order itself. It is not sufficient to give 
s mathematical account, for that relates the different elements in the 
whole to each other, and does not allow one to say anything about the 
W u t y  and order as a whole. No mathematical account for Plato could 
*> thi|Ut For him to make a statement about the whole was to make a 
statement of value. It is to talk about the goodness of the world as 
* whole, sad this is not possible unless the goodness of the whole is
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seen, us the work of the creator. This is why the reference to 
transcendent Vojg and immanent as one in being and differing
only in aspect is not to the point. It fails to recognise that 
iluto thought it is necessary to say something about the order and 
beauty of the world as a whole. It se .as that the motive behind 
Baking such a statement as this is to make Plato’s meaning clear.
®J»t, I suppose, is why Hackforth sayss ’Although we may admit that 
Plato has not expressed his meaning with perfect lucidity** But 
that is what Plato thought was impossible here - to express himself 
with perfect lucidity. You cannot make dear what is meantby 
creation, bee .use it involves talking about the goodness of the world 
wad aying th h thin is due to tho activity of the creator. And to say 
this is not the conclusion of an argument, but it is a principle id 
accordance v7ith which one attempts to speak about the world. It is, 
however, for Plato a principle which gives sense to the world. And 
this is not sense if by that is meant the kind of understanding to be 
found in an adequate astronomical theory. But it is to see that the 
World is good. The way in which Plato compares it with human goodness 
is instructive. For human goodness is achieved for him only when the 
human soul recognises its own good and pursues it. It is not something, 
he thinks, that belongs to the human soul as a matter of course* The 
human soul can pursue an evil path as well as a good one. It is 
because there is this possibility that he does not think of the life of 
the human soul as being completely the work of the creator. But the 
soul of the Is that. Its order and beauty, and so its goodness,
ere completely dependent on the goodness of the creator, In a way in which 
the goodness possible for the human soul, in so far as it depends on the 
choice of th' soul itself, is aoju That is why Plato in the Ihilebus 
cays that the world soul is superior to the human soul. And he means 
hy ’superior* here that its goodness is superior. Shis superior 
goodness is the work of *- by no meant feeble cause which orders and 
arranges years and seasons and months, and may justly be called wisdom 
and mind’ (JOC), That is one point. But we must bear in rtind also 
the difficulty that Plato says there ie in speaking on this subject, 
it does have the clarity that one might expect; and Plato thought that 
this was inevitable in any attempt by human beings to speak about these
things.
To attempt to say that Plato in some way identified the 
$>̂ p.iov/£yê  with the world soul is almost to ascribe to him some kind 
of pantheism. In any case to do this ie to interpret Plato in such a 
Buy that the questions to which he was seeking an answer are left 
bhanswered. It would leave undecided the question about the goodness 
Of the world. And it is important to have some idea why Plato speaks 
°f the world soul as he does. The kind of interpretation we have been 
Considering does not take into account why Plato speaks of the soul
becoming in body» For on this view the living Xoa-po$ would 
to# its own cause* It could then only be described! as the Sophist 
ja*te it t «vo  ̂«».’has * The world would then have to
to# accepted as it is as a living Kotf t and there would be no 
®®«ae of knowing that its soul is superior in every way to its body*
For in the first account of creation Plato says that reason was formed 
soul, and soul in body* As he points, out this is not the correct 
OP^er (2A&-C) »The god Bade soul prior to body and more wmerable in 
toirth and excellence! to be the body’s mistress and governor*• So 
»toea the is pictured as having made soul he then proceeds
*to fashion within soul all that is bodily* • (3&>). If we identify
the world soul and the then it is difficult to see why Plato
should speak of the creation of the world soul as he does* And if 
the is relegated to being only a figure in the myth* then
it must be pointed out that he is the most important figure in the 
®Urth. Plato* in terms of his myth* might have described the activity 
of the *̂jJ»»*>u£ps differently* But the myth would have been 
completely different if it were not what it claims to be, an 
of the creation of the world* The $vjf*.ioo£yc£ is «antral to the 
•hole account.
The world-soul for Plato is not part of the myth of creation, 
#v*n if there are mythical elements in his description of it« creation. 
®*e world-soul is the most real and perfect part of the Ko<r^6^ *
®»at this is the ease is probably a reason why some have wished to 
identify it with the The then becomes something
definite, and something which Plato speaks about at different places* 
hot only in the Tinmans* We have already seen reference to ereatlon 
in the Sophist and the BUebus* It is referred to also in the 
Folitieus myth* As it is seen in the Phaedrus* soul takes different 
forme, the two most important of which are the world-soul and the 
human soul* All the forms of soul, go to make up the total life of
the Ko<r^t£ • And Plato thinks of this life la its totality as an 
t*age of the Voitov , which contains within itself all the
different forms of intelligible living creatures* The reference to 
the Vetrov is not easy to understand, but by it Plato seems
to refer to that which makes it possible to see the unity and 
Intelligibility of the life of the created world. It is spoken of as 
the model In accordance with which the creator works* It is only here 
fn the Tiaaeus, among the dialogues, that Plato speaks of the voipov 
®# does in ths Ehaedo, as we have noted, refer to the form of life whioh 
he there mentions together with God as being immortal and eternal*
Fven here we find the two distinguished in name, even if there is no 
account of the difference between them* Bow the two are to be 
distinguished is not easy to see*
The my in which Plato described God as unchanging in the 
Republic is very »iiwn.ar to the way in which he describes the forms in 
the Phaedo as unchanging and eternal» • as otyro VW0’ otoT* . The pro­
blem of the relation between forms and things that become and pass amy 
®s® the problem of how these things participate in forms* The problem 
®f participation m s  one which Plato found it impossible to solve in 
terms only of that which is unchanging (i*e* the form) and that which 
changing* la the Timceue Plato has given up the idea that what 
becomes and passes away only does so because it participates in a form* 
description of the fora makes this impossible* For the unchanging 
form »neither receives anything else into Itself fro® elsewhere nor enters 
tnto anything else anywhere* (52A)* This does not mean» however* that 
bhe nature of those things which are generated are not in any way related 
*® the forms» for they are likeness of the forms* (51A). ftit now the 
tact that things become according to^an eternal pattern is due to the 
Creative activity of the *
If the way in which Plato describes God in the Republic Is
***? much like M s  description of a form» it is also true that he never 
describee God as a form» nor does he describe the in this
**?♦ But there is a close connexion between the wajfein which he thinks 
®f the 5111(1 the votyro*$«/.Thia is perfectly real» and can only be
b»owa by ’thinking’apart* from sensation with which human beings 
•Pprehend as far as they do by »belief* the K o w h i c h  becomes in 
***•• The former kind of knowledge of that wMch is real and eternal
Spends on that kind of intelligence which »is shared only by the gods 
*®d a email number of men* (51E)* Because this is the ease the ̂ jx»oo^yc^ 
able to look to the eternal as a pattern in order to create the world» 
**4 be sought to make it look as like the eternal as possible» The 
*®*ld is but one world that it might be an imagine of that uniqueness 
bbat is possessed by the vo t̂»* t it is in time« for that is a moving
*®®ee of what is eternal* But the world is not only like the ioyr<>\i |
** is also like the ^ ‘vJfu*>''£fG£ »desired that
things ehould come as near as possible to being like himself** So 
b®re we aee that Plato thinks of the in dose connexion with
bbe sternal world of forme when he eaye that the worid is H h y both the
Vo i t o v  ^ ° V  end the S ^ i o u ^ o ^  * That was already 
*®6gested in the Phaedo* (106D). %  the time he oame to write the
Tlnaeue Plato had come to tMnk that there were in the nature of things
**o things that oould be regarded as eternal and completely ieqperlehable* 
Tfceae were, on the one hand the vo^tev £«*>o>/ , and cm the other» the 
$*»11*1 * They cannot, however, be identified* The ^lOvcYoi
the cause of what becomes, whereas the is not the (mane but
*ke pattern*
If these two, then, cannot be identified, it is important to 
®®e how each figures in Plato’s account* Plato does not give an exact 
®®couat of either of them, and with regard to the ^o^r«v » although
« Aa _
taere is evidence that it was Important for Plato, it is only in the 
*taaeus that he makes any direct reference to it, Aristotle in the 
Aaina (kokh 16 ff) refers to what he calls thedwto To ,
«ays* »In the same way Plato in the Tinaeus fashions the soul out of 
«leaents} for like, he holds, is known hy like, and things are 
tarmed out of the principles or elements, so that soul must be too* 
Similarly also in his lectures *0n Philosophy* it was set forth that the 
**taal itself is corapotoded of the Idea itself of the One together with 
^  primary length, breadth, and depth and everything else, the objects 
bf its perceptions, being similarly constituted* Again he puts the view 
*• other terms* Hind is the monad, science or knowledge the dyad 
(tacAuse it goes undeviatingly from one point to another), opinion the 
aa*i>«r of the plane, sensation the number of tbe solid} the numbers are 
^  expressly identified with the Form® themselves o r principles, and 
*** formed of the elements) now things are apprehended either by mind
or science or opinion or sensation, and these same numbers are the Forms 
of things’* It is perhaps impossible to interpret this passage of
**ietotle la detail, but Plato seems to refer to port of the subject 
•otter of it when he discusses different forms of * ^ ^ c i n  the lame*.
«peaks there of what he considers to be necessary for any kind of
u*, &, «A H « - — • “ ;
$V̂  onlrtM  îTajkaXoV St ^
*kat is important in connexion with this passage from the Xrnwa, and the
**ot of the disoussion of >/i «<.**$. there, is the wids sense that 
Plato gives to the term • It does not just refer to motion
*• space, which is only one of the ten kinds of motion mentioned* It 
defers to all forms of 'jiv u s ‘t$ . Aristotle need the term in a similar 
•>?, althougi his discussion of 'fivw'i* to connexion with his doctrine 
•f the categories and his view of form and matter makes hie discussion 
different from that which Plato gives. Aristotle distinguished between 
which iev/iv^d.j to the category of substance and 
K(v>j<r»5 which ie change to the other categories. And this 
distinction rested upon hie view that >|iv&ri£ is tbs becoming
®f form to matter* the of motion that Plato speaks of in the laws 
•a due to soul seems to be the function of the immanent font according to 
dilatotla, and from this point of view Aristotle attempts to combine those 
i*o forme of Kivhjd^ which Plato distinguishes as ninth and tenth to 
the These two forms of motion are (a) that motion whioh always
•ovea another ohjeot and is moved by another, and (b) that motion which 
•ov«c both itself and another, and which is harmoniously adapted to all 
tarns of actions and passion, and is termed the real change and motion
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°I all that exists," twj ciwiov' Uatvnov’ |dUjJftAij tbu Kî «n̂  89̂ 0)
is when anythin-porses?es this latter form of motibn, that it is 
described as beinr: alive, (8950).
It seems that it was because Plato thought of the 
wiiieh. e-oul Lrir_;s to things r.e the real ?.r>tion of everything that exists 
. that he spe-- ks of the Vo^lbv • In the laws this soul is spoken of 
£tlf aot;I an, but in the ?:*,“»aeuc it is described as being created by the 
*̂̂ eo>>£\|o£ from indivioiblo and divisible existence, sameness and 
difference. Tide is what Aristotle is re'erring to in the Do Aaiaa.
Its life in the Tioeous Is described as a discourse which becomes possible 
*0r it because it is a union of what i© Indivisible and divisible, of what 
is eternal and what becomes and changes. And it is this discourse that
enables it, as the Fhaedrus puts it, 'to take care of all that is soulless*,
H  this motion of the soul is compared to physical motion which Plato 
describes as moving other thing©, but not itself, then the question 
natur ally arises: How is its presence possible in the world? This is a 
onestion which Plato cannot answer. In the laws (898E - 9A) he gives three
<5ifferen  ̂suggestion© as to the way in which this is possible. Either
soul is present in v/hat i© visible, or else it is present in a body 
°f it© ovn which is not visible, or else the soul is completely without any 
k°dy of any kind and directs the body by some miraculous power. However 
that question is to be answered, the fact that Plato does say that the 
KiY'vjWî  0f the world soul, by moans of the circles of the Same and the 
different, as he calls them, possesses, 'rational understanding and 
knowledge* (370) seems to mean that this vCiY^c-15 of the world soul is 
that which maintains order in the world. That means as we have suggested 
fchat the order is not self-explanatory, as the order of certain kinds of 
Physical motions. The question that Plato is attempting to answer is not 
3«st »Is there order in the universe?, but 'How is continuous order possible
4a the universe?* For that to be possible there must be some kind of 
««staining cause. The kind of cause without which, as he puts It In the 
^haedruB, 'all the heavens and all generation oust fall in ruin and stop 
and never again have any source of motion or origin*, It is this, too,
that he refers to in the Phaedo (990) when he speaks of 'the power which 
causes things to be now placed as it is best for them to be placed» and 
which possesses a divine force, ( Sou cf, Politicus 272E)•
Whet Plato says about the world soul in the Timaeus is an attempt 
to answer the question about the nature of becoming which he first raised 
4h the Phaedo, That question was raised there in connexion with the 
discussion of the immortality of the soul. What he says is that it is 
^possible to answer the question about the immortality of the soul unless 
examines the nature of becoming, and now in the Timaeus his View is that 
it is impossible to understand the nature of becoming unless one takes into
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account the real cause of becoming which is soul. Aristotle (Metaph. 
987a 3 2) states that Plato in his youth was greatly influenced by 
Cratylus and Heracleitean doctrines ‘that all sensible things are ever in 
« state of flux and there is no knowledge about them*. Aristotle says 
too, that Plato held these views even in later years. Plato was not 
o&ly influenced by Heracleitus, but also by Parmenides and Zeno. Be 
attempted to show how these two opposed points of view were both 
to&aatisfactory. It was as wrong to deny all becoming as Parmenides did,
os to say, with Heracleitus, that nothing remains the same, as Plato 
states his view in the Theaetetuo. The view that Plato states in the 
Sophist that mind, life and soul must belong to that which is perfectly 
•’foal is his answer to this difficulty. For it is mind« life and soul 
which in the Timaeus give to the world its character of being real.
The motion of the world soul which is the real change which takes place 
in the Kotf'fies « is a union of the divisible and indivisible. It is 
act something which remains f«rever the same, as the fora was described 
in the Phaedo, nor is it something that is forever changing which 
Possesses no character of sameness, as what is bodily had been described 
there. It is the soul which gives to the world the unity and sameness 
that it possesses. Or rather the world*soul is the life of the *Co6 
which possesses this unity and sameness. But it is no longer the kind 
«t  sameness and unity of which Parmenides had written. For this unity 
Sad sameness of the life of the world soul also possesses plurality and 
difference which Parmenides denied belonged to 'what is*. The world is 
*ot just a concourse of warring opposites, nor is it just a place of 
illusory appearances. The world is real itself, and its reality is the 
reality of the life of its soul. It displays order and design which 
«aanot be present in anything apart from soul.
The way in which Plato describes the constitution of the world 
soul in the Timaeus as being a union of indivisible and divisible 
wsdstenoe, sameness and difference seems to connect this account with the 
way in which he speaks of dialetic in the Sophist. That account is in 
berms of what he calls there »the most important kinds', which are 
wxistence, sameness, difference, motion and rest. It is the way in which 
these forms combine with one another that determines what it makes 
sense to say about what is. It is these that make it possible to 
affirm ord&ny anything at all. Unless thèse most important kinds 
Were able to combine as they do in discourse, (which is itself 
regarded as a kind) it would not be possible to 4ay anything. But 
that discourse is possible, for Plato, means that its possibility cannot 
fee divorced ire» wbat is. The fact that discourse is possible for him
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fttft&a that there la aooething reai to whioh thè diocourae refera* If 
4i«o<mr»a la poaaibla, and lt la mot thè illuaion whioh thè Sophiat 
**ka* of ltt iban it sruat be dìeoourae about aomething that la rasi»
A&A th la  diacoura® la  poaaibla sbotti thè world o f beootalztg, and l t  taakaa 
Poaaibla a d la tin ctio n  b etwean stataniatits about thè ivorld o f beooedng 
**** aay ba althar Ime or falsa* *31nee dlaoourae, aa wa found la  trae  
fa lsa , and we ma that thought la  conversatlo» o f tèa  aotü wlth 
**aelf, and opinion la  ths-final raault o f tb o u # t, and «bat wa «aan when 
*• *ay *4t seema' la  a ¡xditura o f senaatlon and opinion, l t  la  in ev itab le  
alnca thaae ara a l l  akln to speech, tona o f them im et sometimos ba 
***ae* (Soph* 264 A -  B) fh la  vlew a f dlaoonrae aa tnaklng poaaibla 
6 lia tin o tio n  batwaan trua and fa lsa  psreeption and judgament, la  poaaibla 
Ìbr Plato baoanaa hla vlew now la  that i t  ansi ba poaaibla ta  rafer to  
ì*<rk la  raal in  tha world o f beoomlng* And that r e a lity  aa wa bava 
*®*tt*ad ont la  thè r e a lity  o f tha l l f o  o f tha world so n i, whleh ha gasa 
°® lo  rafar to  In tha Sophiat, (2ó5B£f*) whan te a la i»  that * it sesie* to  
^a through tha sgenoy o f roaaon ( ) and divina knewledge (
S u  ) that ecmes froa God*.
Piata* a rlaw of dlaleotlc In tha Sophiat la an anawar te tha 
prohlen abitad in tha Phaedo af tha raiatien af tha fera ta particular 
*klnga* The difficiliü aa of tha aocount la tha Phaade ara brougfet out 1» 
tha firat part of tha Paraanides* If tha fora la oonoeived a* otuTo 
^ ‘duto than lt la dlffloolt to tea anoti/ hew it oaa be an objeet of 
kaa^edge at all and how lt oan ba relatad ta « m  world af baooaing.
viaw of tha fora eanaot atand, if there la ta ba ugr knowledge ef 
****** If there la to ba knewledge of farai than it mcat ba kaewledga af 
*a they ara aaan in thè reality of what baeoaas* It la there that 
•htatenoa, aaaanasa and dlff arenada notion and raat ara to ba observad.
®*a fona ara known, in tha w*y in whioh thoy oan ba knorn V  huma bainga, 
^*a bis arder that exhte In tha world af beoonlng la known* Por what
la known about tha world canne! ba axplained «a only sanaatlona whioh 
lolle upan ana anothar with no oonoaaden and ordarad oontinuity. Thla 
#*1*p ami oontinuity oan only ba osplainad If ona refera to tha forna 
'kloh baeona apparant In Ih«** Thla la tha polnt of tha dlstlnotlon 
**** Piato nakaa la tha firat twa hypethaaae of tha Faraaaldaa* «han 
*• refera ta *tha ana* ha has in aind, aa tha introductas? oanvaraatlan 
akam, tha alar of tha fera put farward in tha Phaade* That wftar aada 
fera aenathlng whioh was completai? separata and iaelated froa 
•*a*rtt4af elea* Se thè flret hypothoaia lai *If thar# la a «aa* wlth 
^ e  anphaala on »ona* • Than tha fora la a unity about whioh nothing oan 
aaid, net aren that *it le** The aaoond hypethaaiat 'If Uh* eoe le* 
**** thè «mphaal* on thè *ie* la quii* diffarant* Bar it tha fera la, 
ita baing aan only be show» ** lt roveala ltaelf la tha world of 
^aaeotag* One oanaoot apeak about tha baiag af a fera whleh la eomplataly 
laalatad and aaparated fra* tha werld af baeoniag* Bar oan ««a apaak af 
balng af tha world af baaenlag if that la oanplataly laolatad fisa tha
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forms. The forms themeelvec are what make human discourse about the 
world possible. There could be no discourse about a world in which there 
le no continuity and order to spool: about{ but it would be impossible 
to speak of it apart from the forms. So Plato says in the Parmenides:
•Xf a man refuses to admit that forms of things exist or to distinguish a 
^•finite form in each case* he will have nothing on which to fix his 
thought, so long as he will not allow that each thing has a character 
which is always the same] and in so doing he will completely destroy the 
significance of all discourse. (too tfwvojMV' vavxdTteun
135 B*C) If there is to be knowledge of the world it can only be through 
the form. The enquiry oust not 'be confined to visible things, but must 
•«tend to those objects which are specially apprehended by discourse and 
can be regarded as forms'. So Plato in the Tioaeus speaks of the life of 
the world soul which is the reality of becoming, as discourse in the world 
*oul and he thinks of this discourse as possessing knowledge of forms 
which enables it to maintain the world as it does.
Tn the Tiaaeus Plato speaks of circles in the world soul and 
the kind of notion which he thinks it possesses is circular. This is 
connected with his astronomical view but it is also meant to suggest that 
the motion which belongs to the world soul is eternal and unchanging la 
time, and is that which maintains the world of becoming. $0 he describes 
4t as that which has 'the nearest possible kinship and similarity to 
the revolution of reason', ( ^ f o o  voO T\te/eS«o w k n *  <k
ZpoU^Laws 898A) It is a form of motion which is unceasing and 
Upon which all forms of physical notion are dependent. 'That which is 
«wer moving is immortal] but that which moves something else ox is 
®oved by something else, when it ceases to move, ceases to live. Only 
that which moves itself, since it does not leave itself, newer ceases to 
»ove, and this is also the source and beginning of motion for all other 
things which have motion,' (Fhaedrus 2^50) It U  this ceaseless life 
•f the Kofrf.o$ , that Plato thinks of as being made according to the 
Pattern of the $£>©v . It is what he thinks of as the
«continuity and order of the world that he ¿esttibes in this way as the
life of the world-soul.
But Plato did not think of this life of the world soul as 
eelf^eufficient in itself, although he does say in the Timaeus that it has 
keen created self-sufficient. (33P> *lt was designed to feed itself on 
its own waste and to act and be acted upon entirely by itself and 
within itself] because its framer thought that it would be better 
®® J.f-suf iicient, rather than dependent upon anything else'* This passage 
«hows how it nay seem possible to put forward the view that Plato 
identified the world soul and the * But it also states that
the two are different. The motion of the world soul is described as most 
iike the motion of Vou$ , but it is not Vo0$ itself. For the life
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of täte worlci iio-üi wììv̂ s Bot m ly  m  to iv ia io lc  cucia tmoe, bufe also 
divisiti©. howeror, m  to voĜ  tote bring® Um
to ld  ©oul lu to  beine, and Qivm to  i t  a l l f e  mct perfect o£ i te  klnd,
<*°®8 not £imce in  divisibile osdotence, ixA hm fo r hi© abject o£ Uiaagfrtb 
t o  yo-v|-ròv £<£<?✓  tbaelf« 'Sh® S^jaou^oi 1© tim oause beoaiaee he 
to©a©a©8 perfoct undcintandine of Um pattem  of Um vorld. I t  io  onìy 
% tefermc® to  tte©© tu© tim t ano con ©¿mah o£ Um (podne©© of Um m&ä* 
t o  täte h taoelf io  ¿ood, and thè wcaid io  pood becouae i t  io
accordine to  an eternai pattem » And t o t  io  ©amtehinc tim t oannot 
te  understood cnly hy reference to  tim world soui» Xts ¡joodnoes in  
•Wwinfc In It© Order, bat i t  c©mat be Ju st seid to  be good aal©®© Um m  
* reaecn fo r it© beine, lik e  tim t. Xto ¿podneoe 1s not ©aaethlnG to fc  
^  Just happen© to  mve» Xt io  present In tim vorld In  sodi, end a© we 
tette ©een Fiato onmot e^üain Just how it In possiti© for aoul to be 
tosate In täte world» Speokina In thè hem of to eoa, he ©qy© tätet eoe 
°®unot ©ey ho» ito soul direct© ito body, bat nevertbeleo3 thie i© it© 
llfe» Fot thè oouL *ic not to be poraeivoä by erly of tte bodily 
8iUeeo, bui cm  aniy be diocomod uy tte understmding* » Thio mcons 
to Plato, a© m  ooy ©ay, that tte oource of to life of to »arid 1©
«totem* i t  In not soaethlng t o t  oan be mfeeteood apart f r »  i te  
^v in e  o rijjin . W© o i||te  be abie to  ©oy t o t  t o  uorid w s aovinß, fo r 
totarwse, and tim t i t  was in  eco© ©enee mdowed wtth l i f o ,  bat we 
to u ld  not be a:JLc to  underctend th ic  In any va r̂ uriLoos we were eleo 
*bte to  ©ay t o t  it© liffe  had it© orlgln  In eooethlng th a t m  caonot 
to ee iv e  by amano of thè emme, bat in  sam thing t o t  ean be inderetood 
**n, SaVo'vj ^octk • Thß am  vftx» bdLieve© th io  w ill be ek&m to  
**y t o t ,  barra*dng a soying of Thslee, * a ll thlng© mm fu ll of cade».
So t o n  Fleto describes t o  world ee t o  werk of divine 
toftecianship h» i s  att©ra$t3ng io  eee how th è «arid ee e  t o l e  i s  gond» And 
to©  ie v te t he etteof^to to  glue an eoeouet of In t o  reu t o f t o  TSaeeue»
^  In a @©odoto tote In t o  end he «Kx&d eay team beino© öo not 
^■totetaiid ocafileteily, tlioa h t o  ftot t o t  h# pictaree t o  S**^*iou£.Yoi m  
Steins to e patto» t o t  la eternai lo meeting t o  meid, m m ©  that 
^te Qoodnee© le ©oaothlng t o t  t o  ereator toSmdUt unterstand© end i h U n  
^  hi© ereative aetivity» fhl© Im tte point of Flato* a ©aylng In t o  
tot t o  mrld le govomed fcy a ooui or oouLc t o t  are good «Ith 
•mfect goadnesa» ( ^ 6«*Vì I tiì<w v 3^ < i|V d99B) To moert thè eontrery 
be hlasphaey ( W 3) I M ©  bring» u© bäte to tte dietlnctico betmen 
«oonology and timteogy. Far FOoto ln t o  »eftellii, öod lo a Imine of
Goodneo© and mteangted Mo nature» to n , henever, m  «mm  to 
^•aerite t o  eraatie» aetiv ity  of God wo try  to mdteretand aamthlng t o t  
tan cnly ba fenom to  Ged hiooclf. vm are cnly gSrlng a  team  accocnt, and 
um  aoeomt oanciet ba perfectJLy ernte» Bte baoama evm teoan belog© 
t o  enternd a t oreatteo with *©omthlx»g tob to t& d  teave t o  nao» of t o  
toortala* (Tteu Wß) and telch te piteured a© t o  g ilt  of t o
-  95 •
♦• ®«»t they too can share In an understanding of the world whloh allows 
^h«® to see the world as dependent on the goodness of God.
In both the Timeeus and the Laws the world is thus made to he 
pendent on the providence of God, that is on his goodness* It is 
♦his that Plato refers to when he says in the Unset» in hie address to 
♦k® gods: ’Although you, haring come into being, are not indissoluble 
together, nevertheless you shall not be dissolved nor taste of death, 
Ending ny will a bond yet stronger and more sovereign than those where 
*ith you were bound together when you came to be* (41B) Here Plato is 
*®*erring to those bonds which he has described as those which asks the 
ksevenly bodies living creatures (38®)j that Is to -the union of their 
•®**ls and bodies* The will of ths creator is a stronger bond than all of 
♦hese, and this is what Plato refers to when he says that it is the 
®°®dnewK of the oreator that is the supremely valid principle of becoming* 
®°**® goodness, we oan say, as understood by Plato is not something that 
#fc* can talk about only in the same kind of mythical terms in which he 
♦®lks of ths generation of the universe* (3o|,s goodness is no pert of ths
*®oeration ©f the universe for his, though it* certainly is that in 
*®oordaneo with which the generation of the universe proceeds* The 
fliffieulty of cosmology lies in the attempt to show how this goodness of 
God is seen to be present in the universe in the things that he has made* 
**»• goodness of God eanaot, hsf— ii, be regarded as being present in tho 
***ld aa it is with God* for tho goodness that is present in ths works 
** creation is a limited goodness and an inags of ths perfect goodness 
God*
One of the nain difficulties that Plato faced was to Show how 
♦k® world could be regarded as good, and how this goodness is dependent 
®n the goodness of the £^ < 4 * Por he aaw that the world could
**♦ be regarded as parfeot, and so the question was to deoide how Its 
b®rfeetion could be thought of as being the result of creation* The 
***14 Is not perfect in its goodness ss God is* The reason for this is 
♦***♦ not everything that oomes to b s in the world is the result of the 
*®rk of reason (tv £>* voG StS^fAio^jUv*), since there are things in the world 
♦kat are the result of necessity* It is this latter element which 
Restricts the creative activity ef the $*^|a a o u£ ^ o£ • Although it is
*ll*n In nature to the goodness ef ths S ^ ^ c o y ^ o j  , it is not 
®°opletely alien* Per the creative activity of the is thought
of ®e reason* s overruling of necessity and * persuading her to guide ths 
•Neatest part of the things that become towards what is heat* (48A) Plato 
describes this necessity as an ‘errant cause* (vj ottii©- ), and in
**d«r to understand its nature it is necessary to make an onquixy into ths 
baturs of firo and sir, end oarth and watsr, ths four »laments out of wfcish 
orostor had boon piotarod as »renting tho body of tho universe* The 
*®*son, as we shall see, why Plato thinks this is necessary is net Just
%
their nature should hs understood, as far as that is possible, 
bht algo that their nature may he understood to be subservient to 
*bs goodness of the world* For these elements, in one way or another, 
khTe often been considered to be the first principles and elements of 
the universe ( t w ^vtW ) ,  That is not their nature* With 
**gard to them too, Plato thinks his account will not bs strictly true* 
position in this respect is similar to what it was in giving an aooouat 
those things that have oome about through the agency of reason and 
of necessity* She only possibility is a ’likely* account*
In his description of those things that are the result of the 
nark of reason Plato had distinguished between that whioh is completely 
**&1 and unchanging and that which is net so* She point of this 
^■tinotion was to show that the world whioh becomes is mads after 
*n eternal and unchanging pattern* She nature of the universe as 
Generated, both as soul and body, is dopondont on this pattern* When, 
however, it is a matter of attempting to desoribe this changing world 
itself from the point of view of the nature of the change that taken 
place in it, Plato thinks «bat «be distinotien between that ia unchanging 
daft what ie changing ia not sufficient to shew how bocomlng takes place,
^or in the nature of that which ia unchanging there is no becoming and 
cis'-’*ige, and so if on« wishes to show how it is that things bacons as they 
&o» then it Is necossaxy to givo an account whioh ia in other torn« than 
that whioh is unohanging* Shat this is nsosssaxy is assn from an 
*xaaination of the nature ef these things that beoaee. *a cannot say 
t^at they just become, as we might say that that which ia perfectly real 
real* She world of basoning is not known by neons of rational 
understanding, but through belief which springe from perception* So 
•Ur» however, that becoming ia oompletely deeoribed when we say that it 
*• «bat whioh ia known by belief iatwiviag psrosptien would be untrue,
*** it ia also determined in its naturs by what Plato oalls the 
**«eptaolt of boooniag, space* fhere are three distinot faotore in 
*lato*s aoeount ef ereatient being, space, and beooning* Space is 
*bat la whioh things that become, become according to the pattern of 
those «bingo that have being* Put apaoe io not a part of becoming, for 
** is unchanging in its nature* Plate thought that becoming oanaet in 
own nature be explained (part from something which ie unohanglngi» 
ibis, however, could not bo the form, ftr that, although unchanging in 
its nature, oanaot bo regarded as part ef the world ef becoming» «hat 
becomes ars liksnssses of ths forws, and the possibility of thsir 
beeoaittg ss likenesses of somsthing «bat ia sternal and unchanging, 
depends on their becoming in something whioh although it lo not in any 
*hy a oopy of any tom is yst unohsnging in its nattxra*
That whieh btoomss Is dssorlbsd as nsesssarily visible
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^gible and bodily (31B), but, if it is to become at all, than that in 
it becomes must possess none of these characteristics • It is
^^•ible and characterless. (51A). There is no becoming as such apart 
*Po® that in which becoming takes place. Space itself is not a part of 
becoming. This is why Plato says that it*partakes in sob»  puzzling way 
°* the intelligible and is very hard to apprehend* (51A). He is led to 
®*y this because space is not perceptible by the senses and also because 
Is unchanging in nature. It is, however, a --art of the 
** P&ato thinks of it, and a necessary factor In becoming, apart from 
•bieh becoming would not be possible. It is that by which what becomes 
'«ling, in some way to existence on pain of being nothing at all*. (52C).
Space is not regarded as a result of the creative activity of 
the 8/v|̂ to It is one of the three factors which it is said
•*lst ’even before the heaven cane into being* (52D). The other two 
*** being and becoming. By becoming Plato can here only mean ’all that 
1« visible, not at rest, but in discordant and «»ordered motion’ (30A),
** le that which he also describes as what takes place in space before the 
«Native activity of the begins. Plato gives a description
«I this condition of space which he calls one from which Sod is absent (53B) 
^«to describes tbs ’chaos* which existed before the ordering activity of 
** follows* ’The nurse of becoming, being watery and fiery and
l i v i n g  the characters of earth and air, and qualified by all the other 
Affections that go with these, had every sort of diverse appearance to the 
but because it was filled with powers that ware neither alike nor 
t**®ly balanced, there was no equipoise In any region of it( but it was 
•Verywhere swayed unevenly and shaken by these things, and by its motion 
*lteQh them in turn* (52 D • E) This uncreated condition of apace Is 
Itself regarded as being in motion. Rot only do its constituents possess
Powers of motion, but also space itself possesses a motion of its can!
***• recipient was itself in motion like an instrument for shaking*. (53A).
It is difficult to give an exact interpretation of what Plate
«*«*• by this. It is clear, however, that this description of space as 
•listing before the creative activity of the S'^ou^o.s ie as mubh a 
Part of the myth of creation as anything else in Plato’s account. X* 
fact ws may say that it is if anything more mythical. What is now being 
««counted for is not among the works of reason but it is that which comas 
about of nsesssityi and Plato thought it was ^possible to talk about this
** oomsietily rational terms. Space itself is only apprehended ’by a sort 
** bastard reasoning* (5ZB), and those elements of fire, air, earth and 
* * W  which exist in an unordered state before creation, oould,as becoming, 
even bo apprehended by ’belief Involving sensation*, for even that 
spends on the apprehension of some sameness and continuity. They awe 
^••eribed as ’having every sort of diverse appearance to the sight*. Apart 
**«■ the ordering activity of God they would not be known as fir# and «tier,
) of their***th and air, since they would possess nere vestiges ( Yy
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The very physical order that is presented to the senses Is thus 
**garded as not the result of the mechanical combination of piqrsical 
•lenente, or the result of any other kind of physical process whatsoever, 
tort as the result of the design of the creator. That this description 
space as a hurse of becoming is mythical is a consequence of the 
tomarits at t8C ff. There Plato tells us that 'we are not now to speak 
tf the 'first principle' or 'principles' * or whatever name men choose to 
•»ploy - of all things, if only on account of the difficulty of 
•*plaining that we think by our present method of explanation* • There is, 
tawever, one striking difference between what Plato has to say about the 
•Waring of the four primary elements of space am being a part of what comes 
•tonrt of necessity and his previous description of the works of reason, 
told this has to do with the distinction whleh we previously drew between 
••■oology end theology in Pinto's exposition of creation.
Plato's account of the way in which God has ordered the physical 
•lements of space is in terms of the combination of two kinds of 
•town>ntary triangles. Fire, air and water are each of then different 
*toads of combination of the half-equilateral | earth is a combination of 
*to isoceles. This account of the transformation of three of the 
•laments into one another (fire, air and water), and of the formation of 
•**th from the isoceles is not regarded by Plato in any way as a final 
•*$Uaatioa of the generation of these elements. Be aayst 'If any one 
•to tell us of a better kind that he has chosen for the construction of 
these bodies, his will be the victory, not of an eneoy, but of a friend*.
The account that has been given is as far as Plato can ass the 
test that can be given, but this doss not rule out the possibility of an 
••count which is nearer the truth being given by someone else* Bet that 
toils could mean that an exactly true account could be ever given. The 
Bnture of the subject precludes thisi but there is no reason why seme 
*°re adequate account should not be given* This, however, would be an 
••«ount la mathematical terse, and not in any other* It is the 
Feasibility of improving a mathematical account of the physical elements 
•* the universe that Piste is talking about bore, for this kind of account 
••« for him the meat accurate kind of account of this matter that could be 
Stam* And any improvement in the account mould be an Improvement in the 
tothenatiee of the asoouat, and not in the statement of what he says he is>ot 
^••«ssiag here, namely the first principle er principles of all things*
An account of physical processcss la terms of mathematics was 
*0r Plato a far more adequate account than the kind of account which we 
him criticising in the Phaedo as given by Anaxagoras* For that had 
^••a an account of what is physical in terms of what is physical. The 
tothematical account docs not share this defect* For this makes that 
*ttad of account no account at all. But even of a methematleal account 
*3ato thought the question could be aakedt 'Why is that ws ass in the 
••rid precisely that order which our mathematical account show to be 
there?* Bo answer could possibly be given to this in tarns of mathematics.
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*** no improvement of the mathematical account would make this possible*
***** is the reason why Plato* when he first of all says that God ordered 
W*e chaotic elements of space, and remarks that 'the god then began by 
living them a distinct configuration by means of shapes and numbers',
•*•0 says 'the god framed them with the greatest possible perfection,
******* they had not before*' It is this latter fact that he regards 'as a 
Principle we constantly assert' (53B). This is in no way a mathematical 
Principle, It is rather, to may say, a principle of theology for Plato| 
•fcreas the mathematical order, however it is to be most adequately 
*ccounted for, is a principle of cosmology* The person who is able to 
^^ride a more adequate mathematical account is to be regarded as a friend 
•hd not an enemy, but the person who suggests that the world is not ordered 
*«r the beet is guilty of blasphemy. This principle of theology for 
^ t o  ia one which it is inconceivable that men could improve upon* It is, 
** he puts it, a 'principle we constantly assert *{ there is to be no 
•hang« ia our assertion of this which is the supremely valid principle of 
dooming.
The dis/ftinction which we have drawn bwtween theology and 
c°«mology in Plato is one which shows that in an attempt to give an 
account of creation Plato is forced to recognise that there are differences 
** t*gree In his mythical account* It would be a mistake, however, to 
•**Ppoee that these differences of degree amount to differences of degree of 
•Pproxiaation to what can be regarded as the exactly true account* For 
hheee differences of degree are not differences of degree about the same 
thing} that is about the same kind of account* The different accounts, 
although they are all mythical accounts, really amount to different kinds 
wyth about different aspects of creation* The world as created can 
be described in terms of a myth! but the created world itself is 
*ade up of elements which are 'toto genere' different from each other*
*he four kinds of physical elements are entirely different in their nature 
iro® the nature of the human soul, even if as the elements of the human 
^My they go to make up a part of the aortal part of the human soul*
f̂cere could be no account of the generation of the human soul in the same 
**tad of terms as those that are used in giving an account of the generation 
the primary bodies* even if what has been said about them must be taken 
**te account in any attempt to describe the mortal part of the human soul 
****<& is formed of these elemente* The difference la nature of what has 
be accounted for entail a difference in the nature of the account that 
*** be given! as Plato thought there must be* 'An account is of the ease 
***** as the thin s it sets fourth' (29B). This is why Plato aays that he 
** *ot going to speak about that which is the principle of all things, for 
***** would mean having to give one account of all things, and this by the 
**ture of all things not being the same, is impossible*
Cornford (P.C. p*j£L) draws a distinction between two seams of 
^ th in the Tlnaeua* 'There are two smses in which the timesne is a 
’myth' or 'story' ( ), Bo account of the material world own ever
**euat to an exact and aelflteonaistent statement of unchangeable truth*
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^  til« second plate, the cosmology la cast In the for« of a cosmogony, a 
itorr  of events spread out In tine*. Proa this point of view the 
Ascription of the world soul, the human soul, and the configuration according 
** * Mathematical pattern of the primary bodies, for instance, would fora 
***** ®f the cosmogony} whereas the fact that the universe as a living creature 
** always in a state of becoming means that there can be no exact account of 
*** nature as a whole. It is not the case that these two sense of myth are 
***lrely independent of one another. There is only a cosmogony because 
** true and exact account is possible.
In a sense the distinction which Cornford draws is not a distinction
Atween two sense of the word ‘myth* at all. The fact that there can only
*• a ’likely»account is not a myth} this is something that is true for Plato.
***** *n account is of the same order as the things which it sets forth, is no
'That is important to see is the difference that exists between
Afferent kinds of myths. There is not just one myth, but as many as there
*** objects for there to be myths about. The fact that there can be no
***** account itself, is only that which makes myths themselves necessary.
Ta* ®P*ak about the destiny of the human soul as Plato does, for instant,
** the Republic and the Timaeus, is to set forth a myth which is of a very 
Afferent kind to the one which describes the nature of space before the 
**’it*ing activity of the • Plat o’a myths form a family}
the Tlaaeus is more correctly described as a number of such myths rather 
****** one.
There must be different kinds of myth. One oouid not, for 
**et«nce, speak about the world soul in the same terms as one does about 
**** human soul. There is, however, one principle on which Plato thinka 
* ^  his myths are founded. This is his view that all things ars ordered 
V  Qod for the best. This is the thought that gives to all his myths their 
**ity as myths. This applies squally to what he says about the destiny of 
*he human soul, and to what ho says of the configuration of the primary 
^*A*e. The differences that appear in the different myths are closely 
*°hOected to the different ways in which Plato conceives his principle of 
**leoiogy working out. The goodness of all things is not the same}
Afferent parts of the creation do not share the sane kind of perfection 
goodness. So any attempt to show by means of myth the goodness which 
A® distinct part of creation possesses as over against another, will mean 
* difference in the myth that is given of each. But whereas the myths 
^••selves differ they all share this one characteristic of being an attempt 
** show how that part of the creation that they describe is the best it could 
*°*®ibly be.
This dieotinctiom between different kinds of myth is no where 
• W a r  in the Tlaaeus than in Plato*e account of what, on the one hand is 
****ted through the work of reason, and what, on the other, if— la about am 
***• result of neoeaaity. The creation of the soul of the world is regarded 
^  flato as the work of reason, so also is the formation of the body Of the 
***“ld out of the four elements the work of reason} the fitting of the body 
** the world to Be soul is also the work of reason} but that out of which
***• *°ur elements ore designed is not the work of reason* The nature of 
•Pfcce before the ordering of the universe is what Plato describes as
. The universe as a living creature is the ’mixed result of 
*®«eesity and reason’• 'Xva-'jKnj is that state of things which Plato 
Scribes as ’not at rest’, but in discordant and unordered motion* (30A)« 
** ie these thin s that are ’accessory causes which the god uses as 
®&beervient in achieving the best result that is possible (46C), ’They 
*** ^ocapable of any plan or intelligence for any purpose *• (4600),
*̂*® Physical nature of the universe can only be described if we bring 
ihto account some tiling of which a rational account can be given* This 
■hy the nature of space is described as containing those things that 
®irô uce their sundry effects at random add without order* • (46E).
Plato thought that nothing could be described as good unless it 
** Possible to see that it possess intelligent design and purpose* 
is what olVoi’f lacks, and only comes to possess when the
^juovi^oj takes over its random and purposeless motions and endows 
***** with a design according to mathematical order. The nature of this 
J%eical necessity cannot in any way be called good, apart from the 
6°odne&s that the gives to it. Even then its perfection is not
*° he compared with the perfection of the soul, for it does not possess 
**h®lligence as part of its own nature. For the only existing thing 
***** oan possess intelligence is soul (46D). The nature of what is 
**°̂ ily and only bodily apart from soul has no goodness* $o the point 
***** Plato makes in distinguishin; between reason and necessity is a 
^stinction between two different kinds of goodness, possessed by two 
Afferent parts of the created world. If as we have said Plato in his 
*^ha is seeking to show the different kinds of perfection that exist in 
Afferent created orders and that these differences demand a different 
*tythical treatment, then the goodness of that which is necessary is 
^ferent from that which is the work of reason*
The distinction, in other words, between reason and necessity 
itself a distinction between different kinds of goodness. The goodness 
the soul of the world, and of the divine part of the human soul is a 
*®Hved goodness. It is derived from the creative activity of the 
V o * an^ i® a» °* ki® Goodzj0Be» but its goodness is
B*°r® like the goodness of God than the goodness of what is physical.
*** the soul is intelligent and is endowed with reason so that it can 
*i*eet its own life after a certain pattern which God himself has presented 
** *ith, that is the pattern of hie own goodnees which is revealed la the 
®**ation as a whole. This is partly what Plato means when he says that the 
**to»re of the soul is self-motion. It has been made by God with the 
®*P*city to think and order its life in the body (whether the human boefcr 
the body of the world.) The goodness of what is bodily is also derived 
it possesses no goodness of its own by which its motion may be directed. 
**® goodness is completely derived from Clod, for its motions are random 
°**®® without purpose and design. It cannot properly be called good apart
the order which it receives from God. All its goodness is thus derived.
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soul, however, Is good in s different way. It can be described as 
possessing a goodness of its own. The world soul can be do described 
that it is the cause of order and beauty in the world« The human 
can possess a goodness of its own, for it is by its free choice 
^**t it follows either what is good or what is evil (Laws 90^0). There 
is, however, a difference between the goodness of the world soul sad that 
the human soul, which is described in terms of reason and necessity« 
means that the goodness of the human soul depends on its being able 
rule by reason those mortal parts that c ome about by necessity and 
*kich prevent it from attaining its own goodness«
There are, then, three different kinds of goodness which we can 
**• in the creation, according to Plato« He describes these three 
^Ifieront kinds of goodness in terms of reason and necessity« First 
tbere is the goodness of the world soul which is unchanging as being the 
*°rk of reason! a goodness whfch can be described as its own. This is 
»hat Plato means when he says *Thc- soul, being everywhere inwoven from 
the centre to the outermost heaven and enveloping the heaven all round on the 
°utside, revolving within its own limits, made a divine beginning of 
»•Useless and intelligent life for all time’. (36E). The human soul is 
result of both reason and necessity, and so its goodness is not of the 
•*®c order as that of the world soul« It is lower in the scale of 
Perfection, and this is because it may lose its goodness if it ehooees evil« 
^  even ite goodness can be described as its own if the choice it makes is 
°®rrect« The goodness of what is bodily is completely dirivaiive and so 
to is described as what comes about through necessity and is not the work 
reason. It is in this way that the gyth changes in accordance as the 
Perfection of «hat is being described is different.
There are two questions which arise in coaaextion with Plato*s 
»Ccount which are important for an assessment of what he says« In what 
••»se 1« it that Plato describes the world as good? and how is this
oonnsotod with his view about Sod. These two questions can bs 
•®*bined if it is asked «hat is the relationship between Flate*e view of 
and his view about the goodness that can be ascribed to the world, 
answer to this question is to give an account as Plato does of ths 
in which reason persuades necessity *to guide the greatest part of the 
things that become towards what is beet*« To do this is to show the
relationship which exists between the goodness of the world and Ood. To 
**»• an account of this is also to show how teleology figures in Plato*« 
•ccount of the world«
The nature of the good had been a central theme in the Republic* 
^bere the discussion had been In terms of forms and things that become as 
^ksnesses to their forms« The form of the (food is conceived as the 
^«hest principle in accordance with which the world of becoming and the 
*°rld of being can be interpreted« Plato says of the form of (food! *The 
»fejeete of knowledge not only derive from the good the gift of being known, 
***t are further endowed by it with a real and essential existencef though 
good far from being identical with real existence, actually transeeade
103 -
i* dignity and power*• This passage has caused a great deal of 
trouble in the interpretation of Plato. Amongst the more ¡serious 
difficulties in connexion with it is that Plato seems to make a form the 
®&ttee of the being of the forms themselves. Plato seems to have thought« 
®t least here in the Republic, that the difficulty which Aristotle felt 
*lth regard to the doctrine of the forms is overcome by the doctrine of 
the form of the good. For Aristotle's main difficulty with regard to 
Plate's view of the forms had been how they could have any kind of separate 
**ietenee apart from the actualisation of the fora in particular existeat 
things. Plato's answer to this question is that the good is what gives 
te the forms the reality which they have. Za other words, the final
$*t&eiple of the being of anything, whether it be an unchanging fora or 
Its image which becomes, is its goodness. The main point whieh Plato 
•lahes to stress, however, la that we must not say that this goodness is 
discrete and completely different for different things* But this does 
*ot mean that the goodness of one thing is the same as that of another,
*• if Plato thought that the goodness in all things was identical. Each 
thing is not as good as another. There is first of all the fundamental 
distinction of the difference between the perfection of the fora and of its 
!®®ge to be taken into account. But what he did wish to say is that there 
1® a unity about goodness itself, and it is this unity which belongs to the 
goodness that he calls the form of the food in the Republic. If anything 
1« called good, then it can only be called this by virtue of its 
Relationship with one fora of goodness| and everything that is called good 
®k*res,even if net in the same way, in the same goodness. The fact that 
different things are not good in the same way does not mean that there is 
*° unity of goodness in which they all share as if there «»re more than 
••c form of the good.
The reality of things, in the Republic, is thus intimately 
connected with their goodness. Xtt fact we may say that what Plats is 
•eying here is that degrees of reality and goodness go together. The 
•ore re5.il something is depends on how good it is, and this is why Plato 
*«3rs that *ths good Itself transcends being in dignity and power* • What 
Is most real is the good itself. Things are real in proportion to thalr 
Soodness. The main distinction in goodness and reality which Plato 
Points to in the Republic is that between being and becoming. What 
becomes in an image of what in, and its reality In only an iaagt of 
the reality of Mist is unchanging. So also its goodness Be only an image 
the perfection of the form. This is made clear in the simile of the 
^lhe. The tour parts of the line are not depicted as referring to four 
different approximations to what is most real. The point that 1s of 
importance is the proportion that is seen to exist between and
0 u <r i * , This is a proportion between hat is lees real and what
*• perfectly reals and ao between what is less good end what is perfectly 
8®od. What becomes is not something that approximates to what in
Perfectly real, as for instance Burnet suggests in connexion with the 
^imaeue when he says* 'The sensible world is the intelligible worl$ In
the making*» (Greok Fhilosphy p. 2&0). There is no sense for Plato 
k* which something that belongs to becoming could become unchanging and 
•ternal. Wh fc he does mean is that the world of becoming is an image 
the eternal world and what reality it has* and also the goodness that 
has, ia an image of the reality and goodness of the eternal. For if 
could say that the world of becoming could approximate to the world of 
and in some sense could become that* there would be no reason why 
»hat is called eternal should not approximate to something else more perfect 
itself. In fact the approximation, would be an infinite one with no 
conceivable end. It is only if a clear distinction is made between 
becoming and being that we can begin to understand the nature of either 
°* them ahd see also that the world of becoming depends for its reality 
goodness on the reality and perfection of the eternal world of which 
is an image.
In the Republic Plato says that he cannot speak of the form of 
***• good itself except by analogy. Be compares the position it holds in 
*be realms of being to the place of the sun in the realm of becoming.
®kat the form of good is in itself ( * vro k*0 'w G t o ) cannot be stated, 
say, however* that the form of good is the most important thing to 
about ( *Tb fci'juftov/ ) is to assert that we begin to
^Merstand the relationship that holds between all things when we 
ttade*“etand, a6 far as that is possible for human beings* the goodness
resides in all things. The final meaning which human beings can find 
things is a meaning to be seen only when they see* as far as they can 
the goodness that all things possess. To say* however, that all 
things are in same way good and that the reality which anything possesses 
spends on the form of the good* is to say the same thing. this is bo 
Sire an explanation of the goodness that there is in terms of goodness.
*t i6 because of this difficulty that Plato says that he cannot speak of 
***• good as it is. The fact* however, that the form of the good is said 
be the cause of being to all other forms and also of the reality of the 
of becoming does show how Plato was attempting to see how he oould 
some connexion between what is unchanging and what is becoming, 
of what Plato means when he talks about the form of the good in the 
^public is that there is one principle whereby the reality of what is 
Vernal and what is temporal can be seen together. This principle is the 
goodness in which both shartf and which the world of becoming possesses by 
P0*' easing an image of that goodness that belongs to the world of forms.
The difficulty of speaking of the good as it is* is the 
difficulty of showing how it is the cause of the goodness of everything* 
Plato thought that when one tries to do this the account cannot be 
•*act. For one oan believe that the world is good and interpret what 
W p e n s  according to & principle of teleology as Plato does* but what 
Recount oan one give of this goodness? That the reality of things is 
®°°d might be clear enough* but what is the nature of this goodness? 
can one say that the reality of things is good* unless there is some 
of understanding the nature of this goodness itself. It seen® that
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fo order to understand tho reality of things one has also to understand 
nature of the good; and to understand how things are good is a 
different matter tram understand'ng that they are good. It was this 
question about the nature of goodness that Plato in tho Republic thought 
®°hld not be answered in suiy exact manner. All that can be said about 
toils has to be said in a myth, and what Plato in the Timaeus is seeking 
*° do is to speak of the nature of that goodness which he said in the 
^«public he could not speak about as it is. This means that what Plato 
to sayabout creation in the Timaeus is only an image of what a true 
account of the nature of goodness would be. For goodness in itself 
®an®ot be spoken of, and the goodness that there is in the created world 
°*a only be spoken of in images* This goodness for Plato is the goodness 
•fetch can be seen in the as a living whole. There Is for him
* unity about the world which is an image of that unity which is possessed 
fey the good in itself. This is the reason why he insists that the created 
•diverse is one and complete and that this completeness is apparent in the 
fact that it has the form of a sphere which is the most perfect of the 
8»oaetrical solids. At least this is the way in which Plato chooses to 
•xpreoe the unity of the world. As to whether this expression is exact 
*• can only say that it expresses in an image the goodness and the unity 
to» world possesses, for the true expression of that goodness and unity 
•ecape us. The sphere is able H o  comprehend all the figures that there 
®*'®t (33B) and its ceaseless revolutions make it the best possible image 
°f eternal existence. What is important is not to lose eight of the unity 
°f the world, however we express this unity; for the unity is an 
•saential part of its goodness. It is also to express the goodness that 
fefeere is in the world that Plato speaks as he does of the world soul that 
S&verne the world*s body* The question« then, that Plato is seeking to 
®®8wer in the Timaeue is how we can say that the world is good, when the 
*® *1 nature of goodness is something that we cannot speak accurately 
•bout. This did not mean, for Plato, that we must give up any attempt 
fo speak of this goodness which is to be seen in the world. What it 
*** mean is that we must first of all recognise that this goodness which 
*• somehow discern to be present is something that we cannot properly 
Understand. We must seek to understand it in the best possible way we man*
Plato’s view is that we cannot begin to understand the goodness of 
to» world unless we are prepared to say that there must be a cause for it 
•feich is itself good. There is one view that he always strongly opposed, 
foie is that the order and beauty which is seen in the world and which 
•nables us to say that it is good is only the result of chance. If we 
••• that there is order and beauty in the world, then we must assign it 
a cause. No one Plato thought who sees anything of the order and 
fe®auty that doea exist can say that it is the result of chance. For this 
*°uld be to deny that order and beauty* This means that Plato puts 
forward a view that might he regarded am an argument from design* To say, 
feawever, that he puts forward an argument of the kind that is criticised 
fey Htaae would be a mistake* Plato is just not saying that the reason why we
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*®y that there ust be a cause for the design in the universe is that 
know that every human design is the result of some designing agent, 
fo** he thinks that the design and order that there is in the universe 
cannot be properly compared with any kind of human design* Although 
&e uses the figure of a craftsman to describe the creative work of God, 
k* is fully aware of the fact that this is not to be understood in 
®®&logy with h man craftsmanship* It is not that divine craftsmanship 
fo an image of human craftsmanship, but that human craftsmanship at its 
is an image of that creative activity which belongs to God* To 
Pht the matter the other way round is what Plato calls in the Sophist 
the deceiving art of the sophist* She Stranger asks Thesetetus to 
think of a man who claims not only to know how to speak about everything 
hut *to know how to produce all things in actual fact by a single form 
skill' (Z55D). Be says that must be an illusion* For it eatials 
Baying that a man could make human life and all other kinds of life*
^ere is a connexion betwe a claiming some kind of universal knowledge 
«bout all things and this ability to know how all things are made*
Plato seems to suggest that to know how to speak about all things would 
ifcply a knowledge of how the whole universe, 'men, all other animals,
B&d Plants, and sea and sky and earth and gods and everything else there 
1 b are made'* if any man claimed a knowledge of this kind, his knowledge 
w°uld be only of illusions* Ha would not have understood that the world 
la of such a nature that such knowledge is impossible* All such a man 
could produce would be 'illusions in discourse'* ( ^  P°lS ^ Y °  
<j>oi'/TeW|*̂ .TA ) ^ d  jj© would know nothing about the realities of life* 
(Tuw IV Tcm£ wgi^W'iV’ S^yW i w ^ y w o ^ v w  23^2). The same distinction 
is made by Plato in a later passage of Sophist when he draws a firm 
distinction between human craftsmanship and divine craftsmanship <26 5).
both these passages we see that Plato thinks that to recognise that the 
world is the work of divine craftsmanship is not something that can be 
taught someone as one piece of knowledge among others* The Sophist is 
% person who makes it just that. To know that the world is the work of 
divine craftsmanship is, however, something that one comas to know not 
through any account that human beings might provide and be prepared to 
describe as exact* For if someone did attempt to explain to the young 
kow it is that 'everything is made*, then Plato thinks that 'the 
•ajority of them as they advance in age and after some time, would of 
hocessity be compelled to apprehend thing® clearly as they are, as they 
coo© into close contact with the reality of things' and would give up 
their former beliefs* This is a matter of persuasion Plato thinks*
It is not something that one can expect to see immediately on the first 
bearing.
Sheaetotus is prepared to accept the view that the worll is the 
result of divine craftsmanship and so the Stranger says that there sill 
te no need for him to use arguments to persuade him of its truth (t *̂  koyt» 
Tli-iGoO^ ¿Votyrtsuws TU»t*«v 0|*.eAo>fit\/ 265D)
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and he will assume that ’what is called natural is made by divine art 
and that the thinfjs that are made by men by human art. So there are 
according to this account two arts of production, the one which is 
human, and the other which in divine’. (265B). Plato goes on to argue 
that it is human art that in an image of divine art; that human beings 
imitate the design they see in nature. So it is clear that Plato I3 
not saying that we see design in nature because we work by design 
ourselves, for this human design iteelf is in fact part of the design 
*® observe in the world and which we attribute to the creative 
activity of God as its cause. Plato here lays it down * as an 
hypothesis' that the world is the work of divine craftsmanship.
%is is the account that he will attempt to give, though he recognises 
that others may give different accounts. For Plato all other accounts 
would certainly miss the mark. The goodness of the world is not 
independent; it just does not exist without any reason. What men 
cannot do is to assign to themselves the role of God and give an 
accurate account of that goodness* When Plato assigns the world to 
God as its creator, he is then stating that the world for him is good 
and that it contains a meaning and purpose which he cannot completely 
•xplain, The true meaning of the world, that is its goodness, depends 
on goodness that is beyond the world itself and cannot be regarded as 
a part of the world, but it nevertheless appears in the world as the 
work of divine creation.
However the world is not completely good. There is also evil 
in the world which is contrary to that goodnes: that is revealed in the 
work of divine creation. ’Evils can never be destroyed; for there 
must always be something that is necessarily opposed to the good.
They have, however, no place amongst the gods, but of necessity hover 
around this mortal nature and this world*, (fheaetetua 17 6 a ). Plato 
describes evils in this passage in the same language as he uses in the 
Tlmaeue to describe that which the takes over and persuades
by reason. Plato’s view of <tVÁ\j , and so of evil is not ea$y
to understand. His description of evil ’hovering about this mortal 
nature and tbis world* is comparable with his description of space as 
a disorderly state before the creation. It is out of this state of 
^ v&y K"vj in which the four elements are that Plato pictures the 
forming the body of the world. The world is, 
however, not only an ordering of a primordial chaos but its life is the 
life of a soul, and the nature of this soul is such that it has no 
<3v«i'jVC'V| about it* It Is completely the work of reason* Apart 
from this Plato could not speak of the world as*a perceptible god, 
supreme in greatness and excellence, In beauty and perfection’* (920)• 
The cosmos as a whole possesses a harmony said perfection even though 
there is evil present in it, for the world as created is one in which 
reason has persuaded necessity to order things for the best.
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There lose been some disagreement over the way in wh-'ch Plato’s 
of necessity is to be interpreted* Cornford criticises the
interpretation which was put forward by Taylor. Taylor makes two points 
•toout ¿/«.'jWvj • '*(1) Plc-.ito emphatically does not mean that some
things are due to intelligence and others tc mere mechanism. 'Mechanism1 
60868 in only as the *subordinate* of intelligent purpose, which is the 
principle1 of all imdertakinjs. Apparontiy i|»ô oiC are altogether 
product of intelligence, but nothing is the unaided product of necessity* 
2̂) Also as the name *n A<*V«o jU-tv-vj oî rtCk shows, this 'mechanism1, if
** are to call it so, is supposed to be the most prominent in the apparently 
*»«*alous, exceptional, and singular* (p.300). He says also* 'If we could 
•ver have complete knowledge, we should find that «?v8*yk'Vj had vanished 
our account of the world’. (p.̂ Ol). Comford objects to this view o»
ground that it is 'inspired by the viish to make Plato's divine Reason 
*** °®nipoter.t’Goi'.1 Comford is right in objecting to Taylor's suggestion
with a complete knowledge we should find that ô W^k-vj had vanished 
*̂0« our account of the world. For Plato v̂bly*>j Is not just something 
that figures in the account that he gives of the world, but it Is meant to be 
something real in the world itself. But as we shall see it is difficult to 
*ePa**ate completely what Plato speaks of ae Vo«S and voof K/vj , 
figure in his account together, and any attempt to separate them
c°®Pletely from one another ¡gives a false impression of Plato's view.
Certainly Plato's view of the •»>£.'/is not that he is
^ipotent. But it is difficult to see how any intelligible meaning can be
given to that idea, and that means that there cannot be any sense in saying 
that that God is either omnipotent or not. What Plato is concerned with is 
the goodness of the and that goodness as it is revealed in the
world is something that he speaks about in terms both of and otv<*y*v̂  .
Plato describes the imperfection of the world in terms of k-vj . 
Wfc not just in terms of that, but in terms <f that in so far as it is the 
hnteri&l upon which voi>£ works. There is a contrast between the tso also* 
NOeS possesses every kind of perfection, whereas is a
Ascription of what is imperfect, but the perfection of the world is 
•bperior to its imperfection, la such a way that the world is the best 
Possible. We have already seen that ¿vJyvoj has no goodness which can be 
said to be its own, but that its goodness is completely derived fren the 
Creative activity of the S-vjfvoofc.yes • flato regards those things that 
o»o constituted of necessity as 'subservient causes*. The 
‘bass these cause« as subservient, while he himself contrived ti» good in « 1 1  
thing« that cone to be*. How this goodness that can be discerned in those 
things that cone to be is not dependent on the nature of <^váyK-Vj itself.
The good is completely distinct in nature from that which is necessary. 
*hisis a distinction that Plato draws in other terms in the Philebus (5bC) 
"hen he saysí 'That for the sake of which anything is generated is in the 
®l«ss of the good, and that which is generated for the sake of something 
bise must be placed in another class'. What is necessary and described by
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Plato as be in/ taken over by the O-Vj^ioa^yo^ t cannot be placed in 
close of the goad* but met be regarded from the point of vie* of its 
•listing for the sake of soraethinf else. There arc two kinds or causes 
*the necessary and the divine*. (Tinacus 6$S) Flato goes on to say that 
the reason why we should seek to discover the divine cause is the 
attainment of that happiness of which human nature is capable. But it 
Is also necessary to discover the nature of necessary causes, for without 
this knowledge it will not be possible to understand the divine as that 
should be understood.
The distinction between the necessary an-1 the good is of great 
Importance for Plato. V<® have noted that Plato distinguishes between the 
Afferent kinds of goodness that are possessed by different parts of the 
H’°*id by his use of the distinction between reason and necessity. M® isave 
®lso seen that Plato thought that there is a projxn tion between the reality 
things end their goodness. This means that Plato thought that there is 
* difference in reality between what is necessary and what is good.
ĥere are other passages in Plato which elucidate hie meaning. First of 
*ll there is the statement in the Phaedo which distinguishes between the 
*®al cause and that without which a cause could not be a cause. The 
example that is given is that of Socrates explaining the reason why he 
stays in prison rather than run off to Megara or Boeotia. The point is 
that there are certain things which are necessary for certain kinds of 
human activity* Socrates soys* 'If anyone should say that without 
Possessing such things as bones and sinews, and whatever else I have, I 
could not do as I pleased, he would speak the truth*. (99B) These are 
the kind of things without which what Socrates calls here the true cause 
could not be a cause. They are those causes which are called in the 
îmaeus subservient causes ( (TyvoMiie. ) They are necessary by 
Cmture, and they determine in some way the nature of human action. But 
they cannot be thought of as the final cause of that kind of action.
ĥey are necescary means to that action. Soccrates claims that the final 
cauee of this action is what he considers in the circumstances to be good, 
®hd his determination of what this is does not depend on the constitution 
cf his bones and sinews, even if the way in which he achieves his end does.
It is pointless as far as Socrates is concerned to attempt to account for 
human action in terms of physical causes only. For those physical causes 
*°uld be equally involved if his decision was different and he did run away. 
The deoision is independent of them. It la the same point that Plato makes 
1® the Philebus when he says that * becoming is always for the sake of being*.
says that it is coaly being ( ) that one can place in the class
®f the good, and that which is called beaming cannot be so placed. The 
distinction that Plato makes here between becoming and being, is the same 
the distinction he makes in the Timaeus between what is necessary and 
*fcat is good, which is the work of Vftoj • The world itself is 
described as it$ oo<ri<W • This phrase is one which Hate
*°uld not have used in the early part of the Phaedo where the distinction 




that the world itself is real, and. that he thinks the reality of
®orld is properly uwi.-rstoo-.! in terms of goodness* Otherwise the
***U c&n only be thought of as continually changing and consisting in
•*ch things as are incauable of any plan or intelligence for any purpose'*
(to).
If Plato speaks here about SIS ouftekv ( this does not
*e*n that the distinction which lie draws at the beginning of the Timaeus 
•̂tween being and becoming ae between ’that which is always real and has no 
*coaing and that which is always becoming and is never real', no longer
for him. He wants now to show that the Ko<rp»̂  cannot be described
^  ®eana of one of these only, but that both niust be taken into account*
^  ̂ oir̂  this he is shewing also how it is possible to speak about the
**ality of that uh.‘ ch becomes* This reality cannot be unchanging! but
Either ia it to be described in such a way that it cannot be described as
because it in always in a state of change where nothing remains the same*
*a°t merely as , becoming cannot be said to have any reality
** *11. it ic only .-/hen we bring in the end for which it Exists, and so we
its goodness is, that we can speak of its being and reality* If one 
fee not attempt to speak about the reality of what becomes in terms of its 
*®°dheac| then one is bound up in the realm of the necessary and one has no 
^^erstaaiing of the nature of th<§ world. For the world is a sensible
* ¿t becomes in tine, and is not eternal end unchanging* But 
becoming is not something which is without any kind of order or measure*
^  1b not something about which one can say nothing definite. It is not in 
^■e sense an unlimited chaos which has no unity or purpose about it* This 
^  aby Plato seeks to understand the world as the creation of intelligent 
which in the Fhilebus he describes as due to the work of a cause* 
is caused as the world is a mixture of the unlimited and the limited* 
becoming differs only in name from what is created, and the cause of 
becoming differs only in name from the creative agent of the world* 
Philcbus agrees with the Timaeus in that it is an attempt to see how 
f̂cere ia order in the world, and it attempts to do this by referring to the 
•̂ «teess of the world*
This is a central point in Plato’s account* The reality which this 
**** of becoaming possesses is the order it possesses, and this order andfeat*®bre is put by Plato is the class of the good* It is this which gives
^  k®coming the being it has* This is the nature of >(iviat$ ii$ oSdiolv
^  the end of the Philcbus when Plato gives a classification of what is good
In Ofder of pribrity ha places at the head of his list ’measure, moderation, 
•̂bess, and all which is to be considered similar to these*• This is the 
^°ice of what he chooses to call here 0»J ¿'C$lO£ * (66 A)*
^  the order which exists in the world as a whole which gives it Its 
and which enables us to speak of its reality even if it becomes*
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If ve loa., the good cut of account, then in speaking of the 
world v;o can only speak of v.-hat is necessary. We are then talking 
about hoc ming as becoming wit' out attempting to see its relationship 
with being. As to this land of pursuit ciato says* 'viben a man for 
salte of recreation, lays aside discourse about eternal things and gains 
an innocent pleasure from the consideration of such plausible accounts 
Of bee -King, he will add fco his life n sober and sensible pastime». (59C). 
Plato did not think, however, that this plausible account of what is 
necessary was unrelated to what he calls *discourse about eternal things*, 
by which he ir.cans especially the goodness of things. ’Thas he makes 
olear at 69A. »The divine we should search out in all things for- the 
sake of the life of such happiness as nature permits? tue necessary for 
the sake of the divine, reflecting that apart from the necessary those 
other objects of our serious study cannot be perceived or communicated 
Bor c r. we in any ether way have part or lot in them.* point of this
remarks mows to be that the necessity which does exist in the world is 
aowtfthlng that -runt be accounted for as accurately as possible, in order 
that it might be seen that even the necessity in the world is not 
something which ±n completely unordersd but which, as Plato puts it, has 
been T̂ rsuaded by reoson to guióte the greatest part of things that become 
for the best. Tills .moans that Plato when he gives his account o* what 
comes about by necessity seeks to show to the best of nis ability the 
order which exists in the reel® of what is necessary. In other words 
bis description of necessity ie on attempt to show how »necessity has been 
persuaded by reason to guide the greatest part of things that become for 
the best*. The goodness and purpose that Plato believes can be discerned 
in the world could not be there unless whet is necessary had been so 
Persuaded by reason. He gives, for instance, an account of vision in
terms of necessary canses ( >• is for *°st * * *  *
description of vision as a physical process and such a description can
only be given in terms of necessary canses. These are, however, 
elements in the account which cannot be regarded as a description of 
hscessary causes. This illustrates the point that Plato makes at 68®»
♦The S'w j mo v^ oS made use of causes of this order as subservient, 
while he himself contrived the good in all things that come to be.' The 
purpose of vision, which defines its goodness, is the work of the
An account of necessary causes is for Plato only an account of 
what becomes, and that becoming is necee .-ary for Mm doos mean that the 
Physical processes of becoming possess in their nature something which ie 
independent of the creative aetivity of the . But
becoming as it is to the created world is something which is not 
oompletely independent of his activity, for that necessity which belongs 
bo becoming has been persuaded. As a re ult of this creative activity what 
le necessary has been gives an order and purpose which depends on the 
goodness of the creator. The chaos which Plato describes as existing
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before the creation in his myth is not part of the world as it is.
Shis is how Plato attempts to show that the physical processes of the 
world are not completely dependent on the ordering activity of the 
8w||u O u ^ o $  t in so far as he does not create what is physical, but 
gives to it the order and design it possesses. Shat this is the ease, 
that is, that the physical processes of the world are partly dependent 
upon, and partly independent of the , means that Sa
giving an account of what comes about of necessity we are not giving an 
»«count that is entirely disc naected with what is called the 'discourse 
•bout eternal things*. Only, in attempting to described the physical 
processes as physical processes and as nothing elm, all that is being 
given is a description of the 'mechanism' for instance, by which vision 
»orks. This is how things happen of necessity. It means that they 
could not happen otherwise. tot this is not all. The faot that they 
happen as they do is not only due to the nature of the physical 
constituents of these processes, but is also due to the persuasion of 
the processes by reason. That this is the case is clear from the faet 
that Plato finds it almost impossible to cay anything about a state of 
becoming In which the primary elements of the universe have not been 
Ordered in the best possible way by the . It is
because even necessity is seen to have the order it does have that Plato 
eaya thfft the study of necessary causes is needed for an understanding of 
those things which are the objects of 'serious study*.
Aristotle distinguished between three senses of the word 
»•oescary, and these distinctions seem to he influenced by the way Plato 
thought about the matter. They aret (a) That which is necessary pstforce 
because it is contrary to the natural impulse, (b) tot without which good 
is impossible, (c) That which cannot he otherwise but is absolutely 
»«eessary. (Metaphysios ID72hl2 ff.) It is the last asset of the word 
that ht regards as primary, and it is 'from this sense of 'necessary* that 
all the others are somehow derived.' (1015 a 35). ** Plato's account of
»hat comes about by necessity senses (a) and (b) are included, for in his 
description of necessity he speak» of that as necessary which comes about 
»t random and without any order (b6E): he also »peaks of necessary causes, 
ana seems to have thought of these as those without which the good could 
not be. That is, the goodness of the world is limited by necessity.
The goodness that the world possesses could not be apart from the necessity 
that exists. This means that to attempt to say In what way the world is 
good is impossible apart from an account of the necessity that there is 
1» the world.
The nature of necessity thus shows how the goodness of the wharld 
is a limited goodness, hat it does not show us the nature of the goodness 
that does exist in the world itself. This is dear from the account that 
nato gives of the creation of men. It is a necessary characteristic of 
the body that 'danse bone and much flash cannot go together with
h*o»ly responsive sensation, tor if theee two characters had «»seated to
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toinclde the structure of the head would hare possessed them above all, and 
human race, bearing a head fortified with flesh and sinew, would hare 
toiojred a life twice or many times as long as now, healthier and more free 
P^in* But as it was, the artificers who brought us into being reckoned 
toether they should have a long-lived but inferior race or one with a shorter 
tont nobler, and agreed that evevyone must on all accounts prefer the 
tonrter and better life to the longer and worse*• (73 A-C). The creation of 
to® human race is itself a mixed result of reason and necessity, but a 
^•eription of what is necessary about it only would not help to see how it 
to that the gods created the best possible life for human beings* This is 
•°**thing that can only be seen by reason and understanding, but this 
toderstanding would not be possible apart from as accurate as possible 
toowledge of what is necessary as being subservient causes of what is good*
Xn describing the physical process of vision, for example, we give 
account of how vision works. But this does not allow us to understand 
toy there should be any such thing as vision. When, however, we seek the 
tofteoa for it we also understand that the necessity of it is something that 
tots la with its purpose. This is the way in which Plato sees the necessary 
to something without which the good could not be* A true understanding of 
to*t ig necessary in the world of becoming is impossible unless the goodness 
to Purpose of this becoming is seen. So in the case of vision Plato would 
to*«* with the judgment of Leibniz when he says: ”1 advise those wBo have any 
toatimoat of piety and indeed of true philosophy to hold aloof from the 
topreeiion of certain pretentious minds who instead of saying that eyes were 
*to* for seeing, say that we see because we find ourselves having eyes* 
Recourse on Metaphysics ch. XIX). It might be thought that in describing 
tout i8 necessary all that is needed is a description In physical terms of 
to* what is necessary comes about. But although this is Indispensable in 
®to*ng an aecouat of necessity, it would not be a complete account of what 
to &eee*sary, for we would not then have shown how becoming always exists 
*to being, that is for goodness.
When one sees how becoming always exists for being then what one
todtratanda is not the necessary causes hut the divine ones, and Plato thought 
It -toe neceesary to keep these apart. For to understand how becoming always
**tot* for the sake of being is to understand that the world is good. So
to is a goodness about vision. Its goodness consists in the fact that
totough it men are able to study the heavens and the Universe and so the 
to*fetus study of the world which is philosophy becomes possible. Plato’s view 
*to*t the relation between the neces ary and the good is that it is possible 
to two people to agree about the working of necessary causes, that is they 
*toid give the description of them, hut they could disagree about the 
of what they describe. For one might see no purpose where the other
toght do so, and so the one would not be prepared to M e  any divine «fuses in 
whereas the other would. As for the nature of the necessary Plato 
*tobght that it could he so described that the description of it didnot in 
to »ay militate against saying that there are divine causes. In this case,
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is possible for two people to agree about the physical processes of 
•hat is necessary* but disagree about whether there was any purpose or 
^•®ign in the process. In that cane, for Plato, their accounts of what 
necessary could not really be regarded as the sane. A true 
Understanding of what is of necessity also includes seeing its goodness 
*hich is not necessary. Unless one seeks to understand its goodness,it 
Is impossible to understand how it is that one should seek the cause of 
*B®t is necessary for the sake of the divine causes. Then it win be 
possible to understand that even what is necessary is something wMbh is 
** it Is on ac ount of the creative activity of the ° w s
If we say that the goodness that is in the world is impossible 
*P&rt fro» what is necessary, this does not mean that it is the sole 
®a«ee of that goodness. For although what is necessary determines the 
goodnoeg that is possible, the goodness is there as the work of the 
®*®ator. But this means that the goodness is limited. The world is
hot perfect in its goodness. If there were no ¿vixyKvj , and the 
•orld were completely the result of the creative activity of the 
^>1^10 0 ^ 0 5 * wiic B®5 -iot been limited in his work by < 3 k/vj ,
tkoa the world would share in the perfection that belongs to vouj •
But even if its goodness is limited, its goodness is the most Important 
thing about it. Plato's point is that if you describe the world as a 
•*xed result of the operation of reason and necessity, then you are 
Saving an account which is entirely different from one which states that 
the world is the result of chance. Things do not just happen to be as 
they are. What they are depends on the deration of divine causes which
**■* good. As far as one can see fro» the account that is given in the
’fimaeua there is nothing that exists in the world which is unaffected by 
the nature of what is necessary. Nothing is completely necessary, nor is 
•aything completely the work of reason. When Plato describes the k off 1*03 
** a 'visible living creature* then its goodness as he conceives it is the 
•tked re ult of both reason and necessity. The two cannot be separated.
emphasis is placed upon one over against the other, then one fails to 
B®® the real nature of the world.
Plato's description of the world as a 'visible living creature* 
the way in which he ends his account in the Tiaaeus. It is this 
feature of his account that it is important to understand. He speaks of 
the as living, because he thinks it ossesses a goodness of its
®*h. That is why what he says about the world soul is central in what 
B® says. The world souldts particularly that which gives to the world 
its goodness. Plato's conception of goodness and the soul go together}
*®d this applies not only to what he says about the human life but also to 
•Bat he says about the world. As he puts the matter in his seventh letter* 
*Ro evil nor good worthy of account belongs to things that lade soul*.
( Kdvtov Jyoi&ev Xô ow«i$iov £<rrc Treî  33**E).
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But also he thinks that the existence of rational order is 
impossible without soul. »Reason and mind could never come into 
Mag without soul- (<ro<t>* M *  o 3 k  5 v  uo'rt
sji'io\6'Oy/ Philehus 30C). It is a combination of both these 
ideas that leads Plato to describe the world at the end of the 
P̂iaaeus in the following ways »For having received in fun its 
complement of living creatures» mortal and immortal» this world 
has thus become a visible living creature embracing all that is 
visible. It is an image of the intelligible, a perceptible god, 
supreme in greatness and excellence, in beauty and perfection.
It is single and one in its kind*. (92C)
-  116 -
Comparad with the lepublio, the Lcnra haa Borne timas b#en thou-̂ it 
*• the woik of e» old man «ho has lost the cuthuaiaaa and Inspiration 
oan he found in the earlier weifc* The havre la a ooaproads® solution 
** ths problema whioh Plato iras trylng te anewer* The Bepuhlio, wrltten 
""toi Plato vas a conparatlrely young man beare maay marks of idéalisa. But 
W «  laoks this. Howevar the différences betreen the two «estes ate« to 
4**petr than this, and one of tho main différences la that in tho X*we va 
otuoh more «nphasis placed upon the Impártanos of rdUgion in the lift 
*  *he city-state, and this ls part of the central importance that la giren 
^  **** and nhat Plato oonsiders thè lava to he* Bit riav of lav ia that 
^  *wat he an expression in the life of the city of thè vili of the goda.
***** aa we hare som, is something that wae etreased ly Soorntss, and
^to»e riev ia that »ths servie* of tho lava ia tha service of the goda*»
(xri TÍO KotXux, 8ooA,iD«ÎJC,—  f V  To?i vôji»^ (SjTWÔty t*Îs Oi«s
g*) It is this h tesase the ai« of the lava ia rirtua. 
i) plato* a oonoem h ere is with seelng that thsre muet ha a uaitgr 
•^»»t tha lava as thara ia a unity about virtua* la ia erltielalng a 
**** of lav «hich vas oomraon at his tins* Aocording te this viser ths 
'^^litìuaent of lavs vas determinad hy ths nssds vhich ci reamo taaoos gara 
***• *o, *ad not by the considération in eaoh caae aa to nhothsr thay 
' ^ d  nnko possible the practice of virine* *Pttr vhat vo must aay, if 
1,1 **• to speak truly and Juatly about virtue vhich is dirlno in nature,
^  ̂ *1 ths loglslator «est tako iato acoount net àusi a part of virtua,
*** *&et tha leaet laportant part, in saklng hia lava, but ha muet 
**»le of virtue, and seek for lava that correspond to tote différent 
****• «f rirtua* «ar ahould ha do aa «ur oontemparary laglalaters «a*
** ^«y only investigata and eatahliah lava « h «  a naaft la fslt# and 
*** *o« a olaae of lava about alla tosata and hoiresses, another about 
**«**•, cthara about tan tbouaaad othsr eueh natta«»* * «30l) Th» «lie
** lava baing rirtua, thla giros than thadr unity aa lava« t t  thay 
*** bot haro this unity, thon thoro wmU bo no aaaaa of dooldiag vhat 
than lava* Thay vould bara no oonson purpoae, but would only auit 
S c o l a r  olroumstanoes aa thay arose* This, fer Plato, glraa tha lana 
% ̂ Tina oharaotar far they ara dépendant on rirtua whiah Plate olaaaaa 
geode that ha osila dirina. 'fhere ara tvo kiada af goad 
i ara human, othnmsrs divina* Shbas goods vhloh va sali 
upon tha divina* » a  ata ta vhloh reçoives ths divine 
**** *eoeivos tha htnan* But if it daaa not reeeive tha fiavmar, than
*• deprivai of both* «31 *ff*) Material prosperity ia a huaaa goad, bat 
^  «Mrt ba giva» ita prapar plaaa aa aubearviant to that gaad whioh ia divine, 
***** io virtua. Shle la tha oriar in whioh tho legialatar «net plaaa than 
* * U i . that hia lana ara ta aehlavt tha and of virtoaua liviag.
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la order to understand Plato*■ view that the »«rvice of the lawe 
service of the gods it la necessary to eay something about hie view 
** ***tli V  «* a view which doee not ohange in ita eaaeatiala from the
to the Laws* It waa here that Plato waa greatly influenced by 
^*t«s. iha Republic ia not just concerned with justice aa a political
But with justlee as a wholef and there ia no diatlnotion between this sad 
Beane by virtue» (Compare Aristotle Ethioa 1129b 25» ’There la a 
^  justice which covers the whole of virtue') In «is second bode of the
j Plato dlaousaes tee views of shat virtue or virtuous living is»
****** end Adoimantua attempt to def mod a point of view which regards 
*̂**** not as a necessary good in human Ilfs» but only aa a naoaaaaxy moans 
*«Mwve certain ends* There ia no need to ho virtuous beeaus# that is 
way to live* You only need to practice virtue if it is thereby 
to achieving certain other ends one wiahee to achieve. Plato,
**•** erguoo that if virtue io thought of in thie way, then it ia a 
to think that it la virtue that ia boiag practised« Per the 
livee thie kind of life does not roelly love virtue for ite 
»« The love of virtue ie that whish makss possible the power 
**** it hso ahen "it saints of iteaZf ia ths soul”« (
^ * Otbro I w v  I v  vf,0X'S* Pap. 3 5 8 1)« Othsrwiaa tha praetioa 
la a sham« Pospls only make a chow of virtu# to pda their own 
***• «ttd it ooasoa to be that which falls into ths most important olaoa of 
*** »feloh in tho Republic is described as those geode which are prissd far
it«  .. n U  u  «-l* “ * ,fclrt
**» « I l m  (Ur. JJIU) »0» If J » u < »  « "  •“ * 1.
it as them the man who third» of juotioo in thie way la euffaring 
*fc*t ths lows sails the worst font of ignores*#« That kind of ignorance 
*•» *in the man aha betas, instead of loving, what ho judges to ho aeble 
, while he loreo and eharlehee what ho judgee to ho evil and unjust*» 
*89d) fhis farm of lgnoxenee is sui generis« Plats holds ths sans
•fesut it as 
**»d of
did« Thar# is no Tt^*} which will ear# a man of 
This is what Plato referw to in thie paeoage of tho
thing tint io varygjj.* understand that I an sparking of
**»ti*t iron the ignoauaeo of ssnttanon*. (d69C)
Both la tho Xopnhlio and tho laws Plato wishes to show the falsity
»law that (Hanson pets as to tiis origin of juotioo« Olaueoa
this view as fallows« *By nature, nan say, to do lmjuetiee io good.
^  *»tfar it evil, hut there lo wore evil in suffering injustice 
*•* lu inflicting it« Thor*fare whan nan set unjustly 
^  lk“ hath tiis doing and the «offering,





r ”  ** la noro profitable that they «h«nld mutually agree neither to inflict 
J ^ * 1**« nor to suffer it« Bonos nen began to ootahUsh laws and
w
m doing juotioo with impunity • and the worst - suffering injustice
possibility of requital. Thus justice, being a
, is looked upon with favour, not
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Asthw, sad they oollsd whst ths law proscribed lawful and just« 
is ths origin and nature of justice. It is a mean hetwoea tho
it la good, hut
fche inability to inflict Injustice makes it valuable. For no one 'Who 
bad the power to inflict the injustice and vies anything of a man would 
•’tor make a contract of mutual abstention from injustice with any one 
•lae. He would be mad if he did. Such, Socrates, is the nature of 
justice, and such is its origin, according to the popular account* •
Gkp* 358E -  359B)
Plato* s problem is: How can such a view be shorn to be false V 
Both Glaucon and Adeimantus are represented as not accepting it ,  but as 
being meble to show that i t  is false. Most of the Republic and the Laws 
**• devoted to showing its  falsity, but also both works claim that there 
ho easy answer* For i f  someone possesses virtue, he possesses itJjw» * *  th8re 10 no rtrai#WOTVErd of »
***»: one soul to another. At the very end of the Lqws this is vkwt  we 
reminded of. After all the discussion that has preceded, the question 
«bout education comes to the surface again (969A) The education of the 
SUa*dlans, Whose task is the preservation of virtue in the state, cannot 
** an organised affair, 'I t  will not be easy for them to discover for 
tooaselves what they ou#t to learn, or become the disciple of one Who 
**** already made the discovery. Furthermore, to write down the times at 
toich, and during which, they ought to receive the several kinds of 
tostructicn, would be a vain tiling} feu* the learners themselves do not 
k*0*  what is learned to advantage until the knowledge Which is the result 
learning has four»! a place in the soul of each, (cf Rep. 35SB) And so 
these details, althou^i they could not be truly said to be secret, might 
be said to be incapable of being stated beforehand, because when stated 
toey would have no meaning'. (968D*fc),
'Although they could not be truly said to be secret' • Plato's 
^ fic u lty  is how one could show that a life  of justiee is in all ways 
deferable to one of injustice. That is  What he speaks of in the GorgLas*
H is not difficult to make people agree that a doctor knows more about 
fcWLth then a cook, Who may only be concerned with catering for what people 
pleasure in ad not what Is good for them, but i t  is not easy to 
k̂ Buadc people that there is a similar difference in the way people live, 
some things are good for the soul, others evil. Socrates at the Aid 
the Gcrglas suenarises What he has been saying: 'But among the many 
•toteraents we have made, while a ll the rest are refuted this one alone Is 
toahaken -  that doing wrong is to be more carefully shunned than suffering 
*>t| that above all things a mm should study not to seem good but to be 
®tod both in pigvate and In public) that i f  one becomes bad In ary respect 
toe must be corrected} that this is good in the second place, ~ next to 
b«tog just, to become so and to be corrected by paying the penalty) and that 
®***y kind of flattery, with regard either to oneself or to others, to fCw 
to to metoy, must bo avoided) and that rhetoric is to be used for this 
]p'topo8e always, of pointing to what is just, and so is every other 
totivity*. (52? B-c)
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The view that doing wrong 1b worse than suffering i t  seems 
be genuinely Socratic.Sut it is a view that can only be held by a 
Person who honestly 3©eks to live a good life . For it  is only the man 
cares for justice who w ill be prepared to .suffer wrong rather than 
it .  For i f  the only yoy to avoid suffering wrong is to do i t ,  then 
*° avoid it  is to cease to care for justice. It is only personal 
Pleasure that counts then, end in allowing that to determine what one 
does, one sins against justice.
It is useless just to seen to be good without being so. One 
îgfrt attempt to do this for reputation* s sake, and other people may 
*bink one honest and upright, but the lie  is in one*s a m  soul. One 
follows the path of apparent goodness, while a ll the time one knows 
bbat kind of life  is senseless. Fear that is a ll life  is then. The 
ôchange of one momentary pleasure for another. One lives for oneself 
^one. That is what Plato calls ‘ dwelling with a soul that is not 
bsalthy,but corrupt, unjust and unholy*, (Corgiae 17SB). One has to 
see that the difference between a just and unjust life  is not something 
°f minor importance, but that seeing the difference between them and 
living according to what is just and honest Is what gives sense to 
Ufa,
The main purpose of the Republic is to show the difference 
between the just and unjust ̂ Life, that is between a good and evil life ,
( Tt 481A), Good and evil stand opposed
for Plato in a quite definite way, The distinction between the two is 
bsb an incidental matter which will stake little  difference to a person* s 
•tife, but i t  is the one distinction above a ll others, which i t  is  necessary 
bo make and act upon in order to make life  worth living at a ll. It is  
because this distinction is so definite that Plato speaks of the destiny 
the soul as he does. In his myths the life  which the souls of men 
l*®ad in Hades depends on the choice which they have made between the good 
evil life  while they are on earth. (Phaedo 106a f f ), He pictures 
bhe souls of men as choosing their future lives for themselves in Hades 
*k«n they have lived through their stay of a thousand years there,
(Rep. 6l7D ff,)  Their future life  is  of their own choosing. It  is a 
“an*s choice which is  the deciding factor in each case. The words of 
l*echesis here suggest that a man's life  is not determined rigidly by 
®ate, but that he has a destiny of his own, which he is able to choose 
for himself. This destiny is the choice be makes, and this meqns that 
the choice is not an arbitrary one. The choice is not a matter of 
Indifference! i t  matters supremely what choice is made, Ho man can escape 
bhe penalty of having made a choice that is wrong. Each man has to choose 
bis own daemon, the way of life  he would live. It is  not chosen for him, 
Aether or not he w ill achieve a virtuous life  will depend on how much he 
is prepared to honour virtue, 'Virtue is the possession of no one* • (618E)
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Hone can possess virtue as a slave; its  possession only comes through 
a person recogsising it  as master* The rejection of its claims a man 
alone is responsible for, and God is blameless. In this choice of a 
life  for the future the one tiling that is le ft undetermined is what a 
»an will make of his life  itself* This Plato describes here as 
^ S'S (6188) Its nature depends upon its choice, for as
Hie soul chooses a different kind of life  so does it  become different 
Itself, The life  of the soul, its  nature ( T-vjv t-jjj vjio ŝ 618D)
ehanges according to the choice it  makes between a life  vhich is good or 
aail* This choice depends upon the exercise of reason and a man must 
leam to see wtiat combination of possibilities makes for a good life*
How poverty and wealth, high or low birth, strength and weakness in 
body, quickness and dullness in learning and all other natural land 
acquired capacities of the soul combine to bring about a life  which is  
just and. good* For that life  is good which renders his soul more just, 
'toile the worse life  w ill make i t  more unjust*
It is the same distinction which Plato is concerned to show 
in his discussion of the difference between the philosophic and un** 
Philosophic nature in the Bet utile ;. The true philospher as distinguished 
from the false one is also the man who is able to distinguish between tide 
two kinds of life  that matter above a ll other's, that is between the good 
and evil life* The life  of the philosopher is one which is  described as 
being possessed by that man who has his mind fixed on what is real (
"To?̂  ooev. 5QQB) and on that vhich is unchanging in its coder ( £■ $ 
TVW.yfA'W* $ T t*  ti*L K*Tol Toi-Ofol ¿t«- ^O VToL.
500C). It is this order of the eternal world viiich the philosopher makes 
the object of his cmteraglatlon* It is a world vhioh knows no strife 
and injustice, but where everything is an ordered whole marked by 
Proportion. It is in accordance vdth this that the philosopher orders his 
owe life | his life  is an imitation of this. It is this reality which 
is described here by Plato as divine} i t  is  and K«rj*uv. and in 
as far as a philosopher lives his own life  in dose company vdth this 
&nd of world, so does his own life  become as far as it  is possible for 
human life  to become such, and , (JOO C-D) It is this
life , and only this one that can lead to justice*
There are serious obstades placed in the way of anyone who 
teds to live this kind of life , but they are not obstades that cannot 
be overcome* There is in life  «ta* Plato calls olvoiy K̂ | . It is  this 
that must be overcome. There is  a difference between what is good and 
*hat is necessary* (493C) This latter is a recalcitrant dement in 
human life  which prevents a person from being able to live a good life*
It appears equally in public, and in private life* For the person vho 
seeks to live a life  which is  ordered according to the good, the life  
of society itse lf proves an obstacle, Fl&to compares i t  to the IjLfe of 
* 'huge monster* «hose low and insatiable desires must be satisfied by 
anyone «ho has identified himself with its  interests* According te thin 
view the way in which life  should be lived ie determined by the deelree
of the multitude, desires vhich make no distinction between «hat i s  just 
*»d unjust, and l i f e  beecmeç^f matter of «him and fancy* Sueh a l i f e  ie
incompatible with philosophy, end it  is impossible that the multitude 
should hove any love of wisdom* (495-0, This means that the philosopher 
**131 refuse to take part in the public life  of a city -where the only 
tobiter is lawlessness itself* (496 D-E) There is no hope for mankind 
to a life  t Jilch is determined only by evil desires in its  choices and 
actions. It is necessary that there should be sane other kind of measure 
by which human life  is lived, and this is a. measure which Plato did not 
Regard as human but divine. It Is the issue with which the Athenian 
begins the Laws by asking Clinias whether it  is to a god or to a man 
belongs the merit of instituting the laws of his city.
The tragedy which Plato sees in life  is that those people who 
ere capable of becoming true philosophers are also the people who may 
be most led astray by «vi \j , It is those qualities in a man which
<*131x3.6 him to live toe life  of toe philosopher which also when reared in 
Shi nurtured by evil lead him astray and destroy toe possibility of 
bto leading a good life* It is toe corruption of toe best nature that 
to the worst,
vJhat is meant by saying that toe corruption of toe best nature 
to the worst is not immediately dear. It may seem to be just a tautology 
that tells us nothing, Plato does not mean it  as a tautology even i f  i t  
tos the appearance of being one. For it  is necessary to understand what 
form this kind of corruption takes, and to realise toe danger of such 
Corruption, It is toe possibility of this corruption that interests him, 
find also how i t  may be avoided, He raay well have in mind here to® 
toeusatlon that was made against Socrates that he corrupted toe youth, 
tod he wishes to show that the cause of toe corruption is something 
connected with a philosophic nature itself, when toe circumstances of 
its life  are of such a kind that this nature is not allowed to develop 
naturally, Vfirat is important for Plato is that this corruption should 
be recognised for what i t  is. For it  is the result of following evil 
tod not toe good. But unless the difference between toe good and evil 
is recogiieed, than toe corruption will go unnoticed, and that is the 
**»rst kind of blindness possible.
He says that * evil is  more contrary to the good than to What 
is not good* (491 D), He does not mean by this that evil is more contrary 
to the good than to what is evil. That is quite evident. His point is  
that human life  takes different forms of xhich one form is better than 
toother. This is clear from his question (491D)i ’ Do you think that 
great crimes and complete wickedness came from a feeble nature and not 
father from a noble nature ruined by education, while a weak nature will 
hever be toe author of great good or great evil If* The possession of 
the good is not a necessary part of that character which has those 
qualities which go to ¡rake up toe philosophic nature, (503C) This is  
connected with the view stated in the lysis that what is neither good 
hor bad loves toe good on account of the presence of evil* The soul 
tfiieh is of a philosophic nature is neither good nor bad of necessity, 
but there are different possible wqys of life  open to i t .  Its native
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qualities are such that its proper life is to be good, but it is not 
necessarily good* So the important question is to know the difference 
between a corrupted and uncorrupted nature. It is assumed that a 
Philosophic nature possesses those qualities which make a good life 
Possible, but not only a good life but the best form of human life*
9Q1B), ifirat is important is that it should be safeguarded against 
•omiption, far although its native qualities are such that they can 
®ei8e the best possible fora of human life possible, these native 
qualities sen also make possible the most evil f o m  of human life*
But the difference between good and evil which is involved in this 
®omqption is not easy to understand* This leads Plato to say (492E)*
*Por there is not, and never has been, nor ever will be, a character 
Produced by education, whose virtue has prevailed and stood out against 
bhe instruction of the many - not humanly speaking, ay friehd, for with 
God, as they say, all things are possible* For you must cetainly knew 
bhat While the constitution of states is vfcat it is, if anything is 
Preserved and made What it ought to be, you will not be wrong in 
tearibiag that salvation to divine providence1 (492E - 4934). 11»
®ecape from moral abruption is not completely within the power of 
bwnan beings*
There is a passage in the Thesetetus Which illustrates this 
H e w  of the Republic that the corruption of the beet nature is the worst 
in very dear terns (1720- 1770). Here too the distinction that is 
•fcrawn is between the philosophic and unpfailosophic nature* Plato’s 
discussion here is connected with his criticism of the doctrine of 
Protagorae that man is the measure of all things* (1524)* Plato,
•ither quoting Protagoras or interpreting his view, says that this 
•tatement means ’that any given thing is to ms such as it appears to 
®d, and is to you es it appears to you, you and X being men* (1524)* 
his statement of Protagoras's position Plato,claims that Protagoras 
thought that this view applied not only to sense pereepticn but also 
to statements about right and «rang* Evil and good, too, are as they 
appear to different men at different times* There is ffer Protagoras 
ho means of saying that what is good and What is evil is independent of 
that a man mij3ht think to be good and evil* What a man thinks to be good 
good for him; and the same thing applies to What he thinks to be evil* 
Bo thoughts about What is good and evil are neither true nor false, but 
•aeh man’s thought about good and evil,is as it is to him* Education is 
*h«n the bringing about of a chan#» from the verse condition for a better, 
*nd this change is effected by discourse* ’It is net that a man makes 
•craecne who previously thought vhat is false think what is true (for it is 
hot possible either to think the thing that is not or to think anything 
vhat one eoqperiencea, and all eaqperieneee are true)} rather, X should 
Bay, vhen someone by reason of a depraved condition of mind has thoughts 
of a like character, one makes him, by reason of a sound condition, think
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other and sound thoujrjits# which sane people igaorently call true, 
toereas I should say that one set of thoughts Is better than the other, 
but not in any way truer' • (167A-8).
This view of morality for Plato leads to a false view of 
oducatian, and it is this false view of education that Plato criticises 
to Idle Republic. (5188 • C). It is there called 'putting knowledge 
tots ?, gouL that does not possess it* end is compared to putting visión 
toto blind eyes. As against this Plato states his own view that the soul 
Possesses the means of learning in , and for him, because the nature 
of the sod is such, there is a distinction between what is true end 
tolse with regard to morality. Whether the soul knows what is true and 
tolse -with regard to this depends on whether is turned in the right
direction, for it possesses of itself the power to know the truth. It 
'«a this that Protagoras seems to have denied in saying that each man 
to his own measure. He thought that there could be no common measure 
by means of which something could be decided to be true or false. Plato's 
view of the soul, however, involves saying that there is a cannon measure 
Which is made possible by the: nature of vo3¿ which enables the soul to 
toow what is true and good. Protagoras's view makes moral improvement 
•cnparable to improvement in health. Even if some virtues can be 
regarded as the result of habit and the exercise of them, Plato think»
&at there is at least one which cannot be understood in this way. This 
to wisdom, which he thinks is of a more divine nature and become« useful 
otherwise is accordance to whether it is turned to what is good or 
toat is evil. (Rep. ¡5U3E - 519A) But wisdom is not a necessary possession 
of the soul. It can be used to both ©sod and evil ends. It is# we may 
**y, thought of by Plato as a neutral capacity of the sod. It is, 
however, the power of the soul which never loses its energy which Hat© 
dsewhere described as the soul's self-motion (ham 8960 •» 39TB) Evil 
does not affect the sod as disease affects the body# for the body oan 
be destroyed by disease, but the sod cannot be destroyed by evil, it 
•an only become evil itself. (Rep. 609 - 612).
In addition Protagoras' s view does not allow for that dement 
to human life which Plato considered to be so important. It does not 
•How for the fact that a man's life Is determined in its nature by the 
choices which he makes. For Protagoras, at least as Flato represents 
his view of the matter# thinks that the sophist is able to change a man's 
view of what is ri$it and wrong without# it seems# taking into aoeount 
toe f&et that what a man regards as right and wrong# or good and evil# 
depends on his own choice. The sophist eamut choose for the man whom 
he would persuade# nor can any man choose for another. His choice is 
hie own. It is hi» own sod that does the choosing.
Protagoras's view tends to a relativism which regards the good 
•a expedient; for it doee not in «my way show, as Plato wishes to do# 
toat there are only two alternatives when we think about the l i f e  of sen. 
tor Protagoras there may be innumerable alternatives. His measure of 
toat is good is a htman one rtiioh allov» for different potete of view in 
toat whatsoever a men thinks to be good is good for him. Hate# however# 
Regards goodness as not dependent^ any human standards which may be
different, but a® something which is divine in nature and unalterable, 
Goodness is demanded of men, not because it is expédiait to seem good, 
oven if one is not, but because ‘there is no unri^iteousness with God 
is perfectly ri$iteous, and there is noting more like God than 
one of us who becomes as righteous as possible* • (176C) Men who live 
a life that is characterised by a false show of virtue and consider
v t other men believe them to be virtuous do not know the penalty 
°f injustice. For the penalty they have to suffer is a life of godless 
®fs«ryi that is the pattern according to vhich they direct their lives, 
There are, for Mato, only two ways in which a man may live, either in 
the way of divine happiness which is then the pattern of his life, or 
Sodless misery which he follows at his own peril 
iv ti >̂ %vtl  i<rnoTu>v } too jA v  Q rfou  tw&Mfc<?v«rtbitoo , too
176E), The true philosopher is the m m  who sees clearly this distinction 
find seeks to £Lee Stem the evil. He know» that in this vrerld evil will 
filways exist and he orders his life as a preparation fa r that world in 
*toieh the goodness of God is the orily standard of life, as it must be 
for him also in this. Otherwise he is doomed to live forever in the 
company of what is evil. To live a righteous life, however, is to 
became as like the divine as it is possible for a m m  to become,
(  4>oy^| î ï  ÔfcCo K*üSi t I> 8 u /<*tc» /-
O|*.oiio<3i5 •̂Woiiov' K!iti <S<n0/ p.£,toi j yivttfftu, >76*).
Plato thinks that the philosopher is concerned with an enquiry 
into human nature. (Theat, 17AB of Phaedrus 230A). In the Phaedrus 
Socaaates asks» *Am I really a more corticated and more furious monster 
than Typhon or a creature of a gentler and simple** sort, the bean heir 
of a divine and tranquil nature ?* Hie philosopher is concerned to 
discover what *a human being is, and what is proper for such a nature 
to do or bear different from any other*, Socrates thought that I» was 
carrying out the advice of the Delphic Oracle in putting this question 
to himself, Hunan nature becomes an object of enquiry, and what Plato 
has to say abolît morality and religion is an attempt to msvier this 
Question.
To say that *man is the measure of all things* is not an 
Qdequate explanation of morality, for it certainly does not eaqplain 
'hat human nature is. It might be possible to give an account of 
cense perception in terms of men being the measure of what they perceive, 
but when one cones to morality, then one is concerned with the nature of 
human life Itself, and not with its relationship to something else (for 
instance the world of sense perception as far as that is concerned). The 
^Pestions of morality are human concerns and there is one thing that a n  
•finnot be the measure of • that is their cun lives. So if *sll things* 
fa taken to Include man himself then he cannot be the measure of all 
things, because he cannot be the measure of his own Ilfs. For Plate 
there can be no adequate explanation in these terms. That this is ths 
ease means for him that any attempt to give an account of morality in 
terns of what is human is impossible, and so he rejects the Prot.agorcan
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The same kind of difficulty arises here with regard to morality 
18 *e find in the Phaedo with regard to an attempt to describe the cause 
generation and decay* The important point of that discussion was that 
tfcere could be no account of what is becoming and passing away in terms of 
• •̂ething that itself becomes and passes away* Likewise any discussion 
•* Sorality does not achieve its point unless it is made clear that to 
*8c°bnt for human life in terms of what is human itself is not adequate.
An account of morality is impossible unless it  is seen that 
•orality itself has its basis not in anything human which is always 
•hanging in its nature, with no coamon measure, but in something which 
unchangeable and real, and that is the pattern of divine happiness*
Plato is attempting to give is what we may call an 'overall* 
ûterprefcation of what human life is. It is not an attempt to explain 
one aspect of life  in terms of another aspect (as, for instance,
••• might attempt to explain the political life of men in economic terns),
It is an attempt to explain Iranian life as a whole or, as it was put 
***ore, to see meaning in life itself. There are serious difficulties,
l̂eto thought, in the way of reaching such an explanation, but it  can only 
reached i f  morality is seen to derive its reality from a pattern and 
*®asure which is divine and not human.
Together with this view of morality as being dependent on a 
Pattern of divine happiness goes a view of the human soul as godlike* 
righteousness or justice which Plato speaks about in the Theaetetus 
•Ui in the Republic is not something accidental to human life, the nature 
which can change without radically affecting the life of the soul 
4ieelf# or as we may say, the nature of the soul* The view of Protagoras 
*»Plied that it  could. Teaching morality was merely the changing of one 
•Pinion for another one which was considered to be better# But this view 
••erne to suggest that the change can take place quite naturally without in any 
**3r affecting the life of the person who adopts these different opinions.
** is  Just a matter of adopting different opinions, of exchanging better 
*•*■  worse. There is in this view no means of deciding that there is a 
*i«* of morality that is the best? there is here no question of any 
•tandard or measure of human life which can be regarded as absolute.
means, too, that there is no point in discussing, as Plato seeks 
t° do, the nature of the soul (that is, the nature of human life) with 
• vie* to deciding that its nature is such-and-such, and that certain 
Possibilities are ruled out. For Plato it  is clear that one of the 
Possibilities that is ruled out is saying that there is no definite 
Pattern in accordance with which the soul should live. The human soul 
not only divine in origin, tut this origin is seen in human life, 
the life of a person who seeks to live according to the pattern of 
divine righteousness. He could not even try to live this kind of life  
•nlese the soul had its origin not in something changing but in 
•ooething unchanging. There are only two possibilities •  the good and the 
It is not, however, that the soul can become both of them. It 
••» only become either the one or the other. It cannot become both at
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m e ,  it is that which makes up the destiny of the soul* In fact,
It is this destiny of leading, by one's choices, either a good or an 
•Vil iife that determines th~ unalterable nature of the soul* This 
■•ana that it is the soul itself and nothing else that becomes either 
good or evil* For Plato the soul is characterised by its destiny, and 
to have a soul is to have a destiny? a destiny of the kind outlined*
It is the special nature of the destiny of the soul that makes the soul 
•hat it is. The unchanging nature of the soul is made possible because 
Its destiny is o f an unchanging nature*
This in turn means that the justice of the soul is internal*
It is not. something that the soul can lose while remaining in essence 
^  same as it was before its loss* It is the soul itself which is 
•ither just or unjust * Just as the destiny of the soul is something 
»hich i8 unalterable, so is that justice which the soul seeks to make 
^ 8  own unalterable. The soul itself is not of necessity unchanging in 
it8 nature, though its destiny is. But because justice is unalterable, 
then in so far as the so l becomes juat it also becomes unchanging, and 
becomes like its divine pattern. It is this unchangeableness to which 
Plato refers when he says that ’the unjust pay the penalty for their 
Injustice, and the penalty is the li e fey lead, answering to the 
Pattern they resemble». (Theaet. 177A), The human soul can only seek 
to achieve the unchanging nature of the divine in so far as It folios® 
the path of justice and what is good. For the soul that seeks the good 
is also seeking unity? and «toereas there aro infinite varieties of vies, 
there is only one form of virtue* (Sep. kk% ). The view of morality 
that Protagoras puts forward denies that there is any unity about stoat 
is good. The good is not one, for him, but many, for what is good is 
■hat appears and is good to any man? so likewise it is with what ip evil, 
ihere Is a variety both about what is good and what is evil, and with this 
go«s the denial that we can talk in any sense about the unalterable nature 
the human soul.
Plato's view of the destiny of the e>ul is important in 
■^tempting to understand his view of morality* It is prajaarily a 
*®Ugious idea which he often introduces into hie myths. The idea appears 
1« the Timaeus in the account that is given there of the creation of men,
•hd it is central to the discussion of providence la the Laws. It is 
also connected with what Plato means by saying that the corruption of 
the best nature is the worst* In the Timaeus the destiny of the soul in 
thought of as part of its created nature. Its destiny is what determines the 
■tate of its life at any particular time. It cannot escape it, for that 
*oul4 be to escape from its own nature. The hums souls at their creation are 
ahown the laws of their destifl*. (Tim. *1» .  Plato here states a view of the 
fhU of the soul which he also speaks of in the Phaedrus. (2*6ff). For In 
«Peaking about human souls being shown the laws of destiny at their creation, 
he »eeas to suggest that this is part of the perfection that they possess 
at their creation- that they know the laws of their destiny. That the 
corruption of the soul cones about through forgettin these laws is what
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flato says in the Lav«, and in the Timaeus toat a person achieves 
torou^i living a life of righteousness is a return *to the form of his 
ii*«t and best condition* (
€l$ T*js ^iKoiro £^«s 42D).
So toat the soul achieves is not saaething of its own making in the sense 
that it did not possess this before, but what it achieves is a form of 
life that belonged to it at its creation* It returns to that state 
*toieh it possessed at its creation as somet.dng bestowed upon it by the
S^|U0Og^<4
How is this idea of destiny connected with Plato's view that 
the corruption of the best nature is the worst ? In the Republic it was 
skated in connection with the kind of corruption that is possible for the 
philosophic nature, and toich would prevent that nature from fulfilling 
*ho kind of rule that Ha to thinks is necessary in the state* But in so 
fer as the pattern that the philosopher follows is one which is laid up 
heaven, it is connected with this view about the destiny of the soul*
Por the best nature is the soul. As the Laws puts it* 'Of all things 
that a man possesses, next to toe gods, his soul is most divine, because 
It is that which is most truly his own', ( Ticiviwv 
T<ov ocotoo KT-v| juuTiOv/ |4^xi ^  © t io w o ^ o W J w o v -  oV 726aJ
Corruption is due to negligence of toe laws of one's destiny, a destiny 
*hieh bdongs to one as the creature of toe gods, 'This is toe justice 
of heaven, which neither you nor any other unfortunate person will ever 
boast of ©soaping, and which apart from other forms of justice has been 
specially laid down* You must pay particular attention to it, for you 
Will not lack its attention* However small you are you vdll not be 
®ble to creep into toe earth's depths, nor will you be able to take to 
heaven for your hei^rt, but you will pay the fitting penalty either here 
°** in the world below, or in some more savage place to which you will be 
kaken. This also explains the fate of those whom you saw becoming great 
f*cm small beginnings through their evil and untidy deeds. You thought 
that they had achieved happiness instead of misery and that you saw in 
their deeds, as it were in a mirror, that toe gods take oare for nothing, 
tot knowing how they make all tilings work together so that they contribute 
to the whole. Do you think, you boldest of men, that you need not know 
this justice ? The men too does not know it will never be able to have 
toy true idea nor be able to given an account of toe happiness and misery 
of life », (Laws 905A-B). This view that toe soul suffers the penalty 
for its unjust deeds is not merely one toich Plato speaks about In his 
®yths* In the Laws It forms the aid of toe discussion of toe view that 
the gods do take care of human life* His view of morality cannot bo 
Understood without it.
The idea of jud@aent cannot be separated from belief in toe 
Gods* It is a religious belief, and a specific view of morality must 
So with it, Plato's discussion of morality is oonoemed with the re&ity 
°f the distinction between justice and Injustice* That distinction cannot 
be a real one for him, if toat is just and unjust is a mate* of human 
flecisicn. The difference between good and evil Is than a matter of
128 -
human judgment, and even if human judgnent sees a clear distinction 
between the two, that judgment is still only based on the understanding 
that toman beings c m  have of the difference, The emphasis which Plato 
Jlaced upon this divine judgment* however* is a much more serious affair 
than any human judgment about the difference could be» For vfoat la 
characteristic of human judgments is that they c m  change* thou# to 
their change Plato wouLd say that they change either to a better under­
standing of the laws of destiny or they do not# But there are different 
judgments. But the judgment of the gods on human life is one* final 
sod complete« That is i&at makes the difference between the judgments 
of the gods and human judgments# Hunan beings cannot make the final 
judgaant about their am lives# They do not have the understanding of 
the difference between good and evil that wuLd make this possible# It 
belongs to the gods#
Such a view of divine judgment does entail the belief that the 
difference between good and evil is understood by the gods* and as 
understood by them it is unchanging* That is what makes their judgment 
on unwavering and final me# It also affects the view that a person can 
have about his life# A person vho thinks that morality to only a human 
concern mi#t think that he should live his life according to toe 
difference between good and evil as he sees it# He decides to live like 
that thou# there to no reason he c m  give for deciding to live so. Eto 
life may be a noble and admirable one* but it to only his life» to make 
of it toe best lie can# But on Plato’s view a person must see his life 
*0 a divine creation which in the end will be judged according to toe 
lows of hto destiny* viiieh are not of his own making* but are part of 
bis creation* Hto life to an attempt to understand those laws as dearly 
to he can and ao ’return to the f o m  of hto first and beat condition*#
Unless it to clearly stated that this to Plato’s view, then 
tony of the things that he says in toe lews and in other works are not 
intelligible# This applies for instance to vhat he says about prayer to 
the Laws# For a person too holds a view of morality totoh makes to a 
totter of human judgment, prayer to unintelligible» It becomes 
intelligible» however* on a view about morality of toe kind that Plate 
holds# For according to that view to© final word with regard to any 
human life and its choices between good and evil belongs to toe gods toe 
have a perfect understanding of the difference between the two# Prey«# 
is for direction of the gods about matters of good and evil (Lowe 637E 
SOI). You pray to toe gods because to^r know what is good and evil» and 
*hat to what a human being has to knew if he to to direct hto life 
tooordlng to toe laws of his deetiny*
Plato’s view of morality# then, makes toe reality of toe 
^istinetton between good and evil something which belongs to toe 
jddgaent of toe gods* The distinction could not possibly be of this 
bind if it were only a matter of toman judgomt# to toe li#t of this It 
Accrues easier to understand toe place that Plato assigns to the practise
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®* religion in the laws« For that is not something which he thinks 
as separate from the function of laws in the state. His view of 
law as aimed at the practice of virtue springe from his religious 
new of morality. His discuss ‘ on of what he considers to be the most 
loportant institutions of society, such as the family, shows that these 
too are to be understood as part of the service which human beings owe 
to the gods, which he thinks is the service of the laws«
One of the most general points that he makes about the laws, 
when he says that there mftst be preambles to the laws, also seems to be 
Connected with the same point. It is not enough that the laws should be 
stated and obeyed. It is also necessary that people should be persuaded 
Cf the rightness of the laws, The reason he gives for this is an 
Interesting one. He thinks that the laws must not be external edicts 
which everyone must obey, but people must be persuaded that the laws 
Cre for their good, and obedience to the laws, if it is to be obedience 
°f the kind required, must be the result of being persuaded that the 
laws moke for the practice of virtue. The action of obedience to the 
lows must be * m  0 11 human action is, (90**A) One must be
Persuaded of the rightness of the laws, otherwise there would be no sense 
In speaking of the destiny of the soul, and its return to that condition in 
Which it knows the laws of its own destiny. Because virtue is divine 
1® origin, the discovery of its true nature is all-important« But its 
’Hscovery must be the result of persuasion and not of force, Plato 
Considers the preambles to the laws of equal importance with the laws 
themselves. He thinks this because the law cannot be properly a law 
Without the persuasion which tie preamble makes possible# And this is 
the result of what he considers morality to be. For the origin of 
virtue is divine, and human beings do not have a perfect understanding 
of the difference between good and evil. If laws were just the results 
of human inv ntion, then human beings could understand them, but because 
they have as their aim something that human beings do not fully understand, 
have to be persuaded of their rightness, and that means making 
them a part of their own life, and seeing that they enable men to have 
briber insight into the difference between good and evil. It is because 
We have no perfect understanding here that establishment of the laws is 
thought of as needing so much care, and whether or not human beings 
succeed in establishing just laws Is thought of as the result of the 
guidance of divine providence.
This is the point of what Plato says in his general preamble 
to the laws in the fourth book, (715® ff,) The reason for the existence 
«f the laws at all is that »every man should make up his mind that he be one 
°f the followers of dod* (?l6c). In that case the laws must establish what 
Relationship there must be between God and those who follow him. So the 
®0st important of the laws are those which apply to the practice of 
Religion, This is so first of all because of the general relation that 
be thinks exists between the laws and religious belief. The discussion 
cf atheism in the tenth bo«* gains part of its point from the fact that
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for him the establishment of the laws is
Ia>$ $Vr£uV 0tu>V (8G7A). Bat also the practice of
religion has its ovn importance, in the Republic (427 B-C) , the a m t  
important part of legislation, vhich has to do with religion, is something 
that cannot be achieved by man but must be left to Apollo, the god of 
Delphi, The most important, fairest and first of legal enactments are 
the ‘founding of sacrifices and other farms of worship of the gods, daemons 
®hd heroes? and likewise the burial of the dead and the services we must 
render to the dwellers of the world below to keep them gracious. For of
®uch matters we neither know anything nor in the founding of our city if
wa are wise shall we entrust them to any other or make m e  of m y  otter 
interpreter than the god of our fathers. For this god surely is in such 
Matters for all mankind the interpreter of the religion of their fathers, 
'l|ho from his seat in the middle and at the very navel of the earth delivers 
his intepretation*. So religious practices are not thought of by Plato as 
the result of human invention? they are the gifts of the gods to men.
There are two reasons why he thinks this* The practice of religion relates 
to matters human beings do not understand ( ^  o o k
Tjjti.u; Rep, 427B), and these practices are given to men 
« 1 account of the inherent weakness that there is in human nature. ‘ Child- 
training, which consists In ri$it discipline in pleasure and pains, grows 
slack and weakened to a great extent in the course of men*s lives? and
so the gods, in pity for the human race thus b o m  to misery, have ordained 
the feasts of thanksgiving as periods of respite from their troubles? and 
they have granted them as companions in their feast« the Muses and Apollo 
the master of music, and Dionysus, that they may at least set right their 
‘¡■odes of discipline ty associating in their feasts with gods 1 (Laws 653C), 
But they are not just seme forms of respite from toil. Their observance 
Is the noblest and truest rule. ‘To engage in rscriflce avid communion 
'dth the gods continually, by prayers and sacrifices and devotions of 
®v®ry kind, is a thing most noble, good and helpful towards a happy life, 
«ad superlatively fitting also, for the good man? but for the wicked 
the very opposite. For the wicked is unclean in soul,whereas the good 
B&an is dean? and from him that is defiled no good man, nor god, can 
«ver rightly receive gifts. Therefore all the great labour that impious 
®en spend upon the gods is vain, but that of the pious is most profitable 
to them all». (Laws 716D - 717A)
The preambles also state Plato* s views on natters of religion.
^»e first preambles have to do with the gods and family life (72% ) and 
‘d.th education which concerns the human soul ’which of all things that a 
**h possesses, next to the gods, is the most divine, because it is nest 
truly his own», The necessity for preambles to the laws is described as 
w l i  ©€ov (7220). The main reason there mast be such prensiles is 
*kat people should be persuaded of the ri^vtness of the laws. That for 
flato means recognising their divine origin. That is how the general 
£*eamhle to his own laws begins, ‘Friends* we say to them, *Qed, as the 
tradition declares, holding in his hand the beginning, middle and end 
Of all that is, travels according to his nature in a strai^it lire 
towards the accomplishment of his end. Justice always accompanies his.
find is the punisher of those who fall short of the divine law* To 
Justice, he who would be happy holds fast, and foUov® in her company 
'with all humility and orderj but he who is lifted up vdth pride, or 
elevated by wealth or rani:, or beauty, vho is young and foolish, and 
a soul hot with insolence, and thinks that he has no need of any 
Suide or ruler, but is able himself to be a guide of others, he I say, 
k  deserted of God} and being thus deserted, he takes to him others 
'*10 are like himself, and dances about, throwing all things into 
confusion, and may think he i3 a great mai, hut in a short time he 
Pays a penalty which justice cannot but approve, and is utterly 
destroy«! and his family and his city vdth him.* It is because human 
life is liable to corruption of this kind that people have to be persuaded 
of the divine origin of the lav®, and in being persuaded of this, be 
Persuaded of their goodness*
The importance of preambles which persuade of the goodness of 
the laws is connected with Plato* s general view of morality which we have 
already outlined* If human beings had a definite knowledge of the nature 
the difference between good and evil, and also the ability to live in 
fiocordance vdth this difference, then there would be no need of them*
^eir necessity arises from the weakness of human nature. It is as Plato 
calls it »an unfortunate necessity* about human life. »Human affairs are 
hardly worth serious cohsideration, a d  yet v© mast be serious about 
them - a sad necessity constrains us*, (303B), There must be serious 
concern for what is serious, and the most serious concern of human beings 
*8 God. Their life is dependant on God (as Plato puts it, they are puppet« 
God), and because the nature of this dependence Is not fully understood, 
&e practice of religion is the human recognition of it*
What Plato says about preambles here is connected vdth the way 
In which he speaks of Initiation in the Symposium and Phaedrus, In both 
f̂ceae dialogues he uses religious language in speaking about love. But 
such language is not confined to those two dialogues, but it is also found 
the Republic aid in the Laws* Why does Plato use such language ? The 
very use of such language show© that Plato thought that vdth regard to 
love which is so central to his view of the soul snd so to his view of 
Morality, what the soul can leam about toe good it does not leam of 
itself and an its own, nor is what it learns just the result of its own 
thinking* The soul is initiated into the rites of love because what it 
has to leam about toe good can only be learnt in living a certain way 
of life which is not of its own making. It has to be introduced to this 
toy of life, Whether the souL does leam what it is depends on its 
association with the life of the gods. It is initiated Into divina 
mysteries, which it could not understand cm its own* It is only In so 
far as it shares In toe life of otters and in toe life of toe gods that 
it can understand what is good. This is something it cannot leam of 
&aelf.
Likewise the purpose of the preambles is to initiate people
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into that life  toich is lived in accordance with the laws. For it  is 
not southing anyone can understand apart frcm seeing that it  is a 
®a®Bon life . Otherwise the idea of what the laws are will be that they 
«»pel individuals to act as the laws casnand. They are only external 
Oac>oands, Those people who think of them in this way, have not seen 
that it  is necessary to be persuaded of the rightness of the laws so 
they may share in a cannon life  under the law. But that is not 
toothing one can understand the purposes of apart from accepting such 
a eoeaaon life . It is not possible to understand it  alone and in 
Eolation, for the understanding only cases in living the life  itself,
'Siat is what Plato means whoa he says that the practice of virtue is 
*he aim of the laws. Unless the laws are seen in this light, then what 
Plato says at 7290, for instance, has no sense, *He who thinks the 
^rvices vhich his friends aid acquaintances do for him, greater and 
*®*,e important than they themselves think them, and his own favours to 
them less than theirs to him, will have their good will in the intercourse 
°f life,* The laws achieve their point in the intercourse of life .
Because that is so their point cannot be understood aid realised apart 
from that kind of life  that they make possible. But that must be a 
Qcrnaon life , and not one in Which toe conception of law is only an 
^dividual one. For then toe law® are thought of only as means for the 
achievement of individual ends. The can be no conception of a common life.
, For Plato toe practice of religion in the city-state is 
a recognition of the source that makes such a cannon life  passible,
That source is the gods themselves. That is why the possibility of 
fcere being preambles is described as being • The preambles
SPPly not only to religious practices but also to the practice of 
morality. Morality depends on preambles as much as religion, What is  
®Q8t important about both of them cannot be a matter of legislation,
With regard to morality i t  is a matter of praise and blame. For that 
'which is most important with regard to morality can only be learnt 
through praise and blase. That depends on seeing the difference 
between a life  that is and vwfro5 and one that is ruled by
®fcthar voluntary or involuntary falsehood. The latter kind of life  is  
fce result of vfeat is the greatest evil in the souls of men -  selfishness, 
*hlch leads people to think that their own ignorance is (7321),
Legislation most take this difference into account, but the difference 
itself cannot be legislated for directly, That Is why ELato thinks of 
ftfccation as he does, as the persuasion of the soul of the rightness of 
the laws,
’What ELato says about the gods in the tenth book of the Laws 
fc itself a prelude. If  the origin of the laws and virtue is thought 
to be the gods, then there w et be a prelude to the laws which concerns 
fce gods. The purpose of this book has sometimes been thou#* of as an 
«pologia for the existence of the gods, and in this canneceian i t  is  
described as rational theology. But what Plato says here about the gods is
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said in connexion with vhat lie considers the practice of religion to 
be« vihat he says cannot be regarded as a proof for the existence of 
gods apart frota the practice of religion itself« The book does not 
$®t deal with the existence of the gods but also with their providential 
®re of hxiaan life* and also with the kind of relationship that mast 
«1st between huaan beings and the gods. For the gods cannot be 
Propitiated fey hunan beings so teat they condone any human action. So 
the importance of what is said is not just that there are gods* or to 
diow that there are gods. In Booh XII Plato says that * the knowledge 
the gods is one of the noblest form of knav&edge*, But that inovledge 
ta not just to ‘ know that they are* but also to know hot/ great is their 
power* as far as In man lies1. (956b). his view is very different fro» 
that of Epicurus vho thought that i f  there are gods they took no care of 
human life . That was to deny the power of the Gods in connexion with 
huaan life , Vihat Plato says at the beginning of the tenth book shows 
his purpose clearly. He says* *No one who in obedience to the lawn 
believes that there are gods ever intentionally did any unholy act, or 
ottered any tmlawfuL word) but he who did must have supposed one of 
three things* •  either that they did not exist* -  which is the first 
Possibility, or secondly* that i f  they did* they took no care of men, 
or thirdly* that they were easily appeased and turned aside from their 
Purpose by sacrifices and prayers*. (S85C). This passage connects 
Plato* s view x/ith what we have said of the relation that Socrates saw 
between morality and religion. The Socratic paradox, *No man does evil 
intentionally* can only be understood* as we have tried to show* in 
<»rmexion with this belief that the distinction between good and evil 
depends on the gods. For any person who recognises this* an evil action 
fa contrary to the will of God. He could not perform an evil action 
without knowing it  is against God*s vdll. For Plato* as for Socrates* 
knowledge about the gods is not just knowledge of their existence* bub 
«Iso knowledge teat they determine the difference between good end evil, 
«»d so determine the way in which men must live. In fact the two things 
So together. Human beings earmot understand what is meant by saying teat 
there are gods* unless they know this power of the gods,
"What Plato says here Shout the relationships between human 
beings end tee gods 3a  comparable with his purpose in speaking of 
creation in the Timaeus. For the interest of that, as we saw* was nob 
bo give some proof of creation* aid so serve tee interests of viiat is  
called rational theology. He does not prove the existence of a creator* 
for the father end maker of this universe is hard and difficult to find. 
Hie purpose is to show vhat saying that God is the creator means. And 
that cannot be understood unless his creation is seen to be good. Bub 
that is impossible unless the human soul itself recognises the goodness 
that is revealed in the creation. It is the same with the way men live, 
*b only makes sense far them to believe in the gods* i f  they believe that 
bhe choices they make tpstween good and evil can oniy be understood to 
bezms of the relation between themselves and the gods. There is no
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knowledge about the gods apart frcen knowledge of their power over hunan 
life. And that ia why for Plato religion is concerned with morality,
&  fact it is vdth regard to morality, to the way men live, in 
*BLationship to other men, that beliefs about the gods are so important, 
M s  seems to be partly what Plato was suggesting when he wrote that men 
the puppets of the gods. He meant that the decisions and actions 
human beings are not just their own, but are continually under the 
<JU(%ient of the gods. So it is not just that there are gods. Just to 
®y that, would be a form of impiety for Plato, That, as Epicurus put 
it* would not concern humah life if human life did not concern them,
M *  it does in such a way that Plato thinks that the most serious concern 
d? human life is God,
Plato then is not Just interested in showing that there are 
gads, His view in this respect is of interest when we consider certain 
kinds of philosophical discussions of religion. Such discussion of 
Migion has often been about the notion of God’s existence, and Plato’s 
discussion here has been viewed in the same light, The question of God's 
Matenoe is then looked at as if it is something to be proved, by 
Mlosophers who have put forward proofs, and by those vho have attempted 
to argue against such proofs. Such attempted proofs, however, make it 
look as if the notion of existence can be applied to God in some way that 
understand. As if it might be like discovering the existence of a 
3-finet that is not known to exist. If what Plato says about the 
existence of the gods is interpreted in sane such way as this then the 
«Bin point of what he says is lost. His whole interest in shoving that 
there are gods is quite different from this. His point is to show that 
there are gods, but also to show that they are good, and regard Justice 
«'ore than men do, (887B) To show this is the best and noblest prelude 
t° the laws,
Che of the main ideas that Plato puts forward in the tenth 
kook of the Law« is that the soul is prior to the body* Hia purpose is 
to state what is the noblest prelude to the laws, that there are gods, 
that they are good and honour justice more than men, fthat does this 
Sfelude consist of 7 Of a statement that the soul is prior to the body, 
&  is not easy to understand what he means by this priority, but it is 
«tear that for him an understanding of it is important in order to get 
«tear about hie purpose in this bode. The purpose cannot be interpreted 
*• follows* Plato thinks that it is necessary to show that physical 
«Bticn is dependent cn the motion of the soul. He does not show this to 
he the case. In fact he mentions difficulties that there are in 
sfctempting to shew what relationship there is between these two kinds of 
«oticn. His view is not that the nature of physical motion leads 
necessarily to the idea of the soul's self-motion. If, however, his 
.*Uw is stated in that way# kh*ai it is easy to think that his purpose is 
to prove that there are gods* If proving th*.there are gods is proving 
that the nature of the soul is self-motion upon which physical motion 
depends. Such an interpretation raises difficulties startler to those 
have mentioned in discussing the notions of contingency had necessity 
&  Plato's view of creation.
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..... Plato"Is not concerned to show that there'is a form of motion
that is the motion of the soul. This is given as one of the farms of 
®otion that exist. His whole interest is in showing that the motion of 
®oul is prior to that of the body or, as he puts it is older than that 
of body - not that it is presupposed or implied by motion of bodies* To 
Relieve, then that there are gods is closely connected with seeing that 
the motion of the soul is prior to that of the body, and that it is the 
Notion of the soul that governs the motion of the body.
There are two views possible here. Either the soul is the 
*®suLt of viiat is physical or it is prior to it* The Athenian sayst 'I 
Nust repeat the strange argument of those who make the soul according to 
their own impious notions: they affirm that which is the first cause of 
the generation and destruction of all things to be not the first, but 
last and that which is last to be first, and hence they have fallen into 
®rror about the true nature of the gods* • (891E) Ignorance, then,
about the nature of the gods arises from ignorance about the true nature 
of the soul* It is ignorance about 'the nature and power of the soul, 
^specially in t-hat relates to her origin} they do not know that she is 
the first of things, and before all bodies, and is the chief author of 
their changes and transpositions* *
There are certain difficulties about Plato's view as it is 
abated in the Laws which hsye already arisen in our earlier discussion 
to whether the S^iO^yc^of the Timaeus Is to be identified with the 
t'farld soul or not* Some have thou^it that the is to be
identified with the world soul of the Timaeus and the best soul of the 
haws, (¿970) Such an interpretation seems also to be in line with 
''hat Plato says about the soul in the Phaedrus as being the of
fill generation and decay* What Plato says in the Laws is that soul is 
’among tlie first of things*, vhich seems to suggest that there are other 
things which are also first* Amongst these he would certainly place the 
Sods* But the question he is discussing Is not whether the nature of the 
gods is that they have souls or are souls, even if he describes the beet 
soul that rules the vrarlde as a god* He is not prepared to say definitely 
what the nature of divine activity is* (898E) Still he does think that 
®by view which puts body prior to soul vdll be unable to make any sense 
of what the gods are* He seems to be suggesting that with regard, to the 
gods, the priority of soul over body, is one of the most important points 
that has to be understood, if there is to be any understanding about the 
gods*
It is very easy to extract nature! thedogy frfcn the tenth 
book of the Lswb, and overlook much else that it contains which can 
barely be said to have anything to do with that* When Plato *8 view* 
here are interpreted as natural theology then all the in placed
a: the difference between that kind of motion which Is self-motion and
that which is not. The former is the true principle of change and motion 
ell that is* This is the distinction betwen soul and body, and that
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distinction Is fundamental to Plato*s account. The distinction is 
first introduced to counter the arguments of those Whom he calls 
Vide (f'ûfoi viiose view is that *fire and water, and earth and 
air, all exist by nature and chance* (3$9B). The impiety of such 
people arises from, this view and not from a love of sensuel pleasure. # 
(886a ) But it is impiety nevertheless, aid the dj&inction that Plato 
draws between physical motion and the motion of the soul, and the 
diaim that the latter is prior to the former, is meant to meet this 
form of impiety. It is this that gives the impression that what we 
have here is natural theology# But Plato thinks that this view that 
the body is prior to the soil leads the people who hold it to deny the 
Existence of the gods# But then the view that they hold is not Just 
that the body is prior to the soul# It is bound to affect, Plato 
thinks, their view of morality too# For their denial of the existence 
of gods which is a result of their physical spéculât ions, prevents 
them from recognising what Plato thinks is the important thing - that 
the gods are good and honour justice more than men*
So it might be thought that Plato* s purpose is to show that 
the view that body I3 prior to soul is mistaken, and in showing this 
to show also that what they think about the gods is mistaken too# But 
Plato’s position is not as simple as that* Certainly the priority of 
soul over body is important to his view, but that priority cannot be 
identified with what Plato means by saying that there are gods. If 
it were just that, then it could be perhaps called, natural theology# 
Plato’s point can be better put by saying that the priority of the 
soul over the body illustrates vhat is meant by saying that there are 
gods# And it illustrates it in the only way that Plato thought m s  
possible with regard to the view' held by the W o t  <ro$dt , Their 
denial of the gods is the result of their view that physical motion is 
what is primary# If they can be shown that view is mistaken, then their 
reason for denying the gods will be taken away. But just recognising 
the priority of soul over body is not to be identified with what Plato 
aeans by saying that there are gods# It would be possible to reoo®iise 
this without recognising that there are gods. lihat is important too 
is to* know the gods rightly and live accordingLy*. (338B)
What Plato says about ■toe motion of the soul as being prior 
to that of the body is only the beginning of what he has to say about 
toe gods# Once that has been decided, it Is necessary to go on and 
state what the nature of the soul is, and how its nature can only be 
understood together with toe belief that there are gods. But even with 
regard to his statement that the motion of soul is prior to that of body, 
It must be emphasised that he takes for granted that there are these two 
différait kinds of motion. He says: ’Let it be assjaed that there is 
always one kind of motion which is capable of moving other things, but 
hot capable of moving itself, and that there is always another kind of 
motion which moves itself and other things*. (894B)
The distinction between these two forms of motion is the
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distinction between that vAxich possesses life and that viiich does not*
(8950). This distinction is central to vhat Plato writes here and also 
in the Timaeus, In the Tinxaeus the view of creation is about different 
fora® of living creatures that are made after the pattern of VmjToX 
This view of Plato's is also stated in the Sophist when he aslcss'Are we really 
convinced that change, life, soul and understanding have no place in what 
is perfectly real, that is has neither life nor tixaû xt, but stands 
iiaaxxtable in solemn aloofness devoid of intelligence V ' (24$E) The
Reason why he states the matter in this way is to show the priority of 
soul* Hie soul is not just the result of the combination of physical 
elements, but its life has an intelligible pattern, and as such it is 
Prior to the body of which Plato thought there was no . S o
the question arises what kind of priority is it that the soul lias over 
the body. It is the priority of intelligent life. 'Can we say that it 
has intelligence without having life ? ' (Sophist 249A) But that does 
hot mean that it is the priority of one kind of life over another - that 
of the soul over that of the body. It is the priority of that which 
Possesses life over that which does not* That too was the view in the 
fhaedo with the question! 'Does not the soul bring life to the body ri '
(1050) The body might be conceived as possessing a form of life of its 
own. But the way in which that is described in thei'imaeue suggests that 
It is a life that does not possess intelligence, and vhatever order it 
can possess is the result of the governing and ordering activity of the 
soul. So from a general point of view what Plato speaks of as 
is the ordered life of anything. That is why he speaks of the world 
soul. It is the intelligent life of the cosmos. And that cannot be 
thought of as the work of chance, it is the activity of soul vhieh has 
an intelligible and divine origin, Plato's quarrel with the ^¿oc <ro^ot 
is that they do not recognise this.
If we ask the question about the truth of what Plato is 
saying, then that would be to ask, from one point of view that the 
question might be raised) 'Hew does he prove it ?' But he does not 
prove it independently of a person's reco@iising the priority* That 
la wby he speaks of the need of persuasion, for what mi$xt be thou#xtof ae an 
independent proof la not possible. He thinks however that his view does 
raafee it possible to understand certain aspects of human life that could 
not be understood otherwise* Apart from the priority of soul it will 
not be possible to speak of the difference between good and evil* That 
difference Is so bound up with the life of the soul and that difference 
only begins to make sense, vixen it is recognised as a difference that 
bdLcngs to the life of the soul* It is this that determines the nature 
of life* Human life is unintelligible without it, but what it is belongs 
to the soul«
The priority of the soul over the body is, then,centrel to 
flats* s account. But as we have suggested it cannot be regarded as a 
Proof of the eo&tence of the gods. Its main purpose is to show that
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unless the difference between soul and body is clearly seen, and so the 
soul's priority, it vdll not be possible to know vhat is meant by 
talking about the gods at all. For the priority of the soul includes 
its ability to govern viiat is bodily; the gods too exercise a 
providential activity in relation to the world. Just as it is necessary 
to recognise the difference between soul and body in this respect, so it 
is necessary to recognise the difference between the gods and the world, 
Just as there is a difference for Plato between a liman life vhlch is 
ordered according to a pattern of divine happiness and one that is not, 
so there is a difference between a world which is recognised to be a 
sphere of providential activity on the part of the gods, and one that 
is not so recognised. But the gods take care of all things* And so 
this providential activity is of a different order fro© that which is 
Possible in connexion with a human soul and human body. That is why 
the belief in the gods is not just to be identified with a recognition 
of the distinction between soul and body in general. But that 
distinction throve light on the providential activity of the gods.
Plato* s point seems to be that if you wish to speak of the 
life of the gods, then this is only possible when there is a dear 
distinction made between sod and body. But that distinction does 
sot give an exhaustive account of the life of the gods. It is, however, 
the only way in which human beings c m  make sense of the life of the gods. 
His view of thenhuam soul Is that it is that which orders aid governs 
human life in accordance with virtue. The life of the gods is spoken 
of in the same terms, but it Is dear that the order and government of 
the gods is very different fro© the ordinary notion of the order of vhieh 
the human sod. is capable. For the life of the human soul can not only 
he an ordered one, bub also can show disorder. That is the difference 
between justice and injustice, "«tot Plato thinks is that when the human 
soul lives an ordered life and just life, then this order and justice is 
to be thought of as part of the life of the gods themselves. »As we 
acknowledge the world to be full of many goods and also evils, and more 
of evils than goods, there is, as we affirm, an immortal conflict going 
an among us, which requires marvellous watchfulness; and in that conflict 
the gods and demigods are our allies, and we are their property. Injustice, 
insolence and folly are the destruction of us, and justice, temperance 
find wisdom are our salvation; and the place of these latter is in the life 
of the gods, although some vestige of the© may occasionally be discerned 
fiawng mankind. * (9Q6A-0) The justice and goodness that is achieved in 
human life is not then to be thought of as just human achievaent. Its 
very possibility can only be thou^it of as the result of the life that 
belongs to the gods, That life is perfect in it® virtue, and it is the 
perfection of the life of the gods that makes it impossible to think that 
they can be appeased. But it is also what makes possible a life of virtue 
for human beings. »The gods are the greatest of all guardians and take 
care of our hi$iest interests’ • (9Q?A) The word (|>u was the word used
to describe the philosopher4dngs of t o  Republic, and now it refers to 
the gods. This seems to suggest a change of emphasis In Plato»s thought.
2h the Republic the guardianship of t o  state la in t o  hands of those men
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too have gdnud lnodcd..,© of the good, aod that for Plato meant knowing 
the faro© which were thought of as unchanging realities. The philosopher
king is able to rule because he possesses this knowledge. He is thought 
of as divine and after death may be worshipped. In the Republic the 
forms which were his objects of knowledge had been thought of as 
^changing and eternal, and that gave them something of the character 
of ideals after which he must strive. They seemed to possess an unknown 
reality, however, (Parmenides 134C-D). That view changes in the Sophist 
toere we find the attribution of life to what is perfectly real (249), and 
in toe laws the view is that the perfection of justice belongs to the life 
of the gods, vSien in toe earlier works morality is a matter of knowing 
toe forms .¿iich are doTd VfctO'oCoToi , that seems to suggest a view 
of morality which is independent of religion. But even if in earlier 
«dialogues there are views which show a religious influence, the position 
of the Laws is clearly one in which perfect justice is not just an ideal 
for human beings to strive after, but it is the life of the gods, and any 
justice which human beings are able to attain is only possible because 
toe gods in their perfect justice and great power take care of human life.
This view gives to. the questions of morality a different light, 
For they are not just problems of toe relationships between human beings, 
but they have primarily to do with the relationships that exist between 
men and the gods. That does not mean that the question of the relation­
ships between men no longer have any importance, but that these relation­
ships are primarily relationships with the gods. Men must be just 
because toe gods are just. If you seek to appease the gods then your 
®dtion is like that of men who gain their ends with their fellow men 
by flattery. But to flatter the gods is worse than to flatter men, 
ft is worse because it is isipossible. Ion may flatter men. Then you 
are dishonest in your dealings with them. But if you attempt to flatter 
toe gods that is impious. It is attempting to act in an unjust way in 
toe face of perfect justice.
It is impossible to do this. But why ? The answer for 
Flato is that this perfect justice which is toe life of the gods is not 
completely cut off from men. It is not as if toe gods have a life of 
their own which is completely unrelated to toe lives man lead. For 
bvsaen life itself belongs to the gods. It is through the power of the 
gods which is apparent in their providence that human life is possible 
at all. The gods talc© care of the whole, (903B) It may be difficult 
for human beings to see thisj and a man may be vexed, because he does 
not know how what is best for everything turns out best fo r himself also, 
in accordance with the power that give» being to everything, ( vCott«̂
Tijs vc&iv^ ) (903D), itoat mm must seek to do is
to live in dose relationship with to© providential power of the gods.
For this power is greater than any hmaan power. It enables human beings 
to live in accordance with virtu© end truth. But disobedience of virtue 
snd truth has its own reward. And Plato thinks that that is part of toe
Power of the gods too. As he goes cn to say in the passage just quoted* 
’And inasmuch as soul, being joined now with one body, now with another, 
is always undergoing all kinds of changes either of itself or owing to 
another soul, tliere is left for the draughts»player no further task - sam 
cflly to shift the character that grows better to a superior place, and the 
worse to a worse, according to what best suits each of them, so that to 
*®<*h may be alloted its appropriate destiny*. (903D)
It is, however, not easy to see how Plato is able to combine 
human disobedience with the perfect justice and power of the gods* If 
tk® gods are perfectly just and possess power which cannot be compared 
^th human power, hew is that to be reconciled with human disobedience ? 
Plato says (906A) tiiat the T.rarld is more fuLl of evil than of good, and 
that the conflict that goes cn among human beings is immortal. (<3 dJtv=iTo$ ), 
Ibis is to raise a question which probably Plato would have said he oould 
not answer, Plow is the evil in the world to be explained, if the gods are 
good ? Plato perhaps -would have answered tiiat we cannot understand the 
nature of the evil that there is, but ws must believe that in our conflict 
with it the gods are our allies to overcame it. Not to accept the gods 
as the allies of man would be for Plato to distrust the power which he 
believed they have. But whether Plato thou^it that the conflict would 
finally be overcome is another matter. Prom that he says in the Gorgi&s 
it seems dear that he thought, it possible for a man tho had obeyed the 
just commands of toe rpds to live a life in the company of perfect justice 
after death, (523 A-0). The^v&i^K^ in human life which makes the 
conflict immortal sometimes seems to be out of the gods' control, When 
Plato says* 'There is left far toe draughts-piayer no further task, - 
save only to shift the character that grows better to a superior place, 
and the worse, according to What best suits each of them, so that to 
each may be allotted its appropriate destiny,* it looks as if the gods 
have no choice and that their power is .limited. There is in Plato nothing 
'Which approaches a doctrine of redemption as we find that in Christianity, 
For that teaches that divine forgiveness is undeserved. That Is 
possible for Christianity with Its b e lie f that with God all things are 
possible, but for Plato 'even God Cannot strive against necessity*, (741 A) 
Nevertheless Plato's view of morality in the Laws la religious. 
There is much that may seem harsh In the punishment he lays down for the 
impious, but that is because he thinks that impiety is the worst of sins. 
His view of morality is that justice belongs to the gods, and the penalty 
of injustice is inescapable. That is what Plato wants to point to.
That justice is not decided by human beings, but by the gods, and not 
to recognise this is impiety. If justice were established by human 
beings, then it would have no reality, The reality of perfect justice 
is the life of the gods itself. Because this is so, there is a final 
judgment an human life. Because justice is not decided by human beings# 
but by the gods, injustice is impiety. It is acting against Whet the 
gods have decided. The person who thinks that the practice of religion 
as a means of appeasing toe gods is 'of all impious mm the most wieked
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most impious*. (907B) uirat Plato says about this may be compared 
to what Eckhart says* 'Lo, they are merchants all who, while avoiding 
mortal 3in and wishing to be virtuous, do good works to the glory of 
God, fasts, for example, vigils, prayers, etc., all of them excellent, 
but do them with a view to God's giving them somewhat, doing to them 
somewhat, they wish far in return. All such are merchants. This la 
plain to see for they reckon on giving one thing far another aid so to 
barter -with our Lord, though they are mistook as to tic bargain* For 
® H  they have and have the power to do, they have from God and do 
effect by means of God alone. God has no call to do to them or give 
t&fim anything unless he chooses to. For what they are they are from 
Sod and what they have they have from God and not from themselves.
God is in no wise bounded to requite their acts or gifts except he 
care to do so of his own free will, apart from what they do or give; 
for they give not of their own nor do they act of their own selves, as 
God says, 'Without me ye can do nothing*. They be sorry fools who 
bargain with our Lord like this} they know little or nothing of the 
truth, God cast them out of the temple and drove them forth* • 
(Ecidiart's sermon an the text* Intravit Jesus in templum dei et 
ejiciebat vendentes et ementes. llatt. c. 21 v. 1) Plato thinks that 
the practice of religion cannot be regarded as a means to m end. It 
la itself the recognition of the providential care and justice of to© 
gods.
The difference between a religious view of morality and one 
that is not, is clear in Plato, It is not, for him, attempting to give 
an answer to the question* Does morality have its source in the gods 
or not ? as if that question could be answered in the affirmative end 
there the matter be left. It is not from that point of view a question 
of only deciding what is or is not the case. The question taken just 
like that has no sense. An answer presupposes that one knows what 
morality having its souroe in toe gods is. People who attempt to 
appease to® gods look at the matter in that way. They answer the 
question in the affirmative without any understanding, and then 
proceed to act in such a way that their actions show that they hav© no 
understanding. For Plato, if one knows that morality has its source 
with the gods, then one knows that there is no alternative, (toe has 
*to know toe gods rightly and live accordingly*. (B$Qc)
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ARISTOTLE»S THEOLOGY. 1« f i
For Aristotle theology is closely connected with first philosophy 
** k® calls it ( ^iAo<yo^uL ), vjhich we call metaphysics. In fact 
^lere are passages in the ¡Metaphysics v.hich suggest that these two,
^tether v r i . t h a. , are names for tie same enquiry. It is, however,
^°®sihle to see some distinction in Aristotle*s use of these terras, and to 
*** that theology refers to a narrower field of enquiry than is meant fcy 
®i|her V£u)Ty] or <ro • This mis clear to Aquinas who mentions
in the preface to his commentary cm the Metaphysics. dicitur enim 
•ciervtia divina sive theoloedea, inquantum praedictas (i.e, séparatas)
•*tostantia considérât. I4etâ h.vsica inquantum considérât ens et ea quae 
e°nsequuntur ipsum. Dâcitur prima philosophia, inquantum primas rerua 
c®**«as considérât. Aristotle seems to have thought that of these, what he 
««led divine science as such vas the highest pursuit, because its object of 
#1*3Wiry was that substance vhieh was separate from matter. Metaphysics or 
, as s'.vh may well be possible and understandable without the existence 
6* any kind of substance which is unchangeable, and would then still be an 
investigation of the rature of being qua oeing, although then of course it
ohLy be a metaphysical enquiry of that substance of which Physics treat®, 
Aristotle makes clear at 10 26a2 8i "If there is no substance other than 
which are farmed by nature natural science will be the first science;
^  if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior 
**** ®ust be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first,
^  it will belong to this to consider being qua being • both what it is and 
attributes which belong to it qua being". The same distinction is to be 
*°Uhd in another passage at 10 6 9&3 7* "The former two kinds of substance are 
subject of ̂physics (for they imply movement) i but the third (i.e,
***stance which/ imaerable ; belongs to another science if there is no principle 
stfemon to it and to the o*her kinds ”,
So it is clear that one of the primary distinctions that Aristotle 
concerned with is that between substance that is movable , which means for 
the natural world, and that Atiich is immovable , by 'hich he means the 
la#aoved mover » God. It is this distinction which is uppermost in his mind 
*** that book of the Metaphysics which deals more than any other with the subject 
®*tter of his theology, that is Book A..
When, however, \m look at what Aristotle meant by first philosophy 
^  general we fine’ that this is concerned with an enquiry into the nature of 
qua being, and this is something that he discussed for moat part In 
of hit doctrines of the categories, and difficulties arise when we
*H«mpt to see the relationship between the kind of theology that we read in 
®°°kA and what is said about the categories in other Books, into have already 
^ted that toe doctrine of the categories as an exposition of what is first 
^^osophy for Aristotle can be perfectly well understood as referring only 
Qovoable substance, and its application to what Aristotle understands as
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4* not a t a l l  dear« tfhen A risto tle  oemes to  dlsouea the nature of 0od
** i* not only la  toras of the doctrine of the categories that ho does th is ,
*•* in  foot i t  seems that th is  doctrine i s  aot fundamental for him with reffurd
*• Otology* le diacusoes the matter in  terms of the d istin etio n  that he seas
**Wen auhatanoe that mores and that substance upon whioh a l l  moving
•fchstanoea depend, whioh i s  immoveable. So hare there i s  a fundamental
***fioulty of how A r isto tle 's  motaphyaioa aa stated  in  hia dootrino o f the
***ogori#s la  related  to h it  th selesy .
At the beginning of Book & A riatotle sayoi "Ws have traatod o f
**•* vhieh i s  ^  prim arily and to whioh a l l  the other oatogorieo o f being are
^ « rred  .  l . e .  o f aubstanae. For i t  io  in  virtue o f the oonoept of
^Wtaaoo that the others are said to bo * quantity and qu ality  and the lik e ;
*** e l l  w ill be found to involve the oonoept of substance"« Hart a t leant
** *ty be said to  ooo some point o f connexion between the doctrine o f the
•**egoriee and the theology o f Book A  .  For what io  central to the dootrino
•* the categories, and the theology wo find  there, io  the prlmaey o f
*Wtanoe« the subject matter of theology io  that aubstaneo whioh i s  perfaot
*• U a a c tu a lity , and wa can say that for A risto tle  the a ctu a lity  o f anything
^  to bo measured against i t s  p erfection , but a knowledge o f i t s  perfection
** tor him net anything that i s  arrivad at by an application o f h is  dootrino
** * e  categories« In fo o t, Sod oan only bo dosoribod oo fa llin g  in to  the
of itbc categories, that o f substance, but there i s  l i t t l e  in terest in
•••in s that th is  i s  the ease, because ho f a l ls  in to none of the others, and
*• tha dootrina o f the oatogorioe, regarded as a method o f d istinguiahiag
C e r e n t  oonooo o f being i s  o f l i t t l e  use in  determining the nature o f Ood,
****Ft, apart from the category of substance, by wgr of negation, for none
** *he other categories apply to Ood. But aa a means o f eaying that those
***egortes do not apply to Ood i t  io  of aome use and than narks o ff  Ood'a
••W e  from aU  othar substances to  whioh some other category apart from
W t of substance applies« Ood'e nature ia  deeoribod in  other term s, in
***** of being an object o f lo v e , and o f thinking, term  which do not f a l l
W h in  the dootrino o f categories«
Another my in  whioh the d istin ctio n  between A r le te tle 's  dootrino
** the categories and h is  theology becomes d e a r  la  by noting that the
W noipal argument that he ueee for the necessary existenoe o f o f ir s t  never
l i  net booed upon th e t doctrine, but i s  an argument about the nature of motion#
W . argument seeks to ohow that there must be something whioh ia  immured upon
W eb a l l  motion depends« The point io  not th at there must bo eome f ir s t
W in g  thing« ¥o assume that would not bo to  explain motion, because
***ion would have to  bo assumed ia  order to give an sxplanation s f  it«
i s  the point whloh in  nsdoin o r ltio ia a  o f the v im  o f the early Zoaiom
W  ju st assumed that la  the f ir s t  place there was a  shloh
*** the source o f a l l  subsequent motion«
From th is  i t  bsoomoo olear that ths dootrine o f the eatogorios an
f*»dng the bad a of Aristotle’s metaphysics does not apply to his views about
^ •o lo g y . However i t  i s  p ossib ls to  ooo that A n ld otlo  has them ia  mind whoa
is  concerned with theology» And hero i t  ia  the ideas o f substance, motion
W  the.i which doec not move, and p o ten tia lity  and a o tu d ity  that are
^ftPumost in hia «lad* I t is in terestin g  to note that whereas there io
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*®&®thing which can be opposed to that which moves, i.e. that which does not 
and something that canbe op.osod to that i M ch is potentialf i.e. thajf 
is actual, and the distinction between these is used in defining the 
mover as completely actual and unmoved, there is nothing that is 
opposed to substance as such which is regarded as defining the nature of the 
mover* Here we find the source of an idea in Aristotle's theology
^hich has greatly influenced later writers* the idea that God is a substance 
&  is this use of tlie term substance to refer to God that loads to talking 
*bout God's nature. The distinction that Aristotle does make of course is
k&tweejj material and immaterial substance, and for him God is certainly
Material, and also possibly that part of the human soul which he calls the 
VOy,s X'*>c'<rre>s . But that the term substance is used by Aristotle to
^fer to what is ¿¡aterial and immaterial i.akes it difficult to know what he 
Cl®&n8 then he calls God substance.
Aristotle seems to liave developed his idea of the difference 
**twaen tiie potential and the actual in the world of nature, and also his 
of the difference between efficient and final causality, and applied 
^  to the difference that exists between that which is temporal and that 
v*1*ch it eternal.* fne distinction that Aristotle draws between the temporal 
*** the eternal is the same for him as the distinction between that which 
®°Ves and that vhich is unmoved. Far iiim there is no motion without the 
^stance of timej nor is there any time without the existence of motion.
he puts the matter in the Pliysics Bode VIII* 'Hew can there be any time 
^thout the existence of motion? If, then, time is the number of motion or 
itself a kind of motion, it follows that if there is always time, motion must 
^*9 be eternal. Since time cannot exist and is unthinkable apart from the 
and the moment is a kind of middle point, uniting as it does in itself 
a beginning and an end, a beginning of future time and an end of past 
***•# it follows that there must always be time* for the extremity of the 
^**t period of time that we take must be found in some moment, since time 
tains no point of contact for us except the moment. Therefore since 
moment is both a oeginning and an end, there must always be time on both 
^ e e  of it. But if this is true of time, it is evident that it must be 
^"b© of motion, time being a kind of affection of motion. The same reasoning 
also show the Imperishability of motion", (Physics 251blQff,)
^iatotle here criticises Plato's view stated in the Timaeus that time is 
^^ted, as also for Plato motion is. Far Aristotle both are uncreated and 
both are eternal in the sense that neither has a beginning or an end, 
difference between the two views does not concern us at the moment, but 
is to be noticed is that far Aristotle the eternal life of God is some» 
^ h g  that is timeless and unmoved and it is this that is its eternal nature, 
**** as such is quite different from the eternal nature of time and motion,
^  is completely actual and is the final cause of all things temporal and 
Q>0vlhg, Ihe world of the temporal a d of the moving is one in which both 
^flclent and final causality, and also potential and actual existence are 
be found, but God is the completely actual and the final cause of all that
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A rietotle thinke that he can arrive at 8‘üch a yiesv o í rOil by &n 
t**® U stió n  o f the sature of the worid, and th&t tieans en J.'weotisntion of 
»»ture • f  beooaing, and i t  ie  euoh an exanination that precedas íiio  
*«e«twfc of Ood'e natura in  Book Xi. o f the Metephyaice. He begine th lo
by saying: "The subjeot o f our enquixy le  aubstanco snd the causes v/o are 
**lktag are thoee of aubataaoee* For i  f  «he m irarse ie  of the na ture of 
***01*1 suheta&oe ie  i t a  f ir e t  part"*
Xhe tara * súbetenos* ie  amongst the isost anbtgueus o f thoee ueed 
** Philosophy, and part o f the aablgulty te  whioh l t  g ires r lee  la  a 
****ideration o f vhet A rieto tle  saya ie  oeaneoted s ita  the d ietin etien e that 
11 «tted a t the begiaalag regardiag the dlffereikt waye in  whioh aotaphyaioa 
^  *ogerded by A rietotle* Fer i f  netephyaloe in  ita  v ideet asnee le  en 
"•HWiy in te  the aetnre of aubetanee thca l t  la  that whioh Aquinaa 
***f«rentiatee ea 'aetephysiee inquantun oonaiderat ene e t «a qnee 
‘••M^uttntur ipatai* • In th le  widoet eeaee o f a l l (  aubetanee le  being -  
^  ie* At the beglantag o f Book V A rietotle w xiteet "Therefare i t  le  
** U in g  ae beiag that we nuet alee graep the f ir e t  eaneeeN* That ie  whet 
**t»tetle e a lle  To oV ,  and l t  ie  th le word that he ucee when he ta lke in  
aad eleewhere o f the eetegorlee e f beiag and l t  le  inpertaat to  neto 
^  ho lo  ta lk ing about the d ifferen t asnees o f the tova* lo  eaye T*S»<#u^t 
-r¡> ov haa uaay á ifferen t aeanings» Blaewhere, hoveros, aa la  -¿X. f 
we haré Juei quoted the enquiry e f  netephyeioB le  regerdod aa aa eaquiry 
**tb the natura e f  the eeueea o f eubotanooo (olrntov ) or eubotaaoo ( o 3o*u» ) .
** lo  th lo  taofold saturo o f tho eubjeot that la  «ho baeie of Aquinao*o 
*l*tiaotion  bol vean wfaat ho o a llo  iaetaphyaioe whioh lo  e otuiy o f th lo  sübjeet 
^  fer  ae l t  ooneidaro beiag aad ito  a ttr lta tea  ead * f ir e t  phlleaophy* la  
** fh* ae i t  oonaidore tho f ir e t  eaueoe of tbiage (l*o*oúir(*ov )# (b le itu r  
portea philoaophie laqaaataa prlsea reren oaueaa eenaiderat)« The 
^ •H aotion  ie  ea Upertant oae for A rietotle* For l f  ibllowing Aqulaae «o 
«etephysloe the etudy of b *n g aad ita  attributoo aa A riototlo outllnoa  
la  Booke T aad £  # fo r  insten©#, the» f ir e t  phileeophy although
H®*«med with e l l  thoee d la tla etien e  le  ohhfly oeneemeá w ith whet ero tía  
*lbat oeuooo o f th lw i aa saboteases ( oÍwhov ) t aad th ia  w ill aot inolnde 
^  «hele o f belng -  beoauee whet A rieto tle  o e lle  M oldante w ill not beloag 
*• the f ir e t  osases, but e d il aerorthelooe for* part o f  netaphyeioe ae being  
*•*1 o f  tho general etudy of »wbet lo* that i e  to tlv -  or beiag*
la  book Z he dietintfiiahee four eoneee of the wordZ«ú aa fo lie«««  
«he siap le  bodlee, l*e* oerth ead f lr e  ead water aad ereiything e f  Ha 
**t»  ead la  general bediee ead the thiage eeaposed e f thea, both ani aele  aad 
^ l a e  beiaga (i*e* the hesreniy bediee) aad the parta o f  thoee« A ll thoee 
bailad eubetanoe beoauee they ere aot prodioetod o f a eabjeet but orosy»
* U g  aloe ie predieeted of tbea* (2) That whioh beiag jreeeat la euoh thiaga 
** **• not prodioatod of a eebjoot lo tho oeuee of thelr beiag, ae «ho aoul lo 
%í tho being of oa anlael* (3) Cho parto whioh are proooat in eeeh thingo, 
***Hiag thea and aerlriag that ae lndlrlduala, aad by «hese deetraotiea tho 
lo dootroyod* (4) H»o ooooaoo, tho fósatela of whioh ie a deflaltioa, ie 
oelled the aabetaaee ef ead« thing* Xhe firet of thoee Asiatotlo thea 
lo «ho *ultiaeto oubotretua* (to Vô tiw t«noKv/pv«y) 'whioh io a» leager 
^hdioatod of anythiag olio* 9 tho other throo ooae vmder aaothor oeaoe whioh
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***®totle descries as 'that which being a'this* is also separable - and of thi> 
^t^re is the shape and form of each thing. Aristotle then uses the tern 
only to refer to some particular existing tiling but also to refer to the 
**Mnce, Substance is both To&t *u. and to -rL l«*rc .
Apart from describing T&St Tt and to rC im- and toe substratum as 
S t a n c e  Aristotle also soroetii-ies says that the universal is substance.
*** the substratum and the essence and toe compound of these are called 
^stance so also is the universal' (Z 1038b2ff). But toe universal only 
•̂oooies part of the substance of a thing by way of definition* No 
^Versal is a substance. As to the substratum; this too is substance.
**** this in one sense is the matter (and by matter I mean that which, not
N s g a 'this' actually, is potentially a 'this'), and in another sense 
formula of shape (that iiich being a 'this' can be separately formulated), 
thirdly toe complex of these two, which alone is generated and destroyed, 
184 1 « without qualification, capable of separate existence, (Z 10 4 2a30).
^  is the same point that Aristotle makes earlier in toe same book at 
■*^t>35fft «The word substance is applied, if not in more senses, still at 
*s*st to four main subjects; far both toe essence and toe universal and 
genus are thought to be toe substance of each thing, and fourthly the 
•Stratum. Now the substratum is that of v.hich everything else is 
®*Sdicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else. And so ws 
first determine the nature of this; for that which underlies a tiling 
^^arily is thought to be in toe truest sense its substance. And in 
sense matter is said to be of the nature of substratum, in another eiiape, 
8 8  in a third the compound of those'. No universal we have said is for 
**istotle a substance, although it forms an important part of the definition 
** anything that is a substance. That toe universal is not a substance 
** °he of toe main point» on which Aristotle disagreed with Plato. «It 
Hain« he says, «that no universal attribute is &  substance, and this is 
W*in also from the fact that no couaon predicate indicates a 'this1, but 
**ther a 'such*. If not, many difficulties follow and especially toe 
man* (103Sb34ff),
Plato's argument for the existence of toe forms was mainly based 
*** arguments connected with his theory of knowledge, and Aristotle did not 
^  that forms were necessary in order to put forward an adequate 
•tdstanology, and even went as far as to say "Those who say Forma exist, in 
respect are right, in giving the Forms separate existence, they are 
^otances", (1040b28). And this is quite natural for Aristotle to say, 
^Ause & substance is far him anything that has particular existence, 
**ietotle sayB, however, that where Plato fails is in not being able to give 
8 SQod reason for the existence of 'imporisliable substance which exist apart 
^  the individual and sensible substance* (10W)b32). That is Plato 
**ile to give a reason far the existence of substances which are not individual 
***1 sensible because they are material, matter being for Aristotle the 
^ihciple of individuation with regard to what he calls individual and 
*****11010 substance, Aristotle thought that toe existence of ncaa-sensible
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•*b»tano# was not somsthing which was a matter of epistemology* Their 
**l«t#noe depended for him on arguments about the nature of motion, and not 
arguments about the nature of universale« The being of universale is 
"•••thing that he refuses to hypostasis# in the way that Plato does#
Clearly"f he said, "no universal term ie the name of a substanoe, and no 
•festanoe is composed of substances«" If the universal were a substanoe 
^•h this would mean that these substances would have to be composed of 
••totanoee, and it ie a fundamental principle of Aristotle with regard to 
nature of substance that no substance can be composed of substances«
In sense passages Aristotle seems to identify essence and substanoe« 
^ *ba beginning of chapter 6 of hook Z he writes! "we must enquire whether 
***** thing and its essence are the same or different« This is of some use 
*•* tte inquiry concerning substanas| for each thing is thought to be not 
efferent from its substance, and the essenos is said to he the substanoe 
** tech thing«" (1031 all5ff)« But for Aristotle essenee and subatanoo ore 
*•* completely identifiable, although at tho ond of thio ohaptor ho MpM 
primary and oelfi-eabdetent thing is oao and tho oano to its oseonoe* 
^ 3805), Just os no universal la & substance, no oooonoe is &  eubetanee,
** tho sense of bolng on individual and ooasiblo euetanoe* The oooonoo is 
«hoot fomuls lo a definition and although 'la a fonoula there la always 
** daunt of natter aa well as ono of setuaUte» e,g. tho circle lo 'a Plano 
***c*a' (I043a34)t thoao are porta of the definition of tho ooooaoo and aro 
*** mterlal parts« Tho oesonoe is tea definition of tho fern* (I013a27)« 
***d»y euhetanae is described as both ToS*, tc , and to t t  1<ttl and for 
^datotl# both those dooorlptioaa apply enelogieelly throughout tho 
••tegoriee* So ho aakai "Or has definition like 'what a thing ia' several 
****lags? 'What a thing 1** 1b one oenoo aeons sWbstanee and tho 'this',
^  toother ono or other of tho predicate«, quantity, quality and the Ilka«
*** M  'lo' bolongo to oil things, not however In tho ones sense, but to oao 
**** of thing primarily, and to others In o secondary way, 00 too 'what a 
*log la' bed sago In the simple sense to eubotanoo, but In a United sense to 
dbor categories, for oven of quality we my ask what It la, as teat 
**Uty also Is s 'what a thing lo', - net in the single senes, hswsvsn, but 
**•* as la tee saos of that whleh lo not, sens eey, emphasising the linguist!# 
***•» that that white is not ¿a - not is singly, but nea-erlatant| ns tss 
* *  quality"• (I030al8ff)« (of Aquinos Osansatorla la Xotagbyslss' 1275
***** potot quod fore cades oat divide substantiae hio posits, eun 111a quae 
•̂oitu» In Pvaodloonontla« lan per oublootm InteUlgltur hie sUbatastla
Quod euten dldt genus et univeroalo, quod videtur od genus ot opooloo 
Ctetinere, oontlnotur mb oubotantila ooouadlo, Hoe auten quod quid onat 
**•• hlo ponltur, sod Ibi praetemittlter, quia non oadlt la praodloanontsrun 
**dao aid dost jrinoipiwm« Boquo snim oat gonna asquo opooioe noqao 
^ivlduan, sod horns endun female prladplm),
Psrtieuler sensible eubstenees oase to bo and pass away« That white 
*• W a t  Jtt oubotanoe, however, white la tec for* (the definition of tea 
^dnaa) dean not eono to bo« Since euhotanoe la of tea kinds, tea aaanrata 
%tng and tea formls (I man teat on* dad of swbstsaoe la tea ftonmla taken 
*be natter, whlls another lo tee female In lte generoHty), eubotanoaa 
^  *bo former oonoo ore capable of doatruotlon, (far teoy aro alas capable
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or generation), Oat there is no destruction or toe formula in the sense that 
It is ever in course of being destroyed (far. .toeEfcis no generation of it 
•Ithert tue being of house is not generated, out only the being of ¿¿¿g, 
house), but without generation and destruction formulae are or are not} for 
^  has been shown that no one begets nor makes toese”. (Iu39b20ff.)
**4atotle states the sense in which one toing is m.e same as its essence 
*4 the sense in -hich it is not thus* »The essence certainly attaches to 
tils fona and the actuality. For «soul* aad'to 'be soul» are the sew, out 
Ho be nan* and 'man* are not sc~.e, unless even toe oaro soul is to be 
«ailed iffln". (204blf£.)
Of sensible substance although toe form and ..attar are called substance 
U  is the ccsaex of these two feat Aristotle regards as cajole of separate 
«fctstence without qualification*
Although, Aristotle, in bosk A .  of toe Hetaphysies, wnere ne 
<ieal8 explicitly -with toe subject matter of tocology, says fesat there are 
thrQe kinds of substance (1069a30ff), M s  division is really into kinds 
* the sensible and to at .rial,
(1) Sensible substance - of vMch one subdivision is eternal and 
another perlsiiable; the latter is recognised by all. men, and includes 0.3 .
Plants and animals, of which we grasp too elements, whether one or many.
(2 ) laxovable substance - which certain thinkers assert to be capable 
of existing apart, seme dividing it into two, others identifying the Forms 
«04 the objects of mathematics, and others positing of fem.se two only toe 
objects of mathematics.
B *  former kind of substance (1 ) is toe subject matter of physics 
(for ft implies movement)} but the third kind belongs to anotoer science,
If there is no principle common to it and tue other Lunas *
So the main division that Aristotle lias in mind is one between 
*QV*1 . and to ovaHl. subsumes. there is no conman principle widch
H h  snare he tries to show by ¿-roving that there must be an imovable 
Wbstance which is toe subject matter of tocology and w ich is the first 
Winciple Vtoe primary essence) upon which ever,/thing that moves depends 
for it 8  movement, and this mal.es it something that cannot be investigated 
^  physic^«
Aristotle's doctrine of the categories ap lies to sensible substance , 
bet not to imov able- substance. M e  subject matter with which this doctrine : 
i0  usually described by Aristotle in other parts of toe Metaphysics,  ̂
M v l S v l  . here (in book^l ), however, he speaks of the «uruverse* ( t o  
) of which substance is the first ¿art, and is succeeded by quality 
««4 then fcr. quantity. (M69 a20). This passage fellows closely others at 
the beginning of other boohs of the Metaphysics, and as wo have ¿minted out it 
U  the central position that an investigation of substance holds in Aristotle's 
inquiry that forms the link between what ho has to say about toese two 
Afferent kinds of substance. The .riiracy of substance in the doctrine of 
the categories is matched for Aristotle by the primacy of substance in his 
He*  ̂  the nature of becoming which is summed up for him in Ids view that 
’the causes of substance are the causes of all things'. For without the
m
t̂otxaic© of substance toe oadotorjce or eui»ü of too root of the categories 
^  %**aii¿lo aai oí suis-LlLe substance» ttot Uüel is so.id tq .w ¿rinariJy ia
^®*^®00©* ful oí everythinvtoto -V -ero is toere ¿0 joc causo toich io the 
cause of all, taut ifc'wvocwle eutowuco *wleh win,g In first in 
^¿©ct of cod. lot© reality is toe c&uae of all toinqs*» (107Xa35)
f\t%ÍOCív>X¿£ jjl «¿Qv-'iiZ iV V'Ô ViG A*t» wui.0 xli ,'C'. ̂ u - i ' J J j F * *
.-^Te olee, and -.rao w*.jat he ¿wo so say it .xca.voe door tout for toja taoalurgr
^  «oeaunUix; i./r fcecocdu.,.« i.ruc first sueotion to uo ans ■: ptol'Oui ioi haw is
^  chx\’e ( tljat wo boo in s^wiuLe suoutoncc ^cosible or ;*« . ,oes
¡y/̂ Í8  *l> -cov This im»i»Uj:*bian to .is aare strictly taoolo;lcal view«, 
Wclnio cotí wúo otoAjc io oisuchaiJUd t¿wt iioccocitofcos ti;o adotaice 
7 • Airufc Dover v.- xi ao c d ls  God, It is á¿n¡,extent to ruco ¿toso ttot 
tiie uny ia toch .'iri3iotle»o brought 4. reccods, bocauso It síkms taut iiis
®̂COQijrj,;
^Sgd,
*no oí too Lein; of God, his toeaXe;^ that is, is that ti* ¿.roceos of
C¿L«.Ou wO V4£JiÍ0¿^uíkXX¿ V-.<¥*ijTi* . . . O&í-XD óCi*C O Q i ~ OD L u 48 o  C--.¿LíOOy ^liX I)
tef«¡Én ftf., yaffils...*
Eio question that loáis .'Uriaootle so put ferwroed a w  view cf 3oti»s 
oust as aoes ¿.uo ic*\wrd hau io it ¿cooiftLc that U*are io circt*je 
***•» uu*2d at all, a w  towt jueobion is very s o i l i  to asUnq uav wwro ’a 
^ l d  at all, toxstolla ¿,uss two matter in ¿Is vU* way by asking ;**r is 
i-osoialoV 4wt -u'iaavtio, ilka tuo rest of t¿<© írosle 
^^oOi-iwrs was ioteres-tod in was in attaa»-i«G 1 ¿V® a» accoiait of 
^  ^4a ooont 3ooil¿r_, sow ¿.waour© of it, filo Uo.wVw.r, vns not a 
•«ieneific Ga.¡uiry as vw unaorsV.-d it, liero cowld oe a scicnlific account 
4op Aristotle in toras of tie four olcsoeots, fire, oui*th, air atxl outer but
l'*Wi ^n aa.iuiry would be worely on account of too rolations of . iiyeical 
«ífei-se0f it '(Mould no an account of rola Hans of toe ways in wuicb tooac 
A^-aito interact and doecri*-tion of too rola liens -.filch csiot bctwoco 
***** ¿fysical o la x n ts. I t  would not provide any Mod of •acplsnatte wiy 
W  should so chongo a t a l l ,  Shis ¿weitian io  stated, wo o iiu t say, in  
olftnfilcal farm by Sasrates in tfie fhaodo, uhon lie cr itic ise s  ánoao»
Aristotle recceaisec th is distinction and he «arries an Plato1« 
^teqpt to t d s  qaeetiao in  tens« of fens and cntt«r. Oeocoiag few*
i® the of fema and natter, lie iiocuooee t i l s  in  book A
*** Saysi t ^
« 8 W Í «■©*■! •»!»■« ^ T* f x^ T ^ -  t-i f - £ « f ,A'k\
k  t S v  ¿v t . ^ , u t o v  <! ™  iv,t; H ^ - /wv u  r Ji TO'/r“ '/
/«» 1 ' X , ^  I w d 'í  ¿ t t ’ «  t*u tovn<.oJ«vw'j«'V| otttiv*(.Ti
t f  f . ^ n x . v  1  TY w . l « v -  »1 y f t  ™ r 4M p * te i.
0 ©fe«t bx)
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feasible substance is cliangeaaLG, out if the change is from opposite 
•fcates or intermediate states# but not all states are opposite to each 
for tii® voice is not-white, but fran the contrary state# it is 
Pessary that there must be come tiling which underlies changes into 
opposite state# for contraries do not change). He proceeds to say 
that which is different from botli contrary states .ut which under- 
^• 8 both of them is a third tiling which he calls otter. It is this 
telch changes. The change which is possible for natter# however# is 
•tenge which is different from any particular IdLnd of change such as the 
«tenge from night to day# which is a change in quality. There are four 
^ 8  of change — $ vj «e }
't0 Ti *1 T ^  *{ ^*>Z . These are four of the
««tegories Vvtdch Aristotle considers to be tiie ways in which to ov
rc? are classified. To each of them corresponds a different 
*«Ha of change# forms of change wiiich bear the same kind of relation to each 
•tear as the categories do amongst themselves. In the doctrine of the 
tetegorles there is a fundamental difference between the first and the 
test that is between "OsSì-t c  (and To xc Lem. ) and Tto?ov̂  ic^crov,
TToO KtX., (This is well illustrated by Aquinas in his Commentary 
(885) Die it ergo quod ens dici tur quoddam secundum se# et quoddam secundum 
tecidens* Sciendum tamen est quod 111a divisio entis non est eadem cum 
^la divisione qua dividi tur ens in substantiam et accidens. Quod ex hoe 
tetet# quia ipse postmodum# ens secundum se dividit in decern praedicamenta # 
^ortBa novem sunt de genere accidentia» Hhs igitur dividi tur in subs tantiam 
te accidens# secundum abe aiutaci antis considerations»# e&cut ipsa albedo in 
te considerata dici tur accidens# et homo substantia, Sed ens secundum 
tecidens# prout hic sumitur# oportet accipi per comparaticnem accidentia ad 
tebetantiam, Quae quidem oemparatio significa tur hoc verbo# dst# eum dicitur# 
est albus, Unde hoc tatua# homo est albus# est ens per accidens, Unde 
tetet quod divisio entis secuidur se et secundum accidens, atten-
secundum quod allquid liraedicatur de aliquo per se vel per accidens, 
°ÌVÌ8lo vero entis in substantiam attendi tur secundum hoc quod aliquid in 
tetura sua est vel substantia vel accidens, ef 889)
The distinction then between the first of the categories and the 
tenaincler is the distinction between substance and accident. Since three of 
^te faros of change that Aristotle mentions come under those categories which 
tell under accident (viz, uóeov, i t e t *vj ) they are quite different 
teem that farm of change that comes under the category of substance itself, 
teder the category of falls simple generation and destruction
 ̂ ^ *ot'L \ ToSt ) under that of itovov/ falls
tecrease and diminution ( wù. «j »Coi.x4 To Tii<sbv)| and
teder that of too falls alteration ( ¿UA©iu*r^ ^ wjjtx» x<> xu£(9®s )| 
ted under that of t o o falls locomotion ( ^  ventri t Ótìov ) The
^*ee last kinds of change are changes that happen to substances# but the 
*test is that kind of change by wiiich a particular substance either comes 
0̂ be or passes away (cf. Physics V 225al2-£Q and 227b?ff ),
Aristotle discusses the question of eoming-to-be and passing-away
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^  the *De Generaticne et Corruptions* and in the first Boole of the Physics 
(chapters 6-9). He refers at the beginning of the first work to the views
early Greek philosopher's in the foliating way (31Aa7ff)i- Soou uXv y»̂ .Ti x l -tóLv cfv&u. Aiyooa-i k*1 ?v«s y*v\/«>ec> ToOxo^ u â/ *
"M*iÍ3rau- »«•« si W «  t V  T . e ^ ^ - . v e ^ t S o t t T s .
tó  A'm!bciég*£ <c*. A t ú  KimKs j T0ÚT015 S i  ? » £ « / .
The point here is tiiat if you say that the universe is a whole 
that everything has caae to be from an initial s tate which is an 
£ervitiated unity* then coming-to-be is only alteration of this pre­
dating unity* and so coming-to-be and pas sing-away are in no way different 
alteration* but the same. If* however* the initial state is that more
than one kind of tiling exists, then coming-to-be and passing-away will not be
* W  alteration, but there will be fl/wis and *»•&* proper - that is c m  
thing will erne-to-be out of anooner, and one tiling will ¿ass away into 
•«Bathing else, (cf 3lBa25-27) . Aristotle criticises the views of seme of 
*• predecessors in aha Oe Generations et Corruption©. The view, stated in 
Afferent ways by them, which comes in for most criticism is their view 
* * t y U * K a n d ^ W  are «association» and »dLssocati^i» respectively.,
(v.^; 3 7 Sowtl «'ytSev xtSsiv ?t*e*v iw < y
«15145-0.9 l ^  00 v k * ' z r * u . <t o v k p »*oV * w * «o&
Toittov €ISl«'T̂ B“c«S“t e*lc>eYr£C>''. )
*̂ 1* to tie wishes to say that <|w*n$ and ̂ 0̂  are real changes* and not Just 
Afferent associations of the same elements. His view is that when Air 
®Cftes-to-be out of Water, or when .»ter passes-aney Into Air - there is a 
Change in the kind of thing that ha»*c<xne-to-be or passed-avny out of some­
thing else. It is a substantial change. Aristotle would agree that alteration 
*» a change of ’qualities» (¿AA*oo<r&*. Si **t* ̂ AAi<m*v >>
£<&> he Shinies that inSuUoi^ij there is always ariXttt vAiich remains. The 
♦Iteration is in one of thes-ft,^««¿»W <Cat.9*26ff) not in the t c 
Itself. But in and**gt it is ariSt rt rfiich ccmee-to-be or passes-
d»y together with a n y t h a t  it possesses. The riSt-tc. 1» 
divided Afty»£* into two parts -»Vos and «A^jand it is when these last two 
Change that coming-to-be and passing-awiy take riUce.,( 3 W 3 £ £  ™ XKt
u &  ISv To£t»tf $ $  *«ap**n M  \  + ® 0** *
V v  f'tv to*  t\w 0 £<n. Kbtc ^  / oe>A*tii«s*
the view that coming-to-be and paseing-away are just association and dissoc­
iation does not explain how »this» changes to »that*.
Is this, however, all coming-to-be and pasoing-ec**y are? That is,
♦ changing from one thing to another? Can any distinction be drawn between 
the kind of y w teu  which is a of something and )<*£&<, vtoich ie
Cccdng-tc-be without qualification? Aristotle puts the question in^the^
‘«loKtas wy: v^roy & t o e y i w  ^ tW  V m  t . * iU u*
V l  k"'e!ujS ^  V l K T ’''°s *a t  Tl-
(3^32-34). The exan^lee he gives of the latter kind of coming-to-be are* 
b o o i n g  healthy viien one is ill») becoming small from being lar«e* and 
nee versa.
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That there may be y ivvty , however, suggest tiiat there may be 
fn|| ¿V I and tills in turn would moon that 'not-being * ( To |«.Jj ov )
^  a property of sane things, end not »not-being' in sane qualified sense 
for instance, when something is said to ccee-to-be freon the 'notfwhite'
** the 'not-beautiful', but in an unqualified sense, answering to the unqualifi-e4 |
** cotnirg-to-be' which derives from it, for qualified coming-to-be is cooing» 
^ 5e in same category other than substance, that is change of itoiQc$ #
Hie reference to ‘unqualified1 is for Aristotle a reference to the 
Categories and ‘unqualified» can have two meanings* (1 ) that which is primary in 
eategory; (2 ) that which is universal and embraces all members of a class, 
these two senses correspond two possible interpretations of the term »un­
qualified coming-to-be* and Aristotle argues that according to each of these 
^^Tpretatians of »unqualified», »unqualified coming-to-be» ( and 'unqualif- 
^  passing-away) is impossible. The first of toe categories is fer Aristotle 
^  fundamental one and as unqualified being is for him oweia , unqualif- 
*•4 hot-being will be its very opposite ̂  ewtfia ̂  so unqualified coming-to- 
^  f**an unqualified not-being* will be otaws V*v**lS oWiaj (3 17 b8).
a view of »unqualified coming-to-be from unqualified not-being* contrad- 
certain necessary principles of the doctrine of the categories. It pre- 
*^?ose8 the existence of not-being of such a kind that, since it is a complete 
**S*tton of o vktiA , it will not be an&tTi and so nothing can be predicated of 
^  Under any of the other categories (since it is only of Outfid that the other 
**k®garies can be predicated)) and so in addition it will necessitate the sep- 
***** existence of these other categories. Such is therefore impossible,
Wording to the second meaning of not-being it will be nothing and ex nih-r^ 
^  fit.
To overcome these difficulties Aristotle makes use of his die tine- 
between and The position new becomes changed because
distinction which is necessary in order to give an account of y iA & ij and 
, is no longer between »unqualified being* and »unqualified not-being*, 
Position now isiTgswvjotv t»'** Ik ̂  ovt<$ ofXW ovtoj ¿«.l ,
^7bl7ff Cf physics 225a2Qff). Ik signifies that which is not
), whereas 8 v ro$ wvc signifies that which is Peten­
' k a  The same kind, of difficulties, however, arise with regard
^  this second view as arose with the first. Does this distinction enable cue 
distinguish between »qualified* and »unqualified» coming-to-be? Or do the 
difficulties arise with regard to Zv S v^ ^ u. as there did with
For that which is potentially, is that into which what is 
j^*®4ng-away oust change. What, however, is the status of To 5y Svvw^tt?
predicate of it any of toe categories outside that of substance? If
is possible, but only potentially then there is a being which is un-
^^ttnined and which also in ocming-te-be proceeds out of seme pre-existent 
kt̂ iing, If, however, it is possible to predicate of it some other category 
from that of subetance, then these qualities will, be separable, because 
*** súbeteme t h o u g h i s  not . t ¿> c v eaa
^described not only as »being1, but also as »not-being*, and the question 
r*H arises for Aristotle is vhothar or not the same difficulties arise whan 
. * * is regarded as toe to tv from which becoming proceeds,
^  arose whan T¿ ^  «* • 'was interpreted as
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An adequate treatment of this question involves for Aristotle 
•ft investigation of the iisaterial cause ( ijX.'vj ) as distinct from 
the causes of motion which he says iiave been fully discussed in the 
% 8ics (VIII chapters 3 a 6) and in IiotaphysicsA, - that is both 
efficient and final causes of motion. It is only by investigating the
“• W e  of th at an adequate account of pas sing-away arid casing-to-be
88,1 given and it is in this way that an adequate account can be given of 
W  to ov which enters into and 4 ®°6.u can be given.
It has already been suggested that tA must be interpreted to 
b® to '¿sf and not t b ov lvxikttf.1* , but it is necessary to show
falsely the nature of to Svi Vol^v». this is done by showing that 
t6  ̂  ^  as to o^ is # X-yj , The difficulty which arises is
thinking that is a process into *what is not* ( cij ) and
W t  »what is not* is nothing ({^Wd). Tills view of the matter may lead to 
inking that, if 3 one tiling is always disappearing into nothing, and if the 
bWce of each thing that comes to be is limited, the whole of being would 
long ago have disappeared. That this, is not the case, is a reason for 
linking tliat coming-to-be and passing-awoy are just the coming-to-be and 
•̂SBing^civay 0f one particular thing froo another. Here, of course, Aristotle 
** casuaing what he seeks to prove elsewhere that there Is no actual infinite, 
bit only, potential infinite divisibility. If even this latter were the case, 
W h  the process of yiv*r»^ and^ft©^» might continue indefinitely provided that 
successive and^Gt^i were smaller than the previous one. But this 
^°®8 not fit in with what is perceived to happen.
If then this is not the case, the continuous process of and'"•MW- *"&* must be explained in another way, Aristotle*3 answer is suggested in 
5 * ̂ estion which he now asks* 5 ** T^ TV  ToC*t/
s j i v t f t v  KAc T^V TO* St U b X o K j t'lVftlU tfa*si< T T O V
t ^ v |ccto< ̂ eX^v ]
&*ft23-e5), and the answer must be one which applies to all ycvtan^ and 
The main question which demands discussion is the one which has 
*^®ady bean mentioned* »VJhat is the distinction between unqualified and 
<®,ftilfied and ?*
The distinction that is to be made between these two farms of 
and <̂ 0© ^  depends in the first instance on making a distinction between 
Afferent WjwH« of possible change. This distinction is based on the doctrines 
•* the Categories and in seeing as Aristotle puts the matter that
n e-TjjwIvtA. S'd’vi • Change from one ToSt tl to another, 
•boh as the change from earth to fire , is unqualified awi <^©©£ot
'•»atever the underlying subject of change ( t o  oionci» (utv/ov ) may be. For 
^ t  is important is the nature of this change from being one particular thing 
being another which is change which cannot be otherwise described than as
Apart from this way of looking at the matter, where change is a change 
one particular substance (feSt t O  to another, there is a more general dec­
eption of change which involves a consideration of the material cause of 
“bangs (oX'vy). Aristotle here in the "De Generations et Corruptions" 
^fibliff) states the view that he puts forward in Metaphysics (1069b).
fill* is based or* a distinction between ©3tfu* and frifnyc■$ which are now re- 
t̂ Satded as being equivalent to to ¿V and -ri> ̂  &/ respectively, and he applies
distinction to thu exsuapl© which has given o£ Earth and Fir® (t o (*-tv 
®<e.|x©v «otr^oeik TtS *od tIKdsj \  s* ^ uXk®XV*<r'ifc 'ir s -  
Sia^igou^v. 'j'ij m i o e  vcott w u t<*i5 Tdis 5.ci^oe.»“S’
*®is change is substantial and the distinction that is to be drawn between
<**®U£ied and unqualified and <£&©ê  raast h© one which sees unqualified
and §&ogJi as substantial changes. The distinction cannot be made to rest 
^  ̂ he difference between what is perceptible and imperceptihle, for this latter 
only a difference Kin* $h$p-S and not vwt1 ¿Xî 0 £,vav ,
Apart frcci this kind of yiy£.<n$ and fao&i ( Kelt* )
^ch depends an the nature of the ratcrial ($Aq ) of change, and tills mater- 
^  ®ay differ in three respects in so far as it is (a) a substance ctr not, (b)
56 its having more or less of the nature of substance, and (e) its being 
or ' eoo perceptible, there is another kind of change which is noted at 
^  a33li; -,'jhich is not y{</l<ns ^ • It is the kind of change which 
®een viiesn we cay tint a student ‘coroes-to-be-learned *, but not th a t he
**»s to be without qualification. ( <jwf*v y«t T°v jw&Jvm/te*
V»v£<j^ oo ) An explanation of th is  change too depends on the doe-
^ h e  of categories* To t& i Tu <r^^eLwti,,Toi Sv TocevXt.̂  v«i S j icirov/
^  is  cnly of the f i r s t  category of substance th a t we can say th a t i t  cranes to  
cr passes away q[t'A‘v(> , Other changes tiia t are denoted by the remainder 
^  the categories a rey iv W t^  t i or T»*ts ,  There i s  a sense,
****wer#. in  which changes in  a l l  the categories are to  be regarded as unqualif- 
^  ecning—to-be and passing away, in  so fa r as oZtri* and «rxxgqcn ̂  apply not 
°tly in  tiia category of substance but in  the others too, Etas there is  un- 
^ l i f i e d  coming-to-be in  q u ality  i f  a person c aoes-to-too-iBoroed but not i f  
^  ®aaee-to-be-4gncrant which is  regarded as a *J of knowledge,
A ristotle*s view then is  th a t continuous y ^ ia -15 and are
^«nden t on the existence of the m aterial cause as substratum which is  subject 
^  changes in to  contrary s ta te s . The puzzle th a t a rises with regard to  saying 
***t what ccrces-to-be eones-to-be from what is  not and what passes-eway passes- 
*»y in to  what is  not « fly  a rises i f  »what is  not* is  le f t  unqualified. The 
***«© of »what is  not* th a t applies to ^ v w * s and is  te> ©v Sow*|vt«-j
ll<& .  The ire tter which underlies in  each case is regarded as the 
***•» but the being in  each case is  d iffe re n t. ( $ p-w Y^£ n o q . ¿C fmoK&xai. 
to  «.«to , to  S ' t?vac ou ro m o  319b3*^.). This is  what A risto tle c a lls
bA-vj which Is the subject of change in  Y ^t<5\s and •
As such and <£©©£/£ must be distinguised from a lta r -
****** ( «AkbitvO’is ) ,  which is  change in  the properties of the substratum
’<Ach remains as i t  i s .  According to  the differences in  the properties, which 
subject to  change, so the change is  given a d iffe ren t name. Change of place 
** ««lied locomotion ( )l change of quality  is  called  e ith e r growth or
^®*teution *j )• iifcteraticn proper ( <?AA©iw<n$ ) i s  change of
or property ( k*y* *a\  to W&v )• H atter 0 & X-v̂  )
for A risto tle mainly th a t wrdch is  subject to  substan tial changes, but i t  
includes the substrata of these other kinds of change as w ell.
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Sources of all C.cralngrtarM
All coming-to-be and all pascing-av'ay for Aristotle takes place 
^  vhat he calls the region about the centre ( \v Tlt» to  ̂ .4« ov toi\lo j 
is in the Laver Cosmos, (De Gen, et Carr, 335a26) The sources of &p  
caoing«.t4-be ( h«i<ĵ | yivs-jij oĵ cmu>± here is a universal
which covers all y i v t a tj and indiscriminately) are »equal in
**®ber to and identical in kind with those which exist among eternal and 
Primary tilings ( t\€\V oSv W  yi/tc
«v- oiotbu flt‘Ut£ W  Toi$ ¿¡fCScoî v<*\ %wro»s ),
the eternal and primary things are the celestial bodies - the bodies of the 
,QSPer Cosmos, It is not, Aristotle thinks, sufficient to explain these if 
'*8 Appeal only to material and formal causes. The same is the ease with 
^e ytvyi and of the Lower Cosmos,
Aristotle in the discussion of the four causes of TVoiCMq ̂ vt<ri£ 
in chapters 9 and 10 of the De Generations et Corruptions, after making the 
Poiht which we have just noticed gives a general definition of as VoUv*r<*
t V  tec . Shis definition of 8 * ^  only applies to ytvy* and not
to the eternal bodies of the upper cosmos whose motion must be different,
»*ir being is necessary ( If ^  ) and they fall into one of the
W o  classes of things to which this definition of viX'vj does not apply. The 
other is the class of things which of necessity do not exist*
The second cause in the sense of the end of particular things that 
eQl0® to be (t o  e$ tvt**. ) is the shape and form ( ̂  Wsl'v ),
< form is the definition of the essential nature of each thing, (o a
The third cause is the efficient cause of becoming and pasaing-away 
^ c h  for Aristotle is the sun*s annual movement in the ecliptic circle.
The fourth cause is the final cause of everything that is, both what 
eternal and temporal -the unmoved mover.
The first kind of change is not ytvfc»s tat ôfcet 
Tijc , and so is to be regarded as the cause of '/¿vie 1 5 •
fh&t this is the case involves an ccsanin&tion of the nature of motion itself, 
because if notion i3 only of one kind, then coming-to-be and passlng-eway will 
be Impossible because they are contrary processes. It is this that leads 
^istotle to say that it is not the primary motion - that is the
^Aily revolution of the T̂ p>TOS ) which is the cause of coming-to-be, but
bhe motion along the inclined circle (4|ibtTA tov Ae£om*vKAô) - that is the 
®°hual course of the sun in the ecliptic circle. This latter movement is not 
®^®yB of the sac© kind but has two kind of movements which account for yi*«
*04 <|>0c>£̂  respectively, while the continuity of the movement of the HfctvfeS 
accounts for the continuity of both V iv tff1^ and
tebtot f̂ttn Theory of Becoming in relation, to,...Ills Theology*
It is now necessary to show hov: Aristotle*s account of ŷ vicrî  is 
•«toected with his theology. Aristotle attempts to show the relation between 
two in book A  of the iietaphysies where he gives a suraaary account of 
nature of 14vwi5 and (1069b3-1070a 30). He goes on to generalize
this account and to relate it  to his metaphysical and theological views.
He refers here again to the three constituents of becoming which he
*** »enticmed in the be Generation« et Corruptione -  B X-vu tlSej /
***rttMeric. Tew si Ti « t w  ^  ^  t*.w  n
i  x*l «ftos,-™  St <rT*eT>V -rk, S t -nywv T, u \^ .
•There are then three cause and principles, two being the contraries
*  Which one is definition and form and the other is privation and the third 
b  the matter I Aristotle's notion of <TT%e.V»$ is important with regard to
account of and • He does not consider privation to be
btte kind of unknown cause which brings about generation. If Aristotle does 
bscribetfWgTpj as &  it  is in a special sense and one which is quite 
^ierent from the view that was put forward later by Christian writers who 
♦ «tod about croatio ex nihdlo (e.g. Qrlgau 4  S ©«4, o ti ft<v~ KT.'«-i
Wl vaia^xirajj «Jl. U ti^ s  2 * ToS |*»| Sv-cos Hi T 6 « \ Wat T<5 tivto. . 
*̂*nentaria in evang.Ioann. Chapter 9 ) Aquinas makes this dear in his 
C<*aaentary when he says »Fit erdm album ex non albo, non taman ex qudibet 
bh albo* (2428) Aristotle held that matter itself was not a privation but 
that privation constantly accompanied ^¿vi^s , tut it  is not in any sense
* cause of generation, but only becomes possible as generation and decay are 
°̂®sible. For generation to be possible one must conceive of something 
***&ng«to«.be which did not previously exist, but this change i3 not just from 
Contraries to contraries, for i f  this were so, i t  would be equivalent to saying 
that privation is the cause of becoming, but i f  then privation were the cause
becoming in this way, it  would take the place of the form as a cause, but
was for Aristotle opposed to the farm. He does here call privation a causa, 
^ t i t  cannot be regarded as a cause as the form is a cause. At 1069blB, 
Aristotle says Sort *3 ivSfyiw».
fee €$ 2Ws Y ' V ^ 6 V T O J , U  ^  iv^tirn .
that Aristotle is distinguishing between in this sentence is •»*
,  Privation is the accidental cause (tfcuy ) of generation
d̂ls Aquinas makes clear (2433)t Unde et ingsnere substantiae fiunt maota 
** non ante et ente. Ssc non ente quldem secundum accidens, Inquantum f i t  aliqu- 
id qx materia subiecta privation«, secundum quam dicitur non ens. Sed per sc 
^¿Liquid ex ente, non autem in actu,sed in potantia, scilicet ex materia,
^ae est ans in potentia. The distinction which Aquinas sees here is a dis­
tinction between two modes of the potentiality of generation* privatio is
(cf Physics 190b27), whereas materia is  
»«x» x© ¿ mwv.* Aristotle stresses the need to decide from what 
kind of not-being generation proceeds -  i t  does so in two senses fi’em OTt^cij 
^4 , (cf.Aquino 2437 on the three senses of not-beingj
(1) Uno iaodo quod nullo modo estj ex ta ll non ento non f it  generatio,
<i(hLa ex nihilo nihil f i t  secundum naturam.
(2) Alio n d o  dicitar non an. i p g  crivsUo, jioe <,cnsid«r*tur in dLlquo
•Sector et ex tali nan ante fit quidem generatio sed per accidens, inquan- 
Scilicet gencratio fit ex subiecto cui accidit privatio.
(3) Tertdo raodo dicitur non one ipsa materia, quae, quantum est de 
*•» Kan ons est actu, sod eno potontia. at esc 'tali non onto fit joreratio per 
•®* 2t hoe est quod licit, quod si aliquod non ens ost ens in potontia, ox 
scilicet non onto, fit generatio per so ’«
n fills view of the matter tijat there are three principles of becoming 
{^36S/<S“Tte*p«s; 6 A-VJ ) is for Aristotle a generalisation of the nature ofywwis 
these three can only be said to be the principles of all o<xn*t- 
^  one speaks analogically or universally* ( cf* Joachim Ccciacntary on De Gen.
Corr. pp. 193-199). As Aristotle puts the cptter &070a31); TU 
K*l 2iAAwv %<rriv & s) ***• S ' u ^ ^ v  to©¿Aoc
/̂*}j t«s Kott v^T1 oivot- A&yioiy f twotoc nkv'tioV'. He puts the same point in a 
•lightly different way when he says that ‘the causes of substances are the 
•«uses of all tilings1* But again the causes of all things are the same only 
^versally and analogically*( KbI&oAojkhI ««x’ivwA^i*^) There are two reasons 
•gainst, saying that the causes of all things are the same without qualiflc- 
•tioaa, in the first place, if this were true, there would have to be something 
1̂ ® h  is common to all the categories - that is both to the category of sub­
stance and to the rest of the categories - so that it would be possible that 
k°th relations and substances would corae to dc from the same elements. Tliere 
*®# however, no way in .mch the different categories can be made to depend 
%on setae common principle, for ouch a canman principle would have to be 
®*iar to a H  the categories themselves, out there is no principle which is 
Pfriar to substance which is the first of the categories. In fact, this idea 
^ould destroy the distinction which the doctrine of the categories makes dear* 
*£ there is no principle apart from substance and the rest of the categories, 
then the comnon element «til have to be either substance or one other of the 
Categories, But each category is distinct, and substance is not an 
decant ( «ro^iov ) in relative terns nor is any relative term an element 
cf substance. Secondly, no element is the same as that which is composed of 
the elements, but if it is also true that the elements of substances ani the 
ether categories are the same, then it would fellow that none of the 
d-emsnts would be of either the category of substance of any other of the 
categories, but the doctrine of the categories is true so it cannot be the 
Case that the principles or elements of all things are the same
The ways in which the causes of all things can be analogically and 
'fcdversaUy the same are first of all as farm, privation and matter* Any 
contains these three as elements - though these elements differ in 
^Afferent yw^ri « It is only those elements that inhere in anything
Crit IvotJ^ovr*. ) that are causes, as form, privation and matter do, but 
deo there is an external cause, which may as regards its proximate nature 
differ in different cases, though far Aristotle there is one final «External 
Cause of a-H things - the ¿Kiy^oV Kivoov' • So there are analogically 
three elements and four causes and principles, the three elements (farm 
Privation and matter) being counted amongst the oausee and principles*
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In the sec end place the causes of all things ar' the same in the 
sense that without substances there can be nothing else. »For when 
substances are removed all tilings are removed» (I071a34), for substance 
Slone can exist apart.
In the third place, and 8 v v < * a r e  common
P rin c ip les  A 6>̂ iolv ( Tij> i  Wigy***
bscause everything that c ernes to be comes to be actually what it vac 
Potentially, Aristotle also sees a relationship between and
on the one hand and * <TT^£^<ri^ and 6  A-vj on
the other hand, (See supra) Potentially and actuality apply oCxtXCi  ̂
*foere the natter of cause and effect are the same, but in a different way 
'"hen the matter is different (10 7 1al2ff),
In the fourth place that which is first in respect of complete 
reality is the cause of all things (i,e. the tgv«0»/ )
Aristotle, however, does not mean that this cause is to be understood 
&V<x Xc?̂  (ei. V , as if there were different first causes for different 
things. It is the same for all.
This description of the way in the causes of substance are 
causes of all things is not in any way an argument for the unmoved mover, 
’Ehe necessity of tiatis vhat ¿Iris to tie goes an to show.
Ma.totlB»s view of Motion and its conrcg&gn with M s .-ttelamr
The main subjeev ui sous sod by Aristotle in the Physics is that
°f motion and change. Both these are closely connected with What
4s fcjr Aristotle, He says i V<st\V *•*< jcvr<* |JoAv^(2QQbl2) #
Physics is far his an investigation into the principles of nature (lS4a!4 )
^Xfcy Wou i-iji '«4igp*Tt<v $ tog»<r«io©*t t£*°TOv/
and such an investigation deals mainly with motion and change, for without ̂
on understanding ofthese last two it is not possible to understand what
nature ( <£u<r\£ ) is. This also is connected with Aristotle»s
theology as it is put in Book A -  and it is what 1» considers the
nature of motion and change to be (and which make <$>ocri_£ what it is)
that leads Aristotle to put forward his view that depends upon the 
necessary existence of the unmoved m o w .  (Metaphysics 10?2b7ff \ tssl SX. 6<ttctc kivouv o(bto «kW w v  ¿Vj toOto
►¿v V i  H r V *  TN S f  V  * V  * ay\ i v - S t ^ u t v o v S w w  S V S K A w y  ¿«CTO«->^s Jgoi «ex^js % T n Td.l.
O O-0^Ol>/O5 knti- ^
'Ehe argument that Aristotle puts forward for the existence of an unmoved 
fcevar depends on the view of motion put forward in the Fhysics, especially 
in Book VIII.
For Aristotle change ( feir«* ) covers all natural change
and is synonymous far him with which is the subject matter
of physics. Notion is, strictly speaking a n a r r o w  concept and Aristotle
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Usually distinguishes between three kinds of motion* This view (as 
w® have pr eviously noticed is connected in Aristotle • s mind ;.lth his 
doctrine of the categories# In Physics Book V -xistctlc gives an 
Account of motion ( kn/'VjO' ̂  ) relating it to the doctrine of the
categories and showing to which of the categories motion applies.
Aristotle's general definition of notion is that it is ’the 
fulfilment of vhat exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially * 
Ij Too ^uvajA-U lt/TiA^£lal4 “ij ToKWTOV', W t(\S «2.16 <K tO )
Ih addition to this there is a general classification of change ( |U
There are three kinds» t
(a) vj ii\ b oa tctijAsvov.
(b) £  eg uuoXi^ivoo bir©Kiip,svov.
'rj buo jA-tvaO UTU> kCii |̂ €V6\/,
Ihe last two ere unqualified caciing-to-be and pasaing-away and it is 
these two that are [ L fu  p®A<^ and not V O V ^ t ^  • Although 
ail motion is change, all change is not motion. It is only the first 
kind of change (i#e. ̂  ££5*»ittt|u»»o$?s$*©vc«f».w<*/) that is motion and this 
kind of change is regarded as applying to only three of the categories, 
namely TUm o v  , no<r#v , and TTc>o . This means that 
with regard to the category of substance there is no motion ( v</v*piS ) 
though there is, of course, change ( f4.VT«.(2 eA^ ). So .
applies to four categories, oicu* , no?ov , tto<r©'/ ^and ,
Of these the last three forms of change arei| £$&*<> 
this Implies no relation of contradiction. In Book (1069b3ff) (at
the beginning of the investigation in that book into the nature of 
sensible substance an acoount of which has already been given) Aristotle 
says that change is from contrary states to contrary states and that 
besides these contrary states of change there is a t bird fact«* which
remains during the change, namely natter. In Physios V he^says *
'fiSl M  «roullifî vcos « o w i v  W j W ' i v W s  <v* vtio.s
T»7i K*\ lv otVTî aiort».- „ , x „ ,
(of Fataphysics 1067hl4ff) Of these tv 10̂  tb«s
falls under that class of change Which Aristotle has described as cf 
bno»tfciju,|voj i)$ woovt»i|csw6v whereas change ^  wno*û twi>v(.4»ogi)
and ̂  ̂  5 toKit|cWou $ no w/p,« vov/(jivtffv̂ ) is what he describes as
change Cv • It ©i#it seem puzzling that on the
one hand Aristotle should here speak of change «»»Ksiftvow 
and on the other hand (beta* 1069b3ff) say that the vvoKti'fctvoN/ which 
he fafns \$ does not change* It is clear however, that in
the passage in the ihysics the term 6  jccvoy/ refers to vhat 
changes ** to the subject In that sense - which can be positively described 
( 8 ^ 1ow|̂ tvefv/) as a subject undergoing change, whereas what 
is meant by the substratum ( *6 A*j ) in A. is that which cannot be 
positively described tut is what Aristotle regards as the substratum of 
all change whatsoever, matter whoso nature is potential.
Aristotle here seems to show that there is a definite difference
between »A-vj and k /v*j®\j , He argues that this difference
«Odets Hr showing that it is that which is not (i.e. that which is
without qualification not so-and-so To W n A u ^  to$«, ) which
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becomes and this cannot be in notion. So becoming is not a fora of 
motion, although it is a form of change.
This difference viiich there is between ©A^ and
is one viiich depends on whether the subject ( 6 trei<C£ift.£\/o\/ ) remains 
the sane or not. VJhcn it remains the sane v© have what he calls vciv^is, 
Jltixa refer» to a change in the subject of change itself.
Afferent, foams of motion 1 as well as of change are conceivable, aod 
it is important to see which adS these are possible. Motion is a change 
with regard to contrary states for it is only where contraries are 
concerned that the subject remains the same throughout the motions 
with regard to contradictories we have j^it» (JoA/vj for contradictories 
entail change of subjects* There are different conceivable forms of 
motion which are contrary to each other. They are t - (Physics 229a8ff)
(a) Motions from and to the same thing
(b) Motions respectively from contraries.
(c) Motions respectively to contraries
(d) Motions respectively from a contrary aid to the opposite 
contrary
(e) Motions respectively from a contrary to the opposite 
contrary and from the latter to the former.
0£ these possible forms of motion the motions named in (d) are not contrary, 
but the sane, although they are not the sane in essence. Aristotle*s 
example is that of motion from health and motion to disease. The 
motions named in (a) are really examples of becoming and perishing.
Those in (b) and (c) are not contrary motions either but are changes not 
motions. Thus we are left with (e) which is the only example proper of 
contrary motions e.g. a motion from health to diseams and a motion from 
disease to health. ’Thus’ Aristotle says, (229bZL) we see that two 
motions are contrary to each other only when one is a motion from a 
contrary to the opposite contrary and the other is a motion from the 
latter to the former* • In addition to a contrary motion, motion has 
«other opposite, via rest which is the privation of motion.
Motion only applies to things that have contraries - where these 
ore absent there are only opposite changes, and here there is no rest 
ihlch is conceived as an opposite of motion, but only absence of change.
Bast is only conceivable in the ease of motion which is a change 
Vi«owfci|Civ0'J lb is, in other words, the same thing that can
be in motion and at rest. So there is no change in subject where rest and 
motion are concerned. But in the case of |a.Ct » ^ c>Axh  the contrary 
of absence of change ( o/|ctTo( ĵ Â ortcl ) is also a change in the 
subject - as Aristotle puts it it becomes \ y! * t v  t Q
Of the three kinds of motion, locomotion ( f o g *  ) is 
Srimary end unless this kind of motion is possible the two other Vied» of 
motion alteration and increase or decrease are impossible. The latter 
kind of change is impossible without alteration, and alteration impossible 
vithout locooot^ on. (Physics 260a2? - WJt) • As the primary fora of
motion it is primary in each of three ways; (a) in existence (fa) in 
time (c) in perfection of existence.
It is the primary form of motion in respect of existence, 
because it is the only form of continuous motion, and iihat moves in 
place may not be subject to either increase or decrease, or alteration, 
Pereas these tv® latter forms cf motion are not possible apart from 
°ontinuous motion ifiich is locomotion. It is also primary in respect 
of time, because this is the only form of motion that is possible for 
eternal things (i,e. the heavenly bodies), idhereas in the case of 
something temporal, that comes to be and perishes, locomotion is the last 
of its motion in respect of time for locomotion presupposes that what 
Bowes in .lace has readied a state of perfection which has been preceded in 
time by alteration and increase. In the case of things that cane-to-be 
however, locomotion must exist previously to any process ofbeecning, for 
the other form of motion alteration, decrease and increase are 
subsequent to becoming in time, vhereas locemotion is that vhose being make« 
becoming possible. It is also primary in respect of perfection, This 
aeans first of all that because, ’the degree to which living thing» posse#» 
§D£o[ corresponds to the degree to vhieh they have realised their natural 
development, then! this motion must be prior to all other» in respect of 
Perfection of existence.'̂  ( °* ̂
^A^toy< (it \&k7 2&Lal8ff) Secondly, not only is it the
case that locomotion is a sigi that a thing has reached the perfection of 
its natural development, but also such a perfected thing loses its 
sesential character less in the process of locomotion than in any other 
kind of motion* (2&La2Dff), Locomotion is the only form of motion which 
doe s nob involve a change of being by way of alteration or increase and 
decrease. It is also that fora of motion vhich is produced ’ey that which
Moves itself which Aristotle here describe^ as follows * t o o v o
VO/OUt*.4v'<4>V N at VctvOuVTu)'' VCoL̂  TtQ & TO V T t l$
KW0M|ui-V#^ TO & &  * U °*'/*
Not only is locomotion the primary farm of motion bub a
particular fora of locomotion is primary, and the fact that there is thia 
primary form of locomotion makes clear how it is that there is a motion 
vhich is continuous and eternal. A H  the other fern© of motion and change 
apart from locomotion depend an the existence of an interval of time 
between for instance becoming and perishing, increase and decrease, and 
between the two different (contrary) states of something due to 
alteration. But with regard to locomotion, for it to exist as opposed 
to a state of rest there must be continuity of tl» motion itself.
In these three forms of change apart from <^*£<4 * that 1#
those three which correspond to the ct egoriea of ©ucrCi , txo7 oV , 
and ‘ifocrbV - there is another difference vhich mark» off
from thorn all and shows that they, unlike {j>ogjn. , cannot
possibly be instances of continuous change - their continuity is prevented
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V  th« impossibility of opposite ohsages of this kind taking piece 
•* He sauna tine* These epeoiea of change ( ylvtais and 
$U<n ¿y,̂  <j9(a»5 and ) a11 *»ke Plac9 between
Hlermediateo, oontraiy or contradictory states and as none of them 
***Hnoea of continuous raotion.
are
It is not however all leecaaotion that is continuous and so it 
*****es necessary to show that there can he a continuous notion which toIt
Woperly continuous, A riototlo argues, smot he in fin ite«  In order to 
**thhliah th is  A risto tle  arnica that a l l  locomotion i s  eith er rotatory or 
**®**linear or a compound o f both those forms o f motion, o f these 
***U insar motion which i s  f in ite  cannot he continuous and notions up and
and to the left and to the right are the motions which Aristotle has 
*• Bind here* Neither is locomotion in a circle the same as rotatory 
••Hon for the former need not ho continuous, hut discontinuous if ths 
*****lar motion is in different direction#* Rotatory motion is circular 
••Hon which is oontlnuoua and always in ths tarns direction and differs from 
•••Hllnoar motion or motion la an aro or a semicircle in that the starting 
and termination ) art not the sans, whareas
•Hk rotatory motion they are identical.
Rotatory motion is then the perfect form of motion (
^  1« a lso  sim ple ( £ u A ^ ) A risto tle  moans that i t  i s
•••banging when ho soya that i t  i s  continuous. He thinks that the only
of infinite motion (that la eternal motion) is rotatory motion, haoauaa 
***•>• is no ouch thing ao an infinite straight line, and even if tharo wars 
** »ould hs impossible to traverse an infinite distance* This means that 
•H other forms of motion imply in some way or other rest, that la motion 
*Ht oeases. The only conceivable form of eternal motion is notion in a 
**«U aad this motion is primary being the measure of all other femes of 
••Hen.
Aristotle suss up the position which hs wUhss to maintain under 
**»• hae«s (266a* - 10)
(a) There always was notion sad always will hs motion throughout 
all time*
(b) There is a first principle of this motion.
(•) There is s primary form of motion.
(d) There is only one form of motion that is eternal.
(e) That ths first mover is unmow ml*
is alee a sixth point that Aristotle wishes to shew, that ths first 
••*•* mentioned is (s) is without parts and without magnitude*
2k order to shew this ho seeks to prove the three following
it
(a) Hothing finite sen cause motion during an infinite time 
(266a 1 2 - 24)
He finite magnitude can hero an infinite force. (266*24 * 24)(2)
(o ) Ho infinite magnitude have a finite force (am# - 24)
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From these premises Aristotle argues that since the first uiover is an 
Infinite force because it causes a motion that is eternal it cannot be 
a finite magiitudo, and because there is no such thing as an huinite 
magnitude, the first mover cannot be a magnitude either finite or infinite*
If the first mover is not a magnitude of any kind then it cannot 
be anything physical and so the problem arises vghich is fundamental far 
Aristotle» s view of the unmoved mover of haw something that is not 
ftysical can be the cause of eternal circular motion viiich is. The 
nature of this first mover is described in chapters 7 - 10 of book A .
AHI3T0fLfa*3 THfaOLOGY 1 1 . GOP iu> Tin^OBXtfl.
Aristotle's viev/ of the first unmoved mover is not only m result of
bis physical view s- The most important things that he has to say about 
it are independent of those views. i e thinks that an examination of 
Physical motion can lead to the conclusion that there is a first mover 
which does not move (physics 26?B), but the nature of this first mover 
^istotle thinks of as Vo3$, , and this cannot bo just a result of physical 
•«quiry. «bother Aristotle himself made such a clearout distinction
between physics and theology may bo questionable, but there does seam 
bo be an abrupt transition in book A . of the Metaphysics from his 
■tatement that the existence of motion necessitates the existence of a
first unmoved mover to his statement that the nature of the first
s«^v «¿s,ov ^e,<rtovj) Su i,'
Q ei^ ic T*d &i,w* TcOtO 0
Apart from understanding what this statement means, there is the
question of how Aristotle arrived at such a view, for Aristotle says that 
God's thinking is V o ^ S  ̂ ' S  (1074*34) »  ls important however,
bo contrast this definite statement about the nature of Ood with Plato's
•tatsaent in the Tins oust «The father of this universe is a hard task
bo find', Aristotle's statement seems to be so definite that he seems 
bo think that there is no difficulty at all in saying what God la. Hi. 
intention la, presumably, that if we read his statement with understanding, 
then we know what God ie. As we shall try to show in more detail 1st«, 
bhia oontraet between the two views is very important for any understanding 
of wh.t relation there oan be between philosophy end religion* The difference 
that there is here between Plato and Aristotle is to be found in another 
form at different periods in the history of Christianity. This difference 
a®y be put as the difference between a visw of thaelogy whioh claims to 
ha a aywtamatio account of God'a nature, and another view whioh says that 
this ia impossible. As a matter of history it would be difficult to disprove 
that the influence of Aristotle on Christianity lad to the former view, that 
of Plate to the latter. But the diffarenoa, as we hope to show, is not just 
one about theology, but also about religion itself*
Aristotle's view of God as Vtv> makes Ged a substance unlike
*ny that falls under those other two kinds af substance which ha mentions, 
l*a* temporal and sternal sensible aubstanoe, and it seems that for him 
what marks off God from everything alas is his nature as perfect thought*
It is Gad's nature as vou IvigynA that makes the life of Godigj«t*j «1 JlcSioj • 
It is also in tanas of Voo^ that Aristotle attempts, on the m e  hand,
bo distinguish between divine and human life, and on the other to show
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»hat Is meant by saying that Lumen beings can »hare ia  divine life.
Aristotle Aces little V» explain in tfc* ^etaphysioa why be %< in e
this oossp&riaon between human «*■>' divine life in possible, but ble 
tie» on this matter beooaetj clearer fron what be aaye in the tenth book 
*f the hloonnchean f tbica. There ho Oftys that 'the activity of God which 
1» hi »seed above all others, must take the form of contemplation'. (117ftb22j 
*here belongs to the life of *od pleasure which 1» perfect because hie 
life Is Voo wigjtiA* It is in terms of this also that he describee human 
beppineae. 'If hepplaesa is an activity in accordance with virtue, I t  Is  
**asonable to suppoee that it will be In accordance »life the highest vlrtuef 
■hd this can only be the virtue of the beat part of us*' (1177a 1 1 ) The 
Wat part lo vooj and 'the men whose activity la o e of t) e mind and who 
Qbltiveitea that a*Ki keeps it in the beet oenditio la also the taan whom 
the ¿rods love above all oti ere. ’ (1179» 22). This virtue of the
Intellectual life Arietetle thinks ie superior to  that of the morel life* 
’The moral as dietinet from the intellectual life, «rill, though only in e 
secondary degree, be happy loo.* (1173c B). But this ie human virtue end 
decs not belong to the god», for their virtue ie presumably «hat belongs 
to their nature es Voo Wtgytu* . *od cannot be described ea Juet or 
temporete. ill forms of virtuous activity must be paltry for the gode
»nd unworthy of them.
2r: h is i thloe Aristotle distinguishes between intelleotual and moral 
Virtue. In fa c t, to distinguish between these seems to be one of the main 
purposes of m e work. c shall be more ooaecmed with th is  d istin ctio n  
when we ootae to a comparison of Aristotle*» View with that of f la ts* e.
Sic ill at Inc t i  on wan, however, important for A risto tle , and i t  aeema to be 
e d istin ctio n  he had in  mind when he speaks about t*o l i f e  o f lod . The 
perfeotior, o f God le  the perfection  o f voo^ , end in  A  chapter 9 
A ristotle attempts to explain whet the perfect v*o_5 o f led  le . I t  le  th is  
passage in  particular which has led to the Idee that A ristotle*e view o f 
God ie  that of a being * le h  has no d irect roletionehlp with the world, 
f or the nature of (led lo  vov  ̂ and the object o f  Qod»e vo.|<nj Is  tod h iaaa lf -  
that ie  h ie own thinking. o God knows nothing im perfect. 3o how oan 
he know anything about the e v il o f human life ?  God knows only him»ei.f 
end h is own perfection . »It must be e f  i t s e l f  that i t  th inks, i f  i t  ie  
the meet excellen t of beings, and i t s  thinking i s  a thinking on thinking. 
U074W3).
¿e have already mentioned what may see© to be an abrupt transition 
from Aristotle's view o f God as the first unmoved «over end hie view ef 
Ged as vov W^ihL* ?* *»» however, necessary here to attempt to  keep 
apart two aspects of Aristotle's view of God, even i f  it ie the «mis that 
they are eleeely related in Aristotle* e mind. One is what Aristotle etatae 
when he s g n  IK !l&( 'HtTT Wc ° •3fcwvsj Kott *} .
The ethers lij VO'̂ A'Î  0toG vo^cri^ • I t  le  mphasle an the le t te r
that has led  to  the idea that A r isto tle 's  view o f God ia  that God has 
no d ireot relationship  with the world. But that cannot be A r isto tle 'a
view if we take the first statement seriously.
I U  -
In order to understand how Aristotle to put forward the
*isw that God's nature as ia  Vo-vj<rtw{ Voaprij, , i t  is  necessary to take
iato aooount h is  d istin ctio n  between and • In fa c t, A risto tle
• • • a  almost forced into the view he sta tes hr using th ia  d istin ctio n  in  h is
*®count o f God's nature* He seems f ir s t  to hare applied th is  d istin ctio n
physical change* Apart from th is d istin ctio n , as we hare seen, he could
act give an account o f I ts  meaning as applied to sflVi,G)<>
••«as to be c lea r , but as applied to the nature o f God'e thinking i t  i s
*>t so clear* I t  i s ,  however, a d istin ctio n  which A risto tle  a lso  appllaa
to human thought. I t  i s  th is  d istin ctio n  that he has in  mind when he
••ye in  the Be Animat / TT'- ~ \
To y tW  Ctooto SE <i im v v . vw.pt», |* 4 t v * ) v
V e v  U  to  *«L T l - v x - ,  ^
HeW x\< uiirov^ev * y*y«-'j ^  oCrol€ ^ i,v/
to iu r ^  tu$ (430al0) © ils passage in  the Be Anima has given
*ise to  notorious d if f ic u lt ie s  which w ill not bs discussed here, but in  
Seneral A risto tle  i s  trying to aooount for the fact that human thinking ia  
*• he puts i t ,  in  the Metaphyaiea 'o f oompoelte things and takes place in  
* certain  period of time.»' (1075a8) Unlike God's thinking i t  i s  not
®«**pleteiy actual and always the same. I t  oontains both a potential and 
*n active element*
The di atinctlon  between the passive and active in te lle c ts  in  the Be Anima 
and i a book J \  i s  a d istin ctio n  between vo^  as <$> &*£*<><, and 0<C\ê  •
^  the Be *"<■»« puts the matter* Tovto(fc $ voZs iN»r*jr»Kô ) |»*vt>v 2&*v«.tov ***'- 
«*'£ Sio/^S TIoL0*jt»vu$ ^algTO .̂This sane idea i s  stated  in  Metaphysios  ̂
A . as » ^«¿Tivciv toO vo^ toO
9{%0V} ftcT ^ tc iiv o u  (JA lov  Tdut« % %*ict2 o voOs &txoy
(l0?2b22) in  the Be Anima, A risto tle  i s  d iscussing what ha c a lls  in  tha 
^taphysios °  v *^c » <md i t  ia  only th is  that he ia
®onoerned with there. I t  i s  to po£«£>V tcv t̂ s 4  ynrtu«r*c£t. l<L
^  kA. • 1 » ^ e  Metaphysics, however, he i s  concerned not
o«ly with human thinking, but with the nature o f divine thought* The main 
difference that A risto tle  sees between the two le  that Ged'a \A>u$ la  
Perfect and etern al, but human Vo5$ deals with what he s a ils  tA arvy©*Tot 
U075a8). I ts  a c tu a lity  ia  interm ittent (Be Anima 430a5 Toi S t ^
V*uv iQKKitTiev), beoauae i t s  nature ia$v*«.p5 as w ell as *y<«fyu* •
It la  h*©^th(4  as w ell as td-vjTMfCoi • Tfc® so tu a lity  o f God's thought 
ia  oomplete and everlasting* But th ia  aotu allty  which belongs to  God's
thought „ia alsoc possessed bj man in, an interm ittent way. , (1072024) otv 
i i  'R<n̂  /J* ®i(>S &ot\)fd-<s'Tov • i’\ p.SvUov# Ytc
£*<o»*̂ -<r tu>Tt£pV •
One o f the things that A risto tle  aays when he i s  di scusaing both
the nature o f human thinking and divine thought may seem to be p u sslin g , and
*sy lead one to the idea that there le  a closer rela tion  between the two
than there rea lly  ia . That i s  the id en tifica tio n  o f vo3^ and Ve->|roV •
w*^flnd th is  both in  the Be Anima and the Metaphysics. He eayat CrV piv 
'ttov TO O<ct0 idT«. TO y*o»»V K*a, x'i *0*u p£vov ' 'J yA6£ p*vj
\  Ofwe-VTIH--' twl TO ourtuj ^Tl.^TOv T o o iltd  1<S*TW. (j>e Anima 430al)
•hd to  i \  ’• *utov 0 *0Wi ^Tai p<.To«-A/vnJ>iv x0y /̂o•>|■loC• y*t.
y»yv^m 0 .yyeviov iul & «T t*-u O rov^ n i v«>y ^  (^taa© 72bao)
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®*o Bain difficulty in understanding Aristotle's view of Sod in tie ietaphyaies 
that hig account is a summary one, and there are questions which can be 
W » 4  about the view which oannot be answered accurately from what A risto tle  
fcaself says* One such question is whether we are to say, as Aquinas 
bought, that God has knowledge of the world. There does, however, seem to 
a difference in the identification of vo^ and vo-vj-coV with regard to 
bhaan thinking and to divine thought.
Aristotle thJjafcs that in human thinking there are simple objects of
'«ou^ht. andJLn the esase of/these, falsity is impossible* He says*
V OvVA 3 i>»0£4T<c>v Vo»j<yv5 <✓ Toiwit o3k ior*. rk
*V o{\ k«u, Tt) Sojt vcotc To O*uV’0<<rij tij°«S
***o»e w  &/TWV (he Anima 430a 26) 2<ttl S p*v fa ts  Tl K-tw ryogj 
¿ J r n ^  vc.4, 4  TWtf-«- S t  vo*£ ou
’ £ p0 ,̂ xC Ko«-t<si to Tt Oo Tt KoiTd
llVoi  • (430b26f f ) . The same d istin ctio n  i s  to  be found in  the Metaphysics.
^051bl3ff♦) A risto tle  i s  here d istinguish ing between two kinds of
***rth. 0ns kind of truth has a form o f fa ls ity  opposed to i t ,  and th is  i s  
**&th and fa ls ity  in  relation  to what he c a lls  <fiW©s.T«. • But there i s  
•Bother form of truth which has no fa ls ity  opposed to i t ,  o f the kind that 
*• find with respect to  Tc*. Be puts it in  th is  way in  th f
**taphysiosi W  pi* ^  \  ^ TV  c v
¿ U K  ^  «  - S v ^  tv a u
y*yv<£,Tu-c O rt- jmsv Srt &*. <|>AuSô , 2aV «tc tai r̂ot (1051bl3ff )
A risto tle  thinks that esssnoes and a c tu a litie s  (Meta*1051b3l)
Anioa 430b28) oannot be otherwise than as they ere, and these are the 
Pfopaar objects o f human thinking. But when he speaks of these as objects 
of thought ( vo-vi-r« ) he doss not d istinguish  them from actual thought*
°  S i  a vevj i<rnv vCca-T1 Toi Tt^iy|*eLToi.
U 31bl7). That dess not mean, however, that for A risto tle  they are only 
•Bjeote o f thought. But in  so far as an essence oar a form can become an 
•Bjeot o f thought, when i t  i s  that, i t  i s  not d ifferen t from the act of 
in k in g  i t s e l f .  I t  i s  only possib le to d istin gu ish  between Voo$ and 
^ on  one thinks o f them a s potential; when thought takes place they ore one* 
This view of A risto tle , which ie  only stated  in  b r ief here, la  e lea rly  
n  h is mind when he thinks o f human thinking and divine thought, and the 
**fferenoe between the two* Human thinking can be eith er potential or 
n tu a l. But divine thought i s  completely aotool. The idea that God's 
**ture i s  voC$ leads A risto tle  into d if f ic u lt ie s , and Theophrastus la ta r , 
*oolising these d if f ic u lt ie s , rejeoted the question o f what the object o f 
^t&'s thought i s .  (Magna U orslla I2l3a8) A risto tle  d iscusses these 
d iff ic u lt ie s  in  ohapter 9 o f Book -/V , one question that a r ises i s
Brother A risto tle  here has only divine thought in  mind. (Hose in  h ie  
**anelatlon o f the Metaphysics begins th is  ohapter in  th is  way* 'The naturs 
^  divina thought involves certain  problems«' ( Uf£c xov voo\/
Tiv<̂  3uogi*<£ 1074bl5). This translation  may bo mialoading. 
suggests that thsrs i s  some other kind o f 
* * ieto tle  lo  not speaking o f hors* He
, not d ivine, which 
s  almost to  be spooking of Voe^
•  163
Uk general, ?*.* d at the and of if« chapter aa we fear© already »e*n» 
there is a reference to S otv©giornyoj voî  • o»ofa translation would 
dot ever, bo correct if all VoO^ were thought to bo divine, boos use hie 
Canale tion suggests, a dietinctior; between divine thought wxi thought net 
41 vine. M s  translation lends hi;.'; into difficulties in oora^entsting on
the second »entenoe of tit; chapter* $°«U. fU  ttvu i <|wtv© f̂ i'Aov'
Ihe distinctions that riatotlo makes in this chapter are not in 
•«batance different fro;;; what he says in the e nira. In both places there 
4* an identification of Vooi and voau fivov cn.! this ia meant to apply to both 
btts&n thought and divine thought* This; does cot noon, however, that this 
°bapter han nothing to soy about 'Jed's Voo$ . it is nainly about tint, 
but what la important to notice is that it is about that in amlogy with 
bwaan thinfctr#. That i... T&at leads riatotle into difficulties*
Aid here the distinction between Suvbi^i^and ivTiA*.xtlot 1® uppermost 1 » 
ble mind. ihls is a dicti notion that rune through th© whole of Aristotle's 
Philosophy, and he uses those notions continually, ana not always In the
•**e sanse-j, They a rc  usually translated into . ngliah a a 'potency' and 
‘actuality*. Put whereas rietotle uoea one word for the firot, i*e*
8 ¿Yo< y.y , there are two words which he uses for the second, i.e* ¿yxtA^ti* 
**>4 l«l • (Xoss, in M e  translation, somotimes dlatlnguiahau between
bbese by translating the former as 'actuality*, and the latter as 'corbiete
*«uHty'). . ristotle also mak e.; a distinction between theta sometimes,
*1 though, for the moat part, he uses than in the o& ao sense. He apeak»
0i the relation between the two tores twice in net&physlcs O  . Ho aaya. . _ <> 9 / >, c V '
1*04?«aK>)« iX^)Vo©<u v  a touvokoc, ^  Tle)£ ^ V̂ A/Xil̂ vi c
T(0 tu ( . y J  v^l l*\ tU ¿*T*o JtW.ind again: -to y-L ^
W £ ^ lci TO i q O V j  3 t k  ^  X c X v O f ' iC  H ^ itoC TO S^yov i t i L ^ T t w u
ffuv
1-'
t'v ̂ tx,/'̂ u«(3l05Ca22). Aristotle aeetaa to oonneot the term 
**®re oloeely with Ki^Cif , than h© does the term Aij(f ut * Bo
^•»cribeo K.I v-î rij as in the Physios. (201b31)* in the
**ot book of that work he nose the word }yuAtj(4i* 1« hie definition, and 
^tt ^/C^iu ♦ But bore it should be noted that th© word K ivvjto^ le 
**v> introduced into the definition. Re soyas IffTiv %' ^ k'v^ cij
tpy^TOV <257b8). whon Aristotle quotes hi« definition in the
Anisia, and refers there to the fhysioo, it ia the definition there at 
» X b U  that he quotes> vul yefc l«Ttv/ *| *^ «15 Iv^ytK t»S, ¿TiA-^ J^vtuo, 
W  s^Tut. (be Aniaa 417*14) fbis aeeme to suggest, apart
**oa Aristotle's saying so himself, that the tern ¿vlgyiid was more olosely 
®°®neete* in hia mind with Kift'jffiJ than WB® A{̂ £,ioL • Boos comment»
*h the passage in the *®taphyeloei 'from 1050e?2 .............it appear»
*k*t strictly speaking iv tfy U *  mtoxm activity or aotualisatio» «bile ¿ywlk̂ sid 
**aas the resulting aotuality or perfection. Yet IvtgytM ia not a movement 
*t»ards someth ir^ other than itselfj this ia the difference between it
*bd Kvv̂ «-|̂  . Yet in J\ 4,̂ 7» v/fccre fiod is viewed as the p H  we wmm
0f the universe, he ie called , activity, but in 8« 1074a$6, where
44« imoMteriality and perfection of his bei.r5.; is insisted on, he is described 
** WttAipi* * iMotapfeyoios Vol.ll p*245) But it is not «ely
*1»« nature of God as prim« mover that i s  described, in  th is  «ay, but 
also i t s  nature as V003 • The l i f e  that b elon g  to Cod i s  vou
Although A risto tle  speaks of the two terms in  th is  way in  book 
Of the Metaphysics, th is  does not neon that he thought that there was a 
®1 ear-cut d istin ction  between the two# But neither do they seem to have 
•ractly  the same meaning* The main differenoe ia  that A ristotle  connects 
ol more c lo se ly  with motion than he does . In book &
*hey* i S discussing the d ifference between the potentia l and the actu al, 
*he word that he most often uses for the la tte r  i s  .  And
bs says that for  the most part seens to be velvets (lG47a32).
This eesms to axplain why A risto tle  uses this term of God's thinking and 
hot Atrial • I* 1® “ore suggestive of a continuous process than
is  the term • But then of course, a distinction has to be made
'»•tween «hen it refers to , in  the sense of some
ity a lo a l change, and when it refers to to  • A risto tle  makes
•uoh a d istin ctio n  in  the Be Animal *j Y*£ to« ^ T tKo
) S  ^ ^  T° U ltTS A-etf^voo
(431a6). The facu lty  of sense i s  not «hanged in  perception. In perception  
i t  oomes to  be actu a lly  what i t  was potentially* The same A risto tle  thinks 
la  true of thinking* The mind i s  already capable of thinkings i t s  nature
t C « •> /
la  not changed in  thinking) i t  In ^  • This ie  true of
both human and divine thinking* There i s  s  difference between them, however* 
With regard to human thinking potential oan be prior in  time to actual 
thinking, but th is  i s  not true of divine thought. ( *| SJ**^»*/
l\r Svt, o u $ t )(£0 Vio ) (431*2)
When A risto tle  disousses the d if f ie u lt ie s  he thinks there are about 
voo^ in J V  , chapter 9 , the general d lstln otlon  that he thinks there i s  
between the potential and the actual i s  uppermost in  h is mini. He has 
elready described human thinking as both potential and aotual, and unices 
he made some such d istin ctio n  as th is  i t  would be d if f ic u lt  to  see how 
thinking oould be poeelble a t a ll*  I f  there were no such d istin ctio n  i t  
would be d if f ic u lt  to explain how human thinking oould e x is t , for i t s  
thinking risfers to  things other than i t a e lf ,  and the process o f thinking 
i s  temporal* These make i t  not only actu al, but a lso  potential*
When A risto tle  asks him self what the nature o f God's thinking eon 
be, he wants to  answer two questions» le  God's thought potential or 
aotual? and, What i s  the object o f th is  thinking? His answer to  the 
f ir s t  question determines h is answer to the eeoond) and the answers he 
gives show that he thinks divine thought i s  d ifferen t in  nature from human 
thinking. But although th is  i s  true, A risto tle  speaks of d iv in e thought 
in  analogy with human thinking* He aoema to use what he thinks o f as the 
nature o f human thinking as a means o f comparison, to  point out those 
oh areeteristlos o f human thinking that do not belong to  d ivine thought.
Human thinking la both potential and aotual. But can dlvlna 
thought be this? He thinks it oannot* What nakoa human thinking both 
potential and aotual, le that it depends an aomathlng other than itself - 
Upon sense perception and imagination, without which there would bo no
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Gbjeets o f thought -  that i s  esp ecia lly  what r  i s  to t ie  says i s  To Tt 
tlvou, . so he sayss T* $ 1  J w/ oiitikw l i  ty**v*i<r|**Tok o)ov
&*»<*•• s ‘« 4  r— O  t o g * ' #
" V ®  Y ”1 \ A r V i w j  ^ y t ^ ta'-T i‘tv S w ‘*f,a
2 « & y “rw < 4 ^ !-*>«■ *.si> W<j
,.1 ©* • 7 A '  ) / I <5 ’ ¿1 <XUW £  Tol ¿U H l ClVblV. °<V>^ fS-V
S i »«. J s i b W  l\  4  *.TS«J ™ s TV * Y £ OT'
a  u J otc a S n  u i  « T i ^ M n  n & «  * S ® M  ^  r ® ; t iu S ‘
e ( u a . ' i  £ u .  4k&/&w h <£ tc ©iu>eci'/(!»*i«|i>.
lu v t ill , « T *  t i  © tw eT ll T  T “  , %  „
■ri, s '<  n ^ r .  v ^ r « . «  i t  S > o t« « i TOO r j  * " “ ‘i 1
o{)$£ ih A p t ^«tVTairjWlTO.̂  o3k oi^W «̂CvTrfiS |AoOT(0 0 (j+ ii« .
A risto tle  denies that these ch aracteristics belong to divine thought.
Ronan thinking is dependent on what we might oall the material of thinking
•kihh, for Aristotle, i s  derived from sense perception and Imagination, and
tbia i s  what aaices human thinking 3 uvo<-M& • ®hat ia  "fry A risto tle  asks the 
____. — S iv / x /a i?  TL cfv sT-Vl T o  cT t u \ f * v \
Oo9\t)i t i-n
Vl074hl7) So Sod*s thought i s  completely independent of anything e lse ;
*ts value i s  value as thought. So h is nature i s  ivtQjiicL (I074b20), and 
hot But i f  th is  i s  so , does th is  a c tiv ity  of thinking have an
•tjeo t?  Here A risto tle  seems to think that one oannot talk  of thinking
Without talk ing o f an object o f thought, though as a matter o f fa c t, the 
Ties he puts forward can be interpreted as saying that divine thought has no 
tbjeot -  i t  i s  ju st divine thought. I f  one speaks o f the object o f i t s  
thought, then i t  i s  i t s  thought i t s e l f .  A risto tle  however, oomes to  th is  
in c lu s io n , by trying to Imagine what Sod would think about. He oannot 
think anything which i s  le s s  perfect than h im self, and in  fa o t, there are 
hortain things (presumably A risto tle  means what i s  e v il)  which we oannot 
imagine Ood thinking about. (A risto tle  does not d iscuss the p o ss ib ility  of 
Whether there might not be d ifferen t ways o f thinking about e v il. He seems 
to think that i t  i s  im possible for Ood to  think about e v il in  any way. And 
here h is  view is  very d ifferen t from that o f P lato , who thought rather that 
the real d iff ic u lty  i s  for human beings to understand e v il as Ood understands 
t t . )  1  f  Sod thinks of h im self, then he thinks of what i s  most preolous
divine, and there i s  no change in  th is  thought} for any change would bo a 
°hange for the worse. This would a lso  make i t s  thinking o f a continuous
bind, and th is  would bo wearisome. I ts  thinking would then bo 8 uVo(
*nd not ivt<iyCiJL • Ihors i s  another reason for saying that Sod's thinking 
Is  simple and unchanging. I f  I t  wore not, and one could d istin gu ish  hors 
between thinking and i t s  objeot, than i f  one tr ie s  to  imagine, A risto tle  
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•bjaeta oí' ti:ou*fct. viali they as> objecta of thou^t be diatirvTuiafc en Prom 
l ì - . i  a n m o r lo tbis rateation la tlm* they oannot. , ir. ¿..oint 
X* that thi forra o,> tu- object of thou«?fet la noi 6 ornati; ir¿# a?.^a^My,'o<h 
tbiaklaw it io, Lov-ever, »«parate es a fona tv/ Í5 A-vj * ( hetfcer riatotle's 
n o t , la corraci or not w  alati 1 not discuoi} bore, li rl-ht bo thou^t to 
*olre cortííiii difficultìsii tiiflt bave wlssi. 1j. phi-lo&ophy ubout thè reiailon 
•f raind and objeots of thourfet. )
Apart fra« tei© identifloation of voS^ and Ariatotle aoka
•hother quoatlon in thè i» nimn. Can itaelf be an objeot of
^boughtv Kjm. *v»t05 (je o v«u¿) (429b26) He a®«© to
•barrer thia queotion In thè afflrmatlve vii et. ha naya s v&ù. <ui*ŝ t. Vo-̂ t®5 
íriiv iŜ nt̂ Td vĉ ĵ i- \430al;. It la Important, h o h a v e r , to un*;oratanà 
** e sona« in whioh -rlastotle thinko that veC¿ la vrô  t o $ . i»r 
'shat he ha» to aay about tl.ia do e a not aitali that Voo$ oan have thè 
«hareoter that he thinka Cod'a vouj lina, that lt la Vo^c ve-JjCtwy •
**»• forra aa VoTjxav io s reault of fron paroaption and InagLnatlea*
^ut as an abstract objact of thought l t  oan alther he thoivght o f 1» oonnaadca 
*U>, in td llj f ib le  mattar, or aa an asaanoa ( To tA tfVotc ) in  which 
tane, i t  la  an objeot of thottgbt ̂ part frena auoh a a tter . À riatotle sagrat 
ci 1*1 **S ^  •<««. ri Tl€¿.T¿v VOOV.
U?9b2l ) So ju st aa fora* ara objacta of thought, ao thè raind al ao
«an be an objeot o f thow #t. I t  « i l i  aa O rlatoti« paté it*  iic t t  yu)
to vo^tov/ S (430a8). Sut «e migfat a«y that VoO^
1* Vo^ toj aa a forra, just aa othar objeeta of thou^ht are« That la ehy 
¿natoti« calla it thè farsi of forma. ( Kac M X c'€ ‘«'o* aqvlvwv,
Kom. o v©0£ tlSo^ i i 8£W (432a l)  I t  ia aa a forra that it ia  ''oô xoy,
*b«t iaaana that i t  ia  not ita  vintoti aa auoh that ia  vito$ • Ffcr 
btaaan V0 S4 la  |Ut^.iy|u.f^ov t t  ^ n o iu  vo*>jTô  aotov to«Trs  ̂ TiAA .̂ 
(489b26) But l t  baoonea Vo^x4 «ban we abstract froo ita  acnpoalta oon&ltion, 
•ad tblnk o f 1 « aa a fomu I t  ia  only^ /w  oA-*»j that tre oan id en tity  
vooW  and TO voao j*. ivoV • (430af)
Arlatotl* nakaa tha aaraa di atine ti en In tha »ataphyaloa« (1075*1) But 
baro /orlatati«*# oonperiaon of human and di trine thinking la an 1 1 1  lei t 
•as. 1 or grmUA that vAtb ragard to human thlritiw: tha fora* aa objeet 
•f thou#t io fra# tram mattar and can be idantlfied with tba set of 
thirdcirv?, thie la enly poaalbla banana« it la a forra that oan be abatraoted 
froB mattar. Mattar ia preauppoaad* ^ithout lt no objact of tbaragbt 
•ould ba poaalble. But whan 1 « la a «piaatlon of ditrlna thougbt #ilab la 
•oaplataly fra# frora mattar ira oannot a»gua In tba aana tragr. hat Arlatotl#
baa dono lo to uae a di a ti no ti on betwean V0\/$ and Vo-v|ioV mbloh aakaa
••ma» «han lt refero tr instancea wfcere abstract!on fra« mattev ia paaelbla,
In a asse «here i t  aakaa no a«nae to apasl̂  of auoh abatreotion« Or ira ai^ht 
•ay ha baa fallad to diatlnguiah tao oanaoa of àvi\> ti X-vjy • Ona aanaa 
In «tiloh «re «peak of thiw» ahloh paaaaas mattar aa kvf» v amA
•nolhar in rahieh ira speak of aomathin^ «hioh daaa nat ppmmmi» matte»
•a (iviu vi A-ni • Mommo Arlatotl# itila to make thla distinctien, ba
•aya that wlth rapad to dirima thou«bt Voi|<ri5 and Xd Voo¿ jcCvw 
••a ona, and to aay that Ood’a te>ou«ht ia Vo-^rt,^ la jraat amathar
*tr ot aagrim» tela« Bai with ra«ard io human thlaklng, to a ^  «hmt
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yj' \ tViH\<5’,S and- T6 Vooô Sv«\/are one, is completely d iffe re n t  from saying' 
that hianan thinking is Vo-vj<rs,w>s v o . ike latter makes no sense.
if it ia a correct description of divine thourtfit, the reasons t; at 
l*iatotle gives for suds description in analogy with human thinking are 
'»tenahl«.
3o Aristotle attempts to give an account of divine thought in analogy
*ith human thinking. At the end of chapter 9 of hook -Z\. he does this
to o quite general way, when he aayst &0*»*e o otv/d^mvoj V*3̂  twv(oo y i f  2ytc To iu  lv r̂ S«. tv rwXc,Tivc ̂ £0l/W (_°0 To iO fcV
oAw TtVt to ^ICTOV, oJAA„o oiittoj C A
tpv stTToi./T<x e*i*o/oc. (i075a7) A risto tle ’ s thought a t th is  point 
■offers the inevitab le fa te  o f any attempted system atic theology, which 
a t t e s t s  to give an account o f God's nature in  analogy with human l i f e .
I t becomes an account of Sod's nature which la  r e a lly  an account o f 
human nature, but with certain  lim itation s o f human l i f e  le f t  out. But 
the resu lt i s  something we cannot understand.
We may say a lso  that i t  i s  certain  tendencies in  the language that 
A risto tle  uses that leads him astray* Be makes a d istin ctio n  which 
Makes sense with reference to human thinking, but which makes no sense 
with regard to God, i f  as he thinks God i s  immaterial. A risto tle  ia  
also forced in to  d if f ic u lt ie s  because he tr ie s  to  give a general aoeount 
of thinking. He seems to think that a ll  kinds of thinking are suoh 
that i t  i s  possib le to id en tity  vo8± and v e ^ to v . But ones he has made 
the d istin ctio n  he wants to  in terpret a l l  kinds o f thinking in  terms o f 
I t . A ll thinking is  o f one kind, or e t leea t he tr ie s  to  make i t  a ll  
of one kind. What A risto tle  i s  Interested in  i s  the general question o f 
how thinking Is  p ossib le , and he wants to give a un ified  aooount o f that 
apart from what i s  thought about. In h is  Ethics he makes a d istin ctio n  
between practical and theoretioal , but in  the Be Anima he brings the
two together when he aayst K*l to ftvsu
Kdc T6 vj»io^oSj £ *  tm  * 3 ito  y ivu . k t l  T<5 <*y<*e£ (fall t 3  kWKW
U llblO ) A r isto tle 's  view about tru th  and fa ls ity  la  oomexion with
To Tt ijv  fci vou. s s  wa have Been, la  that the mind oanoet be 
la  error here. He attempts to put forward the sans view with regard to  
actions when he says la  the Metaphysios. Vo Sw w -cW  K*ut<A
Ar^yov ‘¿TUV 8 t«iv  o e> Y ‘>\ToU 0 6  t y i c  T^V S o y ^ j 4. ,v
v u l (Oi lo o ts  HOliiV.
(l0 4 8 sl3 )(o f. pp. la fr e ). *hia i s  but «as ssample. But far our present 
Purposes what we wish to emphasis# I s  how A r isto tle 's  desire for a gsaaral 
aeoount leads him to put forward the kind o f views ha does about Gad's 
Mature.
Sven I f  there art these d if f ic u lt ie s  in  understanding A r isto tle 's  
new  o f Gad as VoJ$ , thaw# s t i l l  ram iss  the question o f what 
*alatioaahip A risto tle  thinks there i s  between God sad the world. HU
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an*w«r to th is  question doss not seem to he as d e fin ite ly  stated  as 
bie r is e  about the nature of Ood, and perhaps he was not as olear about 
th is matter* The main question that seems to be in  h is mind i s  how the 
»®moved mover causes motion. He seems to have thought o f th is  question 
••parately from the one of whioh we have already given seme aooount •  that 
i* the question of the necessary existence o f the unmoved mover. In 
HetaphyeJ.cs A . he f ir s t  g ives h ie reasons for thinking that there must be 
•nth a source of motion ( vti v êrtto  ̂ ) ,  but then he goes on to deal
»1th the nature o f th is  sourot o f motion. What he says about th is  in  
A  i s  very b r lsf and summary* but h is aooount oan bo perhaps batter  
»ndsrstood from what ho saya in  the So Hot» Animaliura and in  the So 
bnima. ^
In A  he saya that the unmoved mover toj igL f-OOVj
îVoy|cW«i Si T . (I072b3). This view is difficult to under­
stand* Just aa difficult aa the idea of God's v©'*«|<riS being
Vô <ri$ • Ws bars seen, however, that the latter idea seems to have 
Ita origin in the attempt that Aristotle makes to apply the distinction 
between Sov*f*i5 and ¿vxiAfc^u*. , and that between v<v  ̂ and w >-̂ t o v , 
t« the mture of God. Xt Is possible also to sac Aristotle's vlsar of God 
M  the snuree of all motion u>$, î > , ss the result of his
wttmnpt to apply his notion of *• * aouroo of motion in the
•oul to the question of how God is the sourea of motion that exists in 
the universe as a whole* That this is not just a guess may be aeen from 
»hat Aristotle says in the Da Metu Animalius (698h8)* 'The paint af rest 
1» the ia still quite ineffeotual unless there is eras thing wlthaut,
»hioh ia absolutely at rest and iamevahla* Haw it la worthwhile to pause 
»ad consider what has bean said, for it involve# a epeeulatien whieh 
•«tends hayand animals even ta the nation af the universe' •
 ̂ What ia it that moves wlthaut being moved? It la to o£Ik.tov *k\
To vo^ tov ( 1072a26). Aristotle attempts to identify these two
notions with regard to God, though in the ease af human beings ha seas 
» difference between them. If wa look first af all at what ha «ays 
About V o a n d  s* sources af nation in the human soul, it
nay ha easier to see how ho attempted ta mas these ideas to apeak shout 
Qed.
Aristotle dleeusees thie question in chapters 9 - 11 of the third 
book of the Do Anise. Ho seems mainly to ha eoseerned with the question 
•f whether it is v'oDi •* Shi«* ia the cause ef human action.
Ha thinks, though it aeons with some misgiving «hat the oause ia
*nd not voO^ • Thai ibis question bothered Aristotle ia el ear wham
«a eempare the passage already qmeted from the Metaphysios (1048a 13),
»here ha seems ta ha saying that vou& ia mare *# aausa. But a full 
iiaouselom af this question would lead ta a consideration af Aristotle's 
•thloal viara. Aristotle treats the question af the relative merits af 
voG^ and sa if it ware a theoretical question to decide
bow they can ha balanced against ana another. For Plata it is sathsr s 
Vacation af hear wa can overcome whan It is for what is svilf and
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h* do»s not distinguish ths two whan ths desire is for die good* The 
illation botwoon the two is never Just a theoretical question for Plate, 
as it often is for Aristotle*
Aristotle attempts in the Do Anioa to distinguish different motive 
foroea in human action. He distinguishes between
fouX^cT|$ c ^ G ^ a n d  $ *v'Totcr/<a. . We
»re not concerned here with the distinctions he ashes between these, hut 
rather with the general conclusions he cones to about the origin of human 
action. for there is a close relationship between this and hie view of 
the movement that God brings about in the universe* So says* *J*em these 
considerations it is clear that in one regard that which is eternally 
moved by the eternal mover is moved in the seme way as every living 
creature, in another regard differently, for while the former ie moved 
eternally, the movement of living creature* has sn end»* (Be Metu 
700*30) Aristotle wanted to explain the eternal movement of ths heavens
in a way similar to his explanation of the temporal movement of human 
beings*
When Aristotle in the Metaphysics is stating his tlcer of the unmoved 
mover of all things, he says that that which both moves and is moved ie 
intemgdiate. (I072a24) He is referring to the circular movement of 
the heavens* It is intermediate between that which neves, but is unmoved, 
(i.e* God), and that which Is acred, but doss move (i.c. ths n U n n q r  
region)* He uses ths same distinction in the he Anlaa when he is 
discussing the asumees ef human action. Hare there is something that 
is unmoved and mores. It is t o  ugoiVCio^ <* . that which
both moves and is moved io To 0£C«Tiv<ov' * *hat whioh is
moved is T o  - o V  • Apart from ths difficulties this view
raises, the similarity between it and ths view of God and the world in 
the Xetsphyelee is striking. Whether Aristotle put forward one vimr 
before the ether, and the later view wae a development of the eerlier 
may be iapeeslble to Aeelde. But whether this is ths esse or not, 
the similarity between the two views is sridsnos of the fast that he 
thought that it was nooosaary to sao that there is s elose relationship 
ef the fci«A Indies ted between an understanding of what htman beings ere 
and ef what God is. fie emphasises this la the Be Motui »Bov we have 
already determined that «is origin ef all ether motions is that which 
novas itself, sad ths origin of this is Immsveble. And ws mart grasp 
this not only generally in theory, but also by reference to individuals 
in ths wsrld sf sens#, far with these in view we seek general theorise, 
end with these we believe general theories eugnt to harmonise** (*98elO) 
Whichever view io earlier, what Aristotle »ays shows that he thought that 
it is possible to think of the nature of God in analogy with «the world 
of oonoo'* It io the same thing that wo have found him doing when ho 
usee the notion of voOs * *"* *** •* ^¿vocf.15 end ImAs^iu,
to spook of God’s nature.
«ho wsy in which Aristotle uses the notions of samefelng that io 
csmovoA and neves, something that moves and la moved, end twining mot
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i s  moved, to refer to human aotion, la  not im possible to understand, 
sad with regard to some forms o f human notion i t  aseas to  he n p ossib le  
account. She object o f desire i s  an unmoved moving cause o f aotion  
toeing an object o f imagination or thought* to ¿piK-Cov 
bo klVOUf«-£V0>/, KlVtc Tu> VO->|&*jVoU ^ ^VToKT^^oi c .
(be Anitaa 433a 18, b ll;  o f Metaphysics 1072 e  26* be Motu 700 b 24).
Be goes on, however, to  speak o f the rela tio n  that there ia  between Sod
and the world in  the same tanas. Bow th is i s  to  be understood i s  by 
no means c lea r , and i t  ra ises d iff ic u lt  questions about A r isto tle 's  
teleo logy . She p oin t, however, that needs to bo amphaeiaed i s  that 
A risto tle  thinks that i t  is possib le to  speak about «ho relation between 
(hid and the world in  analogy with human notion. In huean notion there 
are which human beings sedc t o achieve. In foot the l i f e  o f  the
soul i s  the aehiwrcment o f those ends. Bo thinks of the soul as being
a cause in  three d ifferen t senses« ?<ftt ^ t ^
Too CtaVXOC ¿fwltoixoc <** T»«l Kotc °i£X'v1' "Tolu T°t
0 * .  r c  / S t  C ||,... t  *, -T
TioAAot
-  ” > ' l ’ V x ' l
HVA/VWXWl ' ' » p  v‘~'- % ~ r~ ''•* 9 s l • C ' 1» CfA c. I
8iu^>,<r^ivoos Te.cB0us it- 1 I
KoU. OU Ttov
(bo *»*»»» 41$b8 ff). Wo find hero an expression of en idee that in not 
rosily different from the passage wo have quoted from the be Motn. 
(698al0) It i s  the idee that Aristotle states in the Hetaphyeies 
(1070s 31)* *fhe eeuaee and the prineiplee of different things are ia s 
senes different, but in e sense^ if «no speaks universally and andegi«» 
ally, they ere the seme far all1 • «he soul ootid not bo e material 
eause, because it i s  the form of e bodT* but it is oeoh of the other 
throe causes that Aristotle dbUnguiahes. Bare a^in wo find e similar 
tendency to e general eecount.
Is  there the analogy that A risto tle  claim s there 1« between the l i f e  
o f the soul so the end o f human action , and God as the fin a l eeuae o f  
the world? In the ease o f human beings TO 0glKT<?v i s  something to  
bo aohlwred. Zt i s  f ir s t  o f e l l  en ebjeet e f  im aginetien end thought, 
but i t  bosom to aetual in  aotioa . God oannet bo the end o f the world 
in  th is  sense, beoeuse A risto tle  thinks that the world and God are 
d ifferen t. But th is  i s  only en instance e f  the kind e f  d lfflod lQ r  
that m et a r ise  i f  with A risto tle  we attempt to spook about God in  s  
way which makes sense when we apeak o f human beings.
A risto tle  him self seams to have rea lised  th is  d iff ic u lty , end i t  
i s  e  d iffic u lty  whioh i s  conneoted with ether aspects e f  h ie  thought.
The difficulty arises in connexion with Aristotle's eeneeytlem ef e 
find eause 7 0 C>u 4Vi *.<*. • Zn seme please be
distinguishes between two senses of this. In the Physios (I94d7) he 
taUs ua that it is e distinction whioh he made In an early week sailed 
'On Philosophy'. Zt is dee e distinction whleh ho uses in bock A .  
of the Motephyeioe dim ho is speaking of Ood ee the find earn« of all 
things (lG72b2). He alee usee it la the be Anise when he is
distinguishing between what ia  temporal *nA ctarnal* Be stataa tha 
d istin ctio n  there as follows« S ittco$ Si, To ¿>6 To Tfc ou kacTo u> .
'*he fin a l oauaa haa taro sans eat (a) the and which i s  aimed a t , and 
(b) the being for whose sake the end ia  aimed at# In tha Metaphysios 
d riatotla  eays that i t  ia  only the former o f theee eeneee that ex leta  
£ v  Tois th* D* dnlaa he gives h ie reeaon far
thinking this# I t  i s  'because no liv in g  thing la  able to partake in  
"hat ie  eternal and divine by uninterrupted oontinuanoe, for nothing 
perishable oan for ever remain one and the nano'# (415b3) What tomes 
do be and passes away only achieves i t s  end in  whatever way i s  p easib le , 
snd here there are differenoee o f degree fe r  d ifferen t perishable things# 
She only sense in  which shat comes to  be and passes away properly shares 
in  ererlastingness i s  throng» the in d estru otab ility  o f form# 'So what 
i s  perishable remains not Indeed as ths self-aam e individual hut ease» 
tinues l t e  existence in  something lik e  i t e e l f  •  not m sm rleally one, but 
one in  form'# (415b6 )
The idea that seems to be in  A r isto tle 's  mind hare In that we oaaaot 
apeak o f what i s  eternal and unchanging as haring anything dona in  i t s  
in te re st. I t  i s  an end -  the most perfect end, sad i t  ia  m s  that 
the world o f becoming seeks to  achieve* But i f  we ask hew i t  aehleree 
th is , the answer is  by particular things achieving th e ir  own ferns# But 
even in  achieving m s  they are perishable* i t  i s  only the foam that i s  
in d estru ctib le. In fa ct A r isto tle 's  view i s  that with regard to  m a g s  
that come to  be and pass away the fen s i s  the fin a l oauae# (Phyeioe 199a 
30) 'And sinoe 'nature* new s two things the matter and the fern , o f  
which the la tte r  i s  the and, and sinoe a ll  the rest i s  fer  the sake s f  the 
end, the form must be the cause in  the sense o f 'th a t for the aeke o f  
which*• (o f Be Sen# e t Corr* 335*8).
that A r isto tle  thought in  m s  mgr ra ises a d iff ic u lty  about h ie  
theology# One question that intcreated him was hew one was to account 
fo r  the continuity and un ity  o f  the keamee# Why doss A r isto tle  say 
that Ood i s  the cause o f m s  in  the Metapfcysies? Why did he net ju st 
stop a t the form as fin a l esuse? But i f  he dees not step there, as i s
evident, what relation sh ip  i s  there between forms whloh are in d estru ctib le  
and Ood, who la  eternal? This i s  a question which A risto tle  him self 
does so t seen to reiM  in  ju st m s  form# Although m s  doss not so lve  
the d iff ic u lty , h is  view may be stated  aa fellow s# Be thinks that ths 
continuity o f forms i s  not something that explains why the world i s  as 
i t  is#  In fa ct i t  i s  the continuity o f forma I t s e lf  that has to  be 
explained. That ws m i# t say i s  descrip tive o f the world and s e t  
explanatory. Per there i s  somathlng e ls#  b ssid ss the continuity o f 
the ferns which needs to  he «p lained# This i s  the unity o f the 
oosmoe. That eould net be explained by ju st refsrrln g  to the 
continuity o f the forme, fer  the continuity o f forme i s  a p lu ra lity , 
without any « t fy in g  p rincip le in  it s e lf#  A risto tle  mentions th is  
question o f the unity o f the ooanoe both a t th# eagd«î «*g and the m i 
o f book A  o f the Xetaphysies# So i t  teens to  have h e «  iwperteat *  
him.
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The continuity of fox« in thè eousos ie wfcat Aristotl* tetro* y W£<yi$ , 
end that ìs what needs to be edplained* Aristotl*, in hi* own way, 
holds th* same ri** her* a* Plato t he think* that ŷ Vfcrî  Mieta 
0u<r\oî ‘¿vive* * 'When we are dealing with definita and ordered 
produot* of nature, w* mu*t not sey that eaeh i* of a certain quality 
beesuae it beooae» *ot but rather that they Deooato *o and *o beosos* 
they are 00 and *oy for thè procee* of beoomlng and derelopoent «Menda 
upon bein« and i* for th* ohe of bein«, not rio* rena* (De San* a»«». 
778b3) Ibis passa«*, howerer, might be interpretad a* referrin« to 
th* foro» Ihat i* *hat a thin« iaj that ia thè reaaon for it* be- 
oooing* But where doe* Ood a* final ©ause fit into this sohot*« 
lan't th* fon a* final oauae auffieient?
Aristotl*'* añorar to this questloa la that it ia net* But bere 
it ia dlffleult to se* why he thougbt so* Za nany passa«** he sean* 
to identify God with nature* He define* nature in thè Physie* in 
dlfferent waya. He think* of beth nettar and fon aa ' nature11 but 
it ia nere th* lattar. 'Che fon ladead 1* 'nature* rather than th* 
nattarf far a thin« la nor* prepari/ oaid te b* what it la when it 
has attelaed to fulfillnent than Míen it exista potentially* * (l93b7)
But when Arlatotl* apeaks of Ood and nature doin« nothin« in rain (De 
desio 271*33 Se Partibus 658*9), he aeana te bere senethin« else in 
nlad beaidea nettar and foro. It sena* te be th* sane thin« that fa* 
refera te in thè De Partibus Aninaliun (645*5) * 'Barin« already treated 
ef th* oolastiai worid, aa far as sur oonjeetures oould reaeh, we pre- 
•eed te treat ef saínala, witheut esitila«, te thè beat ef our ability, 
«ny nanber ef th* klngdow, heweeer 1 «noble» Sor if sene bare ne
«raeea te ohom th* sanse, yet eren theae, by diselosin« te intelleetual 
pereeptien th* artisti* spirit that designad than, «tre Insana* pleasur* 
te all who ean trae* Untai of oauaation, and are inolino! te phdleaephy*. 
Zt ia thè s m * peint that he nakss in th* Do Generation# et Cerruptleaei 
'Che originati?# sewees than, ef th* things whieh seno t* be are 
aquel in nnaher te, and idsntioal in kind with tese ia th* spher* ef 
thè eternai and prlaary thin«*« Sor there la m e  in Mie ama* ef 
nettar, and a seenni in thè senso ef forni and, ia additien, thè thtrd 
originati?* saure* nust b* present as well. Per thè tue flrst are 
not auffieient te barin« thiags inte bein«, *ay aere than they are 
adequate te aeeeunt far thè prlaary thinc*'. (335* 26ff).
Aristotl*'s riew of nature la thorougbly tMUoleglwal» fhis la 
olear espeeially in hi* bielogieal wesfcs, where hia aeeeunt ef thè 
«eaeratlott ef anlnals, for instane*, la that sature jridhgia than in a 
wsy whieh ia eendneiipw far th* Ufe they leed. Where there la porpes* 
te be feund, Aristotl* seeks te fiad it. B* state* hi* rise in a 
Cenerai way at th* Decisala« of thè De Partibus AalaeUuai 'Chete ls 
thè final esas* and there ls thè notar osas*, lew we nust desids 
whieh ef these twe eausea some firet, wbleh seeend. Plslaly, howerer, 
that osase la th* flint whieh w* sali thè final eoe. Ver this ls thè 
Beasm, and Mie leseen foros thè starila« peint, alike in th* wecks ef
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aat and in thè works of nature'. (639kl3) 'In  thè works of satura th# 
good and and tka final cause ia stili «ore doalnant tkan in tka varíes 
of art1* ( 6391»20 ) It is tka and or parpóse of tka asístanos of aay 
particular thlng tkat i8 i*8 reeùL causa* All other Musas ara atib« 
sidiary to tkis* Arietotla'a viav of a causal serlas la determinad ky 
tkis idea* Ba ls argulng agsinst tka viev tkat tklaga coma akout ky 
ohanca> and ka vanta to shov tkat tka kind of naoaasliy tkat io to ks 
found ia tka universe ia tka nscsasity of definita anda* Ha glves as 
an azample, haaltk, and saysi 'It is tkat whick la yat to ka - kealth, 
lat us aay» or a man - tkat ovlng to ita keing of suok and suok 
characters, necessita tes tka pra eri stenoa or previene production of 
tkis or tkat antecedenti and net tkis or tkat anteoedont which, ko~ 
eause lt existe or kaa kaen generate*, makee it naoosaaxy tkat healtk 
or a man la in, or shall come inte, asístenos* It ls not poeslkle to 
traes kaok tka sefcLea of naeaoaary aataaadants to a starting point, 
of whiek you can aay tkat, esdstlng itaalf fresa etsrnlty, lt kaa dot- 
azoinad tkair «adátense as ita oonaeguent'. (640a5 ff) lt is tka 
kind of viav tkat kad baan put forvard ky Demoerltus tkat Aristotla 
is orltioislng bere. ArUtotle saya tkat Demoorltus 'reduoes tka 
causes tkat espiala natura to thè faot tkat tklaga kappaaad in tka 
past ia tka sama vay as tkey kappan nov' (Pkysies 252a 33) But tkat 
la no explana tiw, it dosa not espiala thè continuity and unity tkat la 
observad« Aristotlo sayas 'He doto not thiak flt to oosk for a firot 
principio to explain thia 'alvays'i so, vkilo kis tkeory is rlgbt In 
so far as lt ia applled to oortaia ladividaol oaooo, ko ia vrong la 
ssAAng it of universal application' • Arietotla m a  Interested la 
fia&lng a oause of universal application, and ka tkougkt it paaaikla 
ta fiad tkis in tka notlon af purpaaa aa appliad te vkat kappaaa la 
tka universa* Ibis ls «ky ha so oftan aaena te personify natura*
'Chat vkiak ia pradnaad or diraatad ky natura asa nevar ka aagrtklng 
diaordarlyt far natura la araryvkora tka aama of arder'* (2J2al2) 
Altkeugk Aristotlo epeeka ia tkia vay af natura and af Oad (Da 
Casio 27la 33 af 291kl4| Ba Parükua Anlnalium 6*$a9, 66lk24| Ba 
Generatlene Aniaaliua 74lk5, 744a 36), end va must nata tkat ka aaya 
uoually tkat it ia nativa tkat dosa aotklng ia vaia, ka dosa not tktak 
tkat it ia paaaikla ta spaak af natura aa a aauaa ia an un equivocai 
vay* In faot Aristotlo diatiaguiskoo kart katvoon vkat ia sukjoot 
to \ j , and vkat io not* 'It lo voli aaid tkat wo must 
not toka upon ourteJrea to aoék a kogianing (or firot prlaoiplo) af 
all tklaga, yat kta ia aat vali aaid af all tktaga akatarar tkat 
alvoya ara ar alveya kappan, kat only af tkaaa vkioh raelly ara fisa* 
principias of tka starnai tkingaf far lt la ky aaetker aatkod, aat ky 
preef, tkat va acquile kmavladga af tka firat prlaolpla. lev in tkat 
vkiak is ismorakla and unahanglng tka firat principia ia alaply tka 
essente af tka tklng, kut vkan va asma ta tkaaa tklaga vkiak cono luto 
kolag tka principien ora rara tkan ano, vnsyiag In kind and not all of 
tka sano kind'* (Do Oeneretione Animalità 742k30).
«* 1*0 *•
When A risto tle  speak* o f natuTs doing nothing in  rain  i t  i s  hot 
just personification* I t  Sates to  teve that charset te  i f  t e  do not 
take into account the view that he sta tes in  the Metaphysios that the 
eauses of a l l  things are the sane w toC S& H l and da
understanding of nature i s  for A risto tle  an understanding o f how there 
ean he such universal and analogical causes* And the kind o f cause 
whioh i s  prim arily a cause in  th is  universal and analogical way i s  the 
fin a l mnse* I t  i s  for A risto tle  the presence of ration al dosign in  
the universe as a whole* With regard te  the produotlon o f natural 
kinds the fin a l cause i s  the ferny i t  i s  th is that for A risto tle  i s  ths 
evidence o f dosign and purpose* Nature i s  a realm in  whioh there are 
certain  means a t work to achieve d e fin ite  ends (Physios 199*10) But 
©ns has to ses how there are d ifferen t kinds o f onuses which a l l  oon> 
trib ute to  the end* One must d istin gu ish , for in stan ce, between matter 
and form, and th is  i s  a d istin ctio n  that many precious philosophers hare 
not mads d early*  Democritus** view doss net make th is  d istin ctio n  
c lea r ly , and so ha la  unable to  d istinguish  between ehenee end necessity*  
On that view I t  dess mot sa w  to make sny difference whether erne mgm 
that things com about by ohanoe or nse s s s itr  * they seem to  moan the 
same thing* I t  i s  only i f  one d istingu ishes between matter end. form 
that ens «an d istinguish  betmtea them#, and b a te s«  n ssssa ltr  sad 
design* *Vhat i s  nsoes sary  i s  necessary «  * hypothssisy i t  i s  act 
* r esu lt necessari ly  determined by antecedents. (As Bsmserltus theugrt). 
M eosssity i s  in  the m etier, w hile * that far the asks o f white* ie  la  the 
d efin itio n 1* (Physios 800a 13)* *9inea •nature" moans two th in gs, ths 
matter and ths farm, o f white the la tte r  la  ths « d , th s f e n  must be 
th s causa in  ths sense a f "that far th s asks a f white". * (ib id  19 9*30) 
A risto tle , than, thinks o f nature as an ergraisad sh a le , w hite a n  
be described in  •sss ito n ss  with h is  view s f  ths senate, but ev w  os they 
are only universal and aw alsgisal prftnsiplssy that la  « teasel p rin cip les 
white era d escrip tive a f the de s ign that a r ista  in  tea  m lvarse. I t  la  
only when nature i s  being described tea t i t  i s  nasessw y t s  re fer  te  
tease kinds a f asnaaa* I t  would be a a lstek e to  imagine that an 
aeeount e f  nature must ted  tears* «hat i s  tea main task s f  tea  
p h y sie lst -  te  enplaia the nature o f te e  d ifferen t saunas and how they 
are related  te  one aasteer* "BOw, tea  eamsss being fea r , i t  i s  tee  
business o f tee  p h y sie lst t s  hnsw about tea s a l l ,  end i f  he refers h is  
problems bate ts  a l l  s f  them, he w ill  aaaig i tea  '«by* la  the «my proper 
to  h is  aslemo* -  the m atter, tea farm, ths oarer, 'th a t fa r  te e  asks a f 
which'." (Physics 198a 22)* *he la s t  throe eauses often oeinoido, 
A risto tle  alaiaa* Be i s  think ing in  p artlsteer a f d ifferen t Item  a f  
liv in g  beings* And as the saunas for a great deal a f nature sen be 
•a id  ta be tea •  ften  and natter* but theca are tea  causes that are 
precast w ithin nature i t s e l f ,  and th«y do net espi a ls  nature aa a whale*
An explanation a f tea t dteende a kind a f  « u s e  white date net share 
in  te* pre c is e «  o f aeniag to  bo and passing assy* «a haws already 
auggestsd a possib le «my in  white A risto tle  night have been led  t s  pht 
forward tee  view he did o f ths vo t̂s * a *  i s  tee  «moved saver s f  tea
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d iv e rsa . But a part from thosa auggaationa and tha particu lar thlnga 
that A risto tle  aaya about tha natura o f Ood, i t  la  olear that ha doaa 
aat vleh te id a n tliÿ  Ood and nature* Thera la  a olear d istin ctio n  
hetwean phyaiaa and thaology. For tha physiciet • motion la  ultim ately  
*efarable to natura* (Phyeioa 253b5). Nature la  *a aouroe or oauae of 
Valag morad and of baing a t ra st In thet to  whloh I t  balóngs prisa r lly , 
la  Tir tua o f I ta e lf  and not aocidantally* (ib ld  192b2l). But nature 
tapenda on anothar oauae. *0n auch a p rin cip ie, then, dapand the 
bearono a«d nature* (Mataphyaloa 1072 b 13)* Fur A riatetle  the world 
* f natura la  multlform, and aay aooount o f i t  aren in  tha mast genaral 
tarma, muât rafar to d lffarant kinda o f prinolploa. But Ood la  urv- 
•hanglng and aImpla In natura*
a e r a  ara a nuÉbar o f paoasgoa in  ir ia to t lo ’a worka whloh nay auggaat 
that the d istln etio n  botwoon Ood and nature lo  noi d efin ita . But tha 
•«atenea we haro juat quotod fren A  *akaa l t  quita o lear. Why daaa
O rlatoti# aayi l *  Û ol ¿eXl* ® ^ ?
*hy doaa ho met juat aay that i t  la  ^  ^ ' s  that dopando en th ie?
She romoom la  aimpla. Ba thlnka of tha haaran aa d lffaran t fram nature* 
tha la tta r  la  what io  aubjaot to  ahango* Xt la  tho ephare o f ooolag* 
to-ba «ad paaaing-oway, b«* tho homron lo  eternai and unohanglng for hlm*
Se thoee paooagaa in  A rlototlo  whoro ho aoeos to  id o n tify  9od and nature 
are mot te  bo tokan aa maaning thlo* Whan ha ao—t  to  «peak o f nature 
la  that way, l t  la  beoauaa ha la  refarrlng le  the In te llig en t and pur» 
poalTa a o tir lty  that ha thlnka la  to ba obaarrad in  natura.
«he d lffio u lty  whloh hae boon f a it  about Arlototlo* a Tien o f Cfod, 1s 
how anythlng llk o  tha In te llig e n t ao tiT ily  whloh ho aaom ln  tho woxft| o f 
•aturo oan bo a ttrib u to ! to tho klnd o f Ood whloh ho talko about la  
®ook A  o f tho Ketapfcyaloe. Xt la  thia d lffio u lty  that m i^ t laad ta  
an attenpt to  intarprot A riatotle aa Idantifÿing Ood and natura* But 
ahatarer d ifflc u ltla a  thero ara ln  uadaratanding A rlototlo*o Tiens 
about Ood, i t  la  not poaolblo to naka thla id en tifie« tlo n . For t
aooordlng to  A rlototlo , la  not ocnplately aotual aa Ood la . Xt oaaoot 
ho undoratood without rafaranoa ta ahat la  potantial* So A rlototlo  oayoi 
(Xotaphyaleo 1049M ff)*
CKAA t v  oiOTU) « « « '
«ho dlffioulty Arlototlo le faeod wlth la hla theele* lot 
How la it poaolblo to oonoolro of dlTlao aotiTlty la relation to tho 
world? For hla rlow of Ood la that Ood lo «Implo ami unchanging, and 
how oan auoh a bolag bo rolotod to a world in whloh ehaaga la «boarred 
to talco plaoo? «hla la a dlffioulty arlalng mot anly in Arlato«lo*o 
lhaolegy, but ln aay thoolegy whloh attampta ta stato what relation
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« o re  1 « between Ood and tho vorld . À risto tle  in  speaklng o f Sod as 
* fin a l causa sceme io  ba foroad to aay tha oaly ib ing that ha aan say.
Sa saaos te  think that b«causa tha fora la  tha fin a l sansa o f partioular  
thlngs that oem* io  ba and pass saay and as sueh l ì  io  ih« » o si laportant 
oausa in  iha reali» o f nature, tha natura o f Ood oan only ba undarstood 
la  analoga «rith ib is«  Bui « m  l f  ara oan moke soma sansa o f tha fona 
aa fin a l causa iv  \}K̂  ,  whas th is  action l s  applled io  Qed i t e  measing
ls  lo  si«  Por in  iha world o f s * «»• as fin a l causa la
thè foro o f somethlng, bui God oaanot ba iba fin a l oausa o f eomethlng in  
th ia sanso« So U n to ti# *  a aitaopi io  o r la to  «od* a eaaaa liiy  as fin a l 
ta u sa lity  in  aaalogjr with fin a l causaiitp  in  natura oanaot ba sa ia  t s  
Work. B is In ianilon la  no doubt io  i r  tbat tn  speakiag o f Ood'o 
•sn a a lity  in  ib is  wsy w* 9od*s o a u sa lliy , bui a l l  that ba
ha* ro a lly  dona lo  io  tnterprot God*a oaueolity la  tho «ano aay ss  tho 
causallty  o f iho fora as tha final oausa«
Bui Aristotln** risa of «ba fora la noi Just ibai li la «to final 
sanse* li ls al so in nano nsgr tha affloioni oauso* li lo ast only 
what omo pertloular thing bacasi, bui li ls alao tho sauso of lis 
beeomlng that. Ho idsniiflss tho forasi, afflelant sad final osasi 
la iha casa of llrlng bolngs« In tho De «icratione Animili® ho sayat
&4\t iovo5 $4 TV TiJs
»Wc To y T*|S U '̂V|S*
(732*4) So ih# fora bslongs with ih# protdnsio affiel«ai aauso« li ls 
far Aristotls Sa lassaasni m i a «  oausa, whloh la io ba dlsilngulshod 
fra» «art«mal otoring canata suoh ss tha sua. (Xst&physioa 1070b3t).
«ben ha la dissuasi»« «ts diffsronoo betreon naia and fmalo In tho Bo 
Oonerationo Anlmelium ho ldantlflss tho fornai sansa with tho naia, 
and tho material sanse wlth ihs fami*. Ss sa?» sf tho formar «»ai li 
la bsttsr and mero Utili in naturo ihan ihs lattar» Mailirly ha 
tklaks of tha soni as tha fora and tho body aa tho mattar of a llrlng 
animai*
«ha soci aa tho fora af tha Urla« anfani la both ita afflaiamt 
and final aanaa» Aristetle** «amarai definì tion sf tha asm la«
-VJ <j>uv-vj Ì<TtiV IvTtAl̂iloi. ̂  <j>ixriKou
(Ba Anima 412* 27) It io tho prosano# of Ufo «ut diaiinguiahaa 
«Mi ohioh posse*### soul from that whlch dosa net« (413* 21) Zi la thè 
asm that makas Ufo »saalbio, and oo li ls iha sffloioni saune, «ha 
anni, *da an setuallty «  foraulsble assi s a of ssnatlita« «mi possisi 
« potentlalitgr sf bsdng «nseulsd*« (414* 27) Bui li ls osi io snp fora sf 
motti that thè asm oam bri»« Ufo to fama a Uria« animai. It alt  
ba matti sf a f i t t o m i  JdLn*. iriatotle orltlolsi thè olia sf 
U l e m a  phllsssphsra uh# ssisd Just te fit tho asm to a body «mthsmt
*4diag a definite apeeiflcatlon ef thè kiad er oharaeter o f that body' 
(4l4a 23) | There must be ’Batter whioh le appropriate te thè eonl' 
(lbld 26) Za thè De Generatione Animalit® Arlstotle glvee a fuller
aocount, and there he olaims that there must be a special fora o f mattar 
for thè sotti to  unite with in  thè generation o f an animai*
Ttd<r-»|S OuV <TvO ̂ octdj ¿ottC£.
-!• tÌw  H * » v  <*•*tiwv.
<os S Ì T .^or^Tt. « t  + X 1- ^
■ I X V j  OOTW K*ì. ^  T01,*i5t-vj S m 4 u<r,S-
(736b 30) Be ccrcpare» thia IWfcojKA to thè aether of whioh thè hesvenly 
bodies are mede* I t  la  what makee poeeible thè eomlng to  be o f soni 
in  some partioular body* I t  d lf f  «re, A rlatotie olaim e, aa eeul d iffe r e , 
«ad la  more divine in  nature than thè so-oalled  elemento, earth, a lr , 
t ir e  and «ater* I t  la  what aoeo&penies thè male sansa in  thè generation 
• f  animala* A rlatotie oa lla  i t  To ^ C X ^  •
(737a 9) I t  la  thè aerai aa a ffic ia n t eauae*
But thè eoul le  eleo  thè fin a l canee. t̂ v-To* ~T<u.
UOTKol <Tvó fAaLTcX VCoLc To< Tu>V
^tOk>Vy OuTiO *<*. TII t 3 v ^U t Ìo * j Wttet 1^$ °^T,W *
(4 1 ^  18) A rlatotie «anta to say that thè aoul la  s e t  only that vhiah 
makee eoaething that le  a U ve, a llvaf but alao i t  la  thè U fo  whioh 
bolonge te  aaythlag that la  alive* I t  le  not only «he
ot a physioal body in  a teaporal eanae, but i t  alao 
ia  thè n^ iori| \vxt in  definìtion* I t  la  thè eonl
whioh definee thè nature o f e llv in g  belng* So he say a« |*L/
vwl v|»u^  ŝ vsu TtiCrcov/'- (letaphyeice 1043b 2 ef* 1036 a l)  I t  definee 
i t e  nature both ea e ffio ie n t and fin a l eauae*
%e dlffioulty, howewer, in uaderstendi»* Arlatotie' e vie« le ho* 
thia vie« of thè ooul ia related to hie vie» of fad aa final tanarred
mover. In A rlsto tle  «e find  nothing comparable to  thè v ie«  that P iate  
etatee in  thè fiaaeua* Ih ere Plato thlnks o f thè w<^yo£ aa
ereatlng seu l) but for A rlsto tle  soni en ne te  heve en lndependent 
«détenos* At le a s t l f  he dld thlnk that i t e  eodetenee depende tqpon 
Ood, he dose net show how «e are to  thlnk e f  th ie  dependenoe* Or rathev 
«e aheuld say that he dose net nake i t  olear that soni ia  eay ugr way 
dopendent upon Oed* Ber «a meaaet aagr that p ia te thlnka that i t  ia  
poeeible to  A m  how thè esdeteaee o f eo«l la  dependan! apea Oed* Set 
eren i f  that l e  iapoaaible, nevertheleee Plato thinke that I t  la
dependen!*
Parhapa ene ef thè tm snggeetioae that «e heve in Arlstotle ea 
thie guasti*» ia to be feand in thè Ine! ehapter o f boek •
There he makee etateaaata that ean be interpretad a« euggeeting that 
«tare le eene klad ef prerldential astivi ty te be femad in thè werld* 
Proa «ha! he maya there, hewwer, «re eenaet gather amrthiag like thè
vie* ef eveatlea that «e find in Piate* s "Tlmaeua". And «hea «• taha 
«ki. u  « w d *  i i * * n , i i n i1 * l iM ( t a k t f 4 |  m a t |
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the impression we gain is that although Aristotle has a strong sense 
of the order that exists in the world, his conception of this is auch 
that we could hardly call it religious, as we can call Plato's*
Aristotle is clearly concerned with how it is possible to understand 
the continued order of the universe. For instance, in the last 
chapter of hook J\. , he Is concerned with pointing out that any view 
which attempts to explain becoming In terms of contraries only, without 
sty reference to a principle which is distinct from contraries is mis­
taken. There must be principle over and abase what ever contraries 
there are. The first oause is not a contrary* «for there is nothing 
oontrary to that which ie primary* (1075b 23). Of any contrary,
Aristotle thinks, it must be «possible far It not to be*. (1075b 31).
So no oontrary san bs *a productive and Bering principle*. (ibid)
And even if it were *its aotion would bs posterior to its potency*.
If suoh were the principle of thinge, the world would not be eternal, 
as Aristotle thlaks It Is. The unity of things In the world, suoh as 
the unity of the soul and body, of fho unity of form and natter generally, 
cannot be explained apart from a cause whioh is external to any union of 
soul »nd body, or any union of matter and form.
The question that Arlstotlo asks here 1st *Row does' the nature of 
the universe possess the good end the highest good? As something 
separata sad by Itself, or as the order of its parts? U s  answer is 
that It contains It in both ways. This dees not, however, mesa that 
Aristotle was s pantheist. What ht has said about God previously rules 
that out. But neither is his visw of Ood ono whioh plaoos Ood earn- 
pletely and irrevocably outside of the . It is interesting that
here Aristotle uses two terms - to <#f*£>ov ***■ To *£icrrovf.
(1075a 12). He has already described Ood as ^ iotoj (1072b 28).
It may be misleading to translate here as tsoatains* (as Boss does).
That suggests that both to Aye* ©ov and t o  #£,<rtov
T'vj Too SXoo 4>y<ri.C' • Aristotle says* ’God and
nature do nothing in vain* and not *God or nature does nothing in vain* •
So it seems that by To of£«rTov' here, Aristotle refers to what
1 > . ;God brings about in the universe, and by to the
order of the parts ef ^ Tow #Aou . If it is
thought that T O  ci^KH-ov and To of'joL&civ most both
refer just te 7| t o o  # A o o $b<T\$ , then the example that
Aristotle gives tells against this« He says* ’In both ways, like an 
army* for its good le found both in its order and in Its loadsr, 
amd mere in the latt«» So it soma just to connect To ¿yolfrov with 
the of the world, and To ^ « r r o v  with God himself.
She quotation from BSmer at the end of the chapter 1, also evidence 
that Aristotle ie not identifying the two* «The rule of the many is 
not good* one ruler let there be*. It is good to recognise the 
order that there le in the world, but the best is te reoognise that 
there must be a cause of fee order.
The idea that the world ie governed le central to the last chapter 
of book A  * «»4 this idea of pr*vldaaee la for Aristotle an answer
IH*an
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The tern * philosophy of religion' in more recent times has 
cane to be used in connexion with ideas that may be considered to be 
foreign to the thought of Plato and Aristotle* Jaeger claims that this 
is not so* 'The history of the philosophy of religion, in the modem 
sense of the phrase, begins with the sophists and their first great 
attempts to give a psychological explanation of its nature end origin, 
Rationalism, however, can never advance more than a little way along 
this road, because it lacks the organ by which the phenomena of the reli­
gious life are properly perceived; and hence the philosophy of religion 
did not enter an its classical period until the time of the early ixistotle 
and the Academy in the later days of Plato* It is a fact, though the 
accepted history of philosophy may ignore it, that almost the entire 
stock of later «id modem ideas about the philosophy of religion can be 
traced to this society'• (Aristotle pp 156 - 7), The influence of both 
Plato and Aristotle on later writers is not to be denied. It Is also 
necessary, however, to show that there are serious differences between the 
view of Plato and Aristotle in connexion with their 'philosophies of 
religion'«
If we caspare some of the modem aspects of the philosophy of 
religion with the views of Plato and Aristotle, one of the main differences 
is that modem philosophy has to take into account the claim that religious 
truth has been revealed to men. In Christianity, for instance, this has 
resulted in the statement of beliefs that have been revealed* The truths 
of revelation are then contrasted with truths of reason, as they are by 
Thomas Aquinas who distinguishes between truths of reason and truths of 
faith or revelation. This led him to distinguish between philosophy and 
theology. A similar kind of distinction is to be found in Ialenu
On the other hand it has often been pointed out that Greek 
religion was not dogmatic as the Christian religion is, and so the 
question of the justification of revealed dogaa never arose for Plat© and 
Aristotle, as it did for many Christian philosophers, though something 
very much like it did exist for them in so far as they faced the question 
of the relation between their own views and those of the religion of the 
time. Plato made use of the religious beliefs of his day to a far greater 
extent than Aristotle, and he quotes Orphic doctrine, for instan©©, about 
the nature of the soul. In fact i»hat he has to say in his myths about 
the immortality of the soul tends to be almost an apologia for the 
of belief that was common in Orphic circles, and certainly his myths about 
the life of the soul after death are anfluenoed by this source. In the Lous, 
religion for Flato takes on a far more dogmatic character than it has in 
his earlier works, «ad there is a very ¿Lose relationship between morality 
and religion. He find nothing comparable in Aristotle and this goes with 
what we may regard as his more purely intellectual approach to the questions 
that religion raises for philosophy. In fact we may say in general that 
tfiereas Plato found it necessary to try to give seme kind of aceount of the 
issues which the religion of his day raised for him, Aristotle is not
Seriously concerned with religion as such, and xc only interésser in xs 
•0 far as it seems to corroborate hie philosophical view«« (Hot®, qhycics 
W b  Iff),
So in Plato we find philosophy and religion very closely connected; 
In Aristotle there is hardly any relation at all* And thie dlfierence 
becomes clear 5a ibe different kinds of views that they put forward. The 
Point however, may be questioned. If mato in opposition to the view of 
Protaqoras and others claimed that God was the measure of all tilings, 
Aristotle too thought of the world as dependent upon a first cause 
which he calls God, In this ho was probably influenced by what lie had 
learnt from Plato, and it has been argued that this view of hie is an 
earlier one in which the influence of Plato is still dominant. (Jaeger). 
Whatever be the truth about this matter, there is a general difference 
Of ar. roach and this difference is important in an attempt to aerees the 
nature of religió» frost the point of vie® of philosophy. It is common 
to regard what Aristotle wrote as a development and criticism of Plato’s 
thoû it, and this is often a fruitful way of looking at the natter. It 
is also necessary, however, to look at the two views for what they are in 
themselves, When we do this important differences aprear, and we find 
that what in one way must be regarded as a development of Plato’s thought 
ie really very different and is a drastic revision of it,
Tfas difference is clearly seen in their different views about 
»orality* Tor Plato morality ie closely connected with religion* Fear 
Aristotle It is not# There ie a clear relationship betwewwhat Plato 
says about God in the Timaouc and what he says about morality in the 
laws. If God is the creator of the world, he Is also the creator of the 
laws in accordance with which men should live# There is also a dear 
delation between what Aristotle says about God in the ftiti^wles, and 
What he aays about intellectual virtue ir the Nlcooachean Ethics, but 
the relation is quite different from the one that Plato sees between God 
and morality# Tor Plato God is the lawgiver* but ho is hardly this 
for Aristotle# The standard for Aristotle is the good nan (Ethics 1176 
ha6)j for Plato the standard ie God#
There is then not only a difference in their views about 
Morality but also a difference between their views of God# It is the 
difference between their views about God that determine the difference 
between their views about morality# A.B. Taylor In his commentary on 
Plato’s Timaeus claims that Plato is the originator of rational theology, 
but It is possible to see Aristotle ss this more dearly than Plato# If 
*e understand by rational theology what Aquinas understood by theologla 
haturalis then it is much easier to connect this with Aristotle than with 
Plato and would also explain the attraction that Aristotle had for
Aquinas« It is not just that Aristotle had become available for Aquinas 
In the translations of William of Boerbeke end in the commentaries of 
Iba Buschd, but that Aristotle’s theology appealed to Aquinas in his 
Attempt to give proofs for hie religion* national thedogy as such may 
be considerad as consisting of metaphysical arguments for the existence 
of cfod, about the nature of the human eoul, and of the relation that
-  188
exists between the two. Aquinas thought that the cosmological argument 
was the most Important of the arguments for God's existence and Aristotle's 
argument for the unmoved mover Is most closely connected with this* there 
is one fundamental difference, however, between Greek religion and 
Christianity which makes such an argument play quite a different part In 
the thinking of a Christian like Aquinas from what it plays In the thou^it 
of Aristotle# This is the distinction in the Christian religion which is 
central to Aquinas's theology between xdiot is created and the creator# In 
Aristotle this distinction does not exist, although Aquinas attempts to 
interpret Aristotle as if it did. Par Aquinas too the argument is meant 
to be a philosophical proof of what is otherwise revealed, and so he thinks 
of the argument as same kind of defence religion. That this is so is 
illustrated by his view (Sanaa Contra Gentiles) that revelation is 
necessary because the argument will not be understood by all. It is 
nothing nit» this for Aristotle. It is rather the result of that part of 
first philosophy which he calls theology. It is no kind of apologia fedel* 
But as we have attempted to show it is in Aristotle that we find that idea 
of metaphysics vfcich Aquinas considers to be a means of establishing proofs 
for God's existence. It arises from an interpretation of what Aristotle 
calls the study of being qua being in so far as that studies substances 
that are free from matter. The origin of the way in which Aquinas 
understands this is to be found in Aristotle. For Aquinas It is a 
matter of the distinction between what is contingent and what is 
necessary and this is connected with the notion of existence as that is 
applied to God#
In Aristotle's theology the notion of * substance includes the 
notion of ' existence1 as this has been applied to God in later theology.
In any attempt to assess Aristotle's theology or Christian theology as 
it has been influenced by him attention should be paid to tills notion of 
substance. It is not the so-called arguments for God's existence that 
are important, but this concept of 'substance' or 'existence' as applied 
to God# This is far more fundamental#
m e  concept of existence as applied to God is fundamental 
because any argument about God's existence must presuppose an understanding 
of this concept as applied to him? and if any argument for the existence 
of God is to weak, it can do so only if the so called concept of eadstenoe 
which is contained in the premises of the argument applies to the conclu­
sion also# But no one can went to apply the concept of existence which 
applies to what is mentioned in the premises to vhat is referred to in 
the conclusion - that is to God, and that is the main reason for saying 
that any argument for God* s existence fails in what it attempts to show*
But what about God's existence itself ? he have no concept of 
God's as that notion is usually applied. Prom this point of
view it makes no sense to say »1 know that God exists* # One of the aost 
celebrated attacks an arguments for God's existence is Immanuel Kant's#
His main objection was that existence is not a logical predicate and so 
cannot function as such in any argument# Kant would say that we cannot 
prove the existence of anything* In the sense in which 'exists' is being 
used here it would be possible to discover the existence of something, but
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not to prove it.
Some people have thought that Kant* s position may be regarded as 
and aid to religious belief, because it means that the existence of God 
cannot be disproved. This must be small comfort. But in any case Kant’s 
view is irrelevant. This is so because the concept of existence which he 
denies to be a logical predicate makes sense for instance when it occurs 
in such a statement as ‘ There is a palm tree in my garden*, and in Kant' s 
Sense it would not be possible to prove the existence of the palm tree,
But what is important in this example is that the concept of existence has 
an application here - that it makes sense. But does this concept apply 
to God ? Vfe do not know how to apply it to him, and this is the reason 
why Kant’s view is irrelevant. He says that we cannot prove or disprove 
God’s existence because it is not a logical predicate, but this pre - 
supposes that the concept of existence can be applied to God. Kant’s 
position is: ’It is impossible either to prove or disprove God’s 
existence, because existence is nob a logical predicate*. Rather we 
cannot understand how the concept of existence applies to God and so we 
should not just say that it is impossible to prove or disprove God’s 
existence, for that presupposes the application of the concept of existence 
to God, but that it makes no sense to prove or disprove God* s existence, 
because we do not understand how that concept applies to him.
The same thing applies to Aristotle’s conception of substance 
When applied to God. We cannot understand how it is to be applied. It 
is however because Aristotle speaks of God in this way that his way of 
thought gives rise to theology vhieh speaks of God’s nature. Plato’s 
view however, is much nearer vhat is called in religion belief or faith.
This is fundamental to religion. It is not necessary for belief in God 
that there should be an understanding of a concept of existence as 
applied to God. If such m  understanding were possible then religion 
would not be a matter of belief. The true account is impossible for us. 
Aristotle on the other hand in speaking about God as immaterial substance 
is attempting to establish with regard to God a fora of knowledge that 
runs counter to that is important in religion. Because the understanding 
that Aristotle thought was possible is not possible religious belief is 
something different from that it might be supposed to be. For belief in 
God is not anything like a hypothesis or supposition. It is not supposing 
that God exists. If someone says: 'I believe that there is life on Mars' 
than part of the point of this kind of supposition is that it makes sense 
to sayt *1 believe there is life there, but I am not certain*. But 
belief in God is different. If it is thought to be some kind of hypothesis 
which could be confirmed, as the hypothesis that there is life on Mars might 
be, then that makes God as contingent as life on Mare is. There may happen 
to be life on Mars. On the other hand there may not be life there. But 
belief in God is not believing that something may happen to be the oaee 
or not. With regard to the supposition about Mars it makes sense to 
say: * 1 believe there is life there, but I am not certain. Boon we shall 
find out*. But it makes no sense to say in the same ways «1 believe In 
God, but I am not certain. I shall find out whether my belief is true*.
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There it- such a thing as lack of faith - but that is not anything 
ittiich one can get rid of by appealing to the land of evidence vfcich would 
decide tint there is life on bars, ' Lack of faith is not lack of evidence 
in that sense; it is sin not to believe. .¿hen Plato says in the Tiaaeus 
t*n.o xs wQ ix*ao wrod wroAucG tnc i/orlc*.̂ he scces to moan
sometiixng xi&e lx—e.
■ " tno main difference then between Plato and Aristotle may be 
stated by saying ixat for ¿briototle tlie nature of God can be a- matter 
for human investigation. For Plato it is not this, but far sore a 
matter of viiat one believes about God. «risto tie* s view leads to theology
in x>iic sense ¡x»ni xs xiuhss same ‘to ask vixetlxer tiiere is an iosaaterial
substance axxd also tries to show that tiiere is one videh possesses the
nature vixich Aristotle assigns to God in book ‘A .  of the Iietaphysics.
1 rh:hen Aristotle soys that there is an vidch deals vdth
on~i~a «̂n,ia<—t/oing i.e thxnxs ¿¡»as •x.eoj.ogy xs ¡¡>■ x̂i o* si.xs oecauso it deals 
with ixiateriel substance, Gut for Plato t-iere is no such 
vkore God is concerned. For Aristotle the probloas *Is tiiere an immaterial 
substance ? 1 Is a question that can be answered in the affimative, and. 
reasons can be given for its existence, Aristotle makes it look as if one 
can give reasons for die existence ox an xx»aaterxal suoctance ~ and tide is 
Ggd. But this iual;es the difference between believing ir. God and not
believing hi him, a difference between vii Cxi/ Juij n»oro reasonable and vixat 
is less so* but belief in God is not a reason nor an explanation of any
kind.
io horo o l » * V  Jtoamei i * »  oI creation as it i .  found 
in ?lato (see »  end we have tried to show that for hta Croatia,
is a religious idea, re is not m  idea »idol, can bo regarded aa a re su lt 
arrived at *  iidloso..hicel argument and proof. If tias^ecy ia  possiM o, 
and a n te  thought it was, there is no indepe-dent proof that there ia 
blasphw. For religious belief to deny that God created the world U  
liasphcsy, you are aeuyir.,, aot v4,at ̂  ^  prOT£d-
if you deny ’.hat you have proved this is not hlasphaay, but a c o n tra d ic t!« . 
I f  a religious believer saya, ’I cannot deny that God created the world,
I d « 't  believe that i t  is  the «su it of chance' (of. Sophist 2650 ff) then 
ho i s  3syinG that he cannot deny th a t lie believes. iHaspnosy la  denying 
vllsTone believes about God. I t  richt be ashed 'hhy is that so serious ?
barely denying vihat one belivee is not as serious as denying what one 
knows l * In the case of religious belief, denying chat one believe« is, 
because here axe does not possess knowledge, but only belief# There Is 
nothing but the belief to deny. And so not to believe is to blasphaae. 
That is why not to believe is such a serious matter. So Plato says; »e*x 
tiie contrary supposition, which cannot be spoken without blasphemy*, The 
contrary supposition, vixich is lack of belief, is blasphemy, If one 
t..e creation, then one is not denying something tixat has been mistakenly 
asserted. If cne denies it as a mistaken assertion, then this ia to 
misunderstand what one supposed one denies. If it were just a m t o m  of 
something that could be either mistakenly asserted or not, than it * m M  
not be a matter of blasphemy.
•0.91»»
The difference between iiato and Aristotle is also seen in their 
different vicv.c of morality. Aristotle’s view about morality raises 
questions that will not be discussed here, but we shall give some 
indication of the difference betvjeen his view aid Plato* s by discussing 
tv© saints of his ethics. These are;
, C \ C \  ■) /1. Aristotle’s discussion of the doc ratio paradox ouocij iK«ov/ end
2, Aristotle’s distinction between intellectual virtue and moral virtue.
It may be suggested that Aristotle’s discussion of Socrates's 
view in book 711 of ids btides shows that Aristotle recognised the 
importance of 5 tA in a discussion of this subject, whereas Socrates
did not; •«¿at Aristotle did so is to his credit, and we may reject Socrates's 
view because he fails to see this problem. Frau vhat we have already said 
about Socrates it should be clear that he did not deny that incontinence 
is possible on a matter of fact. If it were impossible then Socrates 
would liuve had nothing, to teach.
The real point at issue, as Aristotle sees the matter, is the 
suggestion that the **tf*y> acts through ignorance and Aristotle wants to 
understand diat tide ignorance is, his discussion of the 'practical 
syllogisu' lias tide end in view, but it i.s difficult to see how his 
discussion of this answers Socrates’s problem. Aristotle’s account of the 
ignorance that is involved iniK@if\A is that the does not realise
that.one or other of the promises of a practical syllogism applies to 
Ids action. He 3ceins to think that this solves the difficulty that arises 
and allows us to see that Socrates’ s statement of the problem is  mistaken. 
Aristotle, however, at the end of his discussion says that Socrates was 
right. This mî .t well be a case of Aristotle's thinking, as he often 
does, that a previous philosopher has correctly’' recognised a problem bub 
has failed to give an accurate solution, Aristotle, nevertheless, interprets 
Socrates' s problem in his own way, and attempts to solve that, but the way 
in which he interprets it makes his problem not the one which concerned 
Socrates. /hat we intend to show is that the interpretation Aristotle 
gives is not what Socrates meant when he said that a man who does evil does 
so in ignorance, For the ignorance that Socrates is speaking of here is 
not ignorance of a general premise that applies to a particular ease, bub 
ignorance of the evil Involved in an action.
The i jxorance of the evil that can be involved in an action seems 
to have been of a particular kind for Socrates, As we have attempted to  
show Socratic ignorance is primarily ignorance in the sense of not being 
able to understand the difference bctvrem good and evil, although knowledge 
that there is a difference is possible. For examples of such differences 
can be given. The distinction here between form and thing far Socrates, 
that is the distinction betv̂ en just acts and justice, is the distinction  
betvjeem a particular act where there is  a knom distinction between good 
and evil (or justice and injustice), and the fora, a knowledge o f which 
would be an understanding of the difference between justice and to justice.
The fact that Plato sometimes speaks of foras such as injustice becomes 
clearer if we look at the matter In this way. For knowing the fora of
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injustice would be understanding what injustice is, just as knowing the form 
of justice would be understanding what justice is *<¿0 tfOTo • It was 
this ioiowLeuge or understanding that Socrates denies we possessed. We 
can know that there is a difference between good and evil in particular 
instances, but we cannot know what that difference is in itself. It is 
this character of docrates's view that is lacking in Aristotle* Vie can 
see this, for instance, in his saying that the standard is the good 
man ana in his criticism of the fom of the Good. Aristotle rejects 
the unity of goodness which Plato's view asserts. what Plato refers to 
as tiie form of the Good, about which he says that we cannot gain perfect 
knowledge, is what Socrates said he was ignorant about. Aristotle, 
however, rejects the notion. It is neither an object of knowledge cr 
ignorance for him* He denies its existence. Socrates's position, 
however, is that he is ignorant of its existence. But that does not 
mean for him tiiat it does not exist and there can be no knoviLedge of 
it. Only that he does not possess it. Socrateafe position is that God 
knows, ana this is the view that we see influencing Plato's thought 
especially in the laws*
lie is concerned with a person not realizing that a particular action Is 
the one that should be done in a particular instance. It is not that what 
Aristotle says is canpietely mistaken, but that what he says does not 
answer Socrates's problem. Aristotle argues that there are two kthds of 
premise involved in the practical syllogism, ne says?
(114?al ff)
One main distinction that Aristotle is making here is between 
premises that are universal and ones that are particular. He thinks that 
it is possible to know the universal premises 'Dry food is beneficial to 
all awn* without knowing in a particular instance tiiat some particular 
food is dry. With regard to knowledge of the particular premise he 
that it is possible either to possess the knowledge and not exercise it, 
or to possess it end exercise it. A man may know that some particular food
fhe kind of igiorance that Aristotle discusses is different.
OlTOtos/j #AAio$
before him is dry and so good fat him* but he may not exercise his 
’Knowledge by eating it* This distinction between potential and actual 
knowledge is important here and Aristotle has already made the distinction 
(I1ijj6b31)* -lien, he says at the end of the passage quoted:
T£. TO^TOUg.......................SoiO f
repeating the point he has made earlier (1146b33)^* S ic/cret^ T o
X'iOVXA IfciV p-M 04(O£OU/T«. Si KdcV *0 &$yogou'STot « ^
8iC  d t i o r w  • Tou TO y q  W  S t iw v ,  5 A \ W  u  p h  e t v t u * .
At 1147 aS vital lie S£ffs W>ul T i. S-i| TOoTboj S*o(<rtL Tooj *»*•
he is referring to this frequent vdstincticn between, potential and actual
knowledge and not to the distinction he makes at 11A7al Wien he is referring 
to tiie two different kinds of premises* The distinction between potential 
and actual knowledge itself applies to both kinds of premise. It is ».*><« 
distinction that Aristotle uses in describing ordinary action* Knowledge 
must be actual if action is to take place. The difficulty -with Aristotle's 
view is tiiat he ifmiks the distinction between potential and actual 
knos'ledge can be applied equally to the universal premise and to the 
particular* out in the way in which ue applies it to the universal 
premise it cannot be applied to the particular* and as a matter of fact 
Aristotle docs not so apply it, even if he claims he does. For with 
regard to the universal premise the kind of tiling Aristotle has In 
in spooling of the difference between potential and actual kia-iedge is 
the difference between ¿■aioving seme tiling and not calling it to mind at 
Sumo particular time* aim ending io oo *.mm. .~>ut tnat kind or distinction 
is impossible with regard to what Aristotle calls the particular premise.
If an ossmple of such a premise is: * fills food before me is dry1 * then 
eider I ¡now this or I do not* The fact that it is impossible to 
distinguish between potential and actual knowledge in tiiis case as one can 
witu the universal premise* led aristotie to say that actual knowledge in 
this case is acting in accordaaco with what one knows« Jut that is. not 
knowledge but action*
«ut oven if there is tiiis difficulty in  Aristotle's account of
ordinary action* he realised that it would not account for incontinence, 
even though he seems to-suggest this when he says: 'Since there are two 
kinds of premises* there is nodding to prevent a man's having both uremiaes 
and acting against ids knomiedge* provided that he is using only the
universal premise and not the particular,' he goes on to say; ^Ti "To 
eytlV T W  ^AAoV T̂ C-CfOV vT«Ov vOv/ Q&4v/TiOV
¿ L w  T.% w  n
Si *fc0 l\w  H  iXt,v,7,,us
Kd' TO'/ K<x tcytoc vwo Udivo^ivov' k *l  oiVwjA/tvoV,
U W *  cmJtio SiAti^iVTOw yt iv Toî  lû eyiv'i|yrts.(ti47a10)
This is a different fona of ignorance in vdiicli »the fact tiiat men m e  the
language tiiat Hot© from loiovledge proves noticing* * and the knowledge tiiat 
is the opposite of this kind of ignorance must become part of oneself 
and this takes time.' If tiiis Idnd of ignorance cannot be f - v p i Xn 
terns of the distinction between potential and actual knouLedgu that applies 
to orindary action, how is it to be euqdaincd V Aristotle compares it to
madness and dmikenness, and suggests that in order to understand how such
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ignorance can be dissolved we suet go to the ^u<r (o oc •
Incontinence is a matter of particular passions, and disregard for the 
universal which states vhat ought to be done.
.Whatever we say about the details of Aristotle's account of 
incontinence (and the above is not a complete account) vhat he atteapts 
to do is to give a description of it* He is most concerned with how 
incontinence is possible. But that did not concern Socrates, He was not 
interested so much in a physiological description of incontinence, but 
in trying to understand how it can be overcame, it could only be overeen« 
he thought by following the good and not the evil* What Aristotle says 
about incontinence certainly does not help us to overcome it* His 
position is that the difference between an incontinent and imprudent man 
and one who is continent and prudent is that the latter not only knows 
vhat is right but also does it, whereas the fanner only knows vhat is 
right and does not do it. But that does not help us to understand how 
one can be continent instead of incontinent* Socrates's problem, an 
the other hand, is not whether we can give a description of incontinence 
which describes how it occurs but vhether we can understand something 
about it which will enable us to do something about it. Aristotle »-»n« 
usj »We become good by doing good deeds',  but this is small comfort if 
we are ignorant of why v» do evil and are unable to do vhat is good* it 
is our ignoronoe here that Socrates stresses.
The distinction that Aristotle makes between lnteUeetuáL 
and moral virtue is central to the account that he gives in the Nicomachean 
Ethics* This distinction is partly connected with vhat lie says in the 
last book about the relationship that huaan beings can have with God. For 
it is the possession of intellectual virtue that makes possible the 
relationship that Aristotle thinks thaw is between men and God* He 
placed moral virtue below the intellectual kind* It is this distinction 
of Aristotle's that makes his view of morality strikingly different from 
Plato's* This distinction is not to be found in Plato and Its absence 
there makes Plato's view of the relation between morality and religion of 
a particular kind, Aristotle's view does not raise the kind of problems 
about the relation between morality end religion that Plato's does* He 
places little emphasis upen the moral conflict vhich is connected with s 
religious view of morality. Our discussion of Aristotle* s view of 
incontinence has shewn that he treats this very much as a conflict between 
the intellectual and morel parts of the soul, between \t>yc$ « d x i u O ^ i  and 
his account of the matter is almost purely descriptive* His that 
in order to find out how the incontinent man loses his ignóranos, we should 
consult the ̂ onoAoyoi , is in sharp contrast to Plato's ides of the matter. 
That for Plato was peart of the In huaan life vhich he thougit
only be overeóme by 'knowing the gods rightly and living accordingly.'
Aristotle distinguishes between intellectual and moral virtue at 
the end of Book I and at the beglnningof book U  of hie Ethics. He ssyst
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The question that this passage raises is: 1 doesn't the 
attainment of moral virtue take time and experience V • Aristotle 
suggests that it is just a matter of habit, meaning by this, that 
it is doing the same thing over and over again* But, of course, there 
can be bad habits as v<reU as good ones, and the problem is how to 
distinguish between those* Later, however, in book V1 he does something 
to alter this first impression when he distinguishes between two 
of moral virtue* Kbc&tTTtC 2 nc too So|ettTT(vcoO 8 0 0
S i , v < w  * i
^.T-v."4 u<r,*ci) T o  5 ^  Kue^-j **“  •CoxX'O^-v, “ £ “  «u
'¡N ir& .i. Svcu ^£pvi!jT£ioj.
Aristotle* s discussion in book V1, chapter 13 does show 
that he is unhappy about the broad distinction that he has 
earlier (1103a4 ff)* In fact what he says later seems to do away with 
the distinction*
This is only an indication of the difficulty of the questions
OTC r *v J ~  w — 'I- -A --------; *  ,7. -
-i} |a©1£ t*6\/$Vj ett «vfu j  v&iA'cj tAcygv,
(11Ub 17), he overlooks the point of Socrates’s paradox that virtue
is one thing* For the problem here is about the unity of vlrtuie as
knowledge, not how different virtues are j?£o v(jor£<s (St t-okl̂ V vĵ
¿t>Y Aoyouj T^s # iT 0  c 've*L M ktt^ î s y^e £?vaa (t1,)<|Kg^ l
When Aristotle sayst ^Ac\f 0^ /  Tu>J 2 tc ^
o?0V Ti b'foL&'b'J $Vbix, ofvio <l>epvy?tu»f > © u $ a  «Tv/̂ o
T-»js ̂ OiK'iJs ¿£,iT*|s .(1 1 AAb30) he is still making a distinction between 
^  <2gtT»| and v'O'VjTiK'pj' »moh
is foreiga to Socrates’s thought on the matter* The •*««> t.h*W£ ̂  ̂  
said about his remark a little later* $  jkx* y«i£
K l?  S ^ e X 0 0tfvi1 TwoucGcrffc^diitei ietwil) i5-aie Jouoiv^. ( H 45a2 ),
The main point about Socrates*s view here is (to use Aristotle’s language) 
that you cannot distinguish between ¿gir^ and , && Aristotle
thinks there is a difference and he seems to betray the divergence wVnmm  
his view and Socrates’s when he says: 5-ijAc V S t , v&V i f  w.̂ »
8 t(. Snrf To TeJifc6e(c»«3e^V£?*(6ilt
(114$a2) He refers to the intellectual part of hisaan nature when he says
S w  Too t*qg,ico dv&tc
as if one could know what being prudent is without being #0*
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Aristotle thinks that it is neeesaaxy to make this distinction
between and ¿eiT'vj (i.e, i»j ) because the
first deals with vSt ne«̂  T° TtA®i and the latter with t o T£A.o$ # t m « 
distinction between things that relate to the aid and the end itself would 
for Socrates not make sense in considering what virtue Is* For as we have 
tried to show, what Socrates was concerned about was 1 being good as 
distinct frcm »doing good', and if the end is »being good* then there is 
no distinction between t* to t*a©£ and to * There is then no 
means of being good apart from being good and that is the end itself* That 
Is what Socrates meant when he said that knowing what virtue is is being 
virtuous. Aristotle fails to see this. When he says: «vie become good 
by doing good things* he fails to see the distinction between »being good* 
and doing good* * It is his failure to see this distinction that 
him to the view that he puts forward in the last book of the Ethics,
Someone might object to this distinction, and say that one 
cannot completely distinguish between the two* In that case it is 
necessary to point to the difference that there is between the possibility 
of doing good and possibility of being good. For it is possible to be good 
without doing good, and it is possible to do good without being good. If 
a person is good, then it is who is good* If a person does good, his 
actions may be ones that he considers to be so, although he knows that they 
are not dene with a good heart. The actions do not flow from his goodness* 
They ere not a direct result of goodness* It is impossible to do away with 
a distinction of this kind* To distinguish between prudence as an 
intellectual virtue and moral virtue, as Aristotle does, does not help to
understand this distinction*
Aristotle failed then to understand what Socrates was saying, 
Socrates's view, like Plato's, was a religious one. It sees a dose 
relationship between human virtue and God, Aristotle, however, thinks of 
virtue in a two-fold way as intellectual and moral, and from what he aaya 
in Book X it is dear that it is the former of these that for him connects 
human life with God and not the latter) he reams rather to ridicule the 
idea that God could have anything to do with moral virtue, it is the H fy 
that is in accordance with reason that is most loved by God*
It is not clear what exactly Aristotle means by
He thinks that this is a life in accordance with the hipest form of virtue* 
One characteristic that makes the highest virtue for Aristotle is its 
self sufficiency* <ro^0£ K pU - KA0 1 otS TCW V SvJvfcUbll
1177a33) is its own end, but all practical activites have some­
thing else in view* The best life is one of philoeophicd contemplation 
which gains its ewi end through the exercise of /0O5 * it la only throu^i 
the exercise of vofc that the beet kind of life is achieved.
Whet makes this highest fore of hum» life possible is what
E p S r j & ' J i WS&ise 1z s > A
KoIl  ̂Khti& Too 10V pioj rav fiîv J
(1177b28) It is seme thing divine and not human that makes this beet kind
of life possible. Aristotle only succeeds in showing us what he considers
to be the hipest kind of human virtue by making it something divine and
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not human* The read difficulties of human life seem to be overcome here 
only because they are not treated as human* What both Socrates and Plato 
were concerned with, however, was ¿ e f r f  and h w  that
is possible is not understood by shelving the problem as Aristotle does*
For Aristotle1 s answer to the question of how human virtue is to be gained 
is to say that it is gained not as hvmm virtue but as something ©t.?o£ #
The difficulty in trying to understand what Aristotle means by intellectual 
virtue as the highest form of human virtue Is that it is not really huaaa
virtue*
TKift view is a sharp contrast with Plato's* Hie problem is how 
the hmwr, soul achieves the virtue that is proper to it. Be thought the 
achievement is attended by serious difficulties and obstacles. But he 
does think that it is &£i& virtue that is achieved, if it la achieved*
The life of the human soul is determined by the choices it makes* Its 
life is its choices - how it chooses to live} and that is not Jest an 
intellectual life* It includes the life of what Aristotle calls to # A t> y tv
the life of 2 fU&uj4,&. as well as of •
It is this difference vhich leads us to see how Plato's view of
morality is religious i^ a way that Aristotle's is not* For Aristotle the 
life** is • A life in accordance with reason fulfils,
the highest needs of man* And Aristotle does not doubt for one moment 
that it is self »sufficient* That gives to human life a perfection of its
owi even if Aristotle does cell it , But Plato did not thirds: that
huuan life is seif «sufficient* It is its iaperfecticn that raises his
problems, and his view of that was that it could not be overetne apart 
from the help of the gods. For Aristotle huaan life can possess Its am  
divine nature in the exercise of vcu£ » It Is self«eufficient and in no 
need of divine help. Aristotle's view of the relation between vhat is 
human and divine is that that is human possesses for itself what is divine. 
Although Plato thinks that the human soul is divine in origin, hie view of 
the soul's destiny and divine Jud@nent makes its nature different from that 
of God* Y'iyshjXM. ¿ v 0£U>tiio , The gods are above
us and will always remain our Judges*
The difference between Plato and Aristotle here ie greet* The
difference may be stated by saying that Aristotle thinks that it is possible 
for a person to be *s only as a result of the cultivation of a
natural ability * that is the cultivation of v©u£ . For Aristotle 
ia,ro doubt, something which 8 «* T,vUS
(1179b22)i The achievement of the «¿host farm of virtue is dependent on 
good fortune, and even then it is not something human bub divine.
A iitlitoiO  TOV VoGv ^¿VOV ©  ¿TlLl<5\l{v,o«_ VfcA. 0£»ov ttvfetc pivaV
(De Generations Animalism 736b20>* This seems to suggest that is 
properly something external to husan life, • a divine dement in human 
life *hlch is not part of human nature Itself* fc/oo/ is ©¿»av tc 
t w  (t17 7b26), and it may well have been this idea that 
influenced the Stoics* If the hipest kind of human virtue Is 
it will be achieved as a result of the possession of something timt ls€fc7c$.
i î i i i i H i j i l i i l l i ' i i
1 1 ! I|S l í í  i !.i
' I I I  !< I<*
¡!¡i l ' 1’
s»â5Æl s i l s i l
I i ! 5-  f  ?
i : ! 1 *  l i
¿, 1 1 4 1 lii' I *
l  ¡ i
*  8 * 1 f 5 * 4 « *
i i?ilîlililllll! iiSiif
i i j i ia i r  Ï I ^ 1 1 l î îl | J ,  t  * ¿  f  1 1  |  I
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tentative and often cnly illustrative,, For Aristotle the problems 
of 4f * ¿¿0  **&&>%*+»■ f W i f i i  (tfSlb23) can be answered
apart from religion, ¿\r Plato they cannot.
The difference between the two views does, however, raise the 
questions «What does religion ¡provide for men which is not provided in 
any other way ? * FLato thought that it enables a person to know the gods 
and live in accordance with that knov&edge, but be does not seem to have 
thought * possible to possess that kind of knowledge apart from a religious 
life. The loiowLedge is in the life itself. What he denies is that an 
understanding of religion is possible apart fro® living a religious life.
So there io no answer to the question of vfcat religion provides for men 
which is not provided in any other way, apart from a religious life.
But can't people think about God and not live a religious life ? 
Many questions may arise in one's mind about God, Is he perfectly just ?
Hie question can be of the fora* Goes he really have that nature ? How can it 
be shorn that he does ? That seems to be the way in which questions about 
God arose for Aristotle, But they are only questions about God, and they 
exercise the attention of philosophers. But religion is not thinking 
about Godj it is knowing God in that kind of life that only he can maw*, 
possible for men. This was more like Plato's view. If one thinks about 
God in the way that Aristotle did then What seems to be at stake are 
questions about God's nature. But for religion those questions cannot 
arise} they are already decided. Aristotle was concerned with what God 
is, rather than with what relationship is possible between men and God,
This is true of what he says about God in the Metaphysics, When he 
deals with human nature, it is just that that interests him. He is not 
concerned with the kind of relationship there can be between men and God.
Does this exaggerate the difference betwsen the two views ? 0M  
not Plato too see in the exercise of the highest achievement of kuaan 
beings and tide i3 0<i \c>t*.to£ . (limaeue 90)« But there is the difference 
we have mentioned. For Aristotle it is that is central. This is Q c ^  
It is divine in nature - divine t&d tov . Aristotle says it oases 
O i i e * b e c a u s e  for him its nature is divine not human. That 
human life a temporal union of something divine and something human. But 
because the divine element is present of Itself in human life, that makes 
unnecessary any need for any kind of dependence of vhat is human on v$at 
is divine. For the human already possesses it, (Aristotle's view might 
be compared to certain Gnostic views about the nature of Jesus), The 
that human life is a struggle between good and evil in which divine 
assistance is needed to overcome is absent from Aristotle,
Aristotle's view might be compared to Plato's in the Phaedo,
There Plato thinks of human life as made up of two dements different in 
nature * the sod. and the body, and the life of the soul, so far as it is 
related to that is divine, is thou#tof Xoyicyi/j # Sams of the 
be says make it lode as if only to Aoyux-rucoV is immortal. But even 
then Plato does not say that it is divine, but only skin to the divine.
What he eape later in the nyth makes it clear that Plato is concerned in 
general with the immortality of end not just of Vo 3^ , and that
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means that he is concerned vdth the relation of human life qua human 
life dth vhat is divine* Plato *s distinction is between the hrnaan
body and the human soul, toil© Aristotle's is between the human body
and human soul and that part of the human soul which is not really 
human at all, but @^<>5 .
Plato* s view is bound to raise mere serious difficulties than 
Aristotle* s, and they are difficulties that are concerned with & religious 
view whereas Aristotle*s is not. In fact Aristotle only answers Plato's 
problem about immortality by rejecting it* vhy are they questions of a 
religious kind t The anssnr to this question is not easy to give* The 
reason seems to be that for Plato the human soul is not @i.?0£ • God's 
nature is different from human nature, and so if human beings are to 
share in the life of the gods it cannot be as their equals* Aristotle, 
however, seems to think that only if human beings share the «*»»» nature 
with God can there be eny kind of relation between them* But if 
beings possess of their own nature something. ©*$©$ , then religion is
not possible* For that depends on God’s bein^, m Plato describes him in 
the law©, tykk>/b£u> tt0S * It is difficult to imagine Aristotle's God 
being that*
When Plato describes the life of the human soul in the Phaedrus 
myth and seys that it is ?£<«>$ that characterises its life, this is 
to show that the life of a human soul must be dependent on that of other 
human souls and an the gods* This is very different £tm Aristotle's view 
of the ¿mpXtau. of the intellectual part of the human soul. Its nature 
as dt-Tos makes it independent of others* The kind of love too that 
Aristotle seems to have in mind when he says that God moves everything 
to$ seems to be different from Plato's notion of the matter. Per
Aristotle this is the achievement of form and as applied to the
intellectual part of the human soul, he sees» to think that fcM« achievement 
cn the part of one person is independent of others* Aristotle thinly 
that part of the human soul which is is always , it is that
part which alone is immortal (De Anisia 43Ga24)* It almost looks as if it 
is an alien element in human life • not part of human life itself, 2a 80 
far as it is Ofc?o$ it does not change, though human life 
as he puts it, in so far as it is ruled by that part* But it is 
that part is divine that Aristotle thinks of the development of the human 
soul as more an individual ecnccra. He doee not think ae Plato does that 
it is very much dependent upon the kind of relationship that exists between 
human beings*
For Plato the relationships that can exist between human beings 
can be an image of a huaan being's naUOon with what is divine* This n-m a 
to be the point of his saying in the Phaedrus mytbtoat a lover seeks out a 
beloved in vfccm he oan recognise the gpd he fallows. The relationship between 
the two than beocme# an image of the relation between the lover and his 
god* This is an important idea in Plato* It is the save he has 
in mind in the ham toen he says that it is in a cameo life voder the laws 
that human bslngs can follow toe life of toe gods* This makes Plata's
view very different from Aristotle's because it means for him that the
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ad.icvci.xrw of immortality, that is the establishment of a relationship 
bebxxevi human beings cad the cods, depends upon the kind, of relationship 
the* exists betwean huaan beings themselves. There has to be some kind 
of ancon life* A lucan being must recognise his am  limitations and 
sec tk-vt makes it necessary :%p hi.-, to enter into relationships
of love with people, for Aristotle, however, a human being becomes 
Qlofyfklii'vxTos in E3 "s he cultivates To tv f*.iv & U O V  , 
and that is an individual natter* A human being can become this aLcne,
But the !:ir.d of view that Plato holds does raise serious question» 
about the general relationship between philosophy and religion, For in 
Plato :-b  find philosophy sad religion co closely connected that it is 
difficult to distinguish between the two, The question may be asked whethsir 
such a position is the correct one or rot. But that question is based on
a mismderstaiiiing of !.lat piiilosophy is* If v/e soy that iloto's 
philosophy is religious, than do not mesn that Plato has shown that 
philosophy shows the truth of religion, and so hic philosophy is correct, 
viisreas ¿unstable* s is not because he docs not chav its truth. Far the 
philosophy is different too* Plato's is religious; Aristotle's is 
not. Gar. we say that philosophy as philosophy is able to cake judgamts ' 
about religion idiieh have significance independently of religion ? That 
is, they have philosophical significance, but not a rcligicuo me. If 
there are to be judgments about religion, then they carnot be devoid of 
religious si3 1ificar.ce unless they arc judgnents to the effect that religicn 
is impossible, But then they arc not judgments about rcli;lon, because them» 
is no such tiling. If they are to have religious significance, then religten 
is presupposed. Otherwise, as far as religion is concerned,they are 
ixaningLeus; but they arc also meaningless as far as philosophy is concerned. 
Plato1 s view is an eaasaple of a view which does accept vint lx may 
tl>e reality of xxligionj Aristotle*c does net.
The same point can be put in another way if we say that in 
religion there is no uiderstandiry; of religion apart from the religious 
belief itself. The ;uaderstar.ding is the religion; or -you right say the 
underotonding is then religious.
Aristotle's philosophy contains a view about the nature of God, 
Doesn't that make it religious ’■ Dut tils is only true if xb a&ke no 
distinction between the meanings of religious, nan-religious and irreligious 
According to tills classification Plato* s view will still bo celled 
religious, but will that mean that Aristotle's view is irreligious ? It 
might rather be called non-religious, and perhaps Aristotle xvodLd have 
described it in this way# with certain reservations, dub he could hardly 
have wanted to say that his view of God end the soul were religious.
Aristotle is only concerned with the nature of the soul and of God as 
independent aitities, and not with the kind of relationship between the 
soul and God that makes religion vhat it is, Aristotle's view about 
religion is clearly stated in the Metaphysics; 'Our forefather8 in 
the most remote ages have handed dam to their posterity a tradition 
in the form of a myth, that these bodies are gods and that the divine 
encloses the vfcole of nature. The rest of the tradition has been 
added later in mythical fo»a with « view to the persuasion of the multitude
and to its legal end utilitarian expediency.* Aristotle is only prepared 
to accept as much of religion as agrees with his own views about the 
nature of the universe. There is little idea of the kind of human needs 
that religion serves* But for Plato *the service of the laws is the 
service of the gods*. Plato could hardly have agreed with Aristotle's 
view of religion* But if Aristotle would have regarded his view as 
non-religious, for Plato it would have been irreligious* It is often said 
that Aristotle* s view of God is impersonal and the sense in which Plato 
says in the haws (?16C> that human beings must became followers of God 
probably made little sense for Aristotle* The way in which Plato meant 
this led him to stress the importance of the practice of religion, and so 
for him religious worship is central* If there is a view of providence 
in chapter X of book A *  of the Betaphysi<P then it is impersonal compared 
with Plato's view as that is stated in the Lav®. Aristotle wjuLd have 
understood a n m  -religious view of life. His view is largely that*
Plato*s view, however, is that a ncn-raltgiOTis view is impossible* Che*s 
view is either religious or irreligious. We find in Plato, for instance, 
abhorrence of termLe robbery and this is the first crime that he deal« 
with in establishing lav®* ‘S\e worst fora of crime Is crime against 
the dwelling places of the gods* And that can only be the worst tons of 
crime for someone for Whoa religion is first. The gods demand the first 
allegiance of hraan beings, then their ovn souls,, and lastly their material 
welfare. Such a view of religion makes It ±s$>ossible to think of 
philosophical thinking about it as something Independent of it* If 
religion is that, then it cannot just be an object of enquiry. For that 
is then the way to live, and any thinking about it is regarded as -art of 
that way of life itself. Bat more than that. For Plato it is a mistake 
to think that thinking about it will lead one to a perfect understanding 
apart from the life itself. Perfect understanding is in cny ease impossible 
for haaen beings# 'Whatever understanding is possible comes In living a 
religious life#
Plato* s view accepts the reality of religion* His thoughts 
about the soul and God are what he thinks than to be. Butt heaps 'thinks* 
does not mean ♦suppose* * But for Aristotle religion is mainly a matter 
of supposition. If we ask what, accepting the reality of religion is, 
then it is not something v&ich depends on proof, but it is something v*iich 
decides one* s way of life.
203
1IBL10QB1PHT
Adas, J, Edition of P lrto's Republic, (2 v o ls.) Canbrldge, 1926-9*- '-Ssp
Edition of P lato's Protagoras, 2nd, Edition Cambridge 1921. 
Religious Teachers o f Greece, Edinburgh, 1908*
Ike V itality of PUtonire, Cambridge, 19U .
AUjfr ^,-t, Edition o f Republic Book I , Second Edition, 1944*
Mrntnmm. s t . Thomas. In duedeein lih res metaphyeiconni A ristotelis expoeitle,
edited by R.H. S p iau i, M arietti, 1950.
Coaasntiuy on A ristotle's Do Aniaa, translated by K. tester  
and S. Humphries, London, 1951*
Sumas Contra Gen t ile s , tendon 1924-29*
Irchar-Hlnd. R. p. Edition of Plsto'o Uaaoue. London, 1888 
Buraet. J. Early Grade Philos© r'hy, Third Edition, London, 1920.
Greefc Philosephyi Thaïes to Plate, London, 1914,
Edition o f Plate»e Fhnodo, Oxford, 1937.
The Secretie Doctrine of the Seul, Proc. Brit, leed. 1915-16«
R.G. Edition of Plato »s Philebao, Cambridge, 1897*
PUte'o terra, (2 rolo«) (teeb eeriee), tendon, 1952.
Plato's Timaeug, Critias, Cleitopbon, Keaexento, Epistlea,
(teeb series), 1952.
Goraford. P,M. Plate*s Cosaology, tendon 1948,
Plate *e Theory of Ksovledge, London 1935.
Pinto and Pareenides, tendon 1939*
Priaetpiua Sapientiao, Cambridge, 1952*
Translation of Plate'a Republie, Oxford, 1941.
Before and ifter Socrates, Cambridge, 1932.
The Dhvritten Fhiloeophy and ether Essaya, Cambridge, 1951, 
Mathematies and ttUlectie in tho Republie, VI- VU (l and H), 
in Miad rel, JEU (1932), pp. 57ff* and 173ff.
Sdahill. 8.M. Translation of IrLatotle's Categories, Oxford, 1928.
Transittioa o f A ristotle's te  Mot« «ad te Ineoesa
Aainallua, Oxford, 1912.
Fostaxiero. A.J. ConteapUtioa et Vie Conteaplative solea Platea, Paria, 1950, 
tester , g,B. Christian Theology and Modo» Scioaoo o f tetero , tend
vo l. XUV (1935), PP* 439-466 and v o l, XLV (1936), pp,
1-27.
¿jpyAflft. M i Plato's Buthyphre, Apology, Crlte, Phaedo, Phaedsuo,
(Loeb oorloe), 1947.
Plato's Theaetetes and Sophist, (teob serios), 1952*
Plato's Statesman «nd Fhilehns,(teob se r ie s),1952.
A listo ry  of Greece, vol. VU, tendon, 1904*
Flato 'o Tkoufht, testen , 1935.
The Death e f Secretee, translated hy B. W ritten, London, 1948.
OlftrU. W.S.C. Ike develepnent ef Aristotle's theology la Class. Quart. vol. 
XXVII (1955) PP 162-171» and vol. XXVIII (1954) pp 90-98.
9 m  Greeks and their Geds, Leaden 1950.
Sfe^forth. B. Plate's Bxaminstion ef pleasure, Caskridge, 1945«
Edition of Plato's Phaede, Cantridge, 1955.
Moral Evil and Ignorance in Plate's Ethics, Clar-s, Quart.
vol. XL ( 1946) pp U 8ff.
Plate's theisa, Class. Quart, vol. XXX (1956) pp 4.9. 







Prslegoaena to tho ef Greek Religion, ttird Editlea,
Cenkrldgo, 1922.
Aristotle's Oa the Soul, Parra Katuralia, Oa Breatk,
(Leek series), 1957.
Edltiea ef Aristotle's De Anina, Caakridge, 1907.
Psideiat Ike Ideala ef Greek Cal tare, traas. ky G. Hifket, 
Oxford! 5 role. 1959, 1944, 1945.
Ikeolegy ef ike early Greek Pkilosephers, Gifford Lectures 
for 1956, trsns. ky £.8. Bekineen, Oxford, 1947.
Arietetlei Ike Fundamentals of kia Derelopaent, Seeead 
Edition, 1948.
Traaslatiea ef Aristotle's Ds Geawetioae at Cerraptieae, 
Oxford, 1922.
Edition ef Aristotle's Be Generations at Corruptions, 
Oxford, 1922»
Sesei sur lee rapports sntre la peases greeque et la 
peases dkretieane, Paris , 1955.
Essays in Aaeleat sad Medsra Pkilosepky, Oxford,1955. 
Knowledge sad tke Good la Plate's BepukUe, Oxford, 194$. 





pkilssophlcal Fragments or A Fragment ef Philosepky,
Prince tea, 1956.
Concluding Gkecieatifie Postscript, Oxford, 1941.
Sickness ante Death, Prises ton, 1941.
Ike Interpretation ef Plato's Hepuklle, Oxford, 1951.
Plate's lysis, Symposium, Gergias, (Look series), 1955.
Plato's Laches, Protagoras, Mane, Eatkydesus, (Leek series), 
1952.
A Histoiy ef Greek Religion, trass, ky P.J. fisldea, (Seeond 
Bditiea), Oxford, 1949.
fraaslatioa of Aristotle's Be Partikue Aaiaaliua, Oxford, 1912 
The Place of tke Haaeus in Plato*» Dialogues, in Class.
Quart, a. b. vol. H I  (1955), PP 79ff.
Ike Doctrine of Being la tke Aristotelian Metaphysics, Tkroate 
1957.
Is is s u it





Plat* and Platonism, London* 1920*
Aristotle's (ienerstioa of Animals, (leeh series), 1953*
Translation of Arlrtotle's De Generttieae Anisaliia, Oxford, 1912, 
Aristotle's Sicomachean Ethics* (Leeh series), 1956*
'Sun, Divided line* and Cove, in anas* Quart. n.s. H I (1953) ,
pp 22 ft.
The Eesence of Plato's Philosophy, trees by A. Alios, London, 1933, 
Psyche* London, 1925*
Edition «vf Aristotle's Metaphysics* (2 vole*), Oxford, 1924.
Edition of Aristotle's Physios, Oxford, 1936*
Translation of Aristotle's Hietnaeheaa Ethics, Oxford, 1915* 
Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics, Oxford, Second E m pire, 
1928.
Plate's Theory of Ideas, Oxford, 1951.
Aristotle, London, 1937*
Select Fragments of Aristotle, Oxford, 1932.
Plate's Bepublie, (2 v©ls.),(Loeb eerlee), 1953.
The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues, Cambridge, I 942. 
Plato's Statesman* London* 1952.
The Discovery of the Mind* trans, by f.G. Roremeyer, Oxford* 
Blackwell* 1953.
Plato's Theology, Ithaca, E.T.* 1942.
Plate's Method of Dialectic, trass, by D.J. Ulan* Oxford* 1940.
The Mythe of Plate, London* 1905.
Translation of Aristotle's De Anina, Oxford* 1931.
A Cenaaataxy on Plato's Tinaeus, Oxford* 1928.
Platet the Man and his boric, (Third Edition), London* 1929,
Secretes* London* 1932.
Translation of Plate's Philebue and Epineais* edited hy 
JU ELihaasky* London* 1956.
Translation of Plate's Laws* London* 1934.-> iThe Analysis of i* plats'e Seventh Epistle, in
▼el. xxi (1912) pp 347 ff.
The 'Pelytheisn' of Plate* an Apclegia, in Mind eel. 2LYIl(l938) 
pp. 180-199, and Cemfoxd'a reply ibid, pp 32L-330.
Varia Secratica, 19U.
Aristotle* London* 1943.
Does Oed ExistiT * Leaden* 1947.
. «*• Sophietn, trans. by K. Preen an, Oxford* Blackwell* 1954.
The Disorderly Motion in the Tiaeiee* in dnee. Quart.
x a i n  (1939) ,  pp 7 1  f f .
Eternal Life, Edinburgh* 1912.
Intimations of Christianity among the Aneient Creeks* T^ndits T 
1957.
Wicksteodj. & Aristotle's Physics, (2 vole.) (Loeb series), London, I955. 
F,Mf
Tractatue Logice-Fhilosophicus, London, 1922.
Memo rabillo, Apology, Syoposita, Everyman's Library. 
Socrates and the Socratic Schools, London, 1885.
